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ABSTRACT 
It is contended that space can act as a metaphor for social relationships. The 
thesis draws on schema theory from cognitive psychology to explain how the 
affective qualities of social stimuli serve to bias the 'cognitive maps' of individuals. 
Supporting evidence is cited from the fields of cognitive, social, environmental and 
neuro-psychology. 
The metaphor is tested experimentally from a micro-spatial level (e. g. spatial 
locations of characters in a photograph) up to a macro-spatial level (spatial 
locations of towns). The affective valence of the stimuli used were either a priori 
based (e. g. homes of people already known to the subject, perceived religious 
predominance of towns in a sectarian setting) or influenced by the experimenter 
(e. g. captions purporting to inform representations of social scenes in photographs 
derived from newspapers and magazines). 
Distortion of perceived distances (between subject and stimuli and between stimuli) 
form the dependent variable in each experiment. 
Results in all experiments indicated a strong tendency for the valence of stimuli to 
bias people in their distance estimations. Relative overestimation of distance was 
observed for stimuli perceived to be negatively valenced and the reverse for those 
stimuli perceived to be positively valenced. In a final experiment, distance 
estimations were examined between a variety of human figures photographed in 
'real-world' social encounters. The results were in line with Social Identity Theory, 
with overestimation observed between groups and underestimation within groups. 
Results throughout are interpreted in relation to the 'socio-spatial schema' 
metaphor. 
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CHAPTER 1: General Introduction 
The ubiquity of the cognitive approach to so many issues in psychology has, until 
recently, obscured the importance and pervasiveness of affect in relation to 
behaviour. The idea that affect is integral to mental states is not, of course, a new 
one as will be discussed later. However the " cognitive revolution" in psychology 
(Sperry, 1993), with its implicit acceptance of the Cartesian model has, for some 
time now, distracted attention from the affective and the 'bodily' in their roles as 
mediators of cognitive events. 
The purpose of this thesis is to establish a correspondence between thought and 
feeling. Specifically it hopes to establish an isomorphism of spatial perception with 
the affective nature of the accompanying social knowledge. This concept of "socio- 
spatial isomorphism" was first contrived by Lee (1976) and the study which 
spawned it is detailed below. The theoretical framework on which the concept rests 
is a venerable one in the cognitive literature and one which still retains 
considerable explanatory power: the schema. 
The variable of particular interest will be that of distance. It is hypothesized that an 
individual will perceive spatial separation according to the biasing influence of the 
social schemata instigated at that time. This influence will manifest itself as 
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foreshortening, in the case of positively valenced stimuli, and -distancing, in the 
case of negatively valenced stimuli. At the risk of oversimplifying the hypothesis, 
one might say that close friends are perceived as closer than in reality and 
enemies perceived as more distant than they really are. 
What is the evidence for this correspondence between the social, with its 
attendant affective valences, and the spatial? This chapter will examine the 
experiments and studies in the literature that offer support most directly. Towards 
the close of the chapter there is an outline of the succeeding review chapters 
which will offer a critical consideration of the underlying theories. 
On October 22nd, 1968, Richard Crossman arrived late at a Cabinet Meeting to 
find that seating arrangements had not been changed to take account of the 
"shuffle" that had taken place that same month. 
"... I found myself sitting at the far end of the table up amongst the Cabinet 
Secretariat. It made me realize how difficult it is for a Minister at the end of 
the table on the same side as the P. M. to get an oar in. In Cabinet, the talk 
goes on between the P. M. and the Chancellor on the one side and between 
the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Defense Secretary on 
the other. Those in the middle talk to each other and those at the ends of the 
table have to shout to be heard. There I was, up beyond Burke Trend, where 
I used to sit as Minister of Housing and where Roy Mason sits today. Quite 
an interesting experience. I had to lean right back to catch Harold's eye 
behind people's heads before I could get in. " 
(Crossman, 1977, vol. III, p231) 
Any cabinet minister, past or present, will confirm the 'centrality hypothesis'. Those 
ministers closest to the centre of table at a cabinet meeting (i. e. closest to the 
Prime Minister) tend to have 'the ear of the P. M. and hold greater influence and 
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status when compared to those ministers more spatially' remote. The ' above 
quotation serves to underline the importance of spatiality in social relations. " It 
further suggests that social position relates to spatial position not only for a given 
individual but that this relationship has mutual recognition at least, if not 
agreement, amongst other group members. Such recognition need not' be 
consciously expressed. 
As will be argued in Chapter 5, social schemata select,, interpret and store 
information, often in a hierarchical format. They establish a normative basis for 
evaluation of social information and very often lead to characteristic errors being 
made by the social perceiver. Given the all pervasive influence of schemata, it is 
surprising that one important implication of their preponderance has never to date 
been directly explored. This implication forms the theoretical bedrock of the 
present thesis. I 
Of considerable interest and yet infrequently touched on in the literature is how 
space and social structures directly relate to each other. Specifically, one might 
wonder if space has not in some way become a psychological metaphor for 
prevailing social orders and social relationships. Is there any a priori evidence for 
using space as a metaphor for social structures? 
Anecdotal evidence, at least, is plentiful. One can see that society often formalizes 
its structures and pecking orders on spatial terms and a variety of examples exists. 
An immediately obvious one is that of the courtroom configuration. In this setting, 
the judge is seated highest in court, occupies a central position to the proceedings 
and is 'protected' from contact with barristers and officials by the bar; the prisoner 
sits directly opposite the judge in the "dock" so the judge can directly monitor the 
prisoner's responses and so on. The spatial arrangement of roles in the courtroom 
is formally and precisely circumscribed. 
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The proposed isomorphism between spatial and social factors can also be 
witnessed in the preponderance of spatial metaphors that people use. One can 
readily recognise the prevalence of expressions in everyday conversation such as 
"get away from me! "; "the two are poles apart"; "she drives me round the bend"; 
"he's above all that" and "they're very close", "he's very distant these 'days" to 
mention just a few. The use of spatial considerations to denote social relationships 
is common to many languages. In French we have "ils sont tres proches" (they are 
very close); "eile a ete assez distante avec moi" (she seems quite distant with me); 
"ce sont des cousins eloignes" (like distant cousins). In Dutch one can say: "ik wou 
dat dat kind me niet steeds zo voor de voeten liep" (I wish that child wouldn't get 
in my hair- literally :I wish that child wouldn't walk in front of my feet) 
Spatial factors have, of course, been investigated for many years in psychology 
research but usually in very direct ways as evidenced from e. g. the abundant 
research into privacy and personal space. Little imagination has been paid to their 
possible co-influence on behaviour with social factors. One early study managed 
to point tantalizingly to the dynamic which exists between social and spatial factors 
in peoples' everyday lives. It demonstrated conclusively that the mere physical 
distance between people can have quite a profound effect on their behaviour. 
Festinger, Schachter & Back, (1950) examined the importance of distance on the 
facilitation of relationship formation and maintenance. It was this classic study in 
microecology which led to new understanding by architects and planners of the 
need to design buildings to 'bring people together and underlined the importance 
of propinquity to this end. 
The large housing project named Westgate West was for married, graduate 
students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It consisted of seventeen, 
identical, separate two-story buildings with each building containing ten apartments 
(five per floor). All of the housing units faced onto a grassy court except for the 
end houses. It is important to note the homogeneity of residents in this study. All of 
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them were young (20-35), had just been de-mobbed, were of similar educational 
attainment and socio-economic status and were randomly assigned on an 
individual basis to the housing units (each did not chose their residence). The 
housing units were totally isolated from the rest of the campus and so could be 
considered self-contained. Thus an excellent scenario existed (virtually a field 
experiment) on which to examine the effects of purely spatial factors on the 
evolution of friendships. 
The residents were all asked: " Which three people in Westgate West do you see 
most often? ". One prominent finding from the study was that those people who 
lived closest to the subject were most likely to be nominated as friends. In fact 
those next door neighbours on the same floor were subjects' best friends 41% of 
the time. People living just two doors away were listed just 22% of the time whilst 
only 10% of those individuals living farthest away (at the other end of the hall) on 
the same floor were listed as being amongst subjects' best friends. Another finding 
was that those centrally located tend to be more popular. 
Distances in the study were very small: those who lived next door were 19 feet 
apart (32 feet apart in the case of the two middle apartments) and the maximum 
distance between two apartments on different floors was 88 feet. Nevertheless, 
these small distances in terms of traversal times proved crucial. 
The effort needed to ascend/descend flights of stairs exceeds that to walk down a 
hallway and perhaps this deterred friendship between people who live on different 
floors. Friends who were mentioned were much more likely to be on the same 
floor. Those on another floor were 'farther' away for these residents. Festinger and 
his colleagues referred to this phenomenon as "functional distance". In other 
words, the likelihood that two people would become friends depended variously on 
the layout of the housing scheme plus actual, physical distance. So it seems that 
the closer two people are in space, 'real or imagined', the greater the chance is 
that they will be become friends. 
A later study by Whyte (1958) came to similar conclusions about propinquity. The 
context this time was a newly created suburb named Park Forest. Several factors 
made this suburb of particular interest to Whyte. All the residents had moved in 
around the same time and chosen their homes by chance (all houses being very 
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similar) in areas that were neither poorer nor 'better' than any other. As with the 
Festinger study, this large group of people had, to all intents and purposes, been 
randomly allocated to their residences. By studying social contacts (often using 
announcements about social activities in the local press as a help), he discovered 
that friendship patterns followed proximity patterns very closely. ' There were very 
few friends who did not live close to one another. People living close together 
showed a high frequency of friendship. 
Priest & Sawyer (1967) investigated friendship patterns in a college dormitory. 
They discovered that, even when the variable of recognition was controlled for, 
propinquity was a dominant factor in friendship formation. Floormates were over 
twice as likely to be nominated as dorm residents generally. Propinquity was found 
to increase liking and friendship quite apart from the influence of increased 
familiarity. 
In 1974, Segal showed the effects of propinquity at work in a police training 
academy. Her subjects were 44 Maryland State Police trainees. The interesting 
regime in operation there meant that trainees were assigned to dorm rooms and 
classroom seats by alphabetic order of last names. Those trainees whose last 
names were closest alphabetically were thus more likely to spend their time in 
close proximity. 
Six months after beginning the course, trainees were asked to nominate the three 
closest friends. Segal found that a given trainee's nominated friends were 
predominantly those whose names were close to his own. This occurred to such a 
degree that each nominated friend was, on average, a mere 4.5 letters away 
alphabetically from the trainee. 
Propinquity is clearly a crucial effect in the process of friendship formation. 
Reasons for this are not hard to conjecture. Without propinquity, availability for 
social intercourse and subsequent friendship formation is restricted. A concomitant 
of the availability explanation is that we also 'choose' our enemies from those in 
close proximity. Propinquity can lead to enmity especially if the repeated encounter 
is with a stranger who acts in an unpleasant way each time (Swap, 1977). Over 
time, liking for that person decreases significantly. This finding is undoubtedly 
important but seems less interesting than the more positive and more likely ( see 
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1.4.1 anon) effect'of propinquity: the closer someone is physically, the more likely 
they are to become one's friends. 
The main finding of the studies on propinquity cited can be summed up in a few 
words which underline the metaphorical role space plays and the prevalence of 
this role in language: "Physical closeness produced ''emotional closeness" 
(Berkowitz, 1980, p220). The friendly, next-door residents at -Westgate were 
indeed 'close'. 
To return briefly to the Westgate study, an important adjoiner is that the results are 
unlikely to be explained solely in terms of availability of interaction: The residents 
were certainly likely to see those who lived close by more often but they would also 
get to know those people who lived just 38ft away quite well also. Even walking up 
or downstairs to make friends with residents on other floors isn't too much trouble 
yet the effect of propinquity was so strong as to counter this possibility. So why did 
'mere'- physical proximity impact so --much - on individuals' -social relationships 
especially when other people were available as friends?, - '''t 
The first signs of the importance of affect in cognitive processing occurs back as 
far as early infancy. Affect can play a very subtle role in allowing a relationship with 
an adult to help in the development of the self. Specifically one is concerned with 
thee stage at which the infant realizes that mental states can be shared between 
individuals. One can assume with some confidence that once an infant is able to 
distinguish between self and other, she will soon develop a way of influencing that 
other (Trevarthern, 1979). The question of particular interest here is: when does 
genuine inter-subjectivity arise i. e. when and how does she know that the other 
can appreciate and understand what she is feeling? 
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"Affect attunement" is a fairly recent attempt to explain this stage in development 
more fully (Stern et al., 1985). The behaviour of mothers towards their infant can 
be used as an example. What Stern and colleagues have noticed is that a mother 
will often respond to the more 'expressive' movements of the infant. She will do 
this in a way which is (often) different in mode and form but like it in intensity. For 
example, a nine month old 'infant is shaking a hand rattle in an up-and-down 
motion with an expression of interest and amusement. The mother may then nod 
her head up-and-down in rhythmic harmony with her daughter's movements. 
The authors'argue that the mother is matching the internal state of the infant, not 
in an attempt at imitation, but probably in an unconscious and automatic process. It 
would be difficult for the mother to communicate to the infant a connection 
between her inner experience and that of the infant by mere imitation of the 
infant's motions. Intensity matching in a different mode can achieve this. So an 
infant can learn that other'internal experiences' apart from its own exist; these can 
respond to her own internal state. A contribution to the sense of self which she 
already has is made. Stern et at. believe that affect attunement is widespread in 
the behaviour of mothers. 
There is, of course, a wealth of literature on the nature of attraction. For our 
purposes, this wide-ranging subject can be condensed into a few specific and 
salient areas. 
Can mere familiarity with an object, event or person be enough to create increased 
liking? Let us reflect on the example of a person who sees another regularly, 
perhaps at work but only from a distance and who never interacts with them. After 
some time one might suppose that that person will feel neither one way nor 
another about the work colleague although if the adage "familiarity breeds 
contempt" has any validity, animosity should arise. Contrary to both conjectures, 
an exceptional hypothesis proposes that feelings of friendship will develop and 
increase simply due to repeated exposure to that colleague: the mere exposure 
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hypothesis. It may be useful to place the hypothesis in a particular setting before 
proceeding with a detailed explanation. 
It stands to reason that in order to like or even love someone, meeting them could 
be seen to be a minimal prerequisite. For example, it is well known that in urban 
areas, mere proximity plays a major role in the mating game (Katz & Hill, 1958). In 
a survey of some 5000 marriage licenses in Philadelphia in the early 30's, Bossard 
made some interesting discoveries from the pairs of addresses in each case. 
Over 50% of the couples surveyed had lived within 20 blocks or less before their 
marriage; 31% within four blocks and 17% within one block of each other. Those 
living in different cities before they married constituted only about one fifth of the 
sample. From what became known as 'Bossard's Law', a measure of distance 
known as a'Standard City Block', equivalent to one eighth of a mile was derived. 
Bossard's Law has been noted not only in the US (see also Cotton & Smircich, 
1968) but also in London (Pond et al., 1963) and Oxfordshire (Harrison et al., 
1971). Such evidence for the spatial mating patterns of humans has provided 
interesting, speculative material for sociobiologists (or 'evolutionary psychologists' 
as they now appear to prefer to be called: [Wright, 1995]) working on relationships 
and the impact of mate selection on the gene pool. 
Various reasons exist for the effect observed by Bossard and others. First it may 
be simply a question of convenience: it is easier to find a proximate mate and 
easier to keep on seeing them. Another powerful explanation is that age, religion, 
race and social class play a major role in the determination of a mate since many 
residential areas are homogenous with respect to religion and social class for 
example. Social customs undoubtedly play their part in human populations at least 
(Cook & McHenry, 1978) but there exists another variable to be considered: the 
mere exposure hypothesis. 
Back in 1968, Robert Zajonc published an influential article in which he proposed 
that it was sufficient for us to be merely exposed to a stimulus to become well 
disposed towards it, eventually beginning to like it. Data from his own studies and 
from the work of others were cited in support. For example, Zajonc (1968) refined 
an experiment by Johnson et al., (1960) using stimuli from a famous study by 
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Soloman & Postman (1952). Subjects were shown nonsense syllables: the more 
frequently subjects saw a syllable, the more positive they became towards it. 
One rather powerful study showed how familiarity can lead to increased liking in a 
rather subtle way. The experiment concerned the relationship we have with 
ourselves, namely: how we perceive our own bodies and those of others (Mita et 
al., 1977). Virtually the only occasion on which we see ourselves as others see us 
is when looking at photographs of ourselves. For the vast majority of the times 
when we do look, we see ourselves as reflected in the mirror- a reversed image. 
This image may not be very different from the objective image but, as this 
experiment showed, it is noticeably different. 
Women were shown photographs of themselves and of a friend. For each 
individual photograph, there were two versions: objective and mirror-image. The 
subjects, when asked for their preferences, tended to choose the mirror-image 
photos of themselves but the objective photos of their friends. In other words, they 
preferred the more familiar appearances without fully knowing why. 
The importance of affect in cognitive development as highlighted by the likes of 
Stem et at. (1985, described above) sits well with the role of affect in cognition 
proposed by Robert Zajonc amongst others. Affect, and the debate on its primacy, 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
Space as a metaphor for social relations was tantalizingly touched upon by 
Hargreaves (1979). His was a notable study on social networks with hypotheses 
based firmly on Kellyian personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955). However, as will 
be seen, the pre-eminence of spatial factors is implicitly implied by the 
methodology he used and is consequently of particular interest for the present 
thesis. A phenomenologist, Hargreaves sought to study personal construct 
systems in terms of pattemings of elements (me or others) rather than just in terms 
of construct labels. He argued that when one is existentially presented with a 
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specific relationship (network) structure, one comprehends it by imposing 
constructs upon it such that the constructs with their patterning of elements depict 
the structure in a maximally efficiently way. 
Hargreaves does not consider structure in terms of patterns of interaction 
frequency. Rather he asks who the subject thinks interacts with whom and if they 
like each other (objective analysis of what 'actually' happened would be 
impossible). It is the subjects own description which is then compared to his or her 
construct system (as elicited from a repertory grid). Having adopted this approach, 
Hargreaves then hypothesized that constructs originate to explain the structure of 
the social network: 
"constructs are more attributions to explain patterns than descriptions per se 
of individuals as individuals" (p 157). 
The study was fortunate in being able to use as subjects a group of American 
students who were visiting Edinburgh for one year. For each of the subjects, 
repertory grids were carried out on arrival and again five months later with 
interviews taking place on each occasion. At the interviews, elements were sorted 
out by establishing a representative cohort of contacts: 14 in all. Between the 
interviews on home contacts (USA) and Edinburgh contacts, diary sheets were 
completed and these provided a set of elements for the Edinburgh network grids. 
The experimental part of the study has interesting spatial connotations for the 
present thesis. On pointed pieces of card, subjects wrote each of their contact 
group names (including their own). They were then asked to lay out the cards on 
the table "in whatever pattern came to mind and meant something to them", giving 
no further instructions. This non-directive approach is very much in line with the 
methodology of the personal psychology theorists (e. g. see Kelly, 1955). 
The positions of the resultant 'layouts' were traced on paper before subjects were 
asked to explain the pattern. It is these layouts in particular which draw attention to 
the spatial ordering of relations between people. Without realizing, Hargreaves has 
stumbled across the spatial sequencing of elements described by the network 
system he is studying. 
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The simplest patterns produced included only the personal preference of the 
subject but such patterns were in the minority and due in part to the subjects in 
question having a weak social network in Edinburgh. Having little awareness of 
other's contacts, these subjects tended to have simple and highly evaluative grids. 
Comments during their interviews also featured highly evaluative overtones. 
Hargreaves concluded that these factors, together with ignorance of each others 
responsibilities may well have made it more difficult for such people to establish 
stronger relationships. 
However, as the networks became more detailed, the layouts became more 
complex. Protocols taken after the layout sessions were complete are of particular 
interest to us here e. g. words such as "height" were often emphasized. Elements 
were positioned close together if the relationships between others in the group 
(and between subject and others) was strong. Best friends were placed together 
and sometimes pointing in the same direction. Recall that the cards used in these 
layouts were pointed. Pointing away and physical isolation on the layouts were 
devices which appeared to emphasize personal isolation or low-esteem. 
Hargreaves was not especially concerned with the significance of the spatial 
nature of the social structures he elicited. His concern was primarily with the 
relationship between cognitive structure (as derived form the repertory grids) and 
social network structure. He convincingly concludes that interpersonal constructs 
structure is not self determined along 'Kellyian' lines but dependent rather on the 
structure of the person's social network. Constructs are not the initial basic 
structuring component but only originate to explain already internalized structures. 
One should say at this point that the structures Hargreaves believes exist ab initio 
are schemata and the constructs that psychologists in the Personal Construct 
tradition elicit from their subjects arise from the schemata. 
However the greatest source of interest in Hargreaves work for the present study 
remains the methodology and its implications. He admits that "the most interesting 
form of data collected were the 'layouts"' though he does seem to take the spatial 
characteristics of these somewhat for granted. However if social networks come 
first and are followed by interpersonal constructs used to describe them, then this 
emphasizes the primacy of the social network structure. 
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"One thus has a fairly straightforward image of slow construct change as a 
person involves himself with new contacts or as the structure of the present 
contacts changes" (op. cit. p172). 
A corollary of, this is that the spatial representation of a social network is an 
undeniable and important facet in the concept of the self since the self now 
appears as a function of the person's social network. 
The importance of the Hargreave methodology and the role of spatial factors in the 
self-concept can be seen more clearly when one considers the work done by 
Hazel Markus on self schemata (1977). She defines self schemata as the cognitive 
structures formed in response to attempts to "organize, summarize or explain one's 
own behaviour in a particular domain" (p63). They are cognitive representations 
about the self derived from past experience that "organize and guide the 
processing of the self-related information contained in an individuals social 
experience. " This cognitive, active , inferential view of the structures involved in 
processing information on the self is much in accordance with more general 
schema theories and implicit personality concepts including personal construct 
psychology. 
The traditional view of the self-concept is also one of the 'self theories' used to 
organize experience to allow for effective coping with both the internal and 
external worlds (Pervin, 1978, p187). Markus is more concerned with the structure 
of these "vaguely defined heuristics". The similarity between self-concept and self 
schemata is striking but can one conclude that the self concept is wholly heuristic 
in nature? 
In any case, the terminology may be more of a hindrance than a help. The 
important point to note is as follows. If the self is (purely? ) a function of a person's 
social network and if the self is organized as schemata as argued above, then self 
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schemata are a function of social networks and thereby a function of their spatial 
arrangements. 
Subjects reported to Hargreaves that spatial arrangement of social networks 
seemed a natural phenomenon so the role of spatial factors in the activity of 
schemata seems an equally natural conclusion. A sceptic might argue that such a 
step seems rather ambitious and it is perhaps doubtful whether one can simplify to 
this extent. However the above discussion does (at least) emphasize the 
importance of social networks and spatial factors in the structure and functioning 
of social schemata. 
A recent resurgence of interest has occurred in the area of social psychology 
which emerged in the late forties/ early fifties and has been called the "New Look" 
psychology, also known as Directive State theory (Stapel & Koomen, 1997). New 
Look psychology holds particular interest for the present thesis as it describes how 
social knowledge and biases (schemata? ) can affect judgments of physical 
magnitude of stimuli that are not innately social in nature. The idea that perception 
is innate and unchanging was the formal theory of the day which the "New 
Lookers" believed to be wholly deficient, missing as it did the "higher level" 
processes and the way in which perception interacts with, and is embedded in, a 
configuration of behavioural factors such as needs, values, emotions and the like. 
Jerome Bruner is credited with much of the work in this research field. In 1947, he 
published the results of an experiment which looked at the perception of coin size 
by rich and poor children (Bruner & Goodman, 1947). Not only was the magnitude 
(both physical and value) of stimuli varied but the desirability ('need') of the stimuli 
controlled by using two groups of ten year old children, one from a wealthy 
background the other from a disadvantaged slum area of Boston. A control group 
was also used which was presented only with gray cardboard discs of the same 
size as the coins. Estimates of size were made from memory and with the actual 
coins located nearby. The children were able to indicate the sizes of the money 
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with the use of a 'light-box'. An adjustable diaphragm on the rear surface of the 
box allowed for projection and adjustment of a circular spot on a ground glass 
screen located on the front surface. 
Their results showed that coins were judged consistently larger than the gray 
discs. Furthermore, the greater the value of the coin, the greater the 
overestimation of its size. This latter observation was repeated for both the rich 
and poor children but it was found that the poor children overestimated more than 
their well-off peers to a striking extent. When the coins were absent from view, the 
results were more complex with rich children tending to judge closer to actual size 
for coins less than one quarter dollar but with overestimation of coins a quarter and 
over. Poor children on the other hand, when operating from memory, tend to 
estimate closer to actual size across all coin values. 
Bruner and Goodman explain their results by proposing that the greater the 
(social) value of an object, the greater will be its susceptibility to "organization by 
behavioural determinants" (p36), or for our purposes, the biasing effects of the 
`cash' schema. The greater the subjective need for money, as in the case of the 
poor children, the greater will be the distortion of perceived size. The effects 
observed for the coins-present versus coins-absent conditions they explain by 
speculating that for poor children estimating from memory; "a weakened fantasy" is 
substituted for the more imposing presence of an actual, valued coin, whilst rich 
children use the memory condition to release "strong and active fantasy". 
Another example of how the symbolic value of an object influences its perception 
is demonstrated in the experiment of Bruner and Postman(1948). This time the 
focus of attention was the perception of positive, negative and neutral symbols on 
perception. These included a dollar sign, a swastika and a square with two 
diagonals, respectively, inscribed in black ink on circular discs ranging in diameter 
size from 3/i to 1% inches in YI inch steps. Using the same equipment as above, 
the task was to adjust the size of the light spot until it matched the size of the 
stimulus. 
The authors found that size of disc and type of symbol were both responsible for 
reliable differences in subjective size. As the size of disc increased so did the 
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average, positive deviation from physical size. All three symbol types showed 
overestimation in size. Dollar discs were judged largest, with swastikas next and 
neutral discs the smallest. No interaction between valence of symbol and size of 
disc was noted. 
The result for the positive symbol was explained without much difficulty: that which 
is `rewarding' is magnified: in this case, by overestimation of the object size, a 
finding in line with results of the Bruner & Goodman experiment. Explaining the 
result for the negative stimulus is more problematic. Bruner and Postman propose 
that negatively valenced symbols are adaptively perceived; overestimation of 
symbols of negative valence might help, for example, to alert one to danger or 
threat. Nevertheless, they do agree that it is possible for negatively valenced 
objects to be underestimated or even perceived without bias as reported in 
another experiment in this series (Bruner & Postman, 1947). They finish the paper 
by pointing out that "one cannot expect a simple one-to-one relationship between 
the affective symbolic value of objects and perceptual... accentuation" (p207). 
Bringing the New Look psychology right up to date, Stapel and Koomen (1997) 
report two relevant experiments. The basis for both is the argument that by 
investigating the effects of social knowledge on purely perceptual, physical 
judgments (on those entities without any 'psycho-social' aspects e. g. the size of a 
circle), one can disentangle interpretational from perceptual judgments (Strack, 
1992). They also posit that since similar objects invite comparison more readily 
than dissimilar ones, ("similarity breeds comparability"; Coren & Enns, 1993), social 
information can affect judgments of spatial magnitude by determining what is 
perceived as similar or dissimilar. Such a judgment provides the 'perceptual 
contrast effect' observed in the Ebbinghaus illusion. 
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Figure 1.1: Perceptual contrast effect demonstrated by the Ebbinghaus illusion.. 
The centre circle (`target) in both configurations is identical in size but appears 
larger when surrounded by smaller context stimuli. Adapted from Stapel & 
Koomen, (1997). 
Stapel and Koomen used this illusion and manipulated the experimental 
configurations of it by having the similarity between target and context stimuli 
varied systematically. For example, they found that when the target is the face of a 
woman and the context stimuli are also faces of women, the contrast effect was 
greater than if men's faces provided the context stimuli. This occurred, they 
argued, because of the obvious gender differences in physical features leading 
subjects to categorize the men as belonging to a different ("dissimilar") social 
category and hence causing attenuation of the size contrast effect. 
However the authors took this finding a stage further and suppressed these 
categorizations e. g. when male and female targets and stimuli were categorized as 
lawyers. In this case the purely physical, gender differences which had previously 
made the stimuli dissimilar, both the target and context, are overlaid by the 
overarching, more salient category of 'lawyer. With target and context stimuli now 
categorizable as similar, the size contrast effect was again observed. 
A logical extension of this manipulation was to make the target and context stimuli 
similar e. g. same gender, but having subjects categorize one as a lawyer and the 
others students. Stapel and Koomen found that the size contrast effect did occur 
but was weaker than when both stimulus types were categorized as belonging to 
the same social group: i. e. when the genders of target and context stimuli were 
emphasized or when both stimuli type were perceived as lawyers. 
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Overall they demonstrated a significant linear trend in the sizes of perceptual 
contrasts observed. The contrasts ranged in magnitude from: 
target and context stimuli identical in every way (greatest) 
having the same gender 
having different gender 
non-persons (e. g. cars and trucks) (least) 
All four levels produced significant perceptual contrasts with comparisons between 
each level showing significantly greater size of contrast than the categories listed 
below it. 
What the authors were demonstrating was that not only do social categories affect 
the size contrast illusion, but that the effect occurs even when there is no physical 
analogue (e. g. lawyer and student) and that such non-physical, purely social 
categorizations can even suppress the categorizations based on clearly 
observable, physical differences (e. g. that between the faces of different genders). 
An important conclusion can be drawn from this and the other New Look 
experiments. If judgments of the physical magnitude of inanimate, laboratory 
based stimuli can be biased by social cognitions, then one might expect the 
process to be a fundamental, schematic one. The consequences may be even 
more arresting when personally important, heterogeneous social stimuli are the 
target. Later in this thesis, for example, one particular experiment is reported that 
uses targets which are people known to the subject. 
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An early and valuable insight into the most elemental social schemata is Kuethe's 
simple but elegant experiments. These demonstrate how unit-forming principles or 
social schemata are used by people to extend their knowledge of a given social 
situation when the information presented is ambiguous (Kuethe, 1962). 
His concern was primarily with the spatial representations of 'units' (people, objects 
or symbols) in relation to commonly held views of the social nature of such units. 
Social schemata, he proposed, structured the social response people make when 
they encounter ambiguity in a situation. The more people there are who use the 
same schema, the more likely is the response to the ambiguous situation to be 
shared. 
In spatial terms, the results can be quite marked. Kuethe was interested in 
schemata insofar as they indicated 'belongingness' of people, objects or symbols. 
Implicit in this concern is the proximity and 'closeness' of elements. When asked to 
reconstruct the spatial pattern which occurred during a given social situation, for 
example, people would show constant errors related to the predominant social 
schema. In other words, he proposed that people tend to configure social 
observations in spatial terms and to do so in prototypical ways. 
In an experiment, subjects were asked to place two or more objects cut out in 
silhouette form on a blank field in any way they wished. Each subject placed nine 
groups of objects which were produced from : woman, child, man, dog; 3 different 
sized rectangles, square, circle and triangle. 
The responses were typically organized with height-ordering a common strategy 
with shapes and the man-woman-child group. There was also however a strong 
tendency to put the child between the adults with very few placing the man 
between the woman and child. In another group, the dog was seldom placed 
between the man and woman despite the high frequency with which the child was 
put in this position. Is there a schema of "a man and his dog" perhaps? 
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Non-human objects tended not to separate human objects e. g. when rectangles 
were placed with the two adult figures. This occurred despite the fact that the 
identity of the two rectangles did not lead to them being grouped together at the 
expense of the non-identical adult figures. Good evidence, perhaps, of a social 
schema. 
In a neat 'Bartlettean' follow-up, Kuethe used serial reproduction as a method of 
examining constant error. He began by using two groups of stimuli with two of the 
object outlines in each: identical rectangles and the adult figures. One of the two 
groups was already placed on the field and viewed from a distance by the first 
subject. The group was removed and the subject then invited to replace them 
exactly. After measurement, the second subject was shown this reconstructed 
arrangement and the procedure repeated. The rearrangement was then used for 
the next subject and so on.... each subjects' rearrangement being used as the 
stimulus for the next. 
When no further appreciable altering is made, one can assume that the basic 
schema for the stimulus set has been reached. For the identical triangles, 
separation remained relatively unchanged but the two adult figures were brought 
to almost touching. This reached a 'point of stability' after only about 17 serial 
reproductions. Clearly a schema such as 'man and woman together' seems to be 
working. 
Kuethe's experiments demonstrate clearly that even after basic tendencies to use 
factors such as the horizontal plane and height to organize figures, the content of 
the group leads to highly preferred arrangements of the objects within the group. 
The most notable of these arrangements is that'people go together'. 
The "assumed affinity between people" is indicative of belief in positive social 
relations between people. Moreover, the placing of man and woman figures in 
close proximity indicates an assumption of strong relationship between the two- a 
'normalization' if you like: Kuethe goes so far as to suggest that atypical 
arrangements of human figures in this procedure may be of some clinical value. 
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The assumption under normal circumstances of a close and positive relationship 
between two adults of opposite sex seems to have been fairly well demonstrated 
here. What if, however, the stimuli consisted of two men or photos of individuals 
from widely different backgrounds (the Princess and the hippie) or' if some 
antagonism was apparent between the* humans depicted? What if a 'subject's 
friends and acquaintances are depicted?? 
Social structure in specific relation to physical space is a rarer and less well known 
approach to the area. One prominent example exists. It was during the post war 
building boom that Lee (1968) attempted to evaluate the principles employed by 
planners and architects in the somewhat alacritous construction of the New Towns. 
His work centred on what was probably the first systematic analysis of the concept 
of 'neighbourhood'. Although at first sight the concept appears subjective and 
somewhat nebulous it is one that has been shown to be more than worthy of 
investigation from a theoretical as well as a planning policy perspective. 
Defining the term 'neighbourhood' helps to highlight the theoretical impreciseness 
that has hitherto dogged the planning profession in these matters for so long. The 
most parsimonious definition would be "a bounded residential area that is delimited 
by specific criteria. " (Gold, 1980, p110). Of course the problem remains that it may 
be hard for an observer to discern the boundaries and hence the criteria. Is 
neighbourhood a geographical entity or a social one? In answering this definitional 
question, Lee looked at the effect of where individuals resided on the composition 
and configuration of their macro-spatial schemata. 
Lee observed that the term 'neighbourhood' had dual meaning as both a physical 
and social term. He decided to adopt a phenomenological approach i. e. to try and 
see what the term means through the eyes of the subject and avoid experimenter 
influence on responses altogether. He found that the term "neighbourhood" was 
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one recognised, and used unprompted, by people in the study. The idea of 
neighbourhood seemed to be a salient one in the everyday lives of subjects and 
provided interesting insights into their personal and social dispositions. The main 
finding of Lee's work is that one's neighbourhood cannot be distinguished as a 
configuration of relationships that is either purely geographical or purely social but 
as "an organized synthesis of the two" (Lee, 1976, p35). 
The ideal form of investigation of an urban neighbourhood would be to measure at 
the response level. However, recording the behaviour of individuals on a one-to- 
one basis over a period of time would be extremely laborious, time-consuming and 
costly. Instead, subjects were asked to delineate part of a map of their locality, 
enclosing the area that they considered to be part of their neighbourhood. The 
map showed sufficient detail for subjects to recognise all its features, especially 
their own place of residence, which was marked clearly with a cross. The open- 
ended interviewing which accompanied the procedure confirmed that 
neighbourhood remains a highly salient concept for people and was a term 
volunteered by subjects without experimenter prompting. 
How did the neighbourhoods appear? Results were varied and each subject 
provided a unique neighbourhood. The areas marked included those pieces of 
territory which included neighbours who lived within it and new neighbours added 
by virtue of the fact that they lived in territory which included essential amenities 
such as local shops, post offices and houses of a certain social class and building 
style. In general, the neighbourhoods had the feel of a gestalt about them. 
'They were 'whole figures', standing out from the undifferentiated 
background; with 'form' quality; with contours that belong to the figure and 
not to the ground; they were more lively and articulated than the ground. " 
(Lee, 1976, p130) 
Although there was much variability in the knowledge and use of both the social 
and physical territory by subjects, the neighbourhoods elicited were judged to be 
spatially continuous; there was "some kind of distinct relationship to the whole". 
Despite, and perhaps because of, the variability, it was still possible for Lee to 
discern three types of neighbourhood. The smallest one was the homogenous type 
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which was delimited on the basis of including "people like us". Working class and 
perhaps surprisingly, upper middle class were typical respondents in this category. 
'Social acquaintances' formed the basis of the second type which was more 
extensive than the homogenous type but had no direct relationship with housing 
density. The third and final type could be called 'unit neighbourhood', coming 
closest to the ideal that urban planners had conceived. This was generally larger 
than the other two categories and contained more shops and other facilities. 
Overall it was found that the neighbourhoods elicited were found to be at variance 
with those made in the New Towns (and recommended for new housing generally) 
than that dictated by density requirements plus 'economical' population units. 
Given the wide variety of. neighbourhoods indicated by subjects, it became 
important to provide a standardized scale of measurement on which to express 
individual responses. This was achieved by the use of a scale known as the 
neighbourhood quotient or Nh. Q. This expressed individual neighbourhood 
schemata as a ratio of a hypothetical locality of one half mile radius from the 
subject's place of residence. By taking into account different densities of housing 
and the provision of shops and other amenities, Lee was able to indicate the 
degree of each subject's involvement with his or her environment. 
The content of neighbourhood maps (e. g. the numbers of houses, shops etc. ) was 
thus not expressed in absolute terms but only as a proportion of content of the half 
mile radius. The neighbourhood quotient was then correlated with various 
measures of social behaviour. Positive relationships were found between the 
Nh. Q. and social class, age, length of residence, work location, friendship patterns 
and active social participation within the locality. 
For example, if the wage earner worked in the locality, then his housewife partner 
(remember this study took place in the 1950sl) was more likely to have a 
neighbourhood which was large and physically varied with high social involvement. 
A similar but less pronounced effect was observed with those living in terraced 
housing. However, natives of the area and working class families tended to have 
quite small neighbourhoods with less physical variety and with less social 
involvement (active social participation). Lee explains this by observing that such 
groups place heavy emphasis on family networks throughout the urban area for 
providing social integration. Car ownership, unsurprisingly, does not vary with 
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neighbourhood composition since cars are normally used for traveling longer 
distances outwith the locality. Where social classes in an area are mixed, it 
appears that there is somewhat greater involvement in the neighbourhood. 
The belief that a neighbourhood or other urban configuration cannot be regarded 
solely as a physical entity is now commonly held. For example, Godfrey (1988) 
makes direct links between the physical structure of a city and the social 
characteristics of the neighbourhoods within it. The city is an amalgamation of 
many different specialized social worlds which inhabit distinct neighbourhood 
settings with both class and culture behaving as significant factors in its evolution. 
Lee went on to formulate the concept of the "socio-spatial schema" to represent 
both the concept of neighbourhood and indeed the many other internal 
representations or environmental images that most people possess. 
As long ago as 1961, Beloff & Beloff carried out an experiment which offers strong 
support to the hypothesis of socio-spatial isomorphism. They looked at estimates 
of distance that subjects made between themselves and human faces that varied 
with regard to valence. Valence is a gestaltist term which refers simply to the 
influence of attraction or repulsion made by an object or activity. They proposed 
that a face they believed to be positively valenced would be set closer than those 
faces believed to be negatively valenced : "... it becomes clear that the paradigm of 
a testing situation is indeed one involving distance judgment, in that a stimulus 
object with positive valence, which "attracts", must be placed too near, and one 
with negative, "repelling, " valence be placed too far. " (p720). 
Their stimuli consisted of what they considered were positively and negatively 
valenced faces. These included, inter alia, Prince Philip, President Eisenhower and 
Self (positively valenced) and Gerö, a leader of the Communist Party in Hungary; a 
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member of the Japanese General Staff from the Second World War and subject 
peers (negatively valenced). 
The distance estimation task involved use of the Ames Thereness/Thatness 
apparatus (Ittelson, 1952; Ittelson & Slack, 1958). Subjects, when using this 
equipment see two fields set side by side: the comparison field contains a series of 
five comparison posts viewed monocularly; the test field contains only the stimulus 
figure (a face in this instance) suspended in blackness, viewed monocularly. While 
the comparison field presents (relatively) full distance cues; the test field presents 
only reduced distance cues. 
When using this 'objective distance' judgment device, subjects must adjust the 
position of the test figure until they believe it to be level with the middle comparison 
post. Under such conditions of minimal distance cues, subjects are likely to make 
errors in distance settings, which can be read on a hidden scale by the 
experimenter. 
Beloff and Beloff found that the errors were made systematically and in 
accordance with their hypothesis. Subjects were found to place faces nearer than 
at the point of equality (too near themselves). This may be explained by the use of 
the stimulus card dimensions being used as a distance cue: subjects may have 
thought of the photographs as postcard size when in fact they were much smaller 
(3 by 4% inches). This was actually irrelevant to their central hypothesis but it does 
demonstrate the type of methodological artifacts that one comes across in 
experiments of this kind. 
Regardless of the overall trend in distortion, positively valenced faces were set 
nearer to subjects than negatively valenced faces. Another finding was that self 
faces were set nearer than peers for woman only- the effect was negligible for 
men; this was the only sex difference they found. This particular result is in line 
with the findings of Jourard & Secord (1955) who discovered that females make 
much finer and more varied discriminations about their body image than men. 
Although the total number of stimuli was just eight, the results are striking. The 
perception of distance between self and stimulus did indeed appear to be biased 
by the valence of the stimulus, even when that valence was somewhat crudely 
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categorized. Beloff and Beloff describe their results as "making concrete the 
metaphor of social distance" (p722). 
Immediately following this chapter-and preceding the experimental chapters is an 
extensive literature review as outlined below. The review lays the theoretical and 
methodological foundations for the experimentation to come. 
As three of the experiments entail work on environmental cognition, the 
second chapter will consider the literature on the so-called cognitive 
map as a example of a schema, followed by a section on the issue of 
construct validity in the methodology. 
Chapter Three will look at the historical origins of schema theory with 
definitions and evidence for schematic processes in the literature on 
human memory. 
also looks at alternative and competing explanations and recent 
refinements of the theory. 
A critique of cognitive schema theory comprises the fourth chapter. It 
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Chapter 5 deals with social schemata: definitions, functions and 
example. The role of both inference and interpretation in the filling-in of 
missing details in social information processing is examined with 
specific regard paid to the study of systematic errors made by subjects. 
Chapter 6 examines the continuing debate on the primacy of affect in 
cognition. The importance of the phenomenon of mere exposure and 
liking in social schemata is considered. The perennial question of 
which comes first: feeling or thought is investigated and the question 
itself re-evaluated in light of recent evidence. 
Chapter 7 sets the scene for the experimental chapters. It draws on the 
lessons learnt from the literature review and details the research 
questions to be addressed. 
CHAPTER 2: 
Environmental Cognition 
"'The Image' is back. It returned to psychology by a side entrance 
and its conceptual foot seems firmly wedged in the door. " 
(Downs & Stea, 1970, p3) 
The current status of environmental cognition owes much to the revival of interest 
in the image. It was during the early fifties that the much battered subject of 
mentalism and imagery in particular returned to mainstream psychology after its 
period of disfavour. 
The ostracism was in part due to the predominant influence of the behaviourists 
such as Watson many years earlier (Holt, 1964). The revival of imagery was in part 
due to the activity of more established disciplines such as brain science. The 
interest shown by students of geography, the emergent (and now burgeoning) field 
of environmental behaviour and the rise of the information processing tradition also 
helped to bring the subject back into favour. It was in the middle fifties that the 
name of Kenneth Boulding declared its re-emergence on the back of `brand 
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images' and inspired interest in the cognitive representations of large physical 
areas. Perhaps the most celebrated (and certainly the most cited) contribution to 
environmental cognition from this period was "The Image of the City" by Lynch 
(1960). 
It is not surprising therefore that today the general area of environmental cognition 
is not the sole preserve of cognitive psychologists. Whilst not interdisciplinary in 
the true sense, the expertise drawn from other disciplines notably architecture, 
geography and town-planning has opened up the subject to wider audiences and 
more importantly, donated numerous and valuable insights to the researcher. 
However, the reverse side of this coin is that because the researchers come from 
so many different fields (including architecture and urban planning, geography, 
zoology, neurology, computer science, cognitive, developmental and 
environmental psychology), relatively little cross-referencing occurs and knowledge 
has not accumulated as it perhaps should have done. Unintended replications of 
many studies appear to have taken place (Garling et al., 1985). Nevertheless a 
common interest of many researchers has been how people navigate through their 
daily environments and the implications of such navigation for internal 
representations of space. 
A newcomer to the literature might be confused by the gamut of descriptions 
encountered. Trowbridge was perhaps the first to refer to spatial representation. In 
1913 he studied how individuals orientated in geographic space and referred to 
their representations as "imaginary maps" (Howard and Templeton, 1966). Until 
the 1960's, little work on the topic ensued with the notable exception of Tolman's 
classic study of place-learning in rats that questioned the strict interpretation of S- 
R theory (Tolman, 1948). 
It was Tolman who coined the term "cognitive map" which continues to be used to 
the present day (e. g. Downs & Stea, 1973; Cadwallader, 1979; Garling et al., 
1984; Hirtle & Jonides, 1985; Garling et at., 1990). City planners and geographers 
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have their own terms, e. g. "spatial image" (Lynch, 1960) and "environmental 
image" (Appleyard, 1970). The term "cognitive map" may be defined as "long term 
stored information about the relative location of objects and phenomena in the 
everyday physical environment" (Carling et al., 1979, p200). 
The words "image" or "map" are grossly misleading however. Appleyard (1970) 
found only 3% of a sample able to produce a 'cartographic' map of their locality. 
Topological relations are often not retained in these maps (Lynch, 1960). 
Representations can include separate but connected chunks of environment 
(Ladd, 1970) and need not even be visual (Siegel & White, 1975). Drawn maps 
need not be taken as externalizations of some internal 'map' (Chase & Chi, 1981). 
Siegel & White (1975) play it safe and use the more generic term 'spatial 
representation' to avoid any possible confusion. The term emphasizes their belief 
that we have a spatial model; this model, while it may allow us to draw a 'map', is 
most likely not map-like itself. Its aim is to help navigation within the larger physical 
environment and reduce the risk of getting lost. Not only is the representation a 
'way-finder' but it may act as an organizer of experience by acting as a frame of 
reference to which an individual can attach his or her knowledge (Lynch, 1960). 
The term used by Neisser (1976) is more in keeping with the theoretical bent of the 
present thesis- "orientating schema" which serves to emphasize that "it is an 
active, information-seeking structure" (p 111). In other words, the orientating 
schema not only enables the individual to orient him- or herself in the environment 
but also facilitates predictions and anticipations of features and events within the 
environment. However the term "cognitive map" is probably the most frequently 
used in the literature and whatever the theoretical shortcomings of the term, it will 
be used here for the sake of familiarity along with the terms "spatial schema" and 
"orientating schema". 
Perception and memory are therefore inextricably bound up in its formation and its 
subsequent use and refinement. The present thesis proposes schema theory as 
the most comprehensive and parsimonious explanation of spatial representation 
and the processes associated with it. Under this approach, a cognitive map can be 
viewed as a specific instance of a schema. The question of whether the spatial 
representation or cognitive map is analogical or propositional in nature has been 
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discussed in a previous chapter. Other areas to be covered include acquisition, 
structure, contents and relevant processing of spatial knowledge. 
Perhaps the first significant step in tapping a person's spatial knowledge, and 
more specifically his or her topographical knowledge, was taken with Lynch's now 
seminal study of resident's knowledge of their U. S. cities (Lynch, 1960). 
Although his study did produce empirical results of some interest, perhaps the 
greatest contribution made by Lynch was the creation of a paradigm within which 
much subsequent research was carried out. Only the briefest outline of this study 
is given here. His central concept was that of 'legibility': the ease with which a 
person can organize the multitudinous elements of urban life into a coherent 
mental representation. Another term he coined was 'imageability'- the extent to 
which a city evoked a strong image of itself. Those cities that were highly 
'imageable' were those that could be perceived as patterns of high continuity with 
interconnected parts. Logically then, a city was likely to be imageable if it was also 
legible. 
Boston, Los Angeles and Jersey City were the urban centres in which Lynch tested 
his hypothesis. Using tasks of pencil and paper map-drawing, the production of 
verbal lists of distinctive features, sets of directions for making specific trips in the 
city and making informal questions about orientation with his subjects, he 
concluded a qualitative study of the records completed by his subjects. Lynch 
described the results in terms of the elements their maps included: paths, 
landmarks, districts, nodes and edges. Subsequent studies have identified routes 
and landmarks as the most salient features (e. g. Siegel & White, 1975). 
Routes are considered to be essentially sensorimotor in nature; routines for which 
one has expectations about seeing particular landmarks along the way and 
therefore, to some extent, sequentially learned. In contrast, landmarks appear to 
be primarily visual in nature: they are features of the environment which when 
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recognised in a particular perceptual context can be used as reference points in 
macrospace. Furthermore they are "strategic foci" to and from which one navigates 
and can be used as course-maintaining devices (Siegel & White, 1975). 
More parsimonious still is Garling's concept of "place" as the most salient single 
feature: a basic unit which may correspond to several different elements e. g. 
streets, parts of streets such as crossings or buildings, districts or just "perceptually 
and symbolically salient places" (Garling et al., 1984). Although Garling et al. 
(1984) accept the validity of the traditional, Lynchian taxonomy, they believe these 
elements (defined, it should be remembered, by a city planner) to be merely a 
subset of the psychologically meaningful ones. Other research adds support to 
this. Perceptual characteristics such as name and function appear to be learned to 
some extent independently of spatial location (Pezdek & Evans, 1979); places also 
have psychological attributes e. g. aesthetic quality, complexity etc. (Ward & 
Russell, 1981). 
Despite the seminal influence of Lynch's (1960) work, several criticisms can be 
made (Gold, 1980). The first concerns the use of sketch-mapping; as a 
methodology it can reveal more about the person's map drawing ability than about 
his or her cognitive representation of the city. Lynch tended to use middle class 
and presumably 'map-literate' people. Secondly, too much emphasis was placed 
on the visual component of their urban schemata. Studies of way-finding in blind 
people demonstrate that sight is not a prerequisite for successful spatial cognition. 
Non-visual sources of information from the environment which have important 
affective properties include sound (Lynch, 1976; Southworth, 1969). 
A third criticism is that Lynch largely ignored the symbolic and functional aspects of 
the urban environment. When considering the functionality of a city (the central 
area of Boston as studied by Lynch), Steinitz (1968) concluded that imageability as 
Lynch defined it was dependent upon functional meaning but that functional 
meaning was not necessarily dependent upon imageability. So an individual can 
possess information about activities that are independent of any cognitive 
representations of city form; imageability appears to be determined by visual 
differentiation combined with significant behavioural and social associations. The 
symbolic importance of the city does require a more interactive, apperceptive 
relationship between individual and environment than the implicitly passive mode 
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of urban perception implied by Lynch (Appleyard, 1973). Johns (1969) investigated 
private gardens in cities and came to the conclusion that people imposed their own 
values and 'schemata' on the design of their gardens; contrary to the Lynchian 
process, one needs to study the influence of peoples schemata on the urban 
environment and not the other way around. 
Finally, Lynch's celebrated five element typology has been called into question. 
Some have used the Lynchian typology but felt the need to add function as an 
additional element (e. g. Sarre, 1972). With the original typology having no 
underlying theoretical justification, Goodey et al., (1971) found it legitimate to 
condense it to paths, node/landmarks and edges; they found it impossible to 
distinguish between nodes and landmarks in the written output of their subjects. 
Another equally valid typology is that proposed by Pocock (1975) who, more 
parsimoniously still, categorized the elements from a sketch-map study of Durham 
into point-features, linear features and area. 
To best consider how adults develop and represent the physical environment, it is 
useful to first explore how children develop fundamental concepts of their 
everyday spaces. From infancy as the child moves within its environment, the 
concept of space is an important developing feature. It was Piaget who proposed 
the three stage development of this schematic concept (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967). 
The first stage of accuracy is topological comprehension characterized by an 
egocentric orientation; the relative position of items in space with respect to the 
body is understood. Projective accuracy is the next stage and is characterized by 
the child using a fixed frame of reference in which items in the environment are 
comprehended in terms of their relative positions with respect to various fixed 
points in space. Finally, the most advanced stage is Euclidean wherein space is 
encoded as a unit in which items are located with respect to their position in two or 
three dimensional space. The precise age ranges of these changes vary a good 
deal. 
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Support for the development of internal space proceeding in this way has been 
found by studies looking at the representation of large scale environments in 
children. For example, younger children appear to have greater difficulty than older 
children in estimating Euclidean distance (Siegel & Schadler, 1979). Given the 
plausibility of this model, what are the implications for adult learning ° in a new 
environment? Are there similar changes in adult learning accuracy? 
Hart & Moore (1973), Siegel & White (1975) and Chase & Chi (1981) all propose 
that adult learning in the macro environment resembles a Piagetian, ontogenetic 
sequence of spatial cognition. Adults first notice landmark points and use these as 
'anchors'. One next uses travel sequences to achieve route formation. Then routes 
and landmarks become formed into clusters. Only when an objective frame of 
reference is developed do these clusters co-ordinate with each other, the final 
'survey' representation appearing as a system of routes embedded in an objective 
frame of reference: a developmental progression from landmarks to'route maps' to 
'survey maps'. 
Studies have found that young children's representations of macrospace are more 
route-like and poorly integrated when compared with older children (e. g. Hazen, 
Lockman & Pick, . 1978). There are other findings consistent with the Pigetian 
theory. An early study by Shemyakin (1962) made a similar distinction between 
route and survey knowledge. In six to eight year olds, maps of familiar areas were 
found to reflect familiar routes of locomotion, whereas those of older children were 
more holistic with paths and landmarks more accurately coordinated. 
But what evidence is there to suggest that adults follow this Piagetian trend in 
environmental learning? Appleyard (1970) discovered that newcomers to a city 
were more likely to reverse zone positions than long-term residents. Roads and 
landmarks within zones were placed with roughly equal accuracy by both groups. 
Moore (1973) had subjects' maps of familiar and unfamiliar city areas sorted by 
independent judges into three categories. Level I maps were disorganized with 
elements arranged topologically only vis-ä-vis an egocentric perspective. Level 11 
maps had good intercluster accuracy but were only partially differentiated. Level III 
maps were most accurate of all. They were hierarchically organized and more 
abstract with a schematic reference system allowing for good Euclidean inter- and 
intracluster accuracy, Of particular interest was his finding that significantly more 
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subjects drew Level II maps for unfamiliar areas and Level III maps for familiar 
areas. 
Evans et al (1981) found that intracluster relative landmark placement and 
intercluster placement did not improve over a one year period but that exact 
landmark placement did. Supporting Siegel & White (1975) and Hart & Moore 
(1973), they also found that landmark learning precedes path elaboration unlike 
the converse sequence advocated by Lynch (1960) and Appleyard (1970). 
However Ladd (1970) reported that adolescent sketch map accuracy does not 
improve with length of residency. Taking into account the crude dichotomization of 
length of residence and changes in accuracy found between 6 months and 1 year 
residence (Evans et al., 1981) it is plausible that accuracy may improve and then 
reach an asymptote within about 1 year. 
Siegel & White (1975) and Thorndyke (1980) emphasize the importance of 
schemata of single routes. However Moar & Carleton (1982) believe that from the 
start of the acquisition of spatial knowledge of routes, the subjects employ a 
network schema in which all routes are combined. Therefore with increased 
experience, their schemata may acquire functional properties approaching those of 
real maps. It may be that at this stage of 'schematic maps', routes are represented 
in a spatial analogue format (Kosslyn et al., 1978). Since subjects had sequential 
representations during initial stages of acquisition in their study, Moar & Carleton 
(op. cit. ) prefer a sequential association format instead which contains sufficient 
detail to correspond to real maps but is not isomorphic in an analogical sense. 
Characteristics of the individual also need consideration in this context. The 
developmentally derived model places great emphasis on the importance of visual 
and sensorimotor experience in constructing a spatial representation (Siegel & 
White, 1975). Lee (1968) believes that practical activity causes spatial 
representations to "jell". The complex spatial arrangement of islands is learnt by 
Puluwat navigators by way of an apprenticeship-experience of actually traveling 
the seaways between the islands (Gladwin, 1970). Appleyard (1970) discovered 
that the quality of an externalized representation improved as contact with the 
environment became more direct and Ladd (1970) found that as the sphere of 
activity of black urban youths increased, so too did the quality of their sketch maps 
of their area. Indeed, she proposed that ".. Walking is intimate to the environment 
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and therefore articulates the schema. " (p97). It would appear that locomotion in the 
environment both enhances and articulates the spatial schema. However Allen et 
al., (1978) found that subjects demonstrated route knowledge without leaving the 
lab but they fail to address the question of how such knowledge differs from that 
obtained during initial navigation. 
It may seem superfluous to note, but studies on blind and sighted subjects have 
quite clearly revealed the importance -of visual experience on development of 
representation. Functional (walking) distances appear to be equally well 
represented by both blind and sighted people but Euclidean (straight-line/ "as the 
crow flies") distances are less accurately represented by the blind (Pick & 
Lockman, 1980). 
From studies of spatial knowledge acquisition such as those described above, one 
can categorize states of adult learning and make predictions about distortions and 
performance. There are two broad categories of representation to discuss. 
The first category encodes sequentially locations, landmarks and rough estimates 
of turns. Since such representations originate usually from direct navigation 
experience, they have been called procedural knowledge (Thorndyke, 1980; 
Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982), network knowledge (Byrne, 1979,1982) and 
route knowledge (Siegel & White, 1975). Survey knowledge (Siegel & White, 
1975) or vector knowledge (Byrne, 1979) is a much more global representation. It 
includes abstract information arranged into configurations of points and routes and 
encodes interobject Euclidean distances. Map-learning is the usual source of such 
knowledge. However the degree of detail, in such representations varies a great 
deal (Thomdyke, 1980). Those with real map knowledge or who have extensive 
navigation experience tend to have extremely detailed, almost veridical 
representations. Those with little map or navigation experience tend to have over- 
simplified, schematized representations only (Moore, 1973). So repeated 
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experience of the environment leads to a continuously refined calibration of the 
temporal-spatial relations among features. 
How are these two types of knowledge processed? Thorndyke sees procedural 
("route") knowledge as consisting of a particular set of actions ordered to allow for 
navigation and coded according to an individual's travel experience. Coding is 
more perceptual than semantic (Thorndyke, 1981). With survey knowledge, 
however, the distances between points and the relative position of objects are 
encoded in a fixed co-ordinate system rather than in relation to the self. Typically 
the mental construction is isomorphic to the real world and viewed from above. 
When using only route - knowledge, he further speculates that distances are 
estimated only by mentally traversing the route between the two points. Straight- 
line distances are not directly represented and as Euclidean estimates additionally 
require some form of informal algebra, they 'are thus more susceptible to error. 
However, when using survey knowledge, Euclidean estimates may involve directly 
visualizing the area, locating the end-point and estimating interobject distances 
(Thomdyke & Hayes Roth, 1982). 
There is some neuropsychological evidence to support the distinction between 
route and survey cognitive schemata. Damage to the parietal lobe appears to 
interfere with both route and survey representations while damage to the temporal 
lobe destroys only survey-type representations (Shemyakin, 1962). Luria (1966) 
and other researchers have found that lesion or trauma in the parieto-occipital 
region of the right hemisphere destroys the ability to produce a survey type 
representation (Siegel & White, 1975). Using the familiar black and white diagrams 
of a chess game as stimuli and [015] water-positron emission tomography (PET) 
to identify neural networks, Nichelli et al. (1994) found that retrieval of move 
sequences paired with particular chess pieces appeared associated with activation 
of the hippocampus (and temporal lobe). 
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In a more fundamental approach to differences in spatial knowledge and 
processes, O'Keefe & Nadel (1978) tackled the difficult question of whether space 
is cognitively represented as absolute or relative. Relative space is a set of 
relationships among objects whereas absolute space is a framework in which 
objects are located. When an object moves in absolute space, the space remains 
unchanged unlike in relative space where space is dependent on interobject 
relationships. 
O'Keefe & Nadel argued that both representations of space are needed for tasks 
such as distance estimations, map-drawing, navigation etc. To make the definition 
a little clearer, they proposed absolute space to be a product of a locale system 
which they believe to be located in the hippocampus. They based this belief on 
evidence from studies of animal hippocampal neurons and on the form of amnesia 
in humans with left hippocampal lesions. This latter information they implicate in 
the formation of the neural substrate for the spatial nature of semantic deep 
structure. 
Relative space is a product of taxon ('classification') systems located in other brain 
areas. The system is constructed by motivation due to rewards and punishment. 
Since a route schema depends on each element being correctly linked to the next, 
its use is easily, disrupted; but taxon learning, though incremental and rigid, is 
rapid. However O'Keefe & Nadel propose that the construction of the locale 
system is motivated by curiosity and has no one goal or end-point. Its 
independence of object and place may mean it is not easily disrupted but again 
there is a trade-off; its use is very flexible but comparatively slow. 
The hypothesis that the hippocampus is the neural locus for the locale system is a 
controversial one (e. g. see Russell & Ward, 1982). Nevertheless the influential 
work of O'Keefe & Nadel on the representational systems for relative ('taxon') and 
absolute ('locale') space provides a very interesting parallel to that of route and 
survey knowledge. The concept of a 'mental atlas' is useful in this respect. For 
relative space and route knowledge, one might think of it as a recipe book with lists 
of places and instructions on how to arrive there. For absolute space and survey 
knowledge it resembles more of a traditional map on which places may be located, 
calculations of Euclidean distance made etc. (Downs & Stea, 1970; O'Keefe & 
Nadel, 1978; Russell & Ward, 1982). 
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So the O'Keefe & Nadel (1978) model (updated by O'Keefe, 1991 on 
computational grounds) proposes that animals build up a metric representation of 
the environment with the hippocampus involved as a key brain structure. Most 
recent surveys of neurobiological data concerning the neural mechanisms 
underlying cognitive maps emphasize the role played by the hippocampus (e. g. 
Poucet, 1993). However it would be easy to think that spatial schematizing was the 
only function , of the hippocampus. Indeed the spatial functioning of the 
hippocampus can now be regarded as a particular example of hippocampal 
formation involvement in a wide range of memory applications: timing of events 
(Olton et al., 1978), performance on configural problems (Sutherland et al., 1989), 
the formation of configurational 'associations (Sutherland & Rudy, 1989) and 
declarative memory (Squire, 1992). f 
Nevertheless none of these constructs are incompatible with the participation of 
the hippocampus in the formation and refinement of spatial knowledge. How the 
hippocampus fits into the general schema of spatial cognition is the key question. 
Other brain structures have been implicated in this function: e. g. the parietal cortex 
(Hyvarinen, 1982; Kolb & Walkey,, 1987) and frontal cortex (Kolb, 1984). 
See Chapter 4 for further evidence regarding the role of the hippocampus in 
memory and schematic processing. 
In a lucid review of the literature on the structure of the internal representation of 
spatial knowledge, David Bartram and Pauline Smith (1984) link the work of Lynch 
and Thomdyke together to conceptualize an interrelated network of nodes. Each 
node can be said to represent a 'place identifier' which refers to a particular place 
(e. g. a landmark), a generalized place (e. g. a postal district) and a superordinate 
place (e. g. a city or country). 
Chapter 2 Environmental Cognition 62 
Nodes can thus be said to exist at different levels corresponding to different 
environmental scales. Within each level exist links which describe 'distance', 
'proximity' and 'direction'. The hierarchical structure thus produced allows for route 
representations as a particular path from one node (present place) to another 
(destination). These paths may, argue Bartram & Smith, be derived from actual 
travel in the environment, from indirect knowledge (descriptions or maps) or from 
the network by inference. Hierarchies are not only efficient (see anon) but are well 
suited for inference-making (cf. Kuipers, 1978). 
The transition from network maps to veridical, Euclidean or 'vector' (survey) maps 
is viewed in three stages: the egocentric (or episodic) route representations are 
route dependent (a memory of a travel sequence) and from them topological 
networks can be abstracted. A topological representation, unlike an egocentric 
one, is bi-directional allowing one to travel not only from A to B but also from B to 
A. As more (navigation) information is incorporated into these, they soon 
approximate to the Euclidean vector representations. The Thorndyke & Hayes- 
Roth (1980) study demonstrated this effect and the fact that the navigationally 
experienced group were better on distance estimation tasks suggests that their 
'network' representation, while having the same Euclidean properties as the map 
group, is richer in the detail it contains. The implication of this effect is that there 
may be no 'restructuring' per se after all. 
A further refinement of this 'ontological', developmental view of the cognitive map- 
schema (e. g. see Siegel & White, 1975) is given by Hirtle & Hudson (1991). They 
studied the acquisition of spatial information by subjects in a map or slide 
presentation condition- 16 subjects per group (including controls). Not surprisingly, 
those in the map condition showed they had accurate configurational ('Euclidean') 
knowledge and both experimental groups were able to acquire route information. 
Their findings also included the results of the technique known as ordered tree 
clustering algorithms. In a free recall task of the locations in the stimulus 
environment, Hirtle and Hudson noted the directional components of subjects' 
ordered trees to examine inter- and intra-group differences. Correlations were 
made for each subject between performance on the straight line distance 
estimation tasks and the nature of directionality in their ordered trees; this can be 
taken as a measure of a subject's configurational knowledge. 
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The authors found interesting individual differences only within the slide condition 
subjects: those with a non-directional or bi-directional top node in their trees 
correlated more highly with actual distance than those with uni-directional top 
nodes. So some of these subjects (9 out of a group of 16) were able to acquire 
configurational knowledge. 
Hirtle and Hudson concluded that there is a difference between route and 
configurational knowledge but only up to a point. They go on to state that "these 
are not discrete knowledge states, but rather there is a continuum between route 
and configurational knowledge. " (p343). This conclusion is not dissimilar to the 
result reported by Moar & Carleton (1982) in which subjects began to acquire 
configurational knowledge from the moment of learning the intersecting of routes. 
Hirtle & Hudson's technique of ordered tree clustering may indeed, as they claim, 
become a useful tool in diagnosing the qualitative state of a perceiver's spatial 
schema. 
Further evidence that route and survey representations are not discrete and 
mutually exclusive categories of knowledge comes from Taylor & Tversky (1992). 
They allowed subjects to acquire spatial knowledge from reading route or survey 
descriptions of naturalistic environments (a small town and a zoo). Route 
descriptions were 'tour' like and ordered linearly, using egocentric expressions 
such as "in front of you" etc. Survey descriptions indicated the hierarchical nature 
of the stimulus environment and used canonical terms such as north, south, east 
and west and configurational terms such as "in the middle of' and "across". A third 
group were allowed to study maps instead. 
Subjects were asked 'verbatim' or 'inference' questions from both perspectives: 
survey ("bird's eye") and route (mental tour) and were also asked to draw maps. 
The results reflect the close association between route and survey schemata: 
representations of an environment may not be uniformly route or uniformly survey. 
For example, those given survey descriptions were, not surprisingly, more accurate 
overall in terms of proportions of errors. However, subjects were as fast (judged 
from reaction times) and accurate for inference questions in both perspectives 
suggesting that subjects were judging such questions against a representation of 
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the environment described by the text. Incidentally, map drawings from both 
perspectives were very accurate (cf. Gold, op. cit. ). 
The evidence suggests that, unlike previous research (e. g. Perrig & Kintsch, 
1985), very specific perspective information may not be maintained in what the 
authors themselves prefer to call a mental model rather than an image. This 
mental model "may be like an architect's 3D model of a town; it can be viewed or 
visualized from many different perspectives, but it cannot be viewed or visualized 
as a whole. " (p289; own italics). This fragmentary, pragmatic view of how a spatial 
schema functions is precisely what previous methodologies in particular have 
failed to take into account. The orthodox view of the schema has always assumed 
a more mechanized, pure and holistic view of spatial information processing. 
How important is the achievement of a configurational spatial schema in any case? 
Do real people need a schema of Ordinance Survey accuracy in their heads? In a 
qualification to their three stage progression under the heading of 'functional 
utility', Bartram & Smith (op. cit. ) point out that for some environments (presumably 
very irregular ones), a Euclidean representation is not only more difficult to obtain 
but may actually be less useful. The "criteria for selecting information about places 
and relationships between places are primarily the functional utility of that 
information and its availability". In such cases, Euclidean representation may not 
be the ultimate goal of the system. 
"... the concept of Euclidean space as a homogenous and boundless medium 
is acquired by children and used for limited purposes, while "perceived" 
space is what really counts. " (Lee, 1967, p174) 
Studies of distance and direction estimations have been carried out both in the 
laboratory and in the field. Many have focused on variables which influence the 
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cognitive maps of people in ways which relate to distortions in their conceptions of 
distance. 
Much of the early research into spatial cognition was aimed at understanding how 
both strangers to and longtime residents of an urban area obtained their 
orientation in relation to their specific and diverse needs. There are two related 
skills in orientation: direction and distance perception. 
.: 71.. Direction. Perception 
............................................. 
The perception of direction was first studied in the earlier in the century by the likes 
of Gulliver (1908) and Trowbridge (1913) who pointed to the significance of an 
egocentric reference system in the maintenance of orientation- rather than by the 
configuration of the compass points as had been thought previously. Other studies 
of direction perception included investigations of direction finding in primitive 
societies (Hallowell, 1955; Carpenter et al., 1959) and in children (Howe, 1931; 
Lord, 1941). With regard to the urban environment, it appears that there are 
differences according to age, familiarity with the environment and culture. 
Successful and efficient navigation does not require precise compass directions 
(Rapoport, 1977). 
It should come as no surprise to learn that environmental schemata encode 
angular relations only with substantial 'inaccuracy'. As long ago as 1948, it was 
observed that individuals tend to smooth out curves in routes into straight lines in 
their schemata and also to typically show turns in direction nearer to right-angles 
than objectively the case (Griffin, 1948). The tendency to draw corners of the 
Boston Commons not as obtuse as they are in reality, but more like right-angles, 
was also noted by Lynch (1960). Milgram (1976), Byrne (1979), Tversky (1981) 
and Moar & Bower (1983) also report the same 'normalization' of obtuse angles 
through various tasks. 
More recent research includes studies of reference systems (Garling et al., 1985). 
The learning of spatial relations relative to a global reference system would be 
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especially efficient in orientating oneself as the reference system would remain 
invariant with respect to changes in both the station point of the individual and the 
direction in which he or she faces. 
For example, Garling et al., (1986) asked subjects to estimate directions and 
angles between places not 'perceptually available' (within sight); they concluded 
that "reference systems encoded in cognitive maps have some properties of a 
global reference system even after a short time of residence" (p1). When the 
distances to be traveled are short and the street system conforms to a regular 
system then the acquisition of a global reference system appears to be enhanced. 
More recently, Sadalla & Montello (1989) asked subjects to make traversals of 
several laboratory pathways which varied with constituent turns ranging in size 
from 15° to 165° from the direction of forward motion. Once each traversal was 
completed, subjects were asked to estimate the angle traversed, indicate the 
original direction of travel and point to the start of the pathway. 
They discovered that their subjects were least disorientated by, and remembered 
much better, angles near 00,90° and 180° from the direction of forward motion. 
Divergence from these orthogonal points lead to increasing error. They also 
detected the well documented normalizing error (towards 90°) referred to earlier 
(e. g. Byrne, 1979; Milgram, 1976) whereby subjects showed a strong tendency to 
estimate angles as more like 90° than they actually were. 
Sadalla & Montello employ their theory of orthogonal reference axes to explain 
these results. They believe that when individuals navigate through space, one axis 
is aligned with the direction of travel. Those turns that vary only slightly from this 
axis or from an axis at right angles to the direction of travel are most easily 
remembered and thus are least likely to disorientate the subject. As the angular 
deviation from either of these reference axes increases, so too does the error and 
disorientation of the individual. 
They adduce various factors to account for the proposed existence of these 
orthogonal reference axes e. g. the structure of the human body forming right 
angles when pointing or the orthogonal relationship of the earth's gravitational field 
to our navigable (horizontal) surface. They believe such factors to be important: 
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they note that the concept of vertical direction tends to be extended to represent 
horizontal directions straight ahead in the egocentric frame of reference of the 
subject (Shepard & Hurwitz, 1984). "The equation of vertical with the horizontal 
forward direction yields an egocentric "forward-up" reference axis that moves 
through the space with the viewer. " (Sadalla & Montello, 1989, p348). 
Verbal labels may also be a reason for individuals to remember orthogonal angles 
(90°, 180° etc. ) and diagonal angles e. g. 45°, 225° etc. in direction changes. 
"Straight", "right-angle", "cross", "about-turn", "left-fork", "right-fork" and "diagonally 
across" are all expressions familiar to us when asking for directions. Interestingly, 
cross-cultural studies of the trapezoidal window illusion provide supplementary 
evidence for the notion of orthogonal reference axes (Allport & Pettigrew, 1957). 
Such studies suggest that people from those cultural milieu which contain 
rectilinear architecture develop schemata for right angles (Segall et al., 1966). 
Daniel Montello (1991) followed up the study he completed with Edward Sadalla 
(1989) but took the data collection outside the laboratory. This was to counter the 
possibility that their original methodology was a little too artificial in that visibility 
was restricted and landmark information as such was limited. No such accusation 
of artificiality could be leveled at Montello this time! Sixty pedestrians were stopped 
at one of three locations: one on a street orthogonal to the local grid pattern and 
the other two on streets oblique to the local grid pattern. Both cardinal directions 
and local features provided the non-visible targets for subjects to point to. 
Results indicated a greater error on four of the five targets on both of the oblique 
streets than on the orthogonal street; accuracy and response speed were also 
related to length of residency. From such results he concluded, inter alia, that the 
reason why oblique routes appeared to disorientate individuals was twofold. One 
possibility is that spatial memory may be influenced by heuristics which bias 
schemata in the direction of reference axes that major routes, landmarks or 
cardinal directions determine. An additional possibility is that when individuals 
travel along oblique routes, it becomes more difficult to keep the orthogonal, body- 
centred, reference axes used to organize surrounding spatial knowledge (as 
described above) co-ordinated with orthogonal axes that local features or more 
global frames determine. 
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2 Distance Percep 
...:.......::: "::::::;:::::::::::: 
The literature on distance perception is, by comparison, enormous but will be 
condensed here with only the most salient studies included. Behind much of the 
research on cognitive distance is the assumption that ones' cognitive map contains 
information that bears some relation to that found in a cartographic map. This 
conjecture, first made by Tolman (1948), is of course unproven and today there is 
little dissent from the view that to treat the cognitive map as a real map is to court 
theoretical disaster. See Downs (1981) for a fascinating treatment of this subject 
and his assertion that "there is a failure to appreciate the complex, double role that 
the map plays in our analogical thinking, and second, there is a failure to 
distinguish between the map as metaphor and the map as analogy. " (p287). 
Nevertheless, it is feasible that cognitive schemata will have a 'scale' by which 
information from the real world is somehow transformed for storage in memory and 
later retrieval (Canter, 1977). One example of this approach is research into the 
power function that best fits the distance data produced by ratio-scaling. A power 
function states that cognitive distance is equal to the physical distance raised to 
the power of some exponent and multiplied by a scaling constant as a correction 
(e. g. Baird, 1979; Baird et al., 1982; Montello, 1991). 
Not surprisingly, with such a large literature there are a large number of 
methodologies that have been applied. As a result different cognitive skills are 
being tapped by the specific types of methods used and one needs to temper 
ones interpretation of the literature with this in mind. This point has been discussed 
at length in another chapter so will not be covered in detail here. However there 
are some findings worthy of further consideration. 
One can obtain different impressions of cognitive distance depending on whether 
estimates of actual physical distance or travel-time are used. For example, in an 
urban setting, estimation of time is largely dependent on variables such as the type 
of travel used (car vs. walking), details of the route taken and the time of day 
(important when traveling in the rush-hour). When these variables have been 
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taken into account, it seems that estimates of actual distance are more accurate 
than those of time traveled. 
Canter (1977) studied the estimates of distance traveled in the London 
Underground (the 'Tube'). This transport system has the virtue (for researchers) of 
having standard routes and relatively consistent travel times between stations (this 
only applies only to the central area as the trip to Heathrow shows). He interviewed 
people who lived along a section of a route of the Tube, asking them to make 
estimates of direct distances and travel times between pairs of stations. 
When the two types of estimates were compared, a higher correlation was found 
between distance estimates and real distances than that obtained for travel time 
estimates and actual travel times used by London Transport. In the latter instance 
it was even noticed that for some cases, °, peoples' estimates of time travel 
correlated negatively with the London Transport data; some people thought that 
long journeys took the shortest time to make and vice versa. The conclusion 
seems to be that people have a more accurate idea of distances than travel times. 
The influence of the variables mentioned above means that except perhaps for 
those routes that an individual uses regularly, time is difficult to estimate. Distance, 
on the other hand, is, by definition, constant. So if the person is asked to consider 
a great distance, then he or she will assume that the time taken to traverse it is 
also great. Conversely, if one specifies a long time spent on e. g. the tube, the 
assumption is that the distance covered is great. 
Despite the caveats concerning methodology and interpretation, it is possible to 
discern certain trends from amongst all the methodologies used. The first example 
appears initially to give a confusing picture. It seems that one perceives distance 
under the influence of the direction of the stimulus in the urban environment. In 
certain research, results suggest that people overestimate distance towards the 
centre of the city relative to those distances coming from this area (e. g. Golledge 
et al., 1969; Briggs, 1973). 
Nevertheless, European studies have found the opposite case; Lee (1970) carried 
out a study of distance estimation in the city of Dundee. Using over 170 university 
students, he found that they overestimated all distances but those distances in a 
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downtown direction were perceived as shorter. This finding is concordant with 
earlier evidence which showed that housewives in Cambridge viewed shops lying 
in the direction of the city centre as being 'nearer' than those situated in the out-of- 
town direction (Lee, 1962). 
This earlier study of Lee's replicated the findings of Brennan (1948) for whom the 
term "Brennan's Law" was coined (see the preface to Brennan's 1948 report). Lee 
investigated this 'law' by testing the hypothesis that those (housewives) whose 
nearest shopping subcentre lay outward would be less likely to shop there than 
those whose nearest subcentre lay in the direction of the town or city centre (Lee, 
1962). The hypothesis was confirmed using a sample of 219 respondents in 
Cambridge. 
Lee discounted the two most obvious explanations. The first, as proposed initially 
by Brennan, was that housewives simply would make use of the inward journeys 
they made to do other shopping in the nearest subcentre- "dual purpose journeys". 
In the Cambridge study there was little evidence for this and not enough to 
compensate for the repeated use of the non-proximate subcentre. The second 
possible explanation was one of "selectivity"; shops become more 'rewarding' as 
one progresses towards the city centre. In the case of Cambridge, this explanation 
also seems unlikely since this particular city has a history of urban growth by the 
incorporation of large outlying villages with the result that many of the best centres 
for shopping lie in the outskirts. 
Lee preferred to view Brennan's Law as a special case of a more general principle: 
the sociospatial schema. His view was that all individuals build up a schema of the 
city which includes "a focal orientation built up by the satisfactions of the centre" 
(1962, p662). Such satisfactions would undoubtedly influence ones perception of 
the city with a resultant foreshortening of cognitive distance in the direction of the 
city centre, "perhaps on an increasing gradient, and affecting judgments and 
behaviour which might otherwise be quite independent of the city centre. " (Lee, 
1970, p42) 
Similar results regarding the underestimation of distances toward the city-centre 
were found by Lamy (1967) in Paris and Heinemeyer (1967) in Amsterdam. 
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The reason for divergence on the issue of intra-urban distance foreshortening (cf. 
Briggs, 1973) can perhaps be best explained by looking at cultural differences 
between peoples in the studies. Central areas of a city may be regarded adversely 
in North America but nevertheless be a source of attraction for Europeans; these 
differing values attached to city centres my well cause differential distortion of 
cognitive distances around them (Rapoport, 1976). 
Various confounding variables disturb this neat proposition, however. It is possible, 
for example, that people in European cities would use public transport or simply 
walk on journeys towards the city centre but prefer to drive to destinations outwith 
the centre. It may also be argued that these bus passengers and pedestrians are 
more aware of travel distance than drivers and so would overestimate distances 
into the city centre. What then if this potential overestimation is counterbalanced 
by the same peoples' attraction toward the centre? Another complication so 
obvious that it may even escape attention is that cities differ. They differ in their 
layouts (e. g. Amsterdam vs. Den Haag), regularity of street pattern (e. g. New York 
vs. London), distinctiveness of their historic centres (e. g. - Rome vs. Los Angeles) 
and efficiency of their public transport (e. g. Edinburgh vs. Zurich) to name just a 
few distinguishing variables. Consequently it may be a lot easier to estimate 
distances in one particular city than in another (Canter & Tagg, 1975). 
Another important variable to be investigated with cognitive mapping is the 
directness of the route. It has been found that subjects have consistently 
overestimated the length of routes when these routes include many corners and 
bends when compared to routes with more direct paths. 
Laboratory evidence for this comes from work of line-length estimation described 
in Lee (1971, p652). Subjects were asked to estimate the length of various line- 
drawings. These lines varied in length (6,8 or 10 inches) and contained either 0,3, 
5 or 7 right-angled corners. The results were dramatic showing that overestimation 
of line length increased almost linearly with the number of corners present. Similar 
results were obtained when the variable under investigation was degree of line 
curvature. The longer the line, the greater the degree of overestimation. It was also 
discovered that double ("S" shaped) curves were perceived as longer than single 
("U" shaped) curves and that the perception of length increased with the degree of 
curvature. Outside the laboratory, Briggs found only partial support for this effect 
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when studying the city of Colombus, Ohio but methodological problems temper his 
result (Briggs, 1973a, 1976). 
A related finding is reported by Lee (1975) when investigating the phenomenon 
known as "social severance". This is the effect of barriers (e. g. a motorway or a 
newly built by-pass) on local communities. One measure of severance studied was 
"shifting"; one of its indices was the extent to which the perceived distances of 
destinations on the other side of the motorway are overestimated by comparison 
with those on the same side. Lee found that participants in the study did, indeed, 
shift neighbourhoods back, perhaps to compensate for the loss of facilities on the 
other side 
Kosslyn et at. (1974) looked at a similiar barrier effect from a developmental point 
of view. They asked subjects of different ages to rank the distances between a 
referent toy and the locations of nine other toys; -they had already learnt the 
positions of all ten toys in a 17 ft. space which contained opaque and transparent 
barriers. The results from preschoolers suggested that either kind of barrier led 
them to believe that distances were greater than they actually were. Exaggeration 
of distance only took place for adults across opaque barriers. The authors 
supposed this was due to functional distance being more important for children; 
the inability to perform direct locomotion leads to distortion even if the barrier 
allows visual integration. 
An alternative explanation they offered was that children may use smaller units to 
organize the layout; they have better integrative processing capacities than adults 
who can keep many objects in mind simultaneously. A later study replicated these 
findings but when a distance estimation measure was elicited, barrier effects did 
not interact with age (Newcombe & Lieben, 1982). Their findings also underline the 
importance of an individuals processing capacity and one of the conclusions drawn 
is very familiar to students of cognitive schemata: "that different dependent 
measures may tap different processes" (p46). 
The model of a schema is not, of course, challenged by this latter assertion since 
different dependent measures may utilize different mental standards. What is more 
problematic, at least for a Euclidean model, is the existence of non-commutative or 
intrasensitive distance judgments (e. g. Lee, 1970; Cadwallader, 1979; Foley & 
Chapter 2 Environmental Cognition 73 
Cohen, 1984) or the existence of angular estimates producing alleged triangles 
(where angles encompass more than 180°: Moar & Bower, 1983). 
The importance of such evidence for the effects occasioned by barriers and 
numbers of turns in distance estimation tasks is worth emphasizing. If, as a 
consequence of the evidence above, a Euclidean spatial schema does not exist or 
at least exists in tandem with other forms of representation and is executed only 
occasionally, one must identify the nature of alternative forms of spatial schemata. 
The research into semantic memory has provided some useful perspectives on this 
issue. As far back as Millar's influential paper of 1956, it has been believed that 
individuals have a very limited capacity in the processing of information, variously 
believed to be around seven items that can be held in memory at any one time. 
When storing information that is complex or comprehensive, it seems that one of 
the most efficient strategies is to organize the material into a limited number of 
information-rich 'chunks' or possibly even into a hierarchical arrangement of 
chunks within chunks (e. g. Mandler, 1967). 
Much evidence exists which points to this process of dividing the environment into 
chunks or categories with resultant effects on spatial judgment once chunking has 
been established. It is believed that people can subdivide a route into segments 
and then use these segment boundaries as a basic heuristic in distance estimation 
(Allen, 1981). The distance estimates of subjects have also been found to be 
increasing in a stairstep, threshold fashion with a sudden jump in size whenever a 
new boundary is crossed (Allen & Kirasic, 1985). The boundaries of various 
regions have been shown to induce distortions in the distance and directional 
estimates of subjects; objects in the same subregion "primed" one another more 
than those from separate subregions (McNamarra, 1986). 
Byrne (1979) was interested in people's ideas of walking distance (and angles of 
routes) in their daily environment. He found that the lengths of selected routes in a 
town centre were relatively overestimated compared with those in the more 
regular, monotonous suburbs, as were shorter routes and those having several 
major bends. He believed that such errors may be due to representations failing to 
encode vector information, relying instead on heuristics (e. g. the more numerous 
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the locations on the route, the longer it must be). It is these heuristics which are 
prone to the biases he found. 
Baird (1979) asked his subjects to give interlocational distance estimates on a 
university campus and to construct a layout of locations. Baird suggested that 
underestimations of relative distances between pairs of locations in natural, large 
scale environments was the general trend. Canter & Tagg (1975) found the 
opposite effect and discuss this in terms of a city's "imageability" (cf. Lynch, 1960) 
where, e. g. London, may be viewed as divided by the Thames which acts as a 
reference point for distance estimation judgments. 
This idea of a reference point was taken up by Sadalla et al., (1980) who defined it 
as "a well-known location that serves to delineate the location of adjacent points". 
Results showed that the distances of places to the reference points were judged 
as shorter than vice-versa, i. e. the distances were non-transitive. This does not 
augur well for the idea that the ultimate goal of the cognitive mapping schema is 
veridical representation but the study fails to account for subjective factors not yet 
fully understood in tasks of this kind. 
Evans & Pezdek (1980) compared subjects' judgments of distance between U. S. 
states to distance estimations on a university campus. By giving subjects two pairs 
of campus (or State) locations and asking which pair was closer, they discovered 
that for either type of stimuli, the decision time increased linearly as the ratio of the 
two intrapair distances approached one. This, they argued, strongly suggested an 
analogue component to the processing. 
Cohen et al., (1978) found that the presence of hills and trees lead to 
overestimates of distance, perhaps because these features increase the effort 
required to 'move' between locations which causes distortion of the representation. 
A similiar principle may apply to the number of corners. 
The findings of the Cohen et al., study were essentially predicted in another study 
which used artificial stimuli. In the study mentioned earlier, Kosslyn et al., (1974) 
placed objects at various locations between and behind transparent and opaque 
barriers and subjects estimated distances between object pairs. To recap their 
results: children were found to overestimate distances in the presence of any 
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barrier whereas adults only did so in the presence of opaque barriers. Cohen et 
al's. (1978) study underlines the ecological validity of this group's study. This might 
also be said of other distance estimation studies in laboratory conditions and helps 
to confirm that real and artificial settings are mediated by the same processes. 
In a study by Thomdyke & Hayes-Roth (1980) also already cited, it was found that 
Euclidean distance estimations made by subjects with 12-24 months navigational 
experience in a given 'environment are as accurate as those made by subjects 
whose knowledge is based solely on map-learning. So although survey knowledge 
is not available from direct experience of an environment, they propose that with 
increasing experience of an area, route knowledge may be qualitatively altered to 
approach a survey-like representation. Experienced subjects or 'navigators' have 
route-like representations which are restructured to allow for retrieval of Euclidean 
distances without references to routes. Nevertheless, such representations are not 
identical to survey knowledge obtained from a map. Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth 
speculate that this is because the navigator is still ground-based; he or she may 
'see through' intervening objects ('translucence') to obtain straight-line distance 
estimates. The nature of this restructured knowledge is not elaborated upon. 
Less controversial is the existence of a class of normalizing errors that are the 
result of hierarchical organization of spatial knowledge. The major theoretical 
explanation underpinning such systematic distortions has been alluded to above: 
namely that an individual can, for example, subdivide a route into segments and 
then use these segment boundaries as a basic heuristic in distance estimation 
(Allen, 1981). 
A well known example of segment boundaries in influencing distance judgments is 
Stevens & Coupe's (1978) study which investigated subjects' knowledge of 
relative, spatial locations of geographic loci. They discovered certain systematic 
errors in memory for geographic orientation. For many subjects, errors were made 
in judging the relative positions of two items in space (e. g. they asked: Which is 
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further west- Reno, Nevada or San Diego, California? ) when the superordinate 
structures (the states of Nevada and California in this case forming the 'segment 
boundaries') were arranged in the opposite relative geographic positions. Nevada 
may be east of California but Reno is actually west of San Diego. 
In theory, therefore, people tend to organize their geographical knowledge into 
sets of localized regions; these regions then being hierarchically organized by a 
set of more global relations that link all the local regions together. In an urban 
setting, people will tend to assume a rectilinear grid structure; this is the 
assumption behind Kuipers (1978) model of spatial knowledge. Local regions are 
represented with respect to more global features, ergo a great deal of spatial 
information may be inferred (Chase & Chi, 1981). Furthermore, whether the 
inferencing process is analogical or propositional in form, the implication is still that 
long-term memory representation is hierarchical. One reason why hierarchies are 
efficient is that they reduce the need to store directly every spatial relation; spatial 
relations that cut across regions can be inferred, abstracted or generalized from 
memory. 
As mentioned above, Allen (1981) found evidence of segmentation effects 
(learning of a route by 'chunking' or'segmenting') for both children and adults and 
Allen and Kirasic (1985) propose that route segments formed can significantly bias 
judgments of macro spatial distance. This sort of systematic bias they believe 
parallels that found by Stevens & Coupe (1978) and reflects a hierarchically 
organized cognitive representation. More specifically, they see the results in terms 
of a hierarchical framework with subdivisional processing and computation. A route 
as a whole would be superordinate to various subdivisions, these in turn being 
superordinate to specific locations. Judgments of proximity then, need only 
processing at subdivisional level with computation at the 'deeper' level of specific 
locations should this be insufficient or inappropriate. 
If route segmentation as an analogue of categorization is responsible for the 
systematic distortion Allen and Kirasic (1985) report, then one might expect these 
effects to subside with environmental experience. However, the studies of Lynch 
(1960), Byrne (1979) and Stevens & Coupe (1978) show that some distortions are 
a reliable feature in representations of long-term residents in the area. Yet if one 
accepts route segmentation as an initial means of facilitating memory resulting, 
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after repeated experience, in many segments being integrated according to a 
variety of functional or just practical criteria, then the end product would be a 
developmental trend toward relatively larger and more stable segments. 
As alluded to above, there is much evidence for the chunking of complex or 
comprehensive information during storage in memory. Many studies have 
produced data which are consistent with this view. For example, one could 
anticipate that subjects would be influenced by the number of turns or junctions on 
a route when judging its length if those same route features were to serve as some 
sort of category boundaries (Byrne, 1979; Sadalla & Staplin, 1980a, 1980b , 1981). 
Paralleling these findings, those studies that demonstrated that barriers lead to 
overestimation of distances (e. g. Canter, 1974; Kosslyn et al., 1974; Cohen et al., 
1978; Sherman et al., 1979; Cohen & Weatherford, 1980; Newcombe & Lieben, 
1982) would perhaps be better explained by considering how barriers can act as 
subdivision boundaries rather than, for example, in terms of 'functional distance' 
(Holding, 1992). 
It is feasible to reconceptualize the 'clutter phenomenon' of Thorndyke (1981b); (as 
the number of intervening cities increased, so too did the mean distance 
estimates) as an instance of chunking. A 'chunking phenomenon' account would 
explain this as the cluttered parts of the map being subdivided into smaller 
categories with subjects basing their judgments of distance on the number of 
category boundaries mentally traversed. 
Hirtle & Jonides (1985) address the question of whether all representations can be 
predicted by a purely geometric model. They hypothesized three clusterings of 
landmarks; these were generated by an ordered tree algorithm derived from 
protocols of subjects who were asked repeatedly to recall a memorized list of 
landmarks. Subjects were also tested in a series of tasks requiring judgments 
about distances in space. The rationale for this approach was that subjects would 
recall as a unit those items they had stored together in memory. 
Their results confirm the Stevens & Coupe (1978) model, suggesting also that 
subjects do cluster landmarks on the basis of non-spatial attributes. In addition, 
they found across-cluster distances to be overestimated and within-cluster 
distances underestimated, relative to each other. More recent work by McNamarra 
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et al., (1989) has produced similar results using this same ordered tree analysis. 
Taken with the work of Stevens & Coupe (1978), they believe it only proper that a 
mental model of spatial (and even non-spatial) knowledge must also recognise the 
representation of non-Euclidean information. 
McNamarra (1986) regards Stevens & Coupe's (1978) model as "partially 
hierarchical", i. e. spatial relations between cities in different states are not explicitly 
represented. Such a view is at odds with non-hierarchical theories (e. g. Byrne, 
1978; Thomdyke, 1981) which claim that all is represented at the -"same level". 
However, using amongst other things the novel technique of "priming" (the extent 
to which a subject recognised a target city faster if, on the previous trial, they had 
just recognised a city close to the target on the map), they replicated the results 
reported by Stevens & Coupe (1978). Their results showed, inter alia, an 
interaction between distance and alignment in direction judgments. Yet an 
explanation based purely on superordinate spatial relations fails to explain why 
superordinate information was heavily weighted when objects were close together 
but not when far apart. 
McNamarra (1986) explains this rather convincingly. When objects are close 
together, relatively minor perturbations of their position will produce large changes 
in relative orientation unlike objects far apart in which small perturbations will 
produce rather small changes in orientation. - So inaccurate location knowledge is 
more useful in direct estimates when objects are far apart. 
Holding (1992) replicated in essence the data of both Hirtle & Jonides (1985) and 
McNamarra et al., (1989) but used full cluster analysis and found it to be a useful 
tool. She also found that females were less accurate than males in their judgments 
and were more dependant on clustering and reference points than males- a finding 
not discordant with the robust observation that males perform better on tasks of 
geometry than females (but see anon). Holding also found that clustering of spatial 
information was influenced by semantic factors (e. g. houses together, streets 
together) as well as by physical features on specially constructed map stimuli- 
though she properly cautions against generalizing from map studies to actual way- 
finding of that configuration in the environment (Holding, 1994). 
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So far, the individual variation in representation of macrospace has only been 
hinted at in this review (e. g., Foley & Cohen, 1984). As recently as 1969, Carr and 
Schissler claimed that the emphasis on affective, individualistic and cognitive 
factors in representation was misleading. Clearly these factors facilitate 
understanding of how space is represented. This section is specifically concerned 
with individual differences in spatial cognition but concentrates on two aspects of 
most interest: gender and spatial ability. 
Not until adolescence has a difference in accuracy of spatial cognition between the 
sexes been observed- with a slight male advantage emerging (Evans, 1980). 
Orleans & Schmidt (1972) noted that females tended to construct sketch-maps 
using their home as a referent system ignoring the abstract co-ordinates provided. 
Males did tend to use these co-ordinates when constructing maps. In another 
sketch-map study, Hart (1979) found that the extent of "home range" was more 
restricted (and their map smaller) for girls than for boys. Siegel & Schadler (1977) 
in their model classroom study found that kindergarten boys were more accurate 
than girls in relative and absolute object placement in the model. When working in 
a smaller, more clearly bounded space, these differences disappeared though the 
error rate reported may have obscured sex differences (Evans, 1980). 
So far, ' one may conclude that there may be male superiority on small, two- 
dimensional stimuli but this effect largely disappears in real-scale spatial tasks. 
One study which claims significant and conclusive sex differences is that by 
McGuinness & Sparks (1983). They used sketch-map techniques and found that 
males included more routes and placed buildings more accurately with respect to 
spatial co-ordinates than females. Females showed a poorer topographic sense of 
the stimulus terrain but focused more on landmarks (more accurate in their 
placement to aý central target point) and were more accurate in distance 
estimations. This study runs counter to more recent research but several criticisms 
can be made. Firstly, the authors fail to state the experience the subjects have of 
the stimulus environment (a college campus) and admit that "one or two 
subjects... had only been at UCSC for one quarter.... ". (p 95). It is entirely possible 
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that many of their subjects had poorly established mental representations of the 
campus. Equally, if not more, reprehensible is the fact that only one measure of 
relative error or accuracy was taken thereby failing to take into account possible 
internal accuracy of a sketch map. They even admit that "measures of absolute 
distance do not provide an accurate estimate of geometric layout" (p 96) but fail to 
take this into account when interpreting their results. 
One of the most ecologically valid techniques mentioned already is triangulation 
and a study using this technique found little evidence of sex differences in 
macrospatial cognitive abilities (Kirasic et al., 1984). Male subjects did demonstrate 
a superior knowledge for some locations but the authors ascribe this advantage to 
males being more acquainted with athletic facilities on the campus environment. 
All other analyses showed no sex differences. 
Considering the lack of sex differences in numerous other studies, the issue might 
seem to be finally exhausted. However, gender itself may not be the mediating 
variable in spatial cognition. Rather a difference in spatial ability may account for 
more of the variance in the output of subjects. What then is spatial ability and how 
can it affect the representation of macrospace? Thorndyke & Goldin (1981) have 
suggested that spatial ability may distinguish good from poor 'mappers' (see also 
Goldin & Thomdyke, 1980; Thorndyke & Stasz, 1980). Goldin & Thorndyke (1980) 
found that "good mappers" (as determined by their accuracy of spatial knowledge 
of their own area on measures of location judgments, etc. ) acquired new 
information more accurately and quickly than poor mappers and were significantly 
better at computing spatial judgments using a memorized map of an unfamiliar 
environment. They proposed that good mappers were different to poor mappers in 
their ability to: 
a) encode and/or retain knowledge of spatial relations; 
b) manipulate their internal representation to compute spatial judgment. 
Thomdyke & Goldin (1981)suggested that spatial ability is the major category 
of individual difference variables that distinguish good from poor mappers. 
So spatial ability does appear related to success in cognitive mapping. Several 
components of spatial ability have been identified and, in particular, visualization, 
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spatial orientation and visual memory may be those components, tapping different 
aspects of the same processing skills (Thorndyke & Goldin, 1981). 
Visualization is the ability to transform or manipulate the image of a 2D or 3D 
pattern. Examples of such an operation are assuming an imagined location at a 
landmark or mentally traversing a route. Spatial orientation is the ability to maintain 
an orientation and remain unconfused when the perceived pattern changes, e. g. 
when performing orientation judgments based on navigation experience. Visual 
memory is the ability to encode and remember a pattern of purely spatial or 
pictorial information. 
Thomdyke & Goldin (1981) administered the relevant tests and found good 
mappers better at visualization tasks: not surprising since transformation is a key 
element of most spatial judgment tasks. Spatial orientation skills proved to be 
another possible correlate of mapping ability with good mappers again scoring 
highly. More concrete evidence was found that visual memory ability is a good 
predictor of spatial cognition performance. Although they admit that little is known 
of the actual relationship between spatial ability and cognitive mapping skill, the 
authors propose the following model which accommodates the inclusion of 
individual differences. 
To acquire spatial knowledge from direct experience one must remember various 
visual features, their order and a dependable form of encoding such as a good 
visual memory. Poor subjects are more likely to have more inaccurate 
representations so make more errors in mental simulation, etc. A transformation of 
procedural representations to establish correspondences (in a manner typified by 
visualization) might allow for abstraction of survey knowledge leading to a quicker 
and more accurate development of such knowledge. Thorndyke & Goldin (1981) 
for example, go on to speculate that visualization acts in tandem with spatial 
orientation. Many spatial judgment tasks (e. g. map-drawing) appear to involve 
(judging from subject protocols) the subject mentally traversing the stimulus routes. 
By allowing the subject to maintain a stable frame of reference, and then to retain 
it as direction of mental traversal changes, spatial orientation would come into its 
own as a vital ability. 
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The relationship between gender and spatial ability is not entirely clear. The 
superiority of males on some perceptual cognitive tasks cannot be explained by a 
differential response to training on spatial tasks: this has not been demonstrated 
(McGee, 1979). Nevertheless, Sherman (1967) rightly points out that one simply 
does not know what is "relevant activity" in the growth of spatial abilities. Many 
activities (technical drawing, driving as an occupation, map-reading, planning) are 
often 'sex-typed' in Western culture and education. The unusual but interesting 
observational study by Hart (1979) described all the favourite places, treasured 
short cuts etc. of young children and found that much of this knowledge stemmed 
from unaided exploration. Parental restrictions of such exploration relax as the 
child grows older but it does so much more quickly for boys than for girls. Sex 
differences in parental and other cultural restrictions may then account for later sex 
differences in spatial abilities (Russell & Ward, 1982). One may then tentatively 
presume that: 
"... sex differences in various aspects of perceptual-cognitive functioning are a 
secondary -consequence of differences with respect to spatial visual and spatial 
orientation abilities. " (McGee, 1979, p909) 
".. an individual's distance estimate is not independent of the method 
used to obtain that estimate" 
(Cadwallader, 1979, p563) 
Cadwallader's caveat should be at the forefront of researchers' minds when 
investigating the cognitive representation of space. It also sets the right critical 
note for assessing varying and apparently contradictory results in the literature. 
Problems in trying to externalize peoples' internal representation of space have 
greatly exercised the majority of researchers in the field. However too many have 
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been less than cautious when assigning numerical values to variables which turn 
out to be of dubious validity. Over-dependence on particular techniques and 
frequent misinterpretations of the data have been persistent problems. With an 
even greater variety of methodologies to choose from than before, the issue 
remains contentious. 
Montello (1991) provides the most comprehensive review of methodological issues 
in cognitive mapping research. Cognitive distance is what people think of in terms 
of distances between places in large-scale environments, these places being 
quite far apart and not directly visible from each other. To consider the distance 
properly, people need to travel through the environment, evaluating and integrating 
the information over time. Perceptual distances are those between places that are 
directly visible from each'other and in sight during estimation (Montello, 1991). 
Only cognitive distance methods will be focused on in this chapter though 
perceptual and cognitive distance methods share a lot in common: A variety of 
measurement methods exists and Montello (1991) claims to have produced an 
exhaustive set of 5 classes of such methods citing Golledge (1976) as a partial 
source. 
Perhaps these methods are most widely used on account of ease and relative 
efficiency and because they can be used over a range of distances. There are five 
types commonly employed: 
1. Magnitude estimation 
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Subjects assign a number to a test distance that reflects its apparent length 
relative to a standard supplied by an experimenter or implicitly provided by the 
subject. 
2. Magnitude production 
Subjects adjust a test distance so that its length matches a number or distance 
produced by the experimenter. Again the standard may be supplied by the 
experimenter or implicitly provided by subjects. 
3. Ratio estimation 
Subjects estimate the ratio of two distances or adjust one member of a pair of lines 
to replicate the ratio of test distance to a standard distance. . 
4. Ratio production 
Subjects adjust a test length so it produces a given ratio to a standard length. 
Magnitude and ratio estimation are perhaps the most common techniques to be 
found in the literature. Montello (1991) points out that using magnitude estimation 
in terms of familiar units e. g. miles (Lee, 1970), is a useful method in that it allows 
people to express distance on their own terms, in a manner with which they are 
familiar. It also enables subjects to calculate numerically to produce the ratio, thus 
avoiding the need to 'count steps' as would have to be done in the case of ratio- 
estimation. 
On the other hand what is the influence of maps, road signs, city blocks on this 
method? Peoples' ideas of what constitutes a mile, for example, vary enormously. 
In the studies in which subjects have experience of the environment, the subjects' 
conceptions of both standard and test distances are to an extent a function of their 
familiarity with the environment in terms of both frequency and nature of 
involvement. Furthermore, use of multiple standard distances in any given study 
also means that estimates will be based on various different subjective standards. 
To explain this, one should look critically at the mathematical model underlying 
various approaches to cognitive distance studies (e. g. Briggs, 1973). The 
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relationship between cognitive distance and actual distance is usually expressed 
by the equation: 
Y=a+Xb 
where Y is the cognized distance, X is the physical distance, a is a scaling 
constant and b represents a power function. 
The power function is of particular interest as it may indicate whether the subject is 
over- or under- estimating distance i. e. if it is more or less than one. However this 
exponent does not tell us anything about absolute accuracy but does say 
something about relative accuracy. Veridical judgments will produce a value of one 
but it does not follow that any other values give 'non-accurate' or 'distorted' 
estimations. With an appropriate scaling constant, the estimate may be greater or 
smaller than the actual distance whatever the value of the exponent. Only when 
both exponent and scaling constant are taken into account can one validly discuss 
'over-estimation' and 'underestimation' all other things being equal. Unfortunately 
for those using the technique of ratio-scaling, they seldom are. 
A problem prevalent in many studies lies in describing the data as errors from 
'correct estimates. Problems with ratio estimation and production techniques 
infamously include the non-independence of estimates especially in relation to the 
range of stimuli presented. Ratio-estimation and production are apparently very 
sensitive to "stimulus-context effects" though this problem can at least be 
minimized when a single test distance is estimated with a single standard distance- 
meaning that one unique standard is used for each estimate to be made. 
Ratio and magnitude estimation present potential problems notably in all the 
'calculations' that need to be done by subjects. However the assertion that all 
subjects perform conscious multiplication and division sums in their heads as they 
perform the task (Montello, 1991), is less than convincing. 
One rather worrying point is that there is rather sound evidence to suppose that 
the size of distance estimates does appear to depend considerably on the size of 
the ratio that needs to be calculated between the standard distance and the test 
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distance. All other things being equal, estimates will be most accurate when the 
ratio of standard distance to test distance is close to 1.0 and subjects are required 
to do little distance manipulation to produce the ratio (Baird, 1970). 
standard 
test distance A 
test distance B 
Test distance A will always be estimated more accurately- presumably errors as a 
percentage of the standard distance will be less. Variations in the power function 
may simply be a reflection of "the artifactual influence of the particular standard 
distance" (Montello, 1991, - p107) and not an alleged fundamental relationship 
between cognitive and actual distance (e. g. Byrne, 1979). 
Could data from 'segmentation' studies, where increased estimates have been 
found, be better explained by this scaling artifact? Segmentation of a path breaks 
the test distance down into smaller distances which would be estimated as 
relatively longer (cf. Baird, 1982). 
Less obvious is the problem described as "scale transition" between the standard 
distance and the standard line (or modulus). Subjects are not normally required to 
calculate the transition ratio between this standard distance and its symbolically 
represented standard line. The absolute or relative scale of these symbols that 
subjects need to use in order to express distance could influence the magnitude of 
their distance estimates, though precisely in what way he fails to make clear. 
One of the most fundamental criticisms to be made of the ratio-scaling technique is 
that peoples' internal representation of the standard distance may itself vary! 
Studies assume that all subjects represent the standard distance as an equivalent 
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length but this subjective length cannot possibly be known by the experimenter. 
However most studies do assume this and base measures of 'accuracy' on this 
assumption. Bias on test distances would surely also operate on standard 
distances (e. g. no. of turns, barriers etc. ). By way of example, suppose that a 
subject is given a subjective distance which is 5 metres in reality. If the subject has 
enlarged this internally to six metres or more then an apparent underestimation of 
a test distance might instead reflect an accurate subjective representation of 
same. In other words, the subject is being internally accurate but the experimenter 
would fail to realize this. Externalization of the subject's standard distance to check 
for this is, of course, impossible. 
An associated problem is that the bias acting within an individual on the standard 
distance may not be consistently applied to test distances. Random assignment of 
subjects to the conditions of an experiment, if the nature and amount of exposure 
to the standard distance is equivalent across these conditions, would lead to equal 
bias in the representation of the standard distance across those conditions. Yet 
when two or more long, naturally occurring, standard distances (e. g. streets) are 
used in studies, as is often the case, then any bias in the representation of the 
standard distance would probably be quite different across conditions. 
Given that one cannot know the size of subjective representations of the standard 
distance, ratio scaling as a method for determining the spatial representation of 
any test-distance is theoretically unsound. The exact sizes of the ratios that a 
subject produces will never be known. It is this problem that is seldom if ever 
addressed in the literature on cognitive distance estimation. If the standard 
distance is perceived as shorter than it actually is, then overestimations for 
stimulus distances greater than the standard will be counterbalanced by 
underestimations when the stimulus is shorter than the standard but only when 
there is an appropriate range of stimulus distance used in the experiment. 
Many papers refer glibly to absolute accuracy and over/under estimation with few 
caveats regarding the scaling methods used. This is a danger that is all too easily 
overlooked. Such studies, given the inherent drawbacks of ratio scaling, cannot be 
conclusive. 
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" Paired comparisons 
Distances may be presented in pairs and the subject chooses which is the larger 
or the shorter. All possible pairs is the most common form of use though some 
methods use test distances paired with a standard distance. The triads method 
requires subjects to choose which of the three locations is most distant from the 
other two. 
" Ranking. ý4 
Subjects rank a set of distances in rank order according to length and in a given 
direction (greatest to smallest for example) 
ý,.. ý .. 
" Rating Scales. 
The subjects categorize each test distance as belonging to one of a set of pre- 
defined classes to represent relative length. 
" Partition Scales 
Subjects assign distances to classes with the explicit instruction to produce equal 
appearing intervals of length. 
The first three methods produce ordinal data. Yet by assuming normal distribution 
of data and by transforming this data in some way e. g. proportions to z-scores, 
many researchers have used these approaches to produce metric data. A 
particularly favourite route to this end is via Multi Dimensional Scaling (MDS). 
...... _ ....... :. ..::.::.;.......... 2. 't :. 1 
..:...: 
: 
.....: 
; 
....:.: 
Multi-Dimensional 
Multi Dimensional Scaling, (MDS), is a technique which is capable of uncovering 
the essential structure embedded within some kind of proximity data. This involves 
taking the proximity data and displaying it in Euclidean space in such a way that 
distortion between the distances given on the visual representation is minimized. 
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The technique typically takes data from distance/proximity data sets collected on a 
pairwise arrangement (yet not necessarily with a complete set of pairs). The data is 
then reproduced in a space with one or more dimensions of variability and is done 
in such a way as to minimize the space between the points and to reduce the 
'stress' of the solution. 
Non-metric forms of MDS allow researchers to use rank-ordered distances, as the 
basis for the proximity data matrix and assume only ordinal relationships between 
data points. For example, if point A to point B is estimated as 1 cm and point C to 
point D as 4cm, the non-metric form of MDS assumes only that C-D is greater 
than A-B and not that the latter distance is believed by the subject to be four 
times the former distance. 
MDS produces a measure of goodness of fit called 'stress'. By indicating how well 
any produced - scaling solution fits the data in the original matrix, the stress 
measure helps in assessing the degree to which a given data collection technique 
best fits the data (Magana et al., 1981). Note the difference between stress and 
'accuracy'. 
However, MDS can also provide a -measure of accuracy between the 
representation it generates from the data collection technique and the actual 
physical distances/proximities in the real-world environment. This is usually 
achieved with the help of an additional computer program e. g. CONGRU which 
rotates the axes of the subject-generated -space and real space-until maximum 
congruency is reached and then calculates a bi-dimensional correlation coefficient. 
As in the univariate situation, this coefficient is the ratio of explained variance to 
the total variance (Richardson, 1981). 
One of the major advantages of MDS is that it also allows proximity data from a 
wide variety of sources (sketch-maps; rank-ordered distances, absolute distance 
estimates etc. ) to be used to provide the input. Because MDS relies on rank- 
ordering to produce the matrix on which it acts, the resultant space can only be 
said to reflect relative accuracy i. e. one can compare the relative estimated 
distances between two pairs of locations but not the estimate of a distance and its 
actual physical distance. (Hourihan & Jones, 1979). 
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Here, subjects represent simultaneously place object locations in an environment 
at a smaller scale than that of the environment. This may involve constructing 
models or drawing itself (Howard et al., 1973; Baird et aL, 1979). A standard 
distance is optional though most studies provide some initial details for subjects to 
work from. Subjects are usually allowed to rearrange their maps as they proceed. 
Despite this, some have criticised map-drawing for apparently allowing subjects' 
drawing ability to confound the results ( Byrne, 1979; Magana et al., 1981). 
Sketch maps have been one of the most popular procedures employed in spatial 
cognition. However, individual differences in drawing ability may seriously 
confound the sketch-map output (Evans, 1980). The output may underestimate a 
person's knowledge because of possible limitations in drawing ability (Byrne, 
1979). Errors are likely to be cumulative: the starting point chosen could grossly 
affect the final configuration (Byrne, 1982). The output may an artifact of variables 
such as the order of things drawn and the size of the drawing surface both of 
which may have an impact on the scale of the drawing (Evans, 1980). 
Some studies treat the ordering of recall of elements on a drawn map as in some 
way indicative of relative importance (Golledge, 1977). There is, however, little 
independent evidence to support this underlying assumption. Intuitive knowledge 
of geometry may allow one to deduce and construct facts not initially known 
because, in common with other fields of psychological enquiry, the task changes 
as well as taps the spatial representation (Byrne, 1982). 
However, some researchers have found high reliability correlations between map- 
drawing and other techniques such as distance estimation, object placement, etc. 
(Evans, 1980) though relative object placement was not examined. Cadwallader 
(1979) however found little correlation between such measures. 
The problem with much of the evidence on the reliability of sketch maps is that 
researchers implicitly assume that a subject will produce the same map 
consistently. In other words, the map drawn on the one and only occasion (as is 
usual in the various studies) is taken as a reliable source of data. The only study to 
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examine the test-retest reliability of sketch maps asked subjects to sketch the 
same route on two trials separated by a seven day interval (Blades, 1990). 
Three measures of the maps' content (nos. of road names, named landmarks and 
road segments) correlated highly across the two trials. The coefficients ranged 
from 0.62 to 0.88 (significance of all coefficients: p<0.001). Furthermore these 
results were obtained irrespective of the subjects' familiarity with the route to be 
sketched or variation in the experimental instructions given. Blades' results indicate 
that the reliability at least of the method of sketch mapping over a short period of 
time is good. 
Procedural issues abound, e. g. how much information should be supplied to the 
subject in an orientation or sketch-map task? A cursory review of the relevant 
literature shows that this varies enormously from study to study. Should drawing 
aids be supplied or will these encourage subjects to 'normalize' their output 
(Evans, 1980; Byrne, 1982)? 
Perhaps the greatest problem with mapping techniques is data analysis. Many 
studies have treated sketch-map data at an interval or ratio level when they should 
be analysed within ordinal descriptions or treated descriptively (Golledge, 1977). 
Inter-landmark distance might be 5cms for one pair of landmarks and 10cros for 
another on a sketch-map but one can only validly assume that the subject knows 
the first pair to be farther apart than the second not that he/she knows the second 
pair to be twice as far apart as the first pair of landmarks. In addition, researchers 
seldom describe how mean or modal descriptions of data are arrived at. 
Multidimensional analyses take these problems into account by providing a non- 
metric relative distance accuracy measure.. However, MDS does not entirely 
circumvent the ratio-scale problem: the comparisons are ordinal and the data 
input, though quantitative, leads to a plot that is relative in its metric. Its major 
advantage is that it allows one to take quantitative estimates of Euclidean metrics 
of interlandmark distance without assuming an interval ratio but preserves 
subjects' individual distortions. 
This leads onto the issue of whether or not the very use of the word "cognitive 
map" misleads us into what one might call, false hopes. Chase and Chi (1981) 
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point out that the sketch-map, interview and field study techniques of Lynch (1960) 
and the idea of a cognitive map (Tolman, 1948) have been too influential in the 
literature. Although it may be retained in whole in memory, people do not conjure 
up complete images of a 'cognitive map'. For example architects, when drawing 
from memory, only retrieve small subparts at a time (Downs and Stea, 1973), 
though of itself, this evidence does not entirely refute the notion of existence of a 
complete map. A Lynchian, abstract, sociological map has often mistakenly been 
ascribed some psychological reality when in fact one simply cannot validly 
consider a sketch-map to be a measure of an internal 'cognitive map'. The real 
psychological processes at the basis of spatial representation remain in the 
concept described earlier - the schema. 
In essence, mapping is a form of ratio-estimation and the many problems that 
confound this technique discussed earlier are equally applicable here. The 
standards employed by the subject are inaccessible to the experimenter whether a 
formal distance standard has been supplied or not. As a result, conclusions about 
absolute accuracy are rash as noted above. 
Also worth pointing out is the strong non-independence of the distances produced. 
This refers to the magnitude of one of several distance estimates necessarily 
depending (at least in part) on the magnitude of some or all of the remaining 
estimated distances. Data in the form of ranks or maps are especially prone to this 
non-independence. Weak non-independence occurs when the magnitude of one 
of several distance estimates may be modified by the sizes of some of the other 
distance estimates. In mapping techniques, since subjects are required to 
represent all of the inter-place/inter-object distances in a2 or 3 dimensional space, 
the use of individual pair-wise distances as independent scores in such statistical 
analyses is unsafe. 
An interesting objection to mapping is that these mapping methods force 
Euclidean metrics on pairwise data. That is to say, A to B must equal B to A even 
though the direction of the estimate between the two locations may lead a subject 
to give different representations of the pair in a distance estimation task. In this 
context, the procedure may distort cognitions in the direction of 'improving' 
accuracy especially given the presence of other objects or places that provide 
cues to relative accuracy. Indeed the concept of accuracy is a moot point here. 
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Lee (1970) would not have discovered directional bias in intra-urban distance 
estimation by undergraduates had he obliged them to produce maps or models 
rather than eliciting distance estimates from them. The mapping task changes as 
well as taps the spatial representation (Byrne, 1979). 
Montello has defined this as "non-symbolic estimation of environmental distances 
at the same size as the environment" (1991, P111). Often this simply involves 
subjects walking a straight-line distance they believe to be the same length as the 
test-distance but more involved studies have required subjects to place objects in 
a same size configuration as previously experienced. Problems of scale translation 
and ratio calculation previously described do not apply here though the problem of 
the 'imposition' of directionality, as in the case of mapping, does. 
Asking subjects to walk specified distances has been a popular application of the 
technique for both adults (Sherman et al., 1979; Sadala & Magel, 1980; 
Newcombe and Lieben, 1982) and children (Cohen and Weatherford, 1980; Kahl 
et aL, 1984; Herman et al., 1986). One might suppose that there is a strong non- 
independence of inter-object distances thus created as with other simultaneously 
produced configurations such as mappings or MDS but the technique is "generally" 
done with one pair of locations at a time so this weakness is minimised. 
An intuitively convincing method is that of triangulation with its strong 
independence of estimates made in the actual, full-scale environment. It employs a 
direction and distance estimation ('projective convergence') and is based on the 
principle that a particular location in space can be specified by determining its 
relationship to a number of features in the environment already known. 
Triangulation could be considered a form of reproduction where a subject points to 
a target location from three different positions in the real size environment resulting 
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in a 'triangle' of estimation (Hardwick et al., 1976). The centre of this triangle is 
taken as the estimated point, the size of the area giving an idea of inexactness in 
its location. If four directional estimates are used, they form a quadrilateral area of 
estimation with even more precision. With more estimates being used, the more 
precise the resulting indication of location position may be. 
This gives a useful means of studying configurational knowledge of an 
environment which other distance estimation techniques may fail to capture. The 
technique satisfies the belief that cognitive psychologists should not ignore 
information processing in context; there is a need to know how information is 
processed and (structured? ) in real-world settings (Evans and Pezadek, 1980). 
Reproduction is efficient with only a limited number of estimates being needed and 
the method is easy for subjects to understand. Reproduction techniques are 
popular with developmental researchers as a result. Paradoxically, one of its main 
virtues, ecological validity (getting subjects into the 'real world' and doing 'real 
world' or three dimensional tasks) may also be a drawback since estimates will be 
based to a larger extent on time or effort (Montello, 1991). Not surprisingly, its 
biggest drawback is its inappropriateness for long distances: for some urban and 
larger distance scales. 
This method doesn't require memory for test distances - 'explicit memory that is. 
On the assumption that people minimize effort when travelling, invariably choosing 
the shortest routes, this technique gives an ordinal measure of peoples' spatial 
knowledge (Lee, 1970; Cadwallader, 1976). 
However this assumes that cost and effort is equivalent to distance in the 
minimization process. Supposing the shortest route contains hills, bends, cross- 
overs etc. then equivalence is lost and the cost increases (e. g. Staplin & Sadalla, 
1981; Lee, 1970). Another difficulty is that route choice can involve the subject's 
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preference for the routes in terms of safety, beauty familiarity etc. which may 
confound the apparent principle of minimization. 
This can be seen when alternative route choices are equidistant and other 
variables become salient in the traveller's decision, though Montello (1991) seems 
to miss the point here. When two alternative routes are of equal length and contain 
the same number of turns etc., a traveller may decide on one route not necessarily 
because the route is, for example, more picturesque. The real reason for the 
decision may be that the route does indeed seem shorter because it is 
picturesque. Nasar (1983) noted which of two equally distant garages in a large 
university academic staff chose to park in. By concluding that the more commonly 
chosen garage was 'closer for the staff, Nasar was effectively using the choice of 
garage as an indication of cognitive distance. 
When two alternative routes are of equal length, contain the same number of turns 
etc. a traveller may decide on one route not necessarily because the route is, for 
example, more picturesque. The real reason for the decision may be that the route 
does indeed seem shorter. It seems shorter because it is more picturesque and 
therefore more attractive- a modicum of foreshortening takes place. 
There have been quite a few studies which have sought to compare directly the 
construct validity of various methods. The most important of these are discussed 
below. 
2.161.: ' '> Inter-urban Distanc Estimation Studies 
Using mainly correlational studies, Cadwallader compared (a) ratio and (b) 
magnitude estimation to familiar unit estimation in miles and magnitude estimation 
to partition-scaling (1979). Most of his correlations (estimates with estimates and 
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estimates with actual distance) turned out to be extremely high - around 0.9. He 
claimed that differences in agreement were due to the influence of methodology- 
specifically that methodological differences in data collection could be responsible 
for influencing the rate at which real distances and cognitive distances co-vary. 
However the correlations that he presents do suggest that such an influence is 
quite small. 
2. '[6: 2>::... tntra. urban. ca..:.::.. > ::::::.:::. 
Howard et al (1973) found high interestimate and estimate to real distance 
agreement on the four estimation methods of ratio, magnitude estimation, map- 
drawing and model building. The authors stated a preference for magnitude 
estimation because of the independence of estimates. However they incorrectly 
concluded, from the power exponents alone of 1.05 and . 89 
for magnitude and 
model building respectively, that the former method leads to overestimation and 
the latter to underestimation. 
A caveat to the use of MDS is provided by Baird et al (1979) who compared maps 
produced by subjects' placement of building names on a matrix with non-metrically 
produced MDS maps of U. S. cities. Both of these methods produced very accurate 
placement of the buildings. When subjects came back one week later, they tended 
to nominate their own placement maps as being more accurate than MDS or even 
cartographic maps, as did some subjects who had not generated maps at all. 
Magana et al. (1981), using college students to recall their own campus layout, 
compared MDS solutions of a real map setting to scaling solutions for sketch maps 
and two psychophysical distance -scaling procedures using CONGRU to provide 
an error index for each comparison. They found that magnitude estimation of 
actual interpoint distances (in an absolute judgments task) is comparable in 
accuracy to sketch maps produced with or without constraints (when subjects were 
constrained it was by limitation to the use of a specified list of thirteen landmarks). 
Treating sketch maps as data to provide non-metric scaling solutions appears an 
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efficient way to provide very accurate methods for assessing geographic 
knowledge 
Mackay (1976) compared both MDS maps and sketch maps with cartographic 
maps using subjective and objective ratings based on a comparison algorithm. 
Interestingly, the results indicated that sketch maps, despite much criticism of their 
use (e. g. Byrne, 1979) gave better configurational accuracy. A further blow to the 
usefulness of MDS as a technique for representing distance estimates is MacKay's 
observation that only those configurations with interpoints of low angular variability 
and high distance variability work well. 
Richardson (1981) found that both non-metric MDS configurations and a map 
model method produced configurations of cues (e. g. shops, schools, banks etc. ) 
quite similar to each other, according to the CONGRU bi-dimensional correlation 
coefficient. Buttenfield (1986) compared sketch maps with MDS derived 
configurations and found sketch maps to be surprisingly accurate. Distortion was 
measured in terms of direction and distance. She found that consistency for 
reported locations in the mapping technique was significantly greater than for 
MDS. 
"It is not my intention to promote sketch maps exclusively over MDS 
configurations, but sketch mapping may provide the more 
reasonable alternative in some research situations, e. g., when a 
researcher's goal is to derive a consensual view. " (p245) 
Chapter 2 Environmental Cognition 98 
Interval and ordinal scaling are thought not to be quite as sensitive as ratio-scaling 
and mapping at tapping all the subject's metric knowledge. Their chief advantages 
are that no assumptions are made about the geometry of the estimates to be 
made and subjects find them straightforward to use, with some studies suggesting 
that mapping may be superior at tapping configurational knowledge than the more 
sophisticated techniques of MDS. 
Montello (1991) points out that nearly all the studies (except for Newcombe and 
Lieben, 1982) fail to compare the techniques in different experimental settings. 
"How do these methods compare with each other, both within and 
between experimental conditions, in their abilities to capture 
= relatively subtle influences on cognitive distance? Especially useful 
..... would be direct comparisons of ratio scaling and reproduction. 
" 
(Montello, 1991) 
ý, ý . 
The influence of cues presented with each method is also a matter of some 
consideration when choosing a method. Scaling techniques usually provide data 
which are produced without the need for travel in displaced settings and so there is 
an absence of visual and other sensory cues to aid memory. Likewise for mapping, 
though the angular information that subjects reconstruct will probably influence the 
content of what is recalled. 
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Do experimenters tell their subjects that they want route or straight line distance 
estimates to be made? In some studies it is not at all clear. However, Reiser et 
al. (1980) asked for both route and straight-line estimates and compared these 
results to the results obtained when the instructions were non-specific. They found 
that non-specific instructions produced data similar only to that produced under 
route instructions. 
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Could subjects confuse time with distance when making estimates e. g. making 
estimates of journey time instead of travel distance? Given the prevalence of 
describing distance in temporal terms to one another, such confusion is a -real 
possibility. Again explicit instructions from the experimenter is needed to eliminate 
the confusion. MacEachren (1980) for example found that travel time determines 
cognitive distance. 
An important issue is raised by Ewing (1981): the unit of analysis used in many 
cognitive distance studies. Aggregation of estimates across subjects can seriously 
underestimate relationships between perceived distance and independent 
variables such as familiarity and actual distance. The most frequent example of 
this is the use of correlation between e. g. estimated distance and actual distance. 
What arises is a summary result which may disguise the relationship between the 
variables at the individual level (Canter & Tagg, 1975). 
Of course, it is possible that one can use an aggregated measure when discussing 
the response of subjects regarding one particular distance. It is when this 
approach is applied to produce a general measure of accuracy for a given group of 
subjects that the difficulties begin. This is the case even when all subjects estimate 
the same distances; individual perspectives on accuracy are lost and much of the 
richness of the data is wasted (Montello, 1991). 
there remains apparent ignorance of its various limitations in many studies. 
Perhaps the greatest mistake made by researchers is the implicit reference to 
absolute accuracy when discussing subjects' "correct" and "non-correct" estimates. 
One can only safely interpret accuracy in relative terms and even then with some 
caution. When discussing over- or underestimation, great care should be taken to 
study the relationship between 'real' and cognitive distance. Ratio-scaled data 
cannot help in drawing conclusions about the absolute sizes of differences 
between distance estimates but can be useful in examining how different variables 
may merely vary perceptions of distance . 
Problems in the use of ratio-scaling techniques have been well documented yet 
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Collecting distance estimates in large numbers and at any scale and tends to 
favour the use of interval and ordinal scaling techniques. Because of the strong 
non-independence in, ranking and MDS, the techniques are inappropriate for 
collecting single estimates. Again, the caveats about conclusions regarding 
absolute accuracy apply here; discussions about the generalized relative accuracy 
of an elicited configuration are more appropriate. 
Given the wide variety of results in the field, it is plausible to assume that the lack 
of convergence noted is due to a biasing of some sort on the commonly held 
schema under test by the particular methodology used. 
However this possibility may co-exist with another: namely that each different 
method taps different representations of cognitive space. In other words, cognitive 
space is multiply represented and the diversity of results emerging form the 
different methods merely reflect this multiplicity. Each method may activate 
different mental representations or schemata depending very much on the specific 
goal or activity it seeks to emulate. Given that much research is free of any real 
world context in most cases, the insistence of Garling and his associates that we 
escape the confines of the laboratory setting to examine real world behaviour in 
the travelled environment seems increasingly important (Garling et al., 1984; 
Garling et al., 1986). 
CHAPTER 3: 
Memory and Schemata 
The fact that one's memory for an event may often prove tantalizingly incomplete 
and/or distorted has provided researchers with the considerable problem of 
accounting for such deficits within a coherent theory of memory. As in so many 
fields of psychological enquiry, the literature shows consistent patterns on one 
hand but often contradictory or ambiguous data on another. This chapter will 
attempt to summarize the literature on the schema and its relation to memory. 
One of the most influential theories in experimental psychology has been that of 
the schema. This was one of the earliest attempts to deal with the inaccuracies and 
incompleteness of memory. The idea of an 'organizing knowledge structure' was 
initially provided by the theories of Kant 1787/1963): "... the outer world causes only 
the matter of sensation, but our own mental apparatus orders this matter in space 
and time, and supplies the concepts by means of which we understand 
experience" (Russell, 1961, p680). The neurologist Sir Henry Head is generally 
accredited with being the first to introduce the term "schema". His experience with 
the casualties of World War I, and with the celebrated army psychologist W. H. R. 
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Rivers, lead to an increasing interest in the 'phantom limb' phenomenon, whereby 
an amputee 'feels' the presence of the limb long after its removal, even to the 
extent of trying to use it. Head believed that the accretion of neural patterns in the 
cortex which informs us of the position of our limbs produced the 'postural schema' 
(Head & Holmes, 1911). He claimed that anything which enters consciousness is 
"charged with its relation to something that has gone before. " (Head, 1920). 
The origins of schema theory as applied to memory can be traced back to 
Frederick C. Bartlett in his seminal-study of memory and recall: "Remembering" 
(Bartlett, 1932). He posited that incoming information was organized into "active 
organized settings" called schemata. In the words of Bartlett, whenever a subject is 
asked about the presented material, he/she has to use these active schemata to 
reconstruct the information: "the organism would say, if it were able to express 
itself: 'This and this and this must have occurred in order that my present state 
should be what it is... (p202). In those early days it was not surprising that this 
conceptualization of what constituted a schema was a little hazy. It was particularly 
contrasted with the approach of Ebbinghaus which used readily quantifiable units 
of recall, i. e. nonsense syllables. However Bartlett was claiming that 
'meaningfulness', not the lack of it, was the key to understanding remembering 
Early studies in schemata-related literature include the idea that subjects change 
an incoming sentence into its linguistic deep structure or sentence kernel 
(Chomsky, 1957; 1965) and then store in memory that kernel along with a set of 
the transformations that would be necessary to recreate the originally presented 
sentence from the stored kernel. This has sometimes been referred to as the 
schema-plus-correction strategy (Mehler, 1963) 
The contrasting idea that memory exists in 'traces', accurate in form but variable in 
'strength', has been largely rejected by schema theorists from Bartlett onwards. 
This idea also suggests that incompleteness is due to failure in retrieval and that 
inaccuracies are due to associative encoding processes. 
Schema theorists instead prefer to believe that what is actually stored in memory 
has been put there by a framework or schema of knowledge that selects and 
actively changes the elements of experience to arrive at a representation that is 
knowledge consistent, coherent and unified. 
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One characteristic of everyday life is the sheer abundance of information 
presented to the individual by the environment. This 'overload', to borrow an 
information-processing term, needs to be highly filtered to allow one to store 
information in memory for later retrieval or for immediate use for some proposed 
action. For efficient selection and processing, the individual needs criteria for 
selection and a set of some sort of informal rules for processing. Indeed one word 
is sufficient to sum up the functioning of a schema: efficiency. Schemata allow the 
perceiver to identify stimulus information quickly, fill in information that may be 
missing from the stimulus array and then select a strategy to allow e. g. additional 
information to be obtained, a goal to be reached or a problem to be solved- all 
within the minimum time period. Such wide utility in the processing performed by 
schemata may help explain the ubiquity of the concept in so many areas within 
psychology 
This apparent consistency of processing functions across levels of 
abstraction makes the researcher's task both easier and more difficult. On 
the one hand, it lends a certain parsimony to models of schematic 
processing. On the other hand, it obscures the issue of how one determines 
the level at which information is being processed. " 
(Taylor and Crocker, 1981, p93). 
And so an immediate problem arises with respect to definition. The concept of 
schema has become almost a rag-bag term covering a whole host of phenomena. 
This may be interpreted as either a devaluation of its currency or a confirmation of 
its power. The term schema is applied in so many contexts that "not only is there a 
need to know what schemata are but also what they are not.... " (Taylor & Crocker, 
1981, p90). Consequently how they differ form related concepts is crucial if one is 
to come up with a theory which would pass the minimal requirements of definition. 
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"A schema is 'a cognitive structure that consists in part of the representation 
of some well defined stimulus domain....... one of the chief functions of the 
schema is to provide an answer to the question,, "what is it? " The schema 
provides hypotheses about incoming stimuli, which include plans for 
interpreting and gathering schema-related information ..... It may also provide 
a basis for actuating actual behaviour sequences or expectations of specific 
behaviour sequences..... " 
(Taylor and Crocker, 1981, p91) 
In their review and analysis of schema theory in the social psychology literature, 
Taylor and Crocker (1981) explain schemata by using a visual metaphor. 
Schemata are shown as a series of pyramids with a hierarchical arrangement of 
information: abstract at the top moving down to more specific at the bottom. 
Through "a rich web of associations" the schemata interconnect so that, for 
example, one event can be represented amongst several schemata. Each schema 
can be accessed from top to bottom, bottom to top or through the network of 
associations. 
Evidence for such a system of schemata has been prevalent for some time e. g. the 
hierarchically arranged, semantic structure of memory proposed by Collins and 
Quillian in their seminal paper (1969) and the discussion by Cantor and Mischel 
(1977) about perception of person prototypes in a trait to behaviour hierarchy. 
Although such models may differ in the level of abstraction that they posit, this has 
not proved problematic in understanding how schemata process information since 
it would appear that they possess function in basically the same way at whatever 
the level of abstraction in the system. 
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When a cognitive event is experienced, the only information encoded is that which 
is pertinent and important to the schema presently activated. From this information, 
the semantic content will be abstracted. So from a particular stimulus, only relevant 
and necessary information would be encoded by the schema in operation at that 
time. Integration of this information with previously stored, relevant information 
which was 'brought on-line' by the schema will then take place. 
(A later but less commonly executed process is reconstruction. This occurs when 
someone tries to conjure up a particular stimulus event in their mind. It entails 
combination of the details used for representation with general knowledge to come 
up with a reconstruction of what might have happened. ) , 
This chapter will focus alternately on these four major processes, which function in 
successive order and which together comprise a prototypical theory of schematic 
memory: selection, abstraction, interpretation and integration (Alba and Hasher, 
1983). The evidence which supports the existence of each process will be 
examined as will less supportive and even contradictory evidence. The next 
chapter will attempt a resolution of all the evidence to produce an alternative view 
of schema theory. ` 
The first stage described by a schema theory of cognition is the determination of 
whether or not a particular piece of information is used for encoding. For this to be 
evidenced there are three conditions to be satisfied. 
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Does a relevant schema exist in the first place? Research suggests that where 
previously acquired, relevant knowledge is absent, memory is generally poor. 
Where subjects' knowledge has been augmented with background information or 
with ways to link new information, their memory improves greatly. (Ausubel and 
Fitzgerald, 1962; Wilkes & Aired, 1978; Thorndyke, 1977). 
The advantage of relevant prior knowledge has been demonstrated for subjects 
who had high knowledge of the game of baseball (Spilich, Versonder, Chiesi and 
Voos, 1979). Text concerning the description of a game of baseball was studied in 
groups that differed in the prior knowledge of the game. Quantitative and 
qualitative differences were noted in the recall for high and low prior-knowledge 
subjects. The authors concluded that this indicated the greater ability of the high 
knowledge subjects to "relate the actions of the game to the goal structure and to 
maintain the most important information in a working memory system.. " (p275). 
Similar results have been obtained for subjects with varying knowledge of the 
game of chess (Chase and Simon, 1973) and even in the case where the usual 
correlation between knowledge and age is reversed. Chi (1978) found that where 
younger school students are those with the more detailed knowledge, older 
(undergraduate) students show poorer retention than their age advantage would 
suggest. 
The importance of relevant prior information is also of great significance in frame 
theory (Minsky, 1975). Mismatch of current perceptions with previously held 
knowledge does leave memory for that perception impaired. This can occur for two 
reasons: (a) the structure of the incoming information is quite different from the 
prototypical structure and (b) the subject knowledge of the prototypical structure is 
limited. Studies which used a story from a culture having different structural rules 
or when parts of a fairy-tale are rearranged to present the same information to the 
reader but in an unexpected, 'scrambled' order, demonstrate that in either case, 
comprehension of the story is difficult and memory for the context of the story is 
impaired significantly (Kintsch et al., 1977; Kintsch and Green, 1978; Stein and 
Nezworski, 1978; Thorndyke, 1977). 
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To summarize so far then, it would appear that the degree to which new 
information is assimilated (evidenced by recall) is a function of the amount of the 
prior relevant knowledge, whether structural (e. g. in frame) or content (e. g. theme) 
in nature. Absence of such knowledge means that with no appropriate schema into 
which it can be assimilated, new information is quickly forgotten. 
Of course, simply possessing the relevant knowledge is not sufficient for it to play a 
part in aiding encoding of new material. This knowledge must be "active" for it to 
have any beneficial effect. There are two general approaches through which this 
issue has been tackled. On the one hand, new information is presented to the 
subject in a manner which avoids contact with previously held, relevant knowledge. 
An alternative path is to allow only a slight overlap in congruency with the activated 
schema and the new information being presented. 
In the first approach, where the schema exists but remains inactive, subjects have 
been presented with short passages of prose that were highly abstract and very 
difficult to understand- supplied without a title (Bransford & Johnson, 1972). Recall 
was-poor in those instances where there were no "activating cognitive contexts" 
(Ibid, p717). There are quite a few other studies which demonstrate similar memory 
deficits and other difficulties (Bransford & Lapinski, 1974; Dooling & Lachman, 
1971; Dooling and Mullet, 1973; Thorndyke, 1977). When, there is no relevant 
semantic context i. e. if knowledge structures lie dormant during encoding, the 
acquisition process can be seriously affected. 
Other studies have given schema-activating cues after a story has been read or 
heard. Recall proved to be as poor as when there were no cues provided 
(Bransford & Johnson, 1973; Dooling & Mullet, 1973). 
Bransford & Nitsch (1978) have pointed to an interesting implication of such 
findings. They propose that less experienced people will have greater difficulty 
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than more experienced people in discovering the situational cues that actually lead 
to apparent schema activation. There seems to be some indirect evidence for this 
from the study by Chi (1978) already described. The usual recall superiority of 
adults was lost when children had the prior knowledge advantage. 
In the second approach, where there is an activated schema in existence but with 
only partial congruency with the new information being received, a subsequent 
poverty of relevant memory has been reported. In an important paper, Pichert and 
Anderson readily embrace the concept of the schema to explain their results 
(Pichert & Anderson, 1977). They used passages of text which described an event 
from the perspective of either of two protagonists e. g. a burglar or a prospective 
buyer's view of a house. Implicit in the presentations of the two perspectives is that 
some information is relevant to one perspective only. 
The subjects were biased towards one particular perspective whilst reading the 
stories and later recalled from that perspective. The authors found that "An idea's 
significance in terms of a given perspective determined whether. the idea would be 
learned and, independently, whether it could be recalled a week later" (Pichert & 
Anderson, 1977, p309). 
Kozminsky (1977) looked at how titles, rather than perspective-taking, could bias 
the comprehension process. He similarly found that the perspective taken at the 
encoding stage (in this case, created by using biased titles) can indeed affect 
selection in the comprehension of a text. One may presume that activation of a 
subject's particular schemata was achieved by this initial biasing manipulation. It is 
entirely possible that information which was irrelevant to the activated schema was 
either encoded in a less elaborate form or simply not encoded at all: both schema- 
consistent explanations. 
Other types of information- schema congruency have been studied by 
manipulating the stimulus itself instead of the perspective taken by the subject. In 
one study, simple stories were used to depict characters in situations that were 
consistent with their physical make-up (e. g. a fat man getting stuck in a cave) or 
inconsistent (the old man lifting the piano). After reading such stories, subjects 
read a second one which included descriptions of the activities of these 
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characters. They found that subjects were better able to recall the details of both 
initial and second stories when they referred to or described situations that were 
appropriate to the characters involved. 
What if a schema does exist and is activated during the presentation of new 
information? Only some of that information will be encoded and two selection 
principles have been proposed by Alba & Hasher (1983). 
The first selection principle states that those ideas most important to the theme of 
the information and which cannot be obtained from previously encoded information 
will be recalled best (Owens et al., 1979). Several studies have shown that the 
recall of ideas is a positive function of the independently rated importance of those 
ideas to the overall comprehension of the stories used as the stimuli (Graesser et 
al., 1980; Kozminsky, 1977; Miller & Kintsch, 1980; Thorndyke, 1977; Waters, 
1978). 
Script theory provides the second, related principle. The theory best describes 
highly typical situations (e. g. going to the cinema) where information relevant to 
high frequency, familiar situations is processed (Schank & Abelson, 1977). As 
there is a prototypical script for the situation, typical information can be derived 
from it and thus need not be stored. Memory traces of particular events occurring 
in a situation will not be encoded if they are typical. 
It follows from this that atypical information only will be selected for encoding. One 
reason for the popularity of script theory, especially amongst those interested in 
computer models of memory, is that it allows for great economy of information 
storage in memory. 
So, as regards selection, it would appear at first sight that the three selection 
principles (prior knowledge, activated schema and the importance of ideas) are 
well supported by the evidence. Since there is a selection process then, as Bartlett 
pointed out, the representation of a situation or event is likely to be incomplete and 
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so people will have to complete that situation. The subject "fills in the gaps" from 
the schema. There is good evidence that people have little difficulty in filling in the 
various missing details (Bower et al., 1979; Cofer et al., 1976). 
Alba & Hasher (1983) believe that the overall selection process is crucial in 
understanding "one of the three fundamental memory phenomena, 
incompleteness of recall" (p208). Accuracy in remembering can depend on one or 
two sources: 
1. aspects of the original situation/event that were selected. 
2. chance matches between the original situation/event and the reconstruction 
process. 
Correct "guessing" under this view occurs when the original event/situation has 
ideas or components in common with other similar, partially stored 
situations/events from which we reconstruct. 
Distortions come about when subjects produce "fill-in" details which were not part 
of the original situation- 'reproducing' information not actually part of the stimulus. 
Bartlett's recall protocols showed this clearly though others have been less 
successful in replicating the results (Zangwill, 1972; Gomulicki, 1956). However, 
others have reported "thematic intrusions" (e. g. Kintsch et al., 1975) and subjects 
somehow "remembering" typical ideas or events that had not actually taken place 
(Bower et al., 1979; Graesser et al., 1980; Smith & Graesser, 1981) 
Is distortion also likely when one encounters, whenever memory is not intentional, 
some additional knowledge that is relevant to the schema currently activated but 
which is contradictory to that schema? Spiro (1980a, 1980b) also argues that both 
sources of information will be drawn on during recall, resulting in "reconciling 
errors" that are a by-product of the process of reconstruction. This in turn can lead 
to resolution of inconsistencies between the two information sources. As before 
there will be, during recall, additional information not present originally, in what 
Spiro calls "accommodative reconstruction". 
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Not all evidence regarding selection is positive however. A body of literature raises 
enough questions about selection to deserve a review in some depth. - 
The first principle of selection states that the amount of prior, relevant information 
plays a crucial role in the extent to which new information is encoded. Chiesi et al., 
(1979) have found not only that recall varies a great deal with the amount of prior 
knowledge but that recognition varies minimally. Furthermore the recall 
disadvantage incurred by an inactivated schema appears to disappear when 
memory is tested by measures of recognition (Alba et al., 1981). Important ideas 
may have an advantage in tests of recall but not in tests of recognition (Britton et 
al., 1980; Thomdyke & Yekovich, 1980; Yekovich & Thomdyke, 1981). 
If one believes that the selection process operates at the time of encoding then the 
evidence that it is recognition rather than recall which varies with respect to the 
prior knowledge held, the activation of the schema and the importance of ideas 
does raise some serious problems. One might reasonably assume that information 
that is not part of a representation in memory should be neither recalled nor 
recognised! 
Since it is true that schemata affect the amount and content of what is recalled, 
this additional evidence is highly suggestive of an important role played by the 
schema in retrieval rather than, crucially, in selection for storage. 
There is evidence for this. Some studies have taken an interest in perspective 
effects on comprehension and memory, not least because of the important 
implications for schema theory. The perspective taken by a subject on reading a 
story may in fact act as an organizing schema that both determines expectancies 
and serves as a framework for integrating story information. When two schemata 
exist at a time of encoding but only one is activated and when new information is 
congruent with both, then the information congruent with the activated schema will 
be recalled best. Testing later from the perspective of the previously inactive 
schema, the recall of the previously irretrievable information is enhanced 
significantly (Anderson and Pichert, 1978; Pichert & Anderson, 1977; Fass & 
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Schumacher, 1981). Such studies imply that more is encoded than the process of 
an archetypically schema based, selection principle would suggest. 
Bartlett (1932) suggested that because the representation of an actual event is 
reduced significantly, distortion creeps in. Then the subject has to rely on these 
few encoded details along with general knowledge in order to 'reconstruct' the 
event. However the evidence above does suggest that memory for a particular 
event can be quite good. Furthermore there is only weak evidence for a 
reconstructive activity during retrieval. In an analysis of Bartlett's methodology, 
Mandler & Johnson (1977) found that his stimuli were rather untypical of normal 
prose and a replication of Bartlett's procedures showed rather little evidence of 
distortion (Kintsch & Green, 1978). Sometimes one can reduce error in recall by 
stressing accuracy or by changing the subject's retrieval strategy (e. g. Hasher & 
Giffen, 1978). 
So the possibility exists that reconstruction is optional and helpful rather than 
absolutely necessary. Far more is encoded than the selection principle suggests 
with a great deal of the original information available in memory, although mainly 
accessible by recognition, other conditions of retrieval may also play a crucial role 
in determining accessibility. 
Following on from selection we have the stage known as abstraction. During the 
encoding process, this reduces further the information achieved in the course of 
selection. Only the meaning of the information is coded, not its format, with the 
result that e. g. the syntactical form of a sentence is not held in memory. It is known 
that memory for syntax is both brief and sparse and so it seems that abstraction 
may well take place during encoding (Sachs, 1967; J. R. Anderson, 1974). 
Studies have shown that once a piece of prose is read the time taken to verify 
information presented originally in a complex linguistic format is the same as that to 
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verify the same information presented in a much more simple format (e. g. King & 
Greeno, 1974). 
The issue of whether memory consists of propositions or analogues is still 
contentious. There are two major schools of thought in cognitive psychology on 
how information is cognitively represented and it would be useful here to briefly 
examine the issue. 
One view on representation is the analogical form, most eloquently demonstrated 
by Shepard and Metzler (1971). Their three dimensional mental rotation study 
convincingly demonstrated that mental representations maintain some sort of 
isomorphic correspondence to the real world. The correspondence between the 
imaginal and internal construct and the real world is considered functional and not 
literal, when considering spatial information i. e. second-order isomorphism 
(Shepard, 1975). 
An opposing view is given by the propositional model. This states that information 
of whatever kind, is stored in lists or networks arranged semantically on abstract 
representations of meaning (Pylyshyn, 1973). The proponents of this model do not 
deny the existence of imagery but consider it to be epiphenomenal and not able to 
represent meaning in its own right. They believe that subjects report not the 
properties of their images but the properties of the objects as they know them to 
be. Many researchers assume that memory consists of sets of propositions and 
their relations (See Anderson, 1976; Schank, 1976 and especially Anderson, 1979 
for a lucid discussion). 
Reconciling the two models is a difficult task but one which continues to be tackled 
within cognitive psychology (Hayes-Roth, 1979; Pylyshyn, 1979; J. R. Anderson's 
1979 reply). Perhaps the most accepted working model to date has been that 
expounded by Kosslyn and Pommerantz (1977) which pursues the compromise 
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that cognitive processes may code information in propositional form but retain the 
ability to manipulate it analogically. 
The idea of conceptual dependency is one more formalized presentation of the 
propositional point of view (Shank, 1972). It posits that propositions can be 
expressed simply as a series of primitive concepts. Lexical expressions that share 
an identical meaning will be represented in one way (economically) irrespective of 
the format in which they were presented. In support of this, subjects have been 
shown to mis-recognize or incorrectly remember synonyms of originally presented 
words (e. g. R. C. Anderson, 1974; Brewer, 1975; Graesser, 1978)., 
That essential characteristic of memory mentioned at the start, namely 
incompleteness, can be comfortably explained by this idea of abstraction. Indeed 
the problem now seems to be to explain accuracy in recall. To help in this, schema 
theorists have looked to research in psycholinguistics. I-- 
It is a well established finding that those of us who share the same language also 
share preferences and biases in the ways in which we express information. Given 
that the sender and receiver of a message are operating under these same 
preferences and biases, then the receiver may appear to give an accurate 
reproduction of the message. What may be happening here is that the accuracy is 
due to the semantic content being recalled with the preferred structure imposed 
onto it. One should note here the similarity between the operation of these 
preferences and the reconstruction process using "probable detail" as described 
above. There is evidence for biases and preferences operating for both syntactic 
information (Bock,. 1977; Bock & Brewer, 1974) and lexical information (Brewer, 
1975; Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1974 and 1981). 
The implication of such findings is that when sender and receiver do not share the 
same preferred ways of expressing information, then the likelihood of distortions is 
significantly increased. Since abstraction precedes the other two schema 
processes, i. e. interpretation and integration, where the bulk of distortion is thought 
to occur, then it at least sets the scene for potential major distortion to take place. 
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Most memory theorists accept that memory is to some extent abstractive but there 
is evidence which somewhat undermines the abstraction role in the schema 
process. Is memory always abstractive for example? ' Why can memory for 
overlearned pieces of prose or poetry be so detailed and resilient to forgetting over 
the years (Rubin, 1977)? 
Yet it is true that material which has been presented only once has shown similar 
resilience to forgetting by subjects. By paraphrasing sentences in a television 
soap-opera,,, Bates, Masling & Kintsch (1978) found that memory for the 'original 
utterances was surprisingly good, even though the recognition test was a surprise 
for subjects. The paraphrases used were made by substituting roles for names, 
proper names for pronouns, elliptical clauses for full clauses and vice-versa. 
If people have a model of memory which is selective and abstractive, then 
evidence that memory for original details in the presented material is good (e. g. 
Kintsch & Bates; Bates et al., 1980) presents some problems for schema theorists. 
They might argue that the paraphrases and the original utterances differed in terms 
of their "probable detail" or perhaps in their agreement with the stylistic 
performance of the speakers (if speakers are used). 
There is further evidence which suggests otherwise. Subjects do sometimes 
appear to remember the actual form of the original utterances (Keenan et al., 
1977) and are able to discriminate between the frequency with which repetitions 
giving the gist and repetitions that are completely verbatim occur (Burnett & 
Stevenson, 1979). 
At first glance such evidence would seem to stand in contrast to those early studies 
which support the idea of abstraction as a stage in the schema-driven view of 
information encoding. Yet studies that seem to support abstraction may be simply 
examples where there was superior recognition for semantic over syntactic 
information (Alba and Hasher, 1983). There is evidence that in these studies, there 
was not a total loss of syntactic information from memory (e. g. J. R. Anderson, 
1974; Dooling & Christiaansen, 1977; Soli & Balch, 1976). Other studies have also 
-. , 
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shown recognition of both lexical and syntactic information at retention intervals of 
one hour (Yekovich & Thomdyke, 1981) and even one week (Christiaansen, 1980)1 
If, according to the abstraction process as traditionally understood, words are 
represented by their meanings with lexical information not available then how is it 
that e. g. subjects are able to recognise sentences that contain their original words 
rather than synonyms and generally rarely make synonym substitution errors? 
(Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977) Other evidence suggests that lexical detail is 
coded in memory (Anderson, 1971; Hayes-Roth & Thorndyke, 1979). 
It would appear from the preceding evidence that the representation of lexical and 
syntactic detail is far richer than the abstraction process would have us believe. 
Memory does not appear to be highly abstractive and so a central tenet of schema 
theory is undermined. 
According to Harris and Monaco (1978), interpretation is typically an inference- 
making process. Two main varieties can be discussed here. 
The first variety is known as pragmatic implication and involves transforming 
explicit information into its probable and reasonable underlying intent. At this point 
it is important to distinguish between two kinds of implications carried in sentences. 
A logical implication exists when some information is necessarily implied by a 
sentence. For example:. 
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David forced Alan to rob a bank. 
logically implies that: 
Alan robbed the bank. 
A pragmatic implication takes place when the message being provided strongly 
suggests more information rather than directly asserting or logically implying it. This 
may then cause the perceiver to make a pragmatic inference. For example 
individuals often recall sentence 1 in the form given by sentence 2 (Harris & 
Monaco, 1978): 
1. The barnacles clung to the sides. 
2. The barnacles clung to the ship. 
When presented with sentence 3, people often provide sentence 4 during recall 
(Harris & Monaco, 1978): 
3. Miss America was not prevented from playing the tuba. 
4. Miss America played the tuba. 
So subjects can be seen to be encoding information which is not explicitly present. 
The reason why pragmatic implications are interesting from a schema point of view 
is that they do not, unlike their logical counterparts, have to be understood fully to 
comprehend a sentence and so distortion may creep in. Stored information inferred 
by the subject certainly contributes to the probabilistic nature of communication. 
The fugitive was able to leave the country. 
pragmatically implies, 
The fugitive left the country. 
Yet it is not unreasonable to suppose that in certain contexts, a fugitive, though 
able to leave the country, may choose not to do so. The closer the subject's 
interpretation is to the meaning intended by the sentence maker then the less is 
the distortion; if the meaning is not properly interpreted, distortion will be greater. 
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The second type of inferences are those made during comprehension when there 
are three demands: (a) to concretize vague information, (b) to fill in missing detail 
or (c) to simplify complex information. 
In the case where a concept presented to a subject is vague or imprecise, the 
schema should act in a way as to concretize the information and store it in its 
newly interpreted form- "instantiation". When subjects have been presented with 
sentences containing general terms (e. g. animal, tool) but with scope to allow 
these terms to be comprehended as specific ones (e. g. cat, hammer), it is the 
specific (non-presented) terms which serve as better retrieval cues than the 
presented general terms when the subjects are given cued recall tests (Anderson 
et al., 1976). It would appear that when people are supplied with terms that are 
general or vague they interpret them as specific instantiations. 
The second form of specific interpretation related to comprehension occurs when 
subjects fill in missing detail by implying supplied facts when the incoming 
information is incomplete. If, for example, subjects are supplied with a piece of text 
which implies but does not explicitly state the presence of something, whether it be 
an object or an action, then they more often than not will themselves construct the 
missing information. (Paris et al., 1977). It is even possible that subjects may 
believe the newly constructed information to be part of the original text and 
incorporate it into their representation of the text (Johnson et al., 1973). 
However this form of "filling-in" is not restricted to single words or objects. 
Connections between words may also be added by subjects. The greatest 
comprehension of information in a text is achieved when it can be related to 
immediately preceding information (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). 
When this relational link cannot be made, the individual searches memory for 
relevant connecting information. If such information is not found then inferences 
are made which make the link. This added information is sometimes mis- 
recognised later as having been part of the stimulus (Thorndyke, 1976). Inferences 
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may also be made and incorporated into memory merely because they increase 
the coherence of an idea (Owens et al., 1979). 
It is interesting at this point to note a 'similar process described by frame theory. 
This process occurs when the input is in general accordance with an existing frame 
but is lacking in all of the information categories specified by that frame. In this 
case however, frame theory proposes that default values are used to fill in for the 
missing information (Minsky, 1975). If the order of events in the stimulus is at odds 
with the existing appropriate frame, then those ideas may be re-ordered to conform 
to the precepts of the frame (Lichenstein & Brewer, 1980; Stein & Glen, 1979). 
The third type of inference made during comprehension involves the need to 
simplify complex information especially when the 'load' induced by information- 
processing is great. As before, inferences made in this way are very often 
embodied in the recall of the stimulus (Frederiksen, 1975). 
[It is worthwhile restating that information being conveyed by a stimulus can be 
distorted as an individual can add or modify the information through the 
interpretative process. The interpretative process allows for distortion as it exists in 
tandem with two other processes- abstraction as already described and the final 
schema process, integration. ] 
It would be wrong to think that the notion of interpretation is unique to schema 
theory. Researchers in other fields have recognised and examined interpretative 
processes such as that dealing with the distinction between the nominal and 
functional stimulus (Underwood, 1963), in subjective organisation (Tulving, 1962) 
or in distinguishing between the perceived and the self-generated in memory- 
"reality monitoring" (Johnson & Raye, 1981). 
A prediction made by many schema-based theories that inference is widespread in 
comprehension has failed to find much support. Some have found that subjects fail 
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to make even a simple inference (Hayes-Roth & Thomdyke, 1979; Singer, 1979, 
1981). Frederiksen (1975) found that subjects only made widespread inferences 
when these were specifically demanded by the task. Others found that inferences 
are made only in relation to part of the information in a message (Goetz, 1979; 
Walker & Meyer, 1980). 
Integration, according to schema theory, implies that any integrated memory 
representation comes about from (a) the accurate information selected, (b) the 
interpretations drawn and (c) any relevant general knowledge that exists. From this 
it is crucial to note that a single idea does not exist in isolation but as an 
interconnected part of a greater, complex, semantic whole. There are two 
occasions when processes of integration come into play- at schema formation and 
in the course of modification of an existing schema. 
By demonstrating that memory for a set of related propositions appears to consist 
only of their overall intent , one can demonstrate integration in the formation of a 
new schema (Bransford et al., 1972; Prawat & Cancelli., 1976). Paris & Carter 
(1976) gave the following sentences to 2nd and 5th grade children: 
The bird is inside the cage. 
The cage is under the table. 
The bird is yellow. 
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Those who read these three sentences wrongly believed the following one to have 
been originally presented: 
The bird is under the table. 
However the next sentence was correctly identified as being new: 
The bird is on top of the table. 
So individuals appear to integrate individual ideas into a greater, holistic, memory 
representation. This finding is also demonstrated convincingly by the use of a set 
of sentences and their parent but unpresented sentence. The subset of sentences 
contained varying numbers of ideas and were presented during the acquisition 
stage. Researchers found that the confidence with which a subject decides that a 
sentence was originally presented increases with the degree to which that 
sentence approximates the parent sentence and does so irrespective of whether 
the sentence was actually presented in the first place or not (Bransford & Franks, 
1971; Walsh & Baldwin, 1977). 
Another example of integration occurring during the formation of a schema can be 
seen from studies of one-dimensional ordering paradigms. Barclay (1973) for 
example gave subjects an idea of five animal positions as follows: Lion is to the left 
of the bear, giraffe is to the right of the moose etc. Subjects were then asked to 
imagine the whole array of animals in their proper relative order. 
In the recognition phase, subjects were given originally presented sentences and 
also new ones that complemented or contradict valid relations. Subjects were 
found to be unable to distinguish between originally presented sentences and new, 
valid ones. It seems that subjects can only use the information contained in a set of 
related sentences to construct representations which themselves contain 
information that had already been expressed and inferred information. 
Similar results were obtained by Potts (1977) using artificial terms (e. g. "A TOF is 
larger than a beaver; A mouse is larger than a PIV") and Moeser & Tarrant (1977) 
using non-linear arrays of age comparisons. From a schema point of view, what 
seems to be happening is that information taken from individual sentences is built 
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up and integrated into a larger; semantic whole. During the recall phase, all those 
sentences consistent in meaning with the newly constructed schema are 
considered to have been part of the stimulus array. 
Integration can also be demonstrated when subjects possess prior knowledge of 
the stimulus in question. In one study subjects were given a piece of text which 
they were told was about a fictitious person or someone well known (Hitler/Helen 
Keller). During the recognition phase, new sentences were presented alongside 
original ones which varied in their thematic association to the well-known person. 
Those who were told that the text described the well-known person were apt to 
consider the thematically-linked items as having been in the text originally. This 
result was not obtained for those reading about the fictitious person (Sulin & 
Dooling, 1974). 
In other experiments, subjects have been shown either a short film or a series of 
slides showing a particular event e. g. a multiple car traffic accident. Additional 
information was implied in an initial post-screening question- the presence or 
otherwise of a stop sign.. Half the subjects were asked "how fast was car A going 
when it ran the stop sign? " and the rest asked "how fast was car A going when it 
turned right? " Those receiving the first initial question were more likely to say yes to 
the subsequent question "did you see a stop sign for car A? " than those receiving 
the second (Loftus, 1975). 
When the initial question contains a presupposition, subjects are more likely to 
report having observed the presupposed object or event. (Gentner & Loftus, 1980; 
Loftus et al., 1978; Loftus & Loftus, 1980). In this instance it would seem that the 
new information (additional or contradictory) presented after the event has taken 
place may augment the individuals understanding of the original event, extending 
and refining, as it were, the existing schema. 
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Another set of experiments looked at subjects' ability with hindsight, to describe 
their own accuracy in two tasks. One task was rating the probability of an event 
occurring, the other was determining the validity of factual statements outwith their 
specific knowledge but about topics with which they were familiar (Fischoff, 1977; 
Wood, 1978). 
Following this they were informed of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event 
or are given the validity of the statements. In the testing phase, the subjects are 
asked to estimate the state of their knowledge before the outcome was made 
known or to recreate their original probability or validity judgments without being 
influenced by the outcome information. 
Results have shown that subjects consistently overestimate the degree to which 
they were originally correct and their inaccuracy is in the direction of the answers 
supplied to them in what has become known as the "knew-it-all-along-effect" 
(Wood, 1978). The schema theory explanation of this is that new information is at 
once integrated into the representation that subjects had about the stimuli, making 
it impossible for the new and old information to be separated whenever they tried 
to recall their original responses. 
"Integration is the set piece of schema theories. " according to Alba and Hasher 
(1983, p216). It is with the examination of the formation of a schema (at 
integration) that one decides if there is any substance to the theory or not. 
According to the evidence thus far presented, schema formation occurs whenever 
meaning has been abstracted from the stimuli selected and then joined with related 
abstractions to form a single representation or schema. 
The first evidence that appeared to demonstrate this convincingly was that offered 
by Bransford and Franks (1971) in their highly influential and widely cited article. 
Yet as Moeser (1977) points out, encoding related events does not necessarily 
produce integration. Moreover, the results of Bransford and Franks are difficult to 
replicate; small changes in methodology can apparently reduce or eliminate 
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altogether the effects of such integration as they found (e. g. see Flagg, 1976; 
Flagg & Reynolds, 1977; James & Hillinger, 1977). Given that integration implies 
similarity in the representations of meaning, then further problems arise with 
findings that show it working with nonsense and other non-semantic material 
(Flagg, 1976; Small, -1975). 
The studies featuring the linear-ordering paradigm showed that related 
propositions led to the construction of a holistic representation (e. g. Barclay, 1973). 
However this construction is not a necessary by-product of the paradigm- up to 
30% showed no sign of a holistic representation being produced (Potts et al., 
1981). It is also possible that integration may be merely an artifact of the 
methodology; the longer the time allowed for subjects to decide if the sentence is 
original or not, the less evidence of integration there will be (Lawson, 1977). 
Subjects may indeed store individual ideas, albeit related to ones in the memory 
set (Tzeng, 1975). , 
Difficulties in demonstrating integration in - what is after all a -newly formed 
representation is one thing but to fail to show integration of new material into an 
existing knowledge structure is quite another matter. Studies looking at schema 
modification have included the ý "knew-it-all-along-effect". Recall that this effect 
shows that subjects typically overestimate the accuracy of their original knowledge 
base once provided with additional information presumably because of the difficulty 
in separating old information from new in the integrated schema. 
Hasher, Attig & Alba, (1981) discovered that subjects could recall with accuracy the 
original facts as presented if they are told that the new information is unreliable. 
Moreover subjects were informed of the unreliability of the new material after 
integration should have taken place. Contrary to schema theory then, people can 
be made to recall their original state of knowledge which should be inaccessible to 
memory, due to the integration process. 
The "Loftus" effect has also been undermined as an instance of integrative 
processes. Recall that subjects are e. g. misinformed about a sequence of slides 
depicting an event that they have just seen and later mis-recognise (i. e. confirm as 
original) new slides containing the misinformation. 
- -, ýý ý- "I -, -ýý, I- ýlf I 
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However Berkian & Bowers (1983) have demonstrated that this apparent example 
of integration may simply be due to a methodological artifact. They found that 
when the test slides are shown, not in disorder as with Loftus but with regard to the 
original temporal sequence, then integrative effects are lost. It appears that 
subjects can use information about the sequencing itself to recall their original 
knowledge state. If integration has truly taken place then the original information 
should have been lost. 
Another criticism of this work is that the recall material has been purely peripheral 
to the main focus of the film or slide sequence. Loftus herself later found that 
attempts to alter subjects' memory for core material by integration were largely 
ineffective (Loftus, 1979). It seems possible that the integrating process can most 
readily work with those memory traces that are virtually lost or are difficult to 
retrieve. It is this that results in' the original information being less accessible than 
the updating information. 
Furthermore, it appears that if obviously incorrect information is presented to 
subjects along with the updating information (Loftus, 1979) or if the person 
delivering the new information is distrusted (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980) or if subjects 
are warned in advance about the possibility of receiving wrong information (Greene 
et al., 1982) then modification of non-focal information by the "integration" process 
does not take place. 
It would be wrong to think that integration of related memories necessarily follows 
presentation of related or contradictory information. Evidence exists that new 
material maybe ignored at the time of presentation. or perhaps more importantly, 
after presentation (Greene et al., 1982; Hasher et al., 1981). Subjects appear able 
to remember what their original knowledge state was even after new and relevant 
information has been presented to them. 
In the process of integration, does the newly acquired piece of information lose its 
unique, context-specifying character? Sulin and Dooling questioned this in their 
'famous person' study where they provided evidence to suggest that specific traces 
of the experimental passages were lost by subjects in the recognition phase; 
subjects could only recall from their newly constructed, holistic representations of 
the knowledge in question (Sulin & Dooling, 1974). 
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However Sulin & Dooling themselves admit that recognition errors were minimal at 
short delay intervals and virtually zero immediately after the story was read. The 
recognition test was administered after five minutes for half the subjects and one 
week for the remaining half. 
Dooling & Christiaansen (1977) carried out a similar study. Here subjects who were 
told of the connection between the text and the famous person during the retention 
intervals (two days or one week) made thematic errors. The effect was most 
dramatic for those told of the connection immediately after comprehension rather 
than the 'before' subjects who were told before reading the passage. Subjects 
across both conditions did however show good memory for the original sentences. 
In explaining their results, both Sulin & Dooling (1974) and Dooling & Christiaansen 
(1977) invoke Bartlett's (1932) theory to explain that recall becomes increasingly 
abstract, thematic and distorted as time progresses. So after a long interval, 
passage specific information is recalled less and instead the subject's general 
knowledge of the topic is accessed. Thematic errors become more pronounced 
with time i. e. specific information decays but the schema remains stable. 
Nevertheless, although it resides in the tradition of schema theories, this 
reconstructive explanation remains incompatible with the currently accepted view 
of integration as a process that operates during encoding. 
Schema theory is dependent on the action of information-reduction processes. 
Information is filtered and selected on the basis of just what is needed- depending 
on the activation of an appropriate schema, by the knowledge content of that 
schema and the importance of the incoming material. Since abstraction is a 
process which favours the semantic over the lexical, further reduction in memory is 
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achieved. Yet many studies show that memory for an event may be more detailed 
than such reduction processes would allow. 
Thus far, error and distortion in peoples' memories have been due to reduction of 
quality in the signal. However, distortions also creep in that are due to constructive 
errors where information is added in the form of inferences derived form the 
person's activated schema- the process of interpretation. Integration takes the 
selected information, the interpretations drawn and the relevant general knowledge 
available to combine into a complex, semantic whole. 
Yet again, evidence points to neither interpretation nor integration as being 
essential; it seems possible that people can recall uninterpreted information. 
Support for the notion of integration as observed through schema formation and 
modification is also qualified. Since people are storing information that has not 
been integrated, in the accepted sense, it would appear that integration may not be 
a necessary part of encoding process. Procedural artifacts of early experiments 
may have been the reason for the initial support for the existence of these 
processes. 
Overall it would seem that while memory for complex material is detailed, only 
some of the detail is easily accessible. In light of this and all the evidence above, 
the ship of schema theory could perhaps be described as battered and drawing 
some water but, nevertheless, still afloat and sailing. 
CHAPTER 4: 
A Critique of Schema Theory 
"People make meaning by abstracting relevant essential structures 
which then substitute for the original. The familiarity and simplicity of 
the abstracted structure then make it workable for everyday 
undertakings. " 
(Fiske, 1993, p162) 
Despite the fact that evidence exists which cannot be fully explained by the 
assumptions of schema theory, it remains difficult to propose another theory which 
can both account for the available evidence and make new predictions that cannot 
already be fully coped with by schema theory. As has been shown, there appears 
to be a recall advantage for some details in a piece of text but not for others. 
However there is also no doubt that the representation of that text in memory 
contains more detail than the selection procedures, as defined in the previous 
chapter (3.4), should allow. How one accesses detail in memory becomes the 
crucial question (Alba & Hasher, 1983). 
This chapter will attempt to address only the critical areas of schema theory and 
produce additional evidence, where appropriate, to show how 'the schema for 
schemata' may be differentially interpreted in the minds of researchers. Particular 
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attention will be, paid to the analysis given by Alba & Hasher (1983) which is 
arguably the best in the literature to date. 
The view of how schemata actually work according to Alba & Hasher (1983) has 
been characterized by Foos (1992) as the 'reproductive' view. This proposes that 
individual experiences are retained and that schemata are constructed for short- 
term retention only. When required to answer questions at the retrieval stage, an 
individual may construct a schematic structure. However, they see this a temporary 
schema from which the individual may not be able to distinguish between new and 
originally presented sentences. The individual may even respond less quickly to 
neighbouring items than to remote items. Furthermore the individual may not 
construct and store a new schema in memory but construct afresh only at retrieval 
from stored 'information and even then only if a schema would improve 
performance on the test measures. 
What we are left with is a somewhat fragmented theory of memory accounted for 
by schema theory. A set of explanations do exist but these are more often than not 
tied to certain findings in the schema literature and the literature of other fields 
rather than correlating' with each other. Unfortunately they do not coalesce to make 
schema theory fully coherent. However this lack of full coherence should not 
detract from the usefulness of schema theory in describing much of the data. 
Interpretation of psychological data is nearly always ambiguous. Theories are vital 
in the effort to place meaning on and give structure to (schematize?? ) a given 
pattern of disparate data. Few theories in psychology enjoy complete support in 
the literature and there is a danger, always, of 'throwing out the baby with the 
bathwater'. 
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A common criticism of schema theory is that it is merely old wine in new bottles or 
to put it less decorously- nothing more than "attitudes in drag" (Conover & 
Feldman, 1991, p1365). Schemata are most definitely not the same as attitudes. 
Attitudes are fundamentally affective in nature whilst schemata are both affective 
and cognitive in terms of both product and process. Nearly all definitions of 
attitudes do include some cognitive component in addition to an affective one but 
are not the same as schematic representations characterized by hierarchies' and 
propositions. They are dissimilar to schemata not only in form but in their purported 
effects. ' 
Undoubtedly the core problem is that of definition. One of the reasons why Alba & 
Hasher (1983) find such trouble in relating some of the data to supposed schema 
processes is the narrow definition of those same processes. That they are able to 
define a given process so clearly seems at odds with the "nebulous character of 
the theory" that they assert (p225). Given the enormity of the task, Taylor & 
Crocker (1981) are perhaps more judicious, requiring for a minimal theory only "a 
set of interrelated hypotheses about the nature of schemata" (p90). They believe 
that clarity, internal consistency, compatibility with the data and falsifiability are 
added to this to make a good theory. This perhaps produces a schema theory that 
seems less dogmatic and more flexible in its approach to interpreting the data than 
that proposed by Alba & Hasher. This rest of this chapter will attempt to resolve the 
conflicts in the literature regarding schematic conceptions of memory. 
At this juncture it is perhaps worthwhile to consider just how memory for prose 
detail is represented. An interesting model for text comprehension is that proposed 
by Kintsch & van Dijk (1978). They propose a semantic text base formed in a 
cyclical process constrained by limitations on working memory. Their model also 
includes "macro-operators" which reduce this information in a text base to its gist. 
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Such operations they envisage as being under the control of a schema- a 
theoretical formulation of the person's goals. 
The text base they view as an ordered hierarchy of propositions with the theme at 
the top and propositions sharing the argument descending on the levels below. A 
network exists which interconnects related propositions so that whilst any one will 
not be directly connected to every other one, most would be connected indirectly. 
The similarity of this 'alternative' model to that proposed by Taylor & Crocker 
(1981) is striking. Recall that they also proposed schemata 'looked like' a hierarchy 
of information with greatest abstraction (the theme? ) at the top of the pyramid-like 
structure and least abstraction e. g. specific events at the bottom. A "rich web of 
associations" connects schemata together so that one event can be represented in 
more than one schema. A schema can thus be accessed in a variety of directions: 
top-down, bottom-up or laterally. 
Kintsch & van Dijk (1978) coincidentally posit two types of relations among 
propositions in the text base: hierarchical and descending from the theme plus a 
set of connections that link individual propositions to other propositions directly 
using shared arguments. The components of these types of connections could 
then behave as retrieval cues and so play an influential role in the recall of various 
ideas. To support this text base model, the data show that when a newly 
introduced item of information cannot be related directly to a previously mentioned 
item then recall and comprehension are poor (Lesgold et al., 1979; Yekovich et al., 
1979). Conversely recall is good if one forms connections between propositions 
e. g. inferences drawn to link items of information (Yekovich & Manelis, 1980). 
At this point, it would be useful to examine each of the major schema processes in 
turn, as in Alba & Hasher (1983), (see previous chapter), looking at possible 
alternatives to traditional schema theory. 
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One can now reconsider the work of Bransford and Johnson (1972) in the light of 
the text base model. Recall that they provided substantial evidence for the process 
of selection. Using passages of text with no appropriate contexts or referents, it 
seems reasonable to assume that webs of associations between sentences were 
simply not formed. So the likelihood that one sentence could cue another at the 
recall stage was reduced significantly since the sentences were, for all intents and 
purposes, unrelated. 
What has been apparently demonstrated by studies of frame theory can now be 
reinterpreted to some extent. These have typically presented subjects with 
sentences that have been randomized in order and also in normal, chronological 
order (Thorndyke, 1977). By reducing one's ability to understand the connections 
between ideas in the text through the random ordering of sentences, recall would 
inevitably be reduced as the relative presence of intersentence connections was 
lessened. 
This could help explain why American students had difficulty with the recall of 
stories from other cultures; they would be relatively unable to establish proper links 
between ideas during encoding (Kintsch & Greene, 1978). One is immediately 
reminded of Bartlett's famous War of the Ghosts experiment in which he examined 
the role of expectation in encoding and reconstruction. British subjects were given 
a North American folk tale to read which contained "attributions and causal 
sequences strange to a western mind" (Eysenck & Keane, 1990, p275). Bartlett 
discovered that subsequent recall of the story was not verbatim ("proper links" 
could not be made), and that the story was reconstructed in a manner in line with 
subjects own expectations and assumptions. One can say subjects did not recall 
until they had reconstructed the material in their own schemata. 
Recall that Pichert & Anderson (1977) used as stimuli stories which could be read 
from two different perspectives where the ideas contained in one perspective are 
irrelevant to another. Alba & Hasher (1983) argue that in this case the story can 
lead to two independent propositional - networks each with its own hierarchical 
structure. With one particular perspective there should be connections made 
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among related sentences. Other sentences will exist as unrelated sentences 
outside this network or those related in their own network. 
When a subject faces a recall task, the proposition at the top of the hierarchy 
('theme') is most easily recalled and through it, related and subordinate ideas 
accessed. So if only the main theme is used as a retrieval plan, those irrelevant 
ideas which exist outside the text base may not be accessed. They are only 
accessed when the subject is given the alternative perspective from which to recall 
the story (Anderson & Pichert, 1978). Since these recently relevant ideas were not 
encoded with respect to their theme, the ability of the theme to act as a cue is 
limited and these ideas may not be well recalled (Schustack & Anderson, 1979). 
Recall will also be poor if ideas have not been or cannot be connected either to a 
higher-order cue or to each other (Chiesi et al., 1979; Thomdyke, 1977). Indeed 
the importance effect can be explained by these same processes. Recall that less 
important ideas to the theme are recalled less well than those more important. 
However it seems possible that there occurs the same amount of initial processing 
for ideas at all levels of importance (Britton et al., 1979; Waters, 1978). 
Christiaansen (1980) showed that ideas of high importance are forgotten at the 
same rates as those of low importance. Thus it would appear that accessibility may 
be the reason why items of high importance are better recalled. 
The text base model of Kintsch & van Dijk (1978) is useful in further explaining this 
finding. Assuming that the first idea actually retrieved is the proposition at the 
highest level (i. e. the theme) then recall should occur in top-down fashion with 
each proposition recalled cueing at least one immediately beneath it. Naturally 
under this scheme, the theme is the most likely to be recalled; propositions lower in 
the hierarchy will be recalled only if the complete web of associations above it 
remains intact. Recall performance supports this view (Kozminsky, 1977; 
Thomdyke, 1977) and other research backs the view that text is retrieved in a top- 
down manner (Britton et al., 1979; Yekovich & Thomdyke, 1981). 
Those items that are important will probably be referred to more often by others. 
This leads to important items being called into working memory more often and for 
longer durations than others. Furthermore, these important items will have a 
greater web of connections to other items owing to the rehearsal processes of 
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working memory. Each connection may have components which may then serve 
as retrieval cues (Graesser et al., 1980). 
Further consideration of this aspect of the text base hypothesis underlines the 
importance of rehearsal in text recall. The relatively high accessibility of what is 
known as the theme (Hasher & Griffin, 1978) may be the result of its frequent 
rehearsal or referral during encoding. There is some slight, indirect evidence for 
this rehearsal hypothesis (Meyer & McConkie, 1973; -Black & Bower, 1979). 
Rehearsal of connected ideas seems important where the greater the number of 
ideas descending from one proposition, the more likely it will be recalled. As the 
number of subordinate actions increases, the main action in an episode is better 
recalled. The rehearsal of connected items may explain the work of Brown & 
Smiley (1977)who found that where children are unable to distinguish between 
items of low and high importance, recall of high importance items is still good. 
The proposal by Alba & Hasher, described in 4.1, that schemata are not 
constructed until the retrieval stage is not supported by the explanation for 'prior 
knowledge' effects, expounded in Chapter 3 (e. g. Spilich et al., 1979; Chi, 1978; 
Wilkers & Alred, ' 1978). More recent evidence further undermines their proposal 
(Rojan & Pettigrew, 1992). Experiments have been reported that show prior 
knowledge leads to preferential encoding of inconsistent information (e. g. 
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995; Pyszcynski et al., 1987). The text base 
model outlined above does allow for existence of schemata before the retrieval 
stage and a series of experiments on metaphor-based schemata lead the authors 
to conclude that schematic knowledge structures are not " merely a reflection of 
mappings that are created ad hoc during the process of metaphor comprehension. " 
(Allbritton et al., 1995). 
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Alba & Hasher (1983) prefer to see abstraction through the 'eyes' of retrieval rather 
than through encoding processes. There is certainly evidence that syntactical and 
lexical aspects of text are stored as well as the semantic. However the semantic 
content of a piece of text may be the most resilient because of three possible 
factors: rehearsal, minimal susceptibility to interference and the conscious intent of 
the individual to remember it (McKoon, 1977; Kintsch, 1977). 
Inability to recall lexical information may be explained by faults in the retrieval 
process. Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth try to account for this by invoking the old idea 
of memory trace theory (1977). They suggest that when traces are related, 
discrimination on the part of the subject leads to errors. This may occur via the 
spread of activation through related traces in memory or perhaps by generating 
associative responses (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977; Underwood, 1965). On a 
memory test, errors creep in if any associated memory traces have been strongly 
activated and can compete with the target material. This in turn can lead to 
substitution errors despite the presence of 'veridical traces' in memory. 
As a number of studies show unexpected levels of accuracy even when there was 
no expectation of a memory test (e. g. Kintsch & Bates, 1977), schema theory 
needs to take account of this as well as the distortions and errors. Alba & Hasher 
(1983) propose Johnson & Raye's (1981) model of memory called reality 
monitoring as an alternative to schema theory. 
Briefly, what they propose is that information is represented from two sources- 
external (via the perceptual processes) and internal e. g. reasoning, thought, 
imagination. Underlying this is an assumption that the act of perceiving is 
inherently different from the internal acts of thinking, reasoning etc. i. e. the internal 
acts are either different operations of the mind or mental operations resulting in 
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characteristically different amounts or types of information. The processes involved 
in reality monitoring make good use of such characteristic differences. Reality 
monitoring can be based on certain attributes somewhat independent of memory. 
These attributes act to distinguish between the two types of memories and include 
contextual information (time, place etc. ), sensory information, cognitive operations 
and semantic detail. Furthermore their model assumes involvement of more 
extended reasoning processes which take into account the content of particular 
memories and their relation to other knowledge the person has and the 
metamemory assumptions of the person. 
Some of their results show that memories from both the external and internal 
sources differ in ways characteristic of their class. Confusion increases when 
memories are similar on semantic and sensory levels. Information about cognitive 
operations associated with internally generated memories decreases confusion. 
Those memories that are perceptually based have better spatial, temporal and 
sensory information. The tacit assumptions that people make about these 
characteristic differences reflect themselves in assumptions in metamemory that 
influences the judgments in reality monitoring. 
Despite using materials which only gave slight cues as the source 
(internal/external) of memories they found that significant reality monitoring was 
obtained in certain conditions with retention intervals as long as several seven and 
ten days. Such sensitivity to the origin of information (the ability to preserve 
information about the origin of the information remarkably well) underlines the 
importance of the distinction between internal and external sources of information 
and the usefulness of incorporating it into a model of memory, though schema 
theory also copes well with this distinction. 
Other evidence for reality monitoring comes from the findings that fact versus 
fantasy discrimination ability for inferences decreases when an interfering task or a 
simple delay occurs between acquisition and recall (Brockway et al., 1974; Owens 
et al., 1979). When the experimenter makes the attributes which identify the source 
more salient, the opposite occurs and discrimination increases (Alba et al., 1981). 
Alba & Hasher (1983) suggest that this reality monitoring model can account as 
well, if not better, as schema theory for a range of mnemonic errors eg. 
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misrecognition errors in linear orderings and single word errors (Underwood, 1965; 
Underwood & Freund, 1968), elaborative prose errors (Kintsch et al., 1975; Sulin & 
Dooling, 1974) and reconstructive errors (Spiro, 1977; 1980a; 1980b). 
Reconstructive errors are thought to occur during processing that takes place some 
time after encoding (eg. Spiro, 1980a). However Royer (1977) proposes that 
reconstruction errors can be considered to be very similar to other inferences 
generated during encoding. Thus they may be consistent with a reality monitoring 
account of mnemonic error. 
Reality monitoring assumes that the confidence with which an event is internally or 
externally generated is distributed in a way compatible with some models of 
recognition memory i. e. while some events can easily be classified as internal or 
external in origin, there lies a region of uncertainty in between. Test conditions will 
often determine how these events are classified. Accuracy increases if subjects are 
encouraged to be conservative (Gauld & Stephenson, 1977) or if they are provided 
either with extra time or with cues with which to make the discriminations (Hasher & 
Griffin, 1978; Lawson, 1977). This is because there will be fewer internally 
generated items in the region of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, those items in the region of uncertainty are apparently subject to 
response bias (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Johnson et al. (1981) report that if there is 
some uncertainty regarding the source of an item, then there seems a tendency to 
attribute it to external sources. This has important implications when a subject 
encounters familiar items (e. g. relating to the theme) on a recognition test. Such 
items may well be misrecognised not because they are recalling them with some 
confidence from an existing schema but because of a response bias. So it would 
seem that response biases operating within the reality monitoring model accounts 
equally well for reconstruction processes such as the typicality effect that script 
theory (eg. Graesser et al., 1980) and indeed 'proper' schema theory (eg. Sulin & 
Dooling, 1974) predict. 
Alba & Hasher (1983) have proposed alternative methods of explanation to 
schema theory for various and often disparate data. That schema theory is not 
omnipotent in explaining all the data is not surprising however. "... we think it clear 
that the stored record of any event is far more detailed than prototypical schema 
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theories imply. " (p225) The important word here perhaps is 'prototypical' as Alba & 
Hasher admit, "the basic problem confronting schema theory: its definition" (p225). 
Change the definition and it is possible to accommodate much of the data that they 
dispute. However, tautological dangers lurk menacingly here; there is always the 
problem of 'having one's cake and eating it by changing the parameters of schema 
theory. 
Do these alternative explanations cast doubt on a purely schema theory based 
understanding? Alba and Hasher (1983) seem to think so but their claim that these 
explanations are purely associationist and non schema-theory based is surely 
erroneous. Certainly many of the processes that can be used to explain selection 
in a 'better way predate the rise of schema theory. However this misses the point 
that schema theory evolved to better explain the data in existence and naturally 
incorporated many of the processes that previously were used to explain the data. 
The existence and extent of connections among ideas is a good example of one of 
these processes. 
Once again, researchers have fallen prey to the tautological difficulties in 
understanding a theory with a loose definition. However it does appear unlikely that 
schemata operate only in the way envisaged by Bartlett. Recent studies have 
enlarged our conceptions of the ways in which schemata can operate. In the next 
section, some of the data relating to schema theory will be re-evaluated along with 
presentation of more of the recent research in the area. 
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"Integration is the set piece of schema theories" 
(Alba & Hasher, 1983, p216) 
Given its pre-eminence, the fact that evidence for integration has been undermined 
is particularly worrying. The work of Loftus and her colleagues is a good example 
of this but as one will see, the case they present is still a strong one. 
Recall that Loftus showed either a short film or a set of slides to a group of 
subjects which depicted eg. a traffic situation. Later on subjects were asked a 
question which either contradicted some item of information that they had actually 
witnessed on screen or implied some information not originally present. For 
example, Loftus & Palmer (1974) showed subjects a film of a car crash. Some of 
the subjects were later asked how fast the cars were going when they "smashed" 
into one another and others were asked instead how fast when they hit each other. 
Those asked with the word "smashed" typically gave estimates of the cars traveling 
much faster. Another question was asked later: had they seen any broken glass in 
the film? Once again, those in the "smashed" wording condition were more likely to 
report having seen glass since broken glass is part of a'high speed crash schema'. 
This misrecognition was interpreted as indicating that the new information had 
been added to or replaced the subject's knowledge of the original scene to 
produce a new and most importantly integrated representation (Loftus & Loftus, 
1980). 
As a matter of interest, the Loftus study recalls a much earlier experiment. It has 
been described in Collins & Dreever (1947), as the "Aussage" experiment 
("Aussage" is German for "testimony"). A text, enacted scene or, more usually, a 
picture is presented. The subject is asked to provide a report of what has been 
viewed and then, usually after the lapse of a time interval, a cross-examination by 
the experimenter takes place. One of the types of question asked ("the implicative 
question") contains a strong suggestive element and refers to objects, actions or 
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relationships that are plausible but non-existent. The subject reveals particular 
attitudes or memory-distorting internal factors in his reply. For example, subjects 
may be asked whether or not an individual in the picture was holding a knife in his 
left or his right hand when, in fact, no knife was present. 
A key element in Loftus & Palmer's (1974) study was that the source of the 
misleading, post event information was frequently mistaken. In reality the 
information comes from a source other than the event itself but subjects were 
unable to identify this. Lindsay & Johnson (1989) examined this hypothesis 
drawing on Johnson & Raye's (1981) model of 'reality monitoring' described earlier. 
Johnson & Raye proposed that individuals are occasionally poor at discriminating 
between memory for real (external source) events and memory for imagined 
(internal source) events in their model of memory attribution. In particular, if an 
event is imagined in an especially vivid way, then subjects may subsequently have 
great difficulty in deciding whether or not the event actually took place. 
How does this relate to the work of Loftus and her colleagues? It is possible that in 
those studies, subjects were attributing the misleading information to the original 
scene. Note that in this case original information about the scene is not lost. 
Subjects merely incorrectly identify the source of the additional, misleading 
information. 
Lindsay & Johnson showed subjects a picture of an office. In this picture they saw 
four people and a variety of office objects eg. a desk, pencil holder etc. Some 
subjects were also asked to read a piece of prose after examining the picture. This 
was a description of the office but in certain cases the information contained in the 
text was inaccurate. There were two forms of testing. The recognition test required 
subjects to read a list of objects and decide if each item on the list was featured in 
the picture. The source monitoring test required subjects to decide if each item was 
in the picture, in the description or in both 
The recognition test showed evidence of suggestibility where subjects decided that 
certain objects were in the picture which in fact were only featured in the 
description. Of course this result echoes those obtained by Loftus and her 
colleagues. The source monitoring test revealed that fewer mistakes of this kind 
were being made to the point where the suggestibility effect was attenuated. From 
,..., .. _ 
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these results, Lindsay & Johnson argued that the mistakes people make when 
required to remember an event are less likely to be due to a fault in memory itself 
but rather in the process of recall (cp. Alba & Hashers 1983 reproductive view). 
'Tuning in' subjects to the source of their memories may help in improving recall. 
Other criticisms and refinements can be found in Loftus & Hoffman (1989) who 
nevertheless believe that the finding of 'misinformation acceptance' is a real one 
though for reasons not fully understood. They further suggest that only when the 
original memory is less than 'perfect' (i. e. schematic?? ) will misleading information 
be accepted. As they colourfully put it, it may be that the original memory remains 
intact, "waiting to be kissed awake like Sleeping Beauty" (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989, 
p103). 
A recent study by Stem et al. (1991) looked at the process of integration using 
ambiguous prose passages. Subjects were asked to read ambiguous prose 
passages that were difficult to comprehend without disambiguating titles eg. 
"Some adjustments may be necessary. Feet are important as hands. 
Restraint is usually recommended. Extremes in temperature may affect the 
process.... " Title: Starting A Car. (Stem et al., 1991, p591, ) 
Sentences were presented individually on computer screen to allow enough time 
for reading and to time subjects' responses. Subjects were then asked to judge the 
relative positions of test sentences in the passages- sentence distance judgment 
(SDJ). Another dependent measure taken was the mean reading time. They 
performed best (low reading time and good SDJ score) when given the title at 
reading than when given untitled passages or the title at the time of testing. In 
contrast to Alba & Hasher's (1983) reproductive view, this is suggestive of schema 
formation at encoding rather than retrieval. 
In a follow-up experiment there were four conditions; subjects were assigned to 
either title, no title, delayed title or individual sentence title conditions. In the last 
condition, each sentence was presented with its own title. Each title was 
semantically appropriate for the sentence concerned and unrelated to the title of 
the passage and to titles of all the other sentences eg. 
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Garage sale: First you arrange things into 
different groups depending on their 
makeup. 
Mixing concrete: Of course one pile may be sufficient 
depending on how much there is to do. 
Title of passage: Washing Clothes (Stem et al., 1991, p591, taken from Bransford 
& Johnson, 1972) 
The experimental procedure was much like that for the first experiment but 
included another accuracy measure- composite foil (CF) which is the ability to 
discriminate complete old sentences from foils composed of fragments of two 
different old sentences. A modification of the SDJ measure was also used which 
gave an indication of the magnitude of each subject's error- rs SDJ (i. e. the 
correlation between the judged and actual number of sentences that had 
intervened between members of each test pair). So Stern et al. came up with 
indices of inter- and intrasentence information integration. 
In the second phase of the experiment, subjects were asked to free-recall 
sentences from the passage they had seen as accurately as possible for a period 
of about three minutes. The mean free recall performance of title and no-title 
groups were compared after controlling for the integration of the propositions 
contained in the passages (the extent of intra- and intersentence integration). The 
integration was indexed by the proportion correct on CF performance, proportion 
correct on SDJ performance and the rs measure of SDJ performance. 
The authors found that when subjects are given a title at the time of encoding they 
were better on the CF measure than those subjects given no titles or given titles at 
the testing phase. In addition they found that when subjects were asked to 
comprehend the passage's sentences individually without relating them to each 
other, free recall of the passage suffered. They also discovered that the adjusted 
free recall performance of the title and no-title condition, taking the three indices of 
information integration into account, did not differ significantly. Thus when intra- 
and intersentence information is controlled, free recall performance of the title 
subjects becomes similar to that of the no-title subjects. 
f 
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In conclusion then it does seem that knowledge of the title of an abstract passage 
helps to integrate the passage in memory and this integration is crucial in 
facilitating the free recall of the passage. Furthermore the relatively poor 
performance of . subjects 
in the delayed title conditions is suggestive of schema 
construction at encoding rather than retrieval. 
Other recent work in this area has re-emphasized the usefulness of schema theory 
in explaining some, by now familiar, results. Foos (1992) asked twenty-five 
undergraduates to read simple stories about ordered events. Three different 
sequences of events were used in the stories: a chronological sequence (1-2-3) 
and two flashback sequences, (1-3-2 and 2-1-3). The stories were presented on a 
tachistoscope which allowed the readings to be timed accurately. Subjects were 
also timed as they answered questions on whether or not certain orders of events 
in the stories were true or false. 
Foos found that the input sequence significantly influenced mean story-reading 
time but not mean test-response time. This conflicts with the data reported by 
Baker (1978) who found quite the opposite- namely that input sequence affected 
test-response time. Foos explains this by pointing out that subjects in the first two 
of Baker's experiments were probably not given enough time to construct a 
schema and she in effect forced subjects to construct a schema at retrieval. 
Foos concluded that his own data strongly suggests that subjects were 
constructing schemata during encoding of the material. In contrast to Baker's 
study, subjects could take as long as they liked to read any given story and to 
respond to a test item and it was this no-limiting of time that allowed them to 
construct a schema at encoding. Furthermore this finding clashes with Alba & 
Hasher's reproductive view (1983) which proposes that schemata are essentially 
temporary and constructed at retrieval. It does seem unlikely that people invariably 
construct a schema, disposing of the details originally presented (Keenan et al., 
1977). However Foos has shown that if it is advantageous to use a chronologically 
ordered schema in a testing situation, then "individuals do not hesitate to construct 
such a schema, and... they construct this schema at encoding, not at retrieval" 
(p424). 
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Anderson and Pichert (1987) looked primarily at the effects of a shift in subjects' 
perspective at the recall stage. To recap: the key finding was that subjects could 
recall new information not previously recalled once a change in perspective had 
been achieved (eg. going from a prospective house-buyer's to a burglar's view of a 
house description). This is suggestive of some perspective relevant information 
being stored but not recalled until the appropriate time. This further suggests a 
schema which plays a more important role in retrieval than encoding. 
Support for this view has been forthcoming (eg. Kardash et al., 1988) but others 
support the idea that schemata do indeed affect text-encoding (eg. Lee-Salmons & 
Whitney, 1991; Baillet & Keenan, 1986). - Baillet and Keegan have noted that 
several variables may cause text encoding to be, constrained by reading from a 
particular perspective (1986). They rightly claim that studies such as Anderson & 
Pichert (1978) have tested subjects' memories very shortly after reading (within 15 
minutes). This, combined with the use of short text-passages (eg. 373 words in the 
case of Anderson and Pichert) has made relatively verbatim representations of the 
text passages to be available to the subjects. They found that, in line with their 
hypothesis, a shift in perspective at retrieval did affect recall under immediate 
testing conditions but not under delayed conditions. 
Lee-Salmons and Whitney replicate to some extent, the findings of Baillet and 
Keenan but also note the importance of individual differences in working memory 
(Lee-Salmons & Whitney, 1991). They proposed that readers with a low working 
memory span have poorer text-integration abilities and thus have a greater need 
for an organizing perspective (schema) to help with comprehension. In line with 
their hypothesis, they discovered that the contents of text representation was 
determined by a reading perspective much more so for low-span readers than for 
high-span readers. 
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What much of the recent literature on schemata and schema processes in the 
cognitive domain seems to indicate is that the concept of the schema is far too 
powerful to be discarded just yet. Of the most prominent critics of schema theory, 
Alba & Hasher ".. think it clear that the stored record of any event is far more 
detailed than prototypical schema theories imply. " (Alba & Hasher, 1983, p225). 
However the evidence for this is by no means overwhelming and it neglects the 
fact that all of us would have near photographic memories if , as they believe, "the 
memory trace is richer and more detailed than these [schematic] processes would 
allow. " (p219). 
The power of schema theory in terms of explaining processing efficiency and 
accounting for distortion and error remains largely intact. Definition of the theory 
remains crucial to its current status: perhaps most of the reservations about 
schema theory are more an example of semantic wranglings over what constitutes 
a schema rather than all-encompassing contradictions of its assumptions. 
CHAPTER 5: Social Schemata 
I raised to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had soaked a 
morsel of the cake.... And suddenly the memory revealed itself. The 
taste was that of the little piece of madeleine which on Sunday 
mornings at Combray... my aunt Leonie used to give me, dipping it 
first in her own cup of tea or tisane 
Proust, A /a recherche du temps perdu. vol. 1.: Du c6t6 de chez 
Swann (Swann's Way, 1913; pp48 and 50) 
"Social perceivers, then, have schemas about types of personalities, 
social events, and social roles. " 
(Taylor & Crocker, 1981, p91) 
Over the last ten to twenty years, with the examining of irrationalism and states of 
emotion having receded, the study of how people think about their physical and 
social environments has predominated in social psychology. 
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Assuming that one rejects simple behaviourist notions of social behaviour, people 
are seen not just as individuals reacting to situations but in the process of actively 
interpreting and attributing meaning to them. Schema theory attempts to examine 
assumptions that the "perceivers" have and how these affect the way they 
experience their own environments. In the past, perceivers have been 
conceptualized as, for example, logical philosophers (Heider, 1958), information 
processors (Jones & Davis, 1965) and scientists (Kelley, 1967). Part of the 
theoretical power of schema theory is that it recognizes fundamental aspects of 
such strong views of the psyche and manages to provide and explain additional 
data which sit uncomfortably with competing theories. 
In some ways schema theory was a reaction against the simple view of perception 
that had previously established the mainstream theoretical view. This view depicted 
sensory perception as a passive process: our external environments 'impact on 
our retinas when our eyes open and the scene is recorded much as in the 
photographic process. However knowledge is not stored randomly but, as schema 
theorists propose, organized into structures that can be useful in later cognition. 
Schema theory also emphazises the active role of the mind in mediating, to varying 
extents, the final effect of ongoing perceptions. Put crudely, past cognitions are 
brought to bear on current perceptions. 
Sir Frederick Bartlett was instrumental in bringing the notion of a schema into 
psychology in the 1930s and led the way for its application to social behaviour. He 
had conducted a number of experiments concerning human memorization. One of 
these is the now famous storytelling paradigm where a complex Indian folktale, 
The War of the Ghosts, was read to one person who repeated it to another person 
who in turn repeated it to a third and so on. There were patterns noted in this 
process, both in what was lost in the retelling and in what was retained. The idea of 
a story and the narrative structure itself remained intact. Many details were lost 
however. Unfamiliar objects and ideas were ignored and the more supernatural 
themes removed. 
One way of looking at what was happening was to view the new information 
provided by the story being incorporated into previously held memories or 
experiences. Remembering, albeit incomplete and selective, was facilitated by 
assimilation to this story 'schema'. 
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If one as a social perceiver were to be presented with a particular problem from a 
particular stimulus set, it would be costly (in terms of time and effort) to try out 
every possible solution and match it against all previous experiences,. What we 
appear to do is to identify the stimulus very quickly and chunk information into units 
for efficient processing. Information missing can then be filled in and a strategy 
devised for obtaining further information or reaching some goal. One can loosely 
group the functions of social schemata into two loose categories: 
(a) encoding and representative functions which allow individuals to obtain 
information from their social environment and represent it in short term memory 
and 
(b) interpretative or inferential functions which allow the individual to impute 
meaning to the newly acquired information and from this, select a behaviour, set 
goals or solve problems. 
Given that encoding and interpretative functions are not wholly independent of 
each other and may take place in immediate and rapid succession then definitions 
of each category are likely to be unavoidably blurred (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
Social schemata are constructions of how one's social environment works. In their 
excellent review of the literature on social schemata up to the 80's and a meta- 
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analysis of the concepts within, Taylor & Crocker (1981) identify three main types: 
person, role and event schemata. 
Trying to understand and predict the behaviour of others takes up a significant 
chunk of conscious life. Its very likely that we have a general person schema into 
which we can add modifications, i. e. motivations, traits (e. g. introvert/extrovert), 
interests etc. Such a schema is activated when meeting new people. That of a 
policeman is likely to be different from that of a university professor. In addition to 
including various conceptions of person prototype, person schemata also include 
person impressions or representations of specific individuals (Hamilton et al., 1980) 
and self-schemata (Markus, 1977). 
There also exist more specific person schemata. An example of this is the schema 
constructed for a particular person known to us, built up after repeated exposures. 
When a person acts contrary to the schema we have of them, then we use 
expressions such as "not like him" or "she's not on form". 
Another type is the self schema. This includes knowledge of one's own traits, 
strengths and weaknesses, views of others on self and typical behaviour in a given 
situation. Such a schema is used to understand both past and current situations 
and to predict future ones. 
Yet another type of schema is that for various groups in society. A schema for a 
cleaner may be very different from that for a solicitor. The cleaner schema might 
include features such as low paid, chatty and probably female. That for a solicitor 
would typically be well-off, educated, precise in nature and probably male. It is not 
difficult to see how the resilience of such schemata in society can play a part in 
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stereotyping and prejudice. The similiarity with the concept of the stereotype is 
worrth noting, though the inference that `schema inevitably leads to stereotype' 
should be avoided. 
These are schemes that encapsulate abstract knowledge about sequences of 
events. An example of such a sequence is obtaining a degree. One enrolls at 
university, attends lectures and tutorials, studies written material, passes exams 
and eventually is awarded the degree. The order of such events is invariably fixed. 
Where event schemata prescribe a certain sequence of actions, they are often 
called scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Going to a restaurant is a good example 
of a script. One would expect a particular order of events to occur such as being 
seated, looking at the menu, ordering, consuming the food, paying the bill and 
leaving. Details will vary tremendously from one experience to the next but the 
schema is general and takes account of different requirements e. g. in a canteen 
where the customer gets the food before sitting down. One can assume that stored 
schemata contain masses of scripts to make everyday behaviour possible. Without 
such scripts, "we would be perpetual strangers in a foreign land" (Howitt et al., 
1989, p117). 
If one takes an information processing view of what the environment presents, then 
the perceiver is under a constant barrage of stimuli, all competing for attention. If 
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the perceiver were to stop examining all such information, no substantial progress 
could be made and he/she would be overwhelmed. Clearly, information must be 
filtered. 
The information selected from the environment constitutes some form of stimulus 
configuration. To make sense of it, the perceiver matches it against a schema. The 
relationships and ordering among the elements of the schema are imposed on the 
elements of the stimulus configuration. It is a process which creates the conditions 
for later inferences to be made. Since the elements of the schema are related to 
each other via concepts of hierarchy, balance, affect or grouping, knowledge of the 
schema allows the perceiver to identify the elements of the stimulus configuration, 
with their relationships to one another, and to impute meaning to the behaviour 
encountered. For example there are a variety of characters, acts and events in a 
setting such as a courtroom and each role has its spatial location. The judge sits 
on high and is in charge, the spectators, lawyers and jury form three distinct 
groups. Within the schema are specific röles (e. g. counsel for the defense) and 
events (e. g. the swearing in of witnesses). 
In such a situation, a well defined and commonly held schema exists. However if 
there is some ambiguity in the scenario, providing structure to the experience is 
more difficult. For example, if we see a photograph showing an old peasant woman 
standing beside a group of young well armed soldiers in battle fatigues and are told 
that this town has been recently liberated, then it seems appropriate to assume 
that the woman is well disposed towards the soldiers and may even have been 
talking to them. However, told that the town has been invaded, we would probably 
assume a degree of enmity between the soldiers and the old woman. In each case, 
a separate schema has been instantiated by the verbal descriptions 
("invasion"/"liberation") which in turn give dramatically different structures of 
meaning to the same situation. 
In the previous chapters on schema theory, a hierarchical organization of 
schemata was described with the more abstract elements toward the top (e. g. the 
'theme') and less abstract, more specific elements descending from this. Hierarchy 
is probably not the only organizational principle; others such as balance, grouping 
and categorization are most likely present. With these organizational principles, a 
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person can represent and store his or her knowledge about the organization of the 
environment. 
These basic elements of organization are responsible for the manifestation of the 
structuring nature of schemata. Taylor & Crocker (1981) propose that the 
structuring function of schemata is evidenced de facto by the appearance of 
categorization, balance, grouping and the imputation of relations of proximity, 
reciprocity, similarity and dominance in the individual's construction of a stimulus 
configuration. Categorization is a process especially pertinent to schemata 
functioning. At this point it would be useful to briefly examine this particular process 
and to discover the important implications it has for the functioning of social 
schemata. 
As has been pointed out before, the need for perceivers to produce short-cuts 
when organizing information is paramount, given the wealth and complexity of the 
information presented by the environment on an everyday basis. It simply is not 
possible to attend fully to all the points of information that our senses can provide 
us with. Schemata facilitate short-cuts and allow us to encode important material 
and discard the irrelevant. One of the key processes used in schematizing the 
social world is categorization. 
Information presented to the perceiver needs to be categorized: to be assigned to 
a familiar category. Hand in hand with the categorization process is the inevitability 
of distortion. As part of a schema's efficiency, when an object is perceived and 
categorized, the individual characteristics of the object are lost. That is to say, the 
object is perceived merely as an example of a particular category. The peculiar 
features of that object will not be noticed (although such features are there to be 
selected if required). If we walk along a city street, the funny sounding, black blur 
that passes through our perceptual field is categorized as a taxi without us being 
aware of the red sticker in the back window or the missing hub-cap. 
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Perhaps the best laboratory demonstration of this relationship between distortion 
and categorization was provided by the influential social psychologist, Tajfel. He 
presented subjects with eight lines of varying lengths (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963; Tajfel, 
1981). Each line was viewed separately and the task involved estimating the length 
of each line. In part of the study, labels were appended to the lines- 'A' for the four 
shortest and 'B' for the four longest. The result was that subjects tended to view all 
the 'A' lines as much more similar in length than in reality and likewise for the 'B' 
lines. In addition, differences between the 'A' and 'B' lines were exaggerated- the 
longest of the short lines (in category 'A') judged as very much different in length to 
the shortest of the long lines (in category 'B'). In other words, differences within 
groups were underestimated and differences between groups overestimated. 
Based on this and other, similar work, social categorization has had many 
applications, most notably the study of intergroup conflict. The process of social 
categorization can be viewed as a special form of schema processing. It reduces 
the sheer multiplicity of stimuli emanating from the social environment into a 
smaller number of social categories. 
An important corollary is that social categorization has the effect of exaggerating 
the differences between particular categories (e. g. groups of people) and reducing 
the differences within the categories. One can say that two people identified as 
belonging to two different social groups are viewed as being more different than 
they actually are; two people identified as belonging to the same group are viewed 
as being more similar than they actually are. In other words, once a person is 
categorized as belonging to a particular group e. g. an Italian, then we not only 
assume that he or she is very similar to other Italians but also very different from 
Germans or Norwegians. 
The process of social categorization is more fundamental than causal attribution. 
When we categorize an object, we are saying what it is and this must precede 
what we have perceived it to have caused. If an event is categorized as 'lucky' for 
example, then one is making assumptions about its causes. In the categorization 
process, Tajfel proposes that distortions, in some way analogous to the distorted 
judgment of the lines already discussed, will occur. Most categories contain typical 
examples or 'prototypes' such as the typical Italian person. A prototype embodies 
the major features of the body. Mervis & Rosch, (1980) believe that similarity to the 
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prototype determines whether or not a stimulus is included under the category 
heading. They note that a stimulus does not need to be a replicate of the prototype 
but should contain enough features of the prototype in order to distinguish it from 
those stimuli which must be categorized under a different heading. However, as 
one might expect, there will be many occasions on which categorization will not be 
absolute. For example, should one describe someone who finally wins a lottery 
after many years of trying and after spending thousands of pounds on tickets, 
'lucky' or, merely 'well organized'? Categories may well contain concrete, well 
defined prototypes in their kernels but will probably be hazily defined at the edges. 
Social categorization leads people to place themselves in some categories but not 
others; we develop in Tajfel's terms, a social identity (Tajfel, 1978). This social 
identity or sense of belonging not only gives self-esteem but is a necessary 
precursor for large numbers of people to hate or discriminate against other people. 
Not only do we divide the world into social groups, placing ourselves within certain 
of them, we also need to enhance our own self worth. To do this, we ensure that 
our, social -identity, is evaluated positively and this is achieved by making 
comparisons. Comparisons are made between one's own social group and others 
(see Festinger's 'Social Comparison' theory). It is not difficult to envisage how 
perceived imbalances in the relative standings of various groups can underpin the 
construction of stereotypes and eventually, precipitate inter-group conflict (Tajfel, 
1982). 
Clearly, the formation and utilization of social schemata with their concomitant 
categorization processes can have dramatic consequences for society's well-being. 
There is, of course, a wealth of data in the literature which can be interpreted from 
this point of view and which furhter confirms the presence of the structuring 
function of schemata. In a series of experiments discussed in detail in Chapter 
One, Kuethe investigated how social schemata are responsible for systematic 
errors in the reconstruction of social displays (Kuethe, 1962,1964). In one 
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experiment, subjects were required to select felt figures and place them on a field. 
He found that the persons were always grouped together and apart from objects. 
Patterns of placement tended to be invariant: man, woman and child were viewed 
as belonging together, the child was placed between the two adults and closer to 
the woman. 
It is this characteristic grouping function of social schemata which underlies the 
processes of stereotyping. Looking at the divisive social groupings of race and sex, 
Taylor et al. (1978) discovered that both race and sex form categories for 
organizing incoming information. Subjects recalled information as a function of 
race, sex and number of persons of that race or sex in the group. They exhibited a 
tendency not to make cross-racial or cross-sex errors but rather to mix up members 
of a given race or sex with each other. 
The structuring function of schemata can also be demonstrated by looking at the 
effects of 'impression set' in relation to 'memory set'. Subjects are asked to 
memorize a list of the behavioural descriptions of an individual (memory set) or 
merely to form an impression of the person from that list (impression set). It is the 
latter process which would call on subject's schematic conceptions of personality 
types to restructure the information into a conceptually 'good figure'. In a series of 
six studies, Hamilton et al., (1980) found that those subjects in the impression set 
condition organized the descriptions of behaviour into arrangements of related 
behaviours, i. e. they grouped the descriptions into schematic categories that were 
personality relevant- to a greater extent than subjects in the memory set condition. 
As mentioned earlier, there are other organizational properties in addition to 
groupings that schemata may impose on social stimuli. Where interpersonal 
sentiment relations are concerned, the balance of the structure appears to be a 
prominent characteristic. If person A loves person B, we often make the 
assumption that B loves A also. If B and C are mutually antagonistic, then we are 
likely to suppose that A does not like C either. When this balance of interpersonal 
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relations is disturbed, then we assume that some sort of reckoning is necessary to 
restore balance e. g. if C turns out to love B, will A and B break up? There is 
evidence to show that interpersonal sentiment relationships are remembered better 
if they are balanced rather than imbalanced (Picek et al., 1975). 
In schemata where relationships of dominance and influence are more important 
than sentiment relationships, the organizational property of linear ordering 
becomes predominant (Henley, 1969; Poitou, 1970). E. g. the managing director 
can give orders to the company secretary; the company secretary can't tell the 
M. D. what to do but can order around an account executive. Potts (1972) gave 
subjects a social unit that was incomplete and discovered that subjects during a 
recognition memory test filled in details from the unit and stored the completed unit 
along linear-ordering principles. Hypothetical social relationships consistent with 
commonly held schemata for such relationships are easier to remember than those 
that are inconsistent (Delia & Crocket, 1973; van Kreveld & Zajonc, 1966). 
Turning to schemata for stories and events, Bower, Black & Turner, (1979) 
describe peoples' knowledge of routine services as action stereotypes or scripts. 
They discovered significant agreement between subjects with regard to the 
segmentation of scripts (e. g. a visit to the doctor) into lower level sequences of 
action 'scenes' (e. g. sitting in the waiting room). From this they proposed a 
hierarchical framework of memory with a script made up of descending levels of 
scenes and actions within scenes. Cantor & Mischell (1977) envisage the structure 
of person schemata in a similar hierarchical fashion. 
There is evidence from studies of causal dependencies in passages of text that 
social event schemata can be organized into causal relations. In this passage for 
example: "Jane began to like Steve because of all the compliments he made to her 
on Speech Day, " the superordinate episode or theme is "Jane began to like Steve"; 
"because of all the compliments that he made to her" and "on Speech Day" are the 
subordinative causative episodes. Several studies have shown that people are 
most likely to remember the theme of the passage and least likely to remember the 
causative episodes (e. g. see Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975; 
Thomdyke, 1977). 
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Temporal as well as hierarchical organization can be found in script or event 
schemata. If subjects are given a script in a mixed-up order, then in a free recall 
task, they-tended to recall them in the temporal order in which they would have 
occurred (Bower et al., 1979). In the case of routine events, it is easy for the 
subject to know the goal of the sequence taking place since the text makes it 
implicit; when the event is definitely non-routine, then the goal has to be inferred. 
There is good evidence that schemata determine what material will be encoded or 
retrieved from memory. Since a schema offers a method of structuring the 
information in a stimulus configuration, one would expect that a good match to a 
schema would enhance recall and that information relevant to the schema would 
be better recalled than that not relevant. 
Cantor & Mischell (1977) gave subjects character descriptions of people that were 
(a) internally consistent (e. g. introverted or extroverted), (b) mixed (varied in 
character but not inconsistent), or (c) internally inconsistent (e. g. both introverted 
and extroverted). He found that recall was best for the internally consistent 
description condition in terms of overall amount of information recalled and 
numbers of errors. This is presumably because such a character description 
instantiates a schema for that type of character- the other conditions instantiating 
weak or conflicting schemata. Whether or not the recall task was delayed or 
whether the type of schema was extrovert or introvert appeared to make no 
difference to subjects' performance. As described in the previous chapter, if 
semantic material presented is preceded by a theme, then recall for that material is 
enhanced (e. g. Bransford & Johnson, 1973). So it would appear that if the stimulus 
configuration is a good match for a schema that the subject already has or the 
schema is 'pre-activated' by a thematic cue, recall is facilitated. 
In the Hamilton et al. (1980) paper cited earlier, one assumes that the subjects in 
the 'impression' condition used structured, personality type schemata on which to 
match the behaviour descriptions. Looking at the organization of their recall, the 
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authors could detect categorization by personality types or traits. Those subjects in 
the memory set condition did show subjective organization in their recall but 
nothing which could be described as 'person schematic'. Moreover those in the 
impression set condition showed much better recall of information than those in the 
memory set condition. 
Whilst recall of presented material is enhanced by a match to a schema, so too is 
recall of schema relevant information. Zadny & Gerard (1974) asked subjects to 
view a videotape showing two individuals poking around an apartment. Different 
groups of subjects were given different descriptions of what was going on e. g. the 
people were disposing of drugs in anticipation of a visit by the authorities or that 
the people were waiting for a friend and had become restless. The experimenters 
discovered that features and sentences which were appropriate to the scene they 
had witnessed were better remembered than those related to other scenes. The 
mere presence of a theme predicts which material from a set of information items 
will be remembered later (Bower et at., 1979; Thorndyke, 1977). 
It is surprising and interesting to note that material which is moderately inconsistent 
with a schema may actually be better recalled than material that is schema 
consistent. This is a disturbing finding at first glance. It was uncovered in a study 
where subjects were provided with lists of twelve personality traits e. g. honest/liar, 
irresponsible/conscientious, aggressive/shy which described an individual (Hastie & 
Kumar, 1979). Included in each list was a set of adjectives which varied in 
congruency with the majority of adjectives on the list and did so on three levels: 
high, medium and low. 
The authors found that in certain cases, the low and high level congruency 
adjectives were less well recalled than the medium congruency adjectives. Set size 
(the number of congruent/incongruent behaviours attributed to the character) was 
shown to be crucial to this result. As the size of the incongruent set became 
smaller, there was an increased probability that subjects would recall an item from 
the set. 
It is possible that highly congruent information can be incorporated into a schema 
quite easily and in doing so may become confused with some other non-presented 
but semantically related adjectives in the hierarchy of associations that forms a 
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schema. However, material that is highly incongruent is rejected since it poorly 
reflects the character of the individual. Mildly incongruent material entails a 
considerable amount of cognitive work to make it congruent with the impression of 
the character. This increased processing, as it were, leads to better remembering 
of such adjectives. Accordingly, mildly incongruent adjectives would be rated as 
more consistent with the character impression than un-recalled ones. Incongruent 
material would perhaps generate more idiosyncratic associations or behavioural 
predictions than consistent information (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
A related finding has been reported by Bower, Black & Turner (1979) who found 
that subjects remember deviations from scripts better than actions more 
characteristic of the script. Consistent with the analysis of Hastie & Kumar (1979), 
the deviations that were recalled were typically goal relevant and non-visual. 
An important additional fact is raised by Taylor & Crocker (1981) regarding the 
frequent trade-off that occurs between attention and encoding and storage. 
Incongruent material can affect attention and storage in opposing ways. It may, for 
example, be more easily recalled because it draws attention on the one hand, but 
less easily recalled on the other, since encoding or storing it is more difficult with a 
schema; schema relevant material does not cue it. 
In a previous chapter, the issue is raised of whether subjects were constructing 
schemata during encoding of the material or during retrieval (e. g. Alba & Hasher, 
1983; Baker, 1978; Foos, 1992). A related issue is whether bias in recall that is 
related to the schema in question represents an encoding or retrieval bias. 
Rothbart et al., (1979) presented subjects with the same set of fifty behaviour 
descriptions consisting of intelligent/non-intelligent, friendly/unfriendly, and related 
behaviours. Each behaviour was related to the name of one member of a group of 
fifty men. Half subjects were told that the group was intellectual, half that the group 
was friendly. Half the subjects were given the expectancy before the presentation 
of the behaviours and the remaining number given it afterwards. 
Superior recall for behaviours confirming the stereotype was shown by those 
subjects when the expectancy was delivered prior to the presentation of the 
behaviours but not when expectancies were provided after presentation of the 
behaviours. The self-perpetuating nature of social stereotypes may be accounted 
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for by this memory effect. Moreover, their findings pointed to the localization for 
superior recall for confirming or disconfirming events in the encoding rather than 
the retrieval process. 
Zadny & Gerard (1974), in one of the experiments they report, show their subjects 
an action sequence or skit in which actors playing male and female college 
students discuss brushes with the law that they or their friends have had as a result 
of minor drug and theft charges. They provided half their subjects with an 'intent 
before observing the skit, the remaining subjects afterwards. Three intents were 
used: the situation portrayed a burglary, a search for drugs and the two people just 
waiting for a friend and going "stir-crazy" in their protracted wait. 
Selected retrieval effects were stronger when subjects were given the skit's intent 
before observation suggesting that the bias the authors provided was primarily an 
encoding one. Retrieval bias has been observed in other studies (e. g. Snyder & 
Uranowitz, 1978). However most of the studies in this area have sought either a 
retrieval or an encoding bias but not both together. Those that have examined both 
types of bias have tended to point to stronger encoding biases. 
Implicit in the very idea of a schema is the acceptance that information must be 
efficiently and speedily managed by it. Schema-relevant material tend to exhibit 
faster processing times than schema-irrelevant material as evidenced from a wide 
body of literature. Assuming that a person has a social schema for a given 
situation, it is reasonable to suppose that material relevant to that situation will be 
processed faster than either material irrelevant to the situation or material for which 
there is no schema available. 
The work of Hazel Markus has provided some useful evidence for this. She has 
produced a number of quite influential papers on self-schemata in the 1970s. She 
defined self-schemata as 
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".. cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience that 
organize and guide the processing of self-related information contained in 
the individual's social experiences. " (Markus, 1977, p64). 
Markus'(1977) used only female subjects since the distribution of self ratings on 
various dimensions apparently differs according to sex and so she avoided the 
need for selecting more dimensions. Of the 48 subjects, three groups were 
categorized: independents who had schemata about themselves indicated by 
various trait scales; dependents who rated themselves on the opposite ends of the 
scales to the independents and aschematics who rated themselves in the middle 
range of these scales. 
Subjects were then asked to read sentences describing various behaviours and 
then press a button ("me" or "not me") to indicate whether or not the behaviours 
were self descriptive. The finding relevant to our interests here was that those 
subjects with identifiable self schemata (independents and dependents) showed 
faster response latencies than the aschematics. 
When investigating social problem solving, Taylor et al., (1978) achieved similar 
results. They used different types of cues in each condition to aid subjects in the 
experimental tasks: schema relevant cues, schema irrelevant cues and no cue in 
the control condition. Those problems with the schema relevant cue were solved 
significantly quicker than the 'no cue' problems; these in turn were solved faster 
than problems with schema irrelevant cues. 
Earlier in this chapter (5.4.4), the observation was made that under certain 
conditions, information moderately inconsistent with a schema may be recalled 
better than information consistent with the schema (e. g. see Hastie & Kumar, 
1979) without necessarily weakening the use of the schema concept. In a similar 
vein, Markus (1977) found that false feedback on an attribute was processed more 
slowly by people who held a schema for that attribute (the schematics) than those 
who did not (the aschematics). Rogers et al., (1977) found that subjects who 
encoded trait information in strategies of self-reference typically took longer to 
identify the traits during recall then those who encoded material with non self- 
relevant strategies (e. g. using structural or semantic associations). 
Chapter 5 Social Schemata 162 
At first sight the reader would consider such findings inconsistent with social 
schema theory. Markus (1977) comes to the rescue, citing the importance of the 
specific circumstances during processing of the material. When, under certain 
circumstances, information relevant to the activated schema is being processed, 
the incoming information evokes a 'data base' of experience. This increases the 
time taken to process since both the incoming information and evoked data base 
must be processed. The key question of course is what are the circumstances 
under which schema-relevant information leads to shorter versus longer processing 
times? 
A not dissimilar possibility is that, again under certain conditions, the perceiver 
shifts from automatic to controlled processing (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). This 
latter type of processing involves a slower and more methodical search than the 
former type of processing. More information and/or a richer structure is used on the 
schema-relevant material leading to longer processing times. 
Under what conditions could this shift occur? Information that is highly redundant 
and/or central to the schema could be processed more quickly than information 
irrelevant to the schema. On the other hand, information which has novel 
implications or perhaps is purely peripheral to the schema could engender longer 
processing times. Also possible is that information of a highly valenced type and/or 
information which evokes a data base that is evaluatively mixed might engender 
longer processing times than information which evokes a data base that is less 
evaluative or information that evokes an evaluatively consistent data base. 
So, for example, if people who believe themselves to be nervous were asked if 
they would be (a) nervous at a party or (b) in the presence of a bishop would most 
likely have faster response times to the first question. The second question would 
probably take longer to process since experience of bishops is rare and not 
absolutely central to the schema of nervousness. Similarly such people would 
probably take longer to consider if they would be nervous during an exam rather 
than e. g. nervous in a supermarket since in the former case there are some far 
more emotive implications. 
Taylor & Crocker (1981) warn that with regard to the data on processing time, the 
conclusions of some studies can be misleading. For example mere manipulation of 
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task constraints can lead to variations in processing times. Heavy reliance on 
findings from cognitive schema research (where faster processing times for 
schema relevant information is the norm) can also be detrimental since the 
materials in such studies are often very redundant and laboratory based. 
However, in the social environment, information relevant to the activated schema is 
more complex and derived from a stimuli-rich/ affective environment. Cognitive 
schema literature emphasizes the need for schemata to identify and process 
stimuli quickly and efficiently. Social schemata are more complex and might also 
include cues that serve to identify particular elements that deserve more 
processing time. It is plausible that social schemata allow one to process some 
information efficiently and other material in greater depth. 
Very often, the information presented to an individual is incomplete in some way. 
Social schemata allow one to 'fill in' the missing pieces in the jigsaw. 
A fuller match between stimulus and memory is achieved when a stimulus is 
matched to a schema and a search is invoked for elelments missing in the stimulus 
configuration that are normally found in the schema. So if a perceiver goes to a 
concert hall and fails to see ushers at the door, he or she may speculate as to their 
whereabouts and conduct a search for them. 
Another possibility in the process of filling in missing data is the use of "default 
options". Using a term familiar to computer users, Minsky (1975) proposes that 
when some values in the stimulus configuration are missing, best guesses are 
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inserted as default options. Such default options would have originated from 
previous instances of the schema. If someone is looking for a doctor in a hospital, 
they will probably be searching for someone in a white coat with a stethoscope 
around his or her neck. In this instance, the expectation of a white coat and/or 
stethoscope comprises the default option for the schema of doctor. 
Sometimes the perceiver may not be able "to see the wood for the trees". The 
stimulus configuration presented may contain so much complex detail that during 
recall, the perceiver uses default options for all those missing pieces of information 
that he or she was not able to notice on initial presentation (especially if the 
configuration is presented briefly or out of focus), rehearsal in memory or when the 
situation demands some relevant response. So much of the literature on social 
schemata demonstrate how they can lead to systematic errors being made and in 
particular, errors of omission. It is thus important to note that errors by construction 
and addition are also possible. 
Evidence to support the notion that schemata can produce 'additive' errors in this 
way is forthcoming. Where subjects form inferences about prototypical persons 
with internal consistency (e. g. introvert/extrovert) then they tend to recall the 
behaviour of those persons in ways that are biased toward the inclusion of non- 
presented but conceptually related behaviours (Cantor & Mischel, 1977). 
Spiro asked subjects to read a story about a couple's marriage and family plans 
(Spiro, 1977). They were asked either to memorize the material or to . form an 
impression of the couple. Following this subjects were told that the couple had 
either married (and lived happily ever after) or had split up. During the recall phase, 
those in the impression condition managed to invent data consistent with the story 
outcome they had received. As the time between the story and recall phase 
increased, so the inventing effect was more pronounced, presumably because the 
schema had more time to 'kick in' and invent material relevant to the story. 
Bower et al., (1979) examining scripts found that subjects tended strongly to recall 
actions made by characters that were not actually in the original script but were 
strongly implied by it. When people are given information that someone is 
homosexual, Synder & Uranowitz (1978) found that memories were reinterpreted 
and clues to the person's sexuality were suddenly 'uncovered'. 
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Thus far it would seem that schema-led intrusions of material into subjects recall is 
well established. However there does appear to be an inconsistency with another 
issue: the question of whether or not a mental representation of a stimulus 
configuration is 'fleshed out' in short term memory as a full or partial copy of the 
social schema. Bower et at. (1979) discuss this at length; suffice it to say they 
favour the partial copy alternative. The main explanation for proposing this 
alternative is that to provide a full copy in every case is prohibitively 'expensive' 
from a cognitive point of view. Functionally speaking, this is especially true when a 
full match to a schema is quite unnecessary. By way of example, I can describe a 
story concerning a doctor without you wanting to know if a stethoscope is slung 
around his neck. Of course, you may flesh out this attribute if you wish but for most 
peoples' use of the schema, this would not be necessary. 
Furthermore, one can reason that the process of fleshing out can in theory be 
never-ending. One detail filled in with data or a default option engenders even 
more assumptions and even more default options. There may be occasions when 
full copies are fleshed out but probably only in certain circumstances e. g. 
answering an exam question, when one plans for a certain goal or when the 
situation is highly demanding, involving and/or affectively laden. 
Assuming that the insertion of default options has some validity, one then needs to 
know which default options are inserted and which missing values are left empty. It 
is possible that it is the strength of activation trace associated with a particular part 
of the schema which will determine if this particular part is mistakenly recalled as 
having been present in the stimulus array (Bower et al., 1979). 
So exactly what could result in a strong trace of activation for information that has 
not been presented? With the greater accumulation of memory traces for details 
that have always been part of the schema, one might expect such details to be 
inserted more frequently than less usual details because the latter type would have 
a weaker memory trace. Another cause could be a prior invocation of a schema 
which had some very vibrant, salient details where the memory traces produced 
appear to be stronger since they are more easily recalled. They may act as 
intrusions in subsequent attempts to match stimulus configurations to various 
schemata. 
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Other details that may be intruded would involve those in a schema that are closely 
related to the presented details. This might occur in the case of temporal or 
hierarchical sequences of events. E. g. if told that the captain of the Concorde 
made a landing, one might well assume that the control tower had given him 
landing permission since this is an invariant part of the temporal sequence of 
landing a plane. A further possibility is that schema-relevant details are likely to be 
intruded if activated recently by a data-set which is highly related but non-identical 
(Bower et al., 1979). 
Investigating the question of thematic intrusions raises some important points on 
methodology (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). One problem, familiar to almost all 
psychologists, is that output does not always reflect cognition. That is to say, in the 
case of default options, subjects do not always intrude obvious schema details 
precisely because they are so obvious. For example, when describing the captain 
of the Concorde landing the plane, few will mention the Captain searching visually 
ahead for the runway because they assume that the 'audience' knows this and 
takes it for granted. 
Another problem concerns the easy ability of subjects to flesh out schemata at will 
with minimum effort. Can the experimenter be sure that the subject is accurately 
reporting on his or her representation and not simply fleshing out the schema that 
has been activated. So a subject's representation may be extended inadvertently 
by the experimenter. In the case of the Concorde story, if asked, a subject may be 
able to describe in some detail the corporate livery on the airliner but such detail 
would not be a part of his or her normal recounting of how the 'plane was landed. 
In the problem solving literature there does appear to be a consensus that the 
social perceiver uses heuristics of varying kinds which reduce and simplify the 
process of problem-solving. There are two types of heuristic which concern the use 
of schemata: availability and representativeness (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). 
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Representativeness describes the extent of given stimulation matching the 
essential features of some particular class or category of outcome. For example, 
Pavarotti may be considered representative of the category of tenors and the 
Princess of Wales as representative of the class of aristocracy. When people try to 
judge how likely a given outcome can be explained by a particular set of 
antecedent conditions or whether a particular person is a member of a category 
they use this representative heuristic. If, for example, someone is told that "Steve is 
an adventurous type who loves traveling at high speeds" they are more likely to 
conclude that Steve is a racing driver rather than a solicitor and ignore the 
statistical likelihood (relating to relative numbers of both occupations in the 
population) of this being false. 
One can see that for an individual to judge the Representativeness of a particular 
stimulus, a schema must be instantiated against which it should be compared. By 
matching the information given about Steve with the schemata for "racing drivers" 
and "solicitor", a social perceiver would conclude that Steve is more likely to be an 
instance of the former rather than the latter category. 
Thus the representativeness heuristic allows one to provide a problem solving 
strategy but it can also serve to influence what evidence one brings to bear in 
social problem-solving For example, Tversky & Kahneman (1977) when asking 
subjects to estimate probabilities found that they used base rate information that 
fitted their own causal theories but did not use this same base rate information 
when it did not fit their causal theory of events. Subjects tended to pay less 
attention to information that was not representative of the essential features of an 
outcome. 
The availability heuristic is used for judging frequency of probability by the ease 
with which instances or associations can be brought to mind. According to Tversky 
& Kahneman (1973) it is not necessary to perform actual operations of retrieval or 
construction to assess availability but merely to assess the ease with which such 
operations could be performed. The speed with which one can access instances 
leads to inferences of high probability or frequency. For example when asked to 
judge the percentage of single parents in the community one finds oneself, thinking 
of the number of one parent families that one knows personally. The database 
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provided by a schema provides the link between this sort of use of availability and 
schematic processing. For example, subjects who had schemata for particular 
traits were able to provide examples of that behaviour type faster than those 
without schemata (Markus, 1977). 
It is worth pointing out that information that is outstanding, colourful or highly 
salient in some way can be highly available without schematic access (Taylor & 
Crocker, 1981). However as there can be no judgment of a stimuli's 
representativeness without access to an abstract cognitive structure of some kind, 
the availability heuristic is intimately related to schematic processing. 
With specific cognitive events being matched against a range of schemata to 
assess goodness of fit, one can regard schemata as normative structures. Many 
varied and powerful implications of this can be seen, not least of which is the role 
of normative judgments in the processes underlying the formation of prejudice (see 
next chapter on social identity theory for a fuller treatment of this theme). 
At least one more immediate implication is that if an individual produces schema- 
led expectations in advance of actual experience of a stimulus configuration then 
this configuration is judged against these expectations. The importance of this 
point can hardly be over-emphasized. There is a large literature which shows how 
powerfully peoples' expectations influence their emotions and behaviour. Not all 
expectations come from schemata of course but many do and one can see that 
matching a stimulus configuration to a schema can lead to significant psychological 
consequences. 
There is some evidence for this normative aspect of schemata. Higgins & Rholes 
(1976) looked at impression formation derived from verbal information. They asked 
nineteen subjects to rate the desirability of various trait-role combinations. 
Examples of such combinations would be "immoral priest" and "casual surgeon". 
Their findings showed that overall ratings were a function of the desirability or 
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social value of the role and the extent to which the trait conformed with the role and 
was central to it. It seems that the general evaluation of a stimulus depends on 
whether it "fits" the schema (is a good match or good instance) and how the 
schema itself is evaluated. 1 
In addition, as a stimulus contains more of the central attributes of the schema it 
becomes a better instance of that schema. For example, assuming that a 
commonly held social schema for a lawyer proposes that he or she must be well 
educated then a lawyer who is clever and erudite is a good example of the 
profession. However if the stimulus contains attributes that are not central to the 
schema then even though those attributes may be separately considered positive, 
the stimulus configuration may be evaluated more negatively as an instance of the 
schema. For example the desirability rating of "casual surgeon" was negative even 
when the evaluations of the terms "casual" and "surgeon" in isolation were positive 
(Higgins, Detweiller, Rholes & Custis cited in Higgins & Rholes, 1976). 
We may 'like' people who fit our stereotypes or schemata for them despite the fact 
that we may also view this person in a negative light. Individuals who remain true to 
type, group, class, race etc. confirm our expectations of them, allow us to predict 
their behaviour and plan our own behaviour better. However, a stimulus 
configuration is only preferred if it is being evaluated as an instance of a schema. 
A kindergarten teacher who loves late nights and nightclubbing may not be thought 
of as a very good kindergarten teacher but may in fact be a more interesting 
teacher than one that fits the stereotype. 
Another aspect of the normative qualities of schemata is that those with highly 
developed schemata will tend to evaluate schema-relevant information with over- 
emphasis compared with others. In a series of experiments in the 1970s, it was 
found that with increasing attendance to a stimulus, the evaluation of the stimulus 
becomes more extreme (Tesser & Cowan, 1977; Tesser & Leone, 1977; Tesser & 
Conlee, 1975). z 
For example, Sadler & Tesser (1973) discovered that when subjects are given an 
opportunity to consider an unlikeable partner, they actually liked him less than did 
subjects who were distracted from thinking. On the other hand, subjects who were 
given time to think about a likeable partner, actually liked him more than subjects 
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who were distracted from thinking about him. Tesser & Conlee (1975) report that 
the longer an' individual is given to think on political issues, the greater is the 
likelihood that he or she will hold polarized attitudes on these issues. So people 
who have developed schemata for certain stimuli will show these extreme 
evaluation effects more than people without such schemata. 
Tesser & Leone (1977) explain this by first ruling out simple associationist networks 
as a possible explanation. Attitudes toward an object. (e. g. evaluations) are not 
based on all the person's beliefs but only the salient ones and such salient beliefs 
are not invariant nor indeed are the associations or implications of each belief. 
They propose that belief selection and alteration are, under the control of 
schemata. An individual may have a large number of beliefs about a particular 
stimulus but a schema renders only some of them salient: 
"Just as a scientist can use different theories to explain the same event (e. g. 
wave vs. quantum theories of light) so persons can tune in different theories 
for thinking about the same stimulus. " (Tesser & Leone, 1977, p342), 
So any change in schema would result in a change in thought and attitude with 
consequent accentuation of such changes. If a person had a poorly developed 
schema (or none at all) then it would be difficult for that person to decide which of 
the aspects of the stimulus -(the beliefs) should be made salient. Furthermore if 
there were few rules for inference making, the process of thought would result in 
few cognitive changes. This in turn would have little effect on the consistency of 
the salient beliefs and so relatively slight attitude polarization would result. 
A related finding is reported by Wilson & Schooler (1991) who compared 
preference for different types of strawberry jam between college students and 
experts (trained sensory panelists). Those subjects who were asked to analyze the 
way they felt the way they did tended to agree less with the experts' ratings of the 
jams than students who did not analyze their feelings. 
In a second experiment, preferences for college courses between students and 
expert opinion (34 faculty members) were compared. Some of these subjects were 
asked to analyze reasons for choosing a particular course and others were asked 
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to evaluate all the attributes of all the courses. Again, introspection caused 
subjects in both conditions to agree less with the experts; those who analysed their 
reasons seemed to focus their attention and base decisions on "nonoptimal 
criteria" and those evaluating multiple criteria appeared to have their judgements 
modified leading them to discriminate less between different alternatives. 
Wilson & Schooler concluded that analyzing one's reasons in a considered and 
introspective way can result in preferences and decisions that deviate strongly from 
expert opinion. They suggested that this finding, along with Wilson et al. 's (1990) 
finding (cited in Wilson and Schooler, 1991) that analyzing reasons also reduces 
peoples' satisfaction with their choices, "suggests that it may not always be a good 
idea to analyze the reasons for our preferences too carefully. " (p191). 
The implications of this work for social schematic functioning are important. Those 
with expert opinion can be described as having highly developed schemata and 
those non-experts as having no or poorly developed schemata. The application of 
the studies of Tesser and his colleagues to Wilson and Schooler's (1991) findings 
suggests, rather interestingly, that "thinkers" show extreme evaluation effects that 
can lead to possibly less desirable outcomes. Wilson & Schooler (1991) discuss 
the tendency of "thinking too much": bringing to mind reasons that do not 
correspond very well with those of the experts. Tesser and colleagues seem to 
regard "thinking a lot" as leading to extreme evaluation. It is tempting to propose 
that those with highly developed schemata ("experts") have less need to introspect 
than those allowed to think on the spot for whom learning and on-going schema- 
formation are more necessary. The implication is that the less elaborate one's 
social schemata are, the less will be the quality of attitudes and decisions based on 
their instantiation. 
Although the role of evaluation in schematic processing has received appropriate 
attention with regard to expectancy, there has been little research into evaluation 
within person or role schemata. How the process of evaluating experience from 
expectation actually occurs is not well understood at present. 
A crucial point raised by Taylor & Crocker (1981) is that "the area of expectations 
and evaluations would seem to be a good context in which to study schemata that 
have a strong affective component versus those that do not to see what the 
Chapter 5 Social Schemata 172 
important differences are between them (p111). " As will be seen, the present 
thesis is concerned with just this issue in a variety of settings scales ranging from 
macro space to interpersonal space. 
Predicting future events, to however small an extent, is an activity familiar to us all 
and one in which schemata have been shown to play a key role. Important work in 
this area has been carried out by Hazel Markus. She was particularly interested in 
self-schemata and asked subjects to predict their own behaviour in situations she 
devised where dependent or independent behaviours were involved. Women 
subjects at the University of Michigan had been classified into one of three 
categories: dependents: those who thought of themselves as quite dependent 
people, independents: those who considered themselves as being very 
independent persons and finally aschematics: those who didn't picture themselves 
as being either dependent or independent people. 
One of many tasks she asked her subjects to perform was to indicate whether or 
not an adjective in a check-list was characteristic of herself. Those who thought of 
themselves as being highly independent were the quickest to apply the terms 
meaning "independent" to themselves. Those with dependent self schemata were 
quickest in applying "dependent" adjectives to themselves. 
Markus also conducted an experiment in which schematics appeared to be 
resistant to anti-schematic feedback. Subjects were given false scores on a 
(supposed) test of suggestibility. She found that the 'independents' were the most 
inclined to reject descriptions of themselves that were inconsistent with their self- 
concepts. From this and all her other results, Markus proposed that the schemata 
people had about themselves allowed them to process external information 
relevant to their concepts of self with great speed and efficiency. Whether or not a 
particular adjective applied to them could be quickly decided. They could also 
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remember those times when they behaved in ways which fitted this schema, 
predicting possible concordant behaviour and were able to reject with ease those 
descriptions which did not accord with their own self-schemata. 
It is also possible that under certain circumstances the mere act of thinking about 
an event in a schematic way leads to an overestimation of the likelihood of it taking 
place. Subjects were asked to imagine an event taking place. It was found that 
they considered its occurrence more likely even though the event was 
subsequently discredited (Ross et at., 1977). In explanation of this "perseverance" 
effect, Ross et al. (1977) believe that the mere anticipation of an event taking place 
may make salient cause effect linkages. The salience of such linkages continue 
even after the event is discredited. It is noteworthy that the process of imaging 
does not lead to an overestimation of likelihood of occurrence when the events are 
simple scripts e. g. having breakfast or returning a library book (Carrol, 1978). It is 
possible that such event schemata are at too basic a level to require construction 
by the subject. It is possible that construction of higher level combinations of scripts 
would achieve the perserveration effect. 
By enabling the setting of goals and allowing the appropriate behaviour to take 
place, schemata can enable a person to envisage an ideal state which he or she 
can move towards. So a person who wishes to be a cordon bleu cook can 
envisage what it means in terms of culinary standards to achieve that state and 
test each new dish that he or she cooks against that internal standard. In the case 
of an event schema, temporal ordering allows for the progression from the current 
state to the goal with the specification of the intermediate steps. An individual will 
therefore be able to select an appropriate action sequence (e. g. Abelson, 1976; 
Schank & Abelson, 1977). 
So on entering a restaurant, a stylized and stereotyped schema is activated where 
one greets the maitre d'hötel and is shown to a seat; one orders a drink whilst 
perusing the menu; orders the first two courses; samples the wine brought to the 
table by the wine waiter (especially if one is the only male presentl); makes 
conversation whilst waiting for the courses to arrive; decides whether or not to 
have sweet/coffee afterwards; calls for and pays the bill; thanks the staff and 
leaves. So an individual knows not only what to do in a given social situation but 
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also how to perform this schema i. e. going from a representation to a performance 
through an, as yet unspecified, mechanism. 
An indication of the potential power of the schema was demonstrated by Snyder, 
Tanke and Bersheid (1977). They told subjects that an out-of-sight female partner 
they would interact with was either very attractive or very unattractive. Dependent 
on the expectations of the subject, the partner was differentially treated by him. 
Interestingly, the woman herself appeared to take on either attractive or 
unattractive behaviour: this appeared to be due to the expectations generated by 
the male subject as a result of the misinformation given him. So if a schema is 
strongly activated (certainly information about physical attractiveness would be 
more than sufficient to do this), relevant behaviours ' will come into play. 
Consequently, the implications of the schema may be strong enough `to actually 
construct a particular (false) reality for the individuals involved. 
As has been shown, schemata are powerful in their abilities to create structure and 
lend meaning to the vast and varied input of information that constitutes daily 
perception. The flip side of this coin is that schemata can be cognitively restrictive, 
leading to unimaginative interpretations and denying novel solutions to problems 
which may be presented. 
A concomitant of selectivity in schematic processing is data loss. This may be a 
bonus under certain circumstances but an amercement under others; some 
researchers have likened the activity of schemata to "cognitive gambling" (Miller et 
al., 1960; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Frequently, the individual 'loses' and is 
mistaken about the generalization or judgment made about the incoming data. How 
can this come about? 
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Many of the studies mentioned already have used a biasing paradigm to show the 
advantages possessed by schematic processing. Recall that Snyder & Uranowitz 
(1978) asked their subjects to read a short history of a fictitious woman. Later they 
were told that the woman was involved in either a homosexual or a heterosexual 
relationship. During the recall phase, subjects showed a definite bias: those given 
the lesbian label reproduced lesbian-consistent background; those given the 
heterosexual label reproduced heterosexual-consistent background information. 
In this specific case, errors arise in the selectivity of recall. Errors can also arise 
when an inappropriate schema is used to interpret a stimulus configuration. Taylor 
et al., (1978) found that subjects who used irrelevant cues in a bid to solve a 
"common attribute" task suffered from delayed information gathering and problem 
solving; they had slower decision times than those subjects who did have schema- 
relevant cues or no cues. 
Use of an inappropriate schema can also be seen with respect to the 
"perseverence" effect. Recall that Ross et al. (1977) believe that the mere 
anticipation of an event taking place may make salient cause-effect linkages. The 
salience of such linkages continue even after the event is discredited. So while it is 
usually helpful to encode data in a way which fleshes out meaning, perseverance 
can also limit cognition retrogressively e. g. when the schema is discredited, the 
individual may, have considerable difficulty in retrieving the raw data from the 
inferential structure in which it was embedded. 
Even when using the correct schema, excessive use can lead to inaccuracies. 
Over-enthusiastic schematizing leads to an "illusory data base" (Taylor & Crocker, 
1981, p117). This data base consists of those contributions that the schema makes 
to the stimulus array: the items of information, the inferences and assumptions. 
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When an individual cannot differentiate between the material of the stimulus and 
that contributed to it by the schema, difficulties set in. For example, when someone 
is faced with an incomplete stimulus array, the activated schema will fill in the gap 
with a default option (e. g. Minsky, 1975). At a later time, this option may be 
mistakenly remembered as actually having been part of the original array thus 
apparently confirming the validity of the schema or even providing seemingly new 
data on which further analysis may take place. 
A further and related complication arises when inferences made about the data by 
the schema are themselves stored as data independent of the original data. More 
insidious is the kind of illusory data base which can cause confusion and lead to 
social misunderstanding. There is a little experimental evidence for this (e. g. 
Ashmore & Del Boca, 1980) and much that is anecdotal. What happens is that an 
individual applies a strongly held belief system, e. g. an 'environmental concern' 
schema, widely and indiscriminately on various stimulus domains. Thus someone 
who joins the Greenpeace organization on grounds of opposing the dumping of 
untreated domestic waste at sea may go on to develop views antagonistic to the 
peaceful application of nuclear power. He or she has invoked the 'anti-pollution' 
schema in application to all environmental issues. 
In the world of high power politics, there can be far reaching consequences when 
this type of illusory data base is employed. A Far-Eastern foreign country (e. g. 
Malaysia) may decide that criticism of its government officials in the press of a 
Western country (e. g. the U. K. ) warrants a ban on that country's companies 
tendering for government contracts. What has happened is that the Malaysian 
government has fitted the offending information in the U. K. press into its own 
schema about how the Malaysian government and press relate to each other. Thus 
the Malaysian cabinet mistakenly concludes that press comment is within the 
control of the U. K. government and and hence the press reports are nothing less 
than a British government 'attack' on their own integrity. 
As has also been discussed, schemata are responsible for selection, lending 
structure to, refining etc. the incoming data from the environment. However they 
also appear to contribute to the data base itself by providing 'new data' that 
becomes indistinguishable from the original stimulus configuration. 
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A progression from the illusory data bias is when data which is 
neutral/contradictory with a schema is mistakenly accepted as consistent: a type I 
error. If, as alluded to above, schemata contain examples of the domain they 
specify, one could argue that such examples are, by definition, confirming 
circumstances. Ross et al., 1975 mislead their subjects in two successive 
experiments by giving them false feedback in novel discrimination tasks. These 
required them to decide which member of successive pairs of suicide notes were 
genuine. Subjects were debriefed as to the predetermined and random nature of 
this outcome manipulation. 
Showing that self-perceptions and social perception may persevere even after the 
outcome had been thoroughly discredited, they tried to explain their results in 
terms of "biased attribution processes". Subjects would have searched for 
memories of themselves as being sensitive or insensitive to profound social issues 
such as suicide. Crucially, the debriefing process only undermined a part of a now 
highly resilient opinion i. e. the data base was left intact. Only when subjects were 
told in explicit detail of the perseverence effect were the erroneous self-deceptions 
destroyed. However the error may be structural in nature: an individual may not be 
actively looking for positive examples but focusing instead on the relevant part of 
the schema and finding examples of the behaviour stored alongside (Taylor & 
Crocker, 1981). 
When the criteria for deciding that a configuration and a stored schema coincide 
are loosely defined, then a type 1 error may also take place when neutral (or 
possibly even slightly disconfirming) configurations are judged to be examples of 
the schema. In the study by Langer & Abelson (1974), subjects were deceived into 
thinking that a taped interview they listened to was either a psychiatric assessment 
or a job interview. The stimulus configuration was interpreted by the subjects as 
providing evidence for one of the two situations. 
Individuals often demonstrate a propensity for ignoring plausible and/or relevant 
schemata when checking out the status of incoming data. We often over-rely on 
one single and perhaps, unqualified schema. An example of this 'single- 
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mindedness' is the fundamental attribution error: perceiving the behaviour of an 
individual as a reflection of some strong, enduring trait of that person (Ross, 1977). 
This not only includes a person bias but also a tendency to perceive both 
consistency and stability in the way the individual is behaving. However, very often, 
the bias noted can be explained as an artifact of the methodology (Taylor & 
Crocker, 1981). 
A related but distinct problem is that one of the most characteristic strengths of 
schemata can, at times , be their greatest weakness: i. e. resilience. Schemata are 
decidedly prone to resist disconfirmation. Of course, one could argue that an 
imperfect schema is better than no schema at all (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). When 
one comes across disconfirming data, this discovery may lead to revision or 
amendment of the schema in some -way, perhaps via differentiation (i. e. the 
creation of subtypes and categories). 
The consequences of differentiation should not be underestimated. One can see it 
at work in the area of stereotyping. For example, if a racist comes across an 
African who is intelligent, educated, articulate and well-dressed one would expect 
his/her stereotype of black people to be revised for the better. Alas what seems to 
happen is that the "poor, stupid, lazy, genetically inferior" schema that is held for 
black-skinned people not only goes unchallenged but has its own subcategory 
attached. This African is a 'fluke'; probably has been educated in a white institution 
with white money and probably has some amount of white blood in him. The 
individual belongs to the subclass of 'atypical black'. The inherent prejudice of the 
observer goes unchallenged and indeed is refined to some extent with the creation 
of many different subtypes within the superordinate stereotype. 
Another example of type 1 error bias with stereotyping as an example is provided 
by Heilman & Saruwatari (1979). They looked at the evaluations made of job 
applicants for what were considered stereotypically masculine jobs: jobs thought to 
need stereotypical 'male skills' for effective performance. Previous studies have 
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suggested that attractive females are perceived as being more feminine; attractive 
males as being more masculine (Gillen, 1975; cited in Cash et al. 1977). It was 
from this conceptual base that Heilman & Saruwatari (1979) sought to understand 
the role of physical appearance in the workplace. 
Male and female subjects were asked to evaluate both applications made by and 
photographs of male and female applicants. These applicants had previously been 
judged to be physically attractive or unattractive. Subjects assessed each applicant 
on a number or variables such as their qualifications, starting salary etc. for either a 
clerical or a management position. 
They found that those female applicants who were deemed to be attractive were 
assessed more highly than the unattractive females in relation to the clerical job. 
However, the same attractive individuals were rated lower with respect to the 
management job. For males, attractiveness always led to higher evaluations for 
either job. The "attractive secretary" schema seems quite a resilient one. It would 
be interesting to discover whether admirers- and detractors of a woman in a 
prominent management position (the former prime minister, Mrs. Thatcher, is a 
good example) would rate her as an example of an attractive or an unattractive 
woman. 
It may be useful to discuss the notions of cognitive heuristics and "availability bias" 
with respect to stereotyping in more detail. Much of the work in this area was done 
by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in the seventies (e. g. see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) and has been described briefly above. When an individual is 
faced with conditions of uncertainty or conditions in which important information is 
either unavailable or indeterminate, heuristics are employed to make relevant 
decisions. One of these heuristics has been described as the availability heuristic. 
This comes into operation whenever, 
"he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or 
associations come to mind" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p208) 
In other words, the more quickly an example is retrieved, the more of the examples 
there must have been retrieved in the first place. Another assumption is that the 
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more easily associations are made, inasmuch as'ässociations' are formed from 
actual experience, the more accurate they must be. 
The important consequence of these assumptions is that one merely needs an 
estimate of the ease with which retrieval, construction and association is completed 
to provide a basis for inference and not the total number of associations that come 
to mind. Stereotypes can be seen as instances of schematic structures: particular 
types of expectations which may, to varying extents, act to shape reality. They may 
do so, at least partly, through the functioning of an availability bias. But how? 
In a study of judgements about peoples' personalities and the jobs they have, 
Hamilton & Rose (1978: cited in Taylor, 1982) found that subjects were, for 
example, more likely to remember stereotypic descriptions. Thus they remembered 
'attractive stewardesses' more than 'attractive librarians'. The authors refute the 
possibility that motivational factors may lie behind the results; whilst some 
occupations may be salient for some subjects, those for waitresses, security 
guards and stewardesses etc. probably are not. 
From the social cognitive point of view, the ' availability heuristic may present a 
more plausible explanation. The strength of association between trait and job is 
biased due to the (stereotypic) association between some trait job combinations- a 
form of schema-led, illusory correlation. With the stronger associations, the subject 
judges that these trait-job combinations had been more frequently paired than the 
non-stereotypic combinations. The importance of such bias cannot be 
underestimated: 
"Stereotypes, once formed, can bias the gathering and storage of information 
and subsequent impressions. A consequence is that unjustified inferences 
about social groups or individuals may be perpetuated in the absence of any 
empirical bias. " (Taylor, 1982, p198) 
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In the previous chapter, problems associated with schema theory in the purely 
cognitive domain were discussed at length and are largely applicable with regard to 
social schemata also. Rather than repeating the various arguments why schema 
theory cannot be regarded as a wholly good theory, it may be useful at this 
juncture to summarize the main features of social schemata in order to provide a 
conceptual structure into which their spatial nature can profitably be debated in the 
succeeding chapter. 
XXI 
::. i'+" 
This chapter defined a social schema as a cognitive structure representing 
a social stimulus domain. Not simply a data base, it also consists of plans 
for selecting and intepreting information presented to the individual which 
may lead on to behaviour activation or, at least, to expectations of 
behaviors in self and others. The cognitive structure is refined or'distilled' 
through experience. 
B......::. ..:: > '` `s'": ` 
Social schemata allow individuals to code incoming data and construct an 
inner representation of it, often in hierarchical format. 
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Social schemata act as interpreters and inference makers; adding 
information to the incoming data which may become indistinguishable 
from the original. They also provide a normative basis for evaluation of 
social information, solving problems and developing future behaviour 
plans of the individual. 
.... . .... ... 
..... ..... ... ......... ...... ..... ..... ... ..... ... .......... 
An inherent and crucial characteristic of social schemata is that they lead 
to errors, even when the correct schema is instantiated. They provide an 
"illusory data base" leading to a tendency for type 1 errors to be made. 
Misjudgements of co-variation are also frequently made. 
CHAPTER 6: 
Feel before you think? 
"There are practically no social phenomena that do not implicate 
affect in some important way. " 
(Zajonc, 1980, p153) 
In this chapter, particular attention will be made to the episodic sequence of 
emotional experience and the Zajonc-Lazarus controversy (Zajonc, 1980,1984; 
Lazarus, 1982; 1984). Affect, as we have seen in previous chapters, has particular 
importance for the idea of schematic functioning. A concise summary of the 
experimental work on the cognition and emotion debate now follows and it will be 
evaluated in the light of more recent theoretical developments. 
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When discussing the role of emotion in human cognition one needs to define the 
concept explicitly. Of course there exists a difficulty in defining emotion in a way 
acceptable to all behavioural scientists and "it is by no means easy to say what röle 
the emotions do play. " (Harre, 1979, p274). For example, the terms emotion and 
affect are often used interchangeably. However, affect is a broader, concept, 
arguably subsuming emotion and a variety of other experiences e. g. moods and 
states, "feelings" etc. The distinctions within these terms could be characterized as 
mainly temporal in nature: emotions are intense but episodic; moods are more 
diffuse, longer-term experiences; feelings can be non-intense and episodic. 
Ortony & Turner (1990) believe that there can be no generally acceptable (and, 
moreover, objective) criteria for the definition of an emotion. Specifically they 
propose that there are 
, 
no basic emotions that can be regarded as elemental 
(irreducible) for the generation of the broad spectrum of emotions. 
However, a 'biosocial' theorist such as Izard sees emotions as basic entities in that 
they are vital in the evolutionary adaptation of any species (Izard, 1992). 
Differential Emotion Theory (DET) proposes that emotions may well contain innate 
neural substrates (see next chapter), universal expressions and feelings (cf. Harre, 
1986, p12). Most of what we call emotions are the product of Izard's "affective- 
cognitive-structures" resulting from an interaction between these 'basic' emotions 
and cognition. 
Such structures sound suspiciously like social schemata; he describes them as 
what happens when emotion and thought (or symbol or image) link to form a 
feeling-thought bond. Although it is the thought component of these affective 
cognitive structures that may seem more salient, it is "the emotional component 
that provides the motivation" (Izard, 1991). 
Although he admits that a simple definition does not exist, Izard's working definition 
seems both useful and molar enough to avoid the obvious theoretical objections 
(though as we shall see later, even his approach raises eyebrows in some 
quarters): 
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"An emotion is experienced as a feeling that motivates, organizes, and 
guides perception, thought, and action. " (1991, p14) 
Rychalk (1977) is more specific however and emphasizes the bodily engagement 
with the environment when giving his teleological definition: 
"Emotion refers to the pattern of feelings experienced physiologically by 
individuals usually in relation to certain environmental circumstances that 
seem to provoke them. " (p319) 
It would be helpful if Izard's definition of emotion could be taken at face value but 
conflicting views persist. Even the question that researchers should ask with 
respect to definition has become a matter of some dispute. As with the concept of 
"thoughts", the concept of "emotions" has provided the researcher with more than 
a few existential problems. Do they exist as separate entities, something 'in there', 
or is their existence merely adduced from linguistic labels? Ontological fallacies in 
the definition of emotion seem to preoccupy social constructionists such as Harr. 
Harre makes the point that "emotions cannot be seriously be studied without 
attention to the local moral order. " (1986, p6). By way of explanation he cites the 
work of Nadia Reissland which in itself serves to neatly encapsulate the basic 
reasoning behind his social constructionist viewpoint. 
Mothers of small children were unable, to decide if children bickering over some 
toys were envious or jealous of one another. Taken at face value, one would 
suppose that the mothers were unable to distinguish between these two emotional 
concepts. To examine this further, she asked the mothers to imagine three 
characters: M, N and 0. The first two characters are seated at a cafe enjoying a 
drink together, smiling and laughing. The mothers were given two background 
storylines: M is married to N or M is married to 0. 
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Reissland found that the mothers believed that 0 would be envious of N in the 
former storyline but jealous of N in the latter. It appears that the cultural 
associations pertaining to the institution of marriage were paramount in creating a 
distinction between the two emotional terms- in the culture of these mothers. Their 
apparent inability to distinguish between the terms in the case of the quarrelling 
children is, argues Harre, entirely due to there being a total absence of such a 
moral order regarding the upsets amongst their children over toys. As Harre notes : 
"There is a concrete world of contexts and activities. We reify and abstract from 
that concreteness at our peril. " (1986, p4) 
As alluded to above, Harre believes that emotion is, to various extents, culture 
dependent; eg. emotions may be sourced primarily in visceral perturbations in one 
culture but sourced relatively more in social relations in another. Despite the power 
of his reasoning however, his global assertion that "the bulk of mankind live within 
systems of thought and feeling that bear little but superficial resemblances to one 
another' (1986, p12) makes his arguments seem debatable at least. 
Stimulus --ý Behaviour -> Affect -> Interpretation 
"It is rarely appreciated that the central point of the James-Lange theory was that 
having first reacted organically and automatically, we then characterize our 
circumstances via a process termed 'the emotions". " (Rychlak, 1977, p318) 
Contemporary, commonsense, approaches to emotion typically propose that when 
an individual experiences a stimulus, emotion of whatever kind is precipitated and 
certain physiological concomitants arise as a result. Thus we see a snarling dog; 
we become afraid; adrenalin flows into our bloodstream; our heartrate accelerates 
and our face blanches in fear. 
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A contrary view, popular in the first few decades of this century, is the James- 
Lange theory. In this motor-feedback theory, the stimulus produces physiological 
responses first (especially approach/avoidance behaviours and activation of the 
autonomic nervous system) and these are then cognized to produce the emotion 
felt. Thus we see the dog; blood drains from our face, our heartrate accelerates 
etc. and all these physiological events we perceive as fear. (James, 1969,1884; 
1894). 
However, this description of the James-Lange theory, although ubiquitous in many 
standard texts on emotion, can be misleading, as the quotation at the start of this 
section alludes. It is wrong to suggest that the James-Lange theory views emotion 
as nothing but bodily arousal (Lang, 1994). James' essential argument, - for 
example, was that bodily feedback was a necessary condition (Ellsworth, 1994). It 
is the experience of visceral perturbation which contributes the "emotionality" to 
what the individual would otherwise construe as a neutral or affectless stimulus or 
event (cf. Schachter's theory described anon). 
Cannon famously dealt the theory a critical blow in 1929 when he pointed out, inter 
alia, that visceral changes are often too slow to account for rapid emotional 
experiences and that ' even when physiological 'responses are blocked (by 
surgery/accident), emotions can still be experienced by the individual. What 
Cannon failed to recognise is that James did not intend to constrain bodily 
feedback solely to the ANS (Ellsworth, 1994). Despite Cannon's critique and 
despite the fact that its effect was to severely restrict research on differentiated 
emotions, it is interesting to note that the James-Lange theory still remains 
(mis)reported at least, in most of the texts on emotion. 
Before leaving the subject, it is worth pointing out that in the vast literature on 
emotion generally, researchers fail to admit that the emotion sequence need be 
anything but alacritous. Because of Cannon's critique, it has been merely assumed 
that immediacy in the experience of emotion is generally characteristic and even 
criterial in the emotion sequence. Unfortunately, this has led to a form of tunnel 
vision with only slower sequences in the stimulus-experience chain being 
considered. Ellsworth notes that emotions that are not categorical but have 
differential latencies, e. g. love, are usually ignored by researchers (Ellsworth, 
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1991), but can often be accommodated more successfully under the James-Lange 
theory. 
Real innovation in experimental design characterised the work of Stanley 
Schachter and colleagues at Colombia University in New York. He hypothesized 
that there are no easily distinguishable differences in the gamut of emotional 
experience but rather a general physiological level of arousal which is construed 
according to the perception of the situation the individual finds him or herself in. 
However, a state of arousal does not necessarily mean an emotional state; arousal 
is necessary but not sufficient. A cognitive label is adduced from whatever is going 
on and simply attached to the general feeling at the time to produce 'anger', 'pity' 
etc. 
Perhaps the best known example of this attribution analysis is the Schachter & 
Singer (1962) study. Subjects were told that they were about to take part in an 
experiment looking at the effects of a new vitamin supplement: "Suproxin". In fact 
most of the male subjects received an injection of epinephrine, others receiving a 
placebo injection of saline. Epinephrine mimics adrenalin in that it activates the 
sympathetic branch of the ANS. Some of the subjects were told the real effects of 
the injection; others were mislead, and the remaining group informed that there 
would be no side effects at all. 
A confederate, posing as just another subject, was under instruction to behave in a 
very strange way- (for about half the subjects he was manic). Schachter & Singer 
proposed that those subjects who were not made aware of the fact that their 
arousal was due to the effects of the injection would use the behaviour of the 
confederate as a clue to how they were feeling. 
This is what happened. In short: subjects who were physiologically aroused but 
without knowledge of the drug's effects sought to label their feelings with whatever 
seemed appropriate in the environment. They believed that the confederate must 
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be under the effect of the same drug therefore they must feel the same as they do: 
the stooge provided the cognitive label with which the subjects could understand 
their own feeling. 
Innovative research like that of Schachter is not, however, exempt from criticism 
(e. g. Izard, 1972; Leventhal, 1974; Cotton, 1981). Schacter has not shown that 
emotion is fully dependent on visceral arousal and cognition; he has only shown 
that the two factors are co-influences on emotional states. Epinephrine may have 
simply rendered the subjects more suggestible; they were thus more likely to 
imitate behaviour around them. Schachter fails to take into account variations in 
individuals reactions to drugs; there is evidence that expectations can be major 
causes of emotional states. An implication of Schachter's attributional theory is that 
emotions must be learned- yet children can feel emotion without, one supposes, 
knowing the label for the emotion he or she is feeling. It is well known that children 
born blind display the same emotional patterns as others. 
One finding form Schachter's work seems undeniable and has resisted criticism: 
feedback from the environment can serve to amplify an individuals emotional state. 
Young children, who should have fewer learned reactions to emotionally laden 
situations ought to provide his theory with its most stringent test (Reisenzein, 
1983). 
Closely associated with Schachter's theory is that of George Mandler. Mandler 
(1975) typifies the cultural learning approach to emotion. Humans, he argues, 
constantly engage in the construction of emotion from whatever stimuli our daily 
lives provide. Hence emotions are no more than the products of education, culture 
and experience in our personal worlds. We make as many emotions as needs 
require: 
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"It was Kant who taught us that the real world is essentially unknowable, that 
we construct it, and I think that's fundamentally true. We live in a constructed 
World. " 
(Mandler, 1983, p149) 
He sees perception of visceral arousal by an individual leading to a form of 
undifferentiated arousal. The conditions for this arousal rely heavily on cognitive 
interpretations notably the involvement of blocking or interruption (the arousal of 
attention). Overall, he places the system in an evolutionary, adaptive frame: the 
maintenance of an individual's homoeostasis or the search for information. 
His views on interpretation differs from others in that he believes that the process 
consists of mental structures/innate reactions to stimuli in tandem with an 
evaluation of how the self is perceived. Almost uniquely amongst theoreticians, 
consciousness plays an important role in Mandler's theory of emotion, particularly 
with regard to his notion of "nterruption" where the individual's attention is aroused 
in the first stage of activation of the emotion system (Mandler, 1975). 
Stimulus -+ Affect -> Interpretation -* Behaviour 
"Emotions are rooted in the body" (Rychlak, 1977, p318) 
The James-Lange theory still retains considerable currency in research circles and 
perhaps this is due in part to the work of Zajonc (1980; 1984). Not only does he 
propose that affective reactions to a stimulus come before cognition proper occurs 
(bodily response before thought in the case of James-Lange) but that these so- 
called 'hot cognitions' act independently of the cognitive processes (or 'cold 
cognitions'). This affective evaluation is, he believes, a very basic mental routine 
which is occurring even when little actual information about the stimulus has been 
processed. As he says: 
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"What I want to argue is that the form of experience that we came to call 
feeling accompanies all cognitions, that it arises early in the process of 
registration and retrieval, albeit weakly and vaguely, and that it derives from a 
parallel, separate and partly independent system in the organism. " (1984, 
p154). 
Such affective evaluation is endemic to social interactions of whatever kind and is 
always present at the individual level. 
An example in experimental terms is provided by exposure effects in the absence 
of learning. Repeated exposure to stimuli such as sound tones and polygons can 
lead to preferences being made even when recognition is controlled by reducing it 
to chance level (Wilson, 1979; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) 
Seamon et al., (1984). define what they term the exposure effect as a result of 
repeated exposure to an unfamiliar stimulus. They replicate some previous 
research which showed that subjects can, on the basis of affect preference only, 
select previously shown target stimuli even when they fail to do so by recognition 
memory. An earlier study showed that affective discriminations made without 
recognition can be made even after a delay period of up to one week from the 
initial exposure to the post-test session (Seamon et al., 1983). 
The authors propose that this case of "target selection by affect" is in many ways 
analogous to the dejä vu phenomenon. Stimuli may be recognised as being 
familiar but without the recognition of the foundation for this acquaintance i. e. the 
individual has not recovered the original context/event etc. into present awareness. 
More evidence supporting Zajonc's affective primacy argument can be seen in the 
section "Mere Exposure and liking" (1.41). 
Throughout much of the other evidence in its favour (e. g. see Zajonc, 1984, 
pp119-120), the problem remains that the experimental situations created 
sometimes relate poorly to common emotional experience. The stimuli used often 
seem irrelevant to daily experience and subjects' judgements of preference could 
be described as superficial in many cases; the affect elicited would be minimal and 
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the results may be due to a simple failure in recognition memory (Eysenck & 
Keane, 1990). 
Stimulus -* Interpretation -+ Affect -* Behaviour 
One of the keenest critics of Zajonc's theory of affect primacy is Richard Lazarus 
who adopts a more conventional, pro-cognitive stance (Lazarus, 1982; 1984; 
1991). His view emphasises the primary importance of cognitive appraisal 
(interpretation) of a stimulus encountered by an individual. 
Lazarus, at least in the earlier studies, relied heavily on techniques of instilling 
certain degrees of stress (accompanied by various emotions) in subjects and then 
seeing whether directing the cognitive appraisal of the stimuli varied the stress 
levels (see Lazarus, 1966, for a review). These were usually psychophysiological 
measurements of e. g. heartrate and GSR (rather than obviously less reliable self- 
report measures). 
For example, in one study, Lazarus and Alfert (1964) showed a particularly explicit 
anthropological film to a group of male university students. The film depicted a 
coming-of-age ritual in Aboriginal Australia where a long cut was made in the penis 
of a teenage boy as part of a sub-incision rite. The authors manipulated the 
cognitive appraisal of the film by having allowed some of the subjects to listen to a 
pre-screening tape which detailed the positive anthropological aspects of the 
ceremony they were about to see (eg. the teenager was happy to take part in what 
was deemed to be an important aboriginal ritual). 
The physiological measurements taken during the screening of the film showed 
that the introductory 'explanation' produced significant reductions in stress. So the 
manipulation of the cognitive appraisal by an individual of an apparently stressful 
event can change the meaning of the stimulus for the subjects. An anecdotal 
illustration of this phenomenon is being confronted by a man-eating lion with and 
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without the intervening presence of a set of cage bars. From this and similar 
results, Lazarus has gone on to generalize that it is cognitive appraisal which is 
primary in the emotion process and not an affective response. 
That the appraisal is an unconscious one has not impressed Zajonc who rightly 
points out that data supporting the existence of pre-conscious processing is sadly 
lacking (Zajonc, 1984). Lazarus has, in turn, attacked Zajonc's position arguing that 
Zajonc reduces the individual to the role of information-processing automaton 
rather than allowing consideration of personal factors, experiences and memories 
interacting with the ongoing emotional operation. All emotional states, he believes, 
rely on cognitive appraisal of meaning. In fact the process could be occurring so 
quickly that thoughts and feelings become indistinguishable- a point that will be 
elaborated on anon. 
Surveying the literature, it seems that, in accordance with the cognitive zeitgeist of 
the times, the appraisal view of emotion has a definite edge. Frijda (1993) has 
managed to clarify the concept of appraisal, believing that researchers have used it 
with two meanings in mind: one is the content of the emotional experience and the 
other is the cognitive antecedents of emotion (the definition used here). 
Unfortunately, when used in the former sense, appraisals constitute information in 
self-reports; the emotional experience might contain appraisals originating from the 
emotional response rather than pertaining to causes hence it is of little use when 
drawing conclusions about antecedents. Furthermore, Frijda (1993) believes that 
cognitive appraisals "can be minimal in complexity" (p381), and adds: 
'The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to 
be of a quite elementary kind" (p357) 
How elementary? Hence the pivotal question is whether "untransformed, pure 
sensory input [can] directly generate emotional reactions" (Zajonc, 1994, p122). 
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Zajonc's own answer to this is "yes", of course, but there remains the problem of 
enough convincing data to support this conviction. More recent evidence is 
supportive of Zajonc's theoretical stance by undermining Lazarus: Russell (1987) 
and Parkinson & Manstead (1992) have seriously criticised the studies allegedly 
supporting Lazarus' appraisal theory. Another criticism of Lazarus' standpoint 
concerns his methodology: Lazarus has traditionally relied on 'strong' emotions 
(fear, disgust etc. ) for empirical support of his arguments; milder emotions have 
been neglected (Ellsworth, 1991). 
As Eysenck & Keane (1990) also point out, the studies reported by Lazarus do 
have the advantage of having employed more "meaningful" stimuli and having 
consequently more "genuine" emotions as a result than those studies offered by 
Zajonc. Nevertheless these authors, perhaps not surprisingly as they are writing in 
a student's handbook on cognition, manage to fudge the issue by declaring that 
there are grounds "for assuming (albeit tentatively) that emotional experience is 
generally preceded by cognitive processes, even if that is not invariably the case. " 
(p469, own italics) 
Before drawing a less equivocal conclusion here, there are other aspects of the 
debate to be considered, specifically the duality problem that it stimulates. Also to 
be presented will be other, highly pertinent, evidence which has somehow 
managed to escape serious review to date. 
"If the idea of emotion is pushed far enough, it appears to bang up against 
cognition. Similarly, if cognitive processes are followed far enough they appear to 
reach emotion. If, in the end, either one is defined in terms of the other, the 
question of which precedes which becomes meaningless. " (Strongman, 1987, 
p106) 
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That an individual can respond affectively to a stimulus without apparent 
(conscious awareness of) cognitive activity has even been admitted by Lazarus 
(1982). Both Zajonc and Lazarus are in agreement on one thing: there must be 
some form of sensory information for emotion to register. However, they disagree 
on exactly what constitutes cognition. 
So we come back to the problem of definition: what is an affective response? 
There are parallels in other areas of science. The problem over the duality of light 
("is it a wave or a particle? ") has raged for years in physics laboratories the world 
over and has yet to be resolved (to the authors knowledge). Closer to home, the 
nature-nurture debate (e. g. is intelligence inherited or acquired? ) has also 
highlighted the problem of apparent duality in mental phenomena. 
However, the somewhat specious problem of the duality described above may 
obfuscate the enormous impact of emotion on issues in psychology. Researchers 
may continue the Sisyphean task of resolving the Zajonc-Lazarus controversy and 
loose sight, in the process, of the important and pervasive impact of affect on 
mental life. Perhaps a more interesting way of conceiving of the duality problem is 
to consider emotion and cognition existing as "elements of a continuous, 
inseparable stream of behavior"; rather like the theme in the musical form known 
as a 'fugue' (Lewis et al., 1984, p264). 
Affect and thought can thus be envisaged as mutually dependent and inextricably 
enmeshed mental features. Possibly the most salient point to note for the present 
thesis is that affect is a crucial element in the organism's response to any stimulus; 
this is perhaps the greatest contribution to the discussion on emotion that Zajonc 
has made. 
Buck (1988) tries to resolve the difference between affect and thought by defining 
Lazarus' cognition as knowledge-by-acquaintance and Zajonc's cognition as 
knowledge-by-description (Zajonc's 'cold cognition'). The following brief exposition 
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of the two terms will doubtless find resonance in the reader's cognisance of two 
types of well researched cognitive knowledge: procedural and declarative. Indeed 
the distinction between the two knowledge types closely parallels that offered by 
Ryle (1949) who differentiated between knowing that and knowing how. 
Knowledge-by-acquaintance is an affective process, being direct sensory 
awareness that is self-evident; knowledge by description is knowledge about such 
sensory awareness. So we know the flavour of garlic when we taste it, the sound 
of music when we hear it and the sensation of a bicycle when we ride it but we 
cannot hope to invest the experience of these things in another individual (James, 
1890). Knowledge-by-description comprises information about a stimulus; the less 
we think about something, the less we know about it and thus our knowledge is of 
the acquaintance type. Thus it is how much we know about the stimulus that is 
critical here. 
Buck's (1988) analysis of what Zajonc perceives to be cognition and what Lazarus 
perceives it to be clears away much of the controversy between them. In essence, 
it seems that their supposed essential difference ("what comes first") is really a 
derivative of definitional imprecision. Zajonc's 'affective response' may be little else 
than Lazarus' 'cognitive appraisal' and has yet to be resolved (to the authors 
knowledge. Buck's developmental-interactionist theory, with its roots in Schachter's 
work, proposes that knowledge-by-acquaintance, being an affective process itself, 
precedes and establishes the nature of knowledge-by-description (Buck, 1988; 
1991). Insofar as an affective process (however defined) is paramount in receiving 
the stimulus, Zajonc, in spotlighting the role of affect, may just win this argument. 
CHAPTER 7: ' The Present Thesis 
"Everything that is real is emotional" 
(Buck, 1991, p136) 
This chapter aims to bring together concisely various aspects of the literature just 
discussed; to provide a bridge between the reviewed literature and the empirical 
work to be reported. It is hoped to establish schema theory as, at the very least, a 
viable framework on which to better construct an understanding of socio-spatial 
phenomena. 
Affect: ".. any kind, of feeling or emotion attached to ideas or idea- 
complexes" 
Valence: ".. the attracting or repelling influence of objects or activities" 
(Driver, 1981, p 10 and p309) 
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".. all emotions .. are either positive and attractive or .. negative and 
repulsive. " 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p17) 
What is it that leads to changes in perceived distance? Is it emotional valence or 
categorical difference? Why invoke the "social" in an explanation? It was argued in 
Chapter Six that affect, "emotional valence" is ignored by researchers at their peril. 
Whatever stance one takes on the primacy of affect question, socially shared 
experiences of valence do seem to be a major orientating variable in human 
behaviour. 
Why not use 'mere' categorization as a theoretical explanation? The structuring 
function of schemata offered by Taylor & Crocker (1981), described in Chapter 
Five, seems to 'relegate' categorization to the (crucial) role of an organizational 
principle. Categorization is undoubtedly necessary but not sufficient. A major 
attraction of schematic processes is their characteristic inclusivity: schemata act 
immediately and holistically. When combining socially shared information (religion 
of town, 'niceness' of people etc. ) one can be sure that these attributes are not 
conceived on a limited series of dimensions or categories but holistically on one or 
more continua. it may be argued that social attributes can be stored as categories 
but when thinking about social objects, schematic functioning better facilitates the 
processing of this information and the variety of affect laden material shown to be 
instantiated simultaneously. 
It seems plausible that social information may be stored as categories but re- 
constituted in thought through schemata. Categorization can thus be thought of as 
first order analysis. It is possible for some people to have knowledge about a 
subject but with no evaluative component attached. One example of such a 
`neutral' knowledge base might be the field of geology, another (for non-technically 
minded people), the mechanical workings of their car. 
Information from the social environment, or from socially 'loaded' stimuli, requires a 
different form of processing, when categorization on its own is not enough. 
Categorization provides a form of 'cold' ratiocination, allowing the immediate 
activation of the schema with all the evaluative and emotional implications. 'First 
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order categorization is necessary to decide which 'second order schema is 
relevant. Categorization implies that schemata are evoked. 
So schemata come into play when categorization is involved ("he's a TV 
presenter") but also when an evaluative, valenced and, most usually, a socially 
valenced component is bound up ("none of us can stand him. Under , these 
conditions, schemata best describe the individual's response: reaction to the name 
"Jeremy Beadle" is immediate and holistic. In areas of enquiry, where the 
researcher uses socially laden material as in the present thesis, schemata seems 
an ideal theoretical mechanism with which to understand subjects' responses. 
In the past, as can be seen in Chapters Three and Four, traditional schema theory 
has more or less exclusively focused on explanations of 'cold' cognitive 
processing. The following section reminds us of the hitherto variable efficacy of the 
use of schema theory in explaining data from social settings. The present thesis 
hopes to counteract this deficiency by expanding, the scope of schema theory to 
incorporate the all pervading influence of the evaluative and emotional in the social 
environment. 
The literature review has focused on two main areas: schema theory and 
environmental cognition. What are the key elements from these areas of which the 
reader should be cognizant for the present thesis? 
Chapter Two focused on the multitudinous methods of cognitive distance elicitation 
and their validity. As estimations of distance were to form the dependent variable 
throughout the experimental phase, the literature on cognitive mapping was 
especially relevant. As in most fields of psychological enquiry, methodology in this 
area comes up against the potential problem, ab initio, of distorting the mental 
phenomena of interest through the experimenter's need to externalize it and before 
the subject's own distortions can be examined. 
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With this preliminary difficulty in mind, investigation of people's estimation of 
distances was carried out by making as few assumptions about the (psychological 
as opposed to statistical) significance of differences in the sizes of perceived 
distances. Non-metric assumptions about the data were important. Minimal 
interference with subjects' externalizations and treating these without excessive 
manipulation were also a major requirement. 
From the outset it became clear that there was not one ideal methodology for all 
scenarios under investigation. It seems that firstly the scale and secondly the social 
valence of the scenario should dictate the method used. Each distance scale 
would have an appropriate elicitation methodology, for example, not necessarily 
shared by another. It would be wiser to suggest that an ecologically minded 
experimenter adopt a minimally assumptive approach in methods of elicitation (and 
also in subsequent analysis of the data). 
People do not use algebra when estimating distance in everyday settings (at least 
not consciously). If the biasing influence of social schemata was to be detected, 
methods were needed that subjects would not find too taxing but which would, 
nevertheless, still reveal any systematic errors in their judgments. 
The body of literature reviewed heretofore contains much that comes close to the 
thesis propounded here. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that, with the 
exception of one study, all have not fully recognised the isomorphism of space and 
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social factors. Several studies have indeed come close, sometimes tantalizingly so, 
but without making the final theoretical step towards the metaphor. 
In the case of the Westgate study, Festinger et al. (1950) cannot explain their 
major finding, "closeness equals friendship" solely by reference to availability of 
interaction. The 'mere exposure' hypothesis notwithstanding, the complexity of 
acquaintance formation requires consideration of other, possibly contradictory 
evidence, often the subject of media interest ("Neighbours at War" etc. ) Similarly, 
Bossard's Law points to the importance of spatial factors in social relationships 
without making the ultimate connection. 
The Hargreaves (1979) study takes an interesting methodological approach to the 
formation of friendships, primarily because of the spatial layouts he elicited from 
subjects but also because of the longitudinal analysis. Spatial factors were, to him 
at least, almost co-incidental to the investigation. From a socio-spatial point of 
view, one could characterize the study as a 'near-miss'. 
The New Look movement in psychology also came close to crossing the Rubicon. 
These researchers managed to establish a link between the positive, the attractive 
and size overestimation. Crucially, their stimuli were objects and not people. the 
'social' in their analysis therefore was ultimately missing. 
Kuethe's (1962) series of experiments could be regarded as antecedents of the 
second group of experiments in the present thesis. Although he did identify a 
tendency for human figures which 'go together socially to be placed in proximity, 
he did not explore the tendency any further. His static methodology involved the 
use of figures devoid of any realistic social content in situations that were lab- 
based to say the least. His important contribution was to establish inter-figure 
distance as an organizing factor but not the on-going schematic processing of 
socio-spatial distancing. 
Beloff & Beloff (1961) did look at how the valency of human figures in a very direct 
way in a fascinating experiment using the Ames Thereness-Thatness equipment 
described in Chapter One. However, they failed to recognize the possible 
significance of their findings vis ä vis schema processing (or indeed any other 
viable theory), instead preferring an explanation based on the 'mere' concept of 
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social distance. Their choice of stimuli rested on the widespread recognition of 
famous (and infamous) individuals. How even more interesting would their results 
have been if they had used the faces of people known personally to each subject. 
Lee's (1976) phenomenological analysis of what it is that makes up a 
neighbourhood is explicit in its theoretical underpinnings. A direct connection 
between space and social factors was established. In retrospect, the notion that a 
neighbourhood is neither purely physical nor purely social but a synergism of the 
two now seems unremarkable. What remains to be explored is the dynamic nature 
of the isomorphism: in particular how the changing affective quality of e. g. a 
neighbourhood feature such as a church hall (its list of uses changing regularly) 
influences its spatial perception over the temporal residency of respondents. 
Much of the literature on "cognitive mapping", the field of research closest in 
methodology to the requirements of the present thesis, tends to rely excessively on 
laboratory settings. Researchers also appeared to fear 'polluting' their data with 
real-life variables. In addition they seemed to concentrate purely on cognitive 
aspects, regarding perceived distances as a reflection of a variety of other 
cognitive variables rather than taking into account the singular importance of social 
valence. Those studies that did address the issue of the affective quality of stimuli 
tended to treat it as almost epiphenomenal, acknowledging its importance but 
relegating it to a partial explanatory role ex post facto. 
All of this leads on to the question of what the present thesis is 'about'. One aim is 
to put affect, and social valency in particular, centre stage as a major orientating 
variable in the perception of space. 
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If space can act as a metaphor for social relationships then the most important 
questions to be asked in the forthcoming experiments include: 
" Does the perception of space vary with the social valence of objects in that 
space? 
" Is this variation systematic i. e. can one predict the direction in perceived spatial 
distortion form the social valence of the object? 
" Are the distortions 'dose dependent': do they vary in magnitude with the size of 
the judged social valence of object? 
" Is the spatial distortion observable over a range of distance scales? 
It is from these four questions that the following hypotheses were formed: 
1. It is proposed that the positive social valence of people or objects leads 
inevitably to a foreshortening of the perceived distance to that figure/object from 
the observer. Bearing in mind the lessons learnt from Chapter Two, the 
foreshortening would be expected to be relative rather than absolute. 
2. From hypothesis 1, it follows that negatively socially valenced figures/objects 
would lead to relative over-estimation of distance. 
3. It is expected that as the perceived degree of social valence of the stimulus 
increases in either direction (positive-attractive or negative-repellent), the error 
in distance estimation varies in appropriate magnitude. 
4. Given the schematic nature of underlying social representation, one would 
expect similar errors in distance estimation between all socially valenced stimuli 
according to the structure and balance of the stimulus array (see 5.4) and not 
just between starting and target stimuli . 
5. Both objects and people are likely sources of social valence and will exhibit 
socio-spatial isomorphism over a range of distance scales. 
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From the various limitations in the literature described above, and from the 
hypothesized nature of the isomorphism, it was decided to investigate the 
phenomenon across a range of stimulus types and scales of distance. If socio- 
spatial isomorphism was as universal and elemental to cognitive functioning as 
hypothesized, then a certain robustness would be observed in the data: systematic 
errors in distance perception would be detected with relative ease. 
Foreshortening of distance: in what context? 
Taking a lead from the cognitive mapping methodology, it was decided to tackle 
the issue in-the first instance from a conventional, distance estimation point of 
view. In the first study, Chapter Eight, subjects were students at the University of 
St. Andrews who were asked, in a double postal survey, to estimate distances to 
the homes of their acquaintances from their own place of domicile. Using a 150mm 
distance estimation scale to represent a maximum of three miles, the methodology 
was intuitively easy for subjects to grasp. An assumption was made that 
respondents would have the type of spatial representation of the town they lived in, 
in a so-called "survey map" as discussed in Chapter Two., This assumption was not 
without its dangers (perhaps even long term residents would have merely "route" 
representations) but if the phenomenon was as fundamental as predicted then the 
methodology would betray schematic processing of socio-spatial information 
despite the background 'noise' in the data. 
The aims and assumptions of this approach were also used in Chapter Nine. Here 
the setting was that of a lab but the methodology was otherwise largely similar. 
This time the stimuli were not provided by the homes of acquaintances but by 
another form of socially valenced stimuli, in Northern Irish society at least, i. e. 
towns. In a country where at least part of one's identity can be adduced from 
where one lives, the name of a town is more often than not a potent source of 
social valence, with much historical, religious and political baggage attached. The 
scale of distance was different: a maximum estimation of 80 miles between the 
source town (Belfast) and the other eighteen towns, in line with the fourth 
hypothesis above. 
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To see if macro-scale space can bear witness to the distorting effects on 
perceivers of socially valent stimuli in a configurational response set, the third 
study (Chapter Ten) was undertaken. This time subjects were given the opportunity 
of indicating the position of the same towns as used in the previous experiment, 
but in a two dimensional space representing the whole of Northern Ireland. 
Furthermore, the respondents were recruited 'in the field' from two distinct, highly 
socially segregated but spatially contiguous communities in Belfast city: a subject 
pool of heightened group distinctiveness when one compares it with the student 
subjects used in Chapter Nine. The social valence of the target towns was 
expected to reveal itself through marked and systematic distortion of respondents' 
distance perception. 
The distance scale over which subjects were to estimate distances was at the 
micro level for the next three experiments. In Chapters Eleven to Thirteen, subjects 
were tested in lab settings but the stimuli comprised documentary style, newsprint 
derived photographs, presented on slides. In Chapter Eleven, the biasing effect of 
experimenter-manipulated captions on photographs deemed 'neutral' in content 
with regard to social valence was investigated. By adding socially loaded 
information to a given photograph, it was hoped that the valence of the perceived 
'whole' social scene would instigate a suitably modified social schemata and with 
that in place, a corresponding error in its spatial perception: revealed through inter- 
figure distance estimation. 
In Chapter Twelve, a similar technique using projected slides of comparable 
material was used. This time however, the direct ratio-scaling technique of Chapter 
11 was dropped in favour of allowing subjects to actually recreate what they saw 
on screen with two cut-out photocopy likenesses for each photograph to be placed 
on a neutral frame. The variety of social scenarios and the varying degrees of 
social valence associated with them would be allowed to 'gel' in the mind of the 
subject and create a social schema for each scene with concomitant distortion in 
the inter-figure distance estimation made. As in Chapter Four, the social scenes 
used were on the inter-figure distance scale: from centimetres to several metres. 
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A logical extension of the methodology was made in Chapter Thirteen where 
multiple relationships were examined. On the same two-dimensional frame, 
subjects were able to recreate the social relationship positions they witnessed on 
screen: examples of photographs of similar, realistic social scenes. This allowed for 
a greater complexity of analysis: examining the data for the presence of 
isomorphism not just for dyadic relationships but triadic, quadratic etc. 
There is a functional, though not theoretical break between studies 1- 3 and 4-6. 
Studies 1 to 3 use towns and cities and inter-urban landmarks as the objects of 
perception; studies 4-6 employ exclusively human figures as sources of social 
stimuli. Two major distinguishing factors are available to the experimenter: scale 
and the nature of the stimuli. 
The range of scales can be banded into 3: 
1. inter-urban; 2. intra-urban; 3. interpersonal 
The range of scales used was chosen to be reasonably broad in order to discover 
if the socio-spatial phenomenon would be observed at more than just one scale. At 
first sight, the natures of the stimuli might seem to show little relatedness. After all, 
towns and buildings are inanimate objects with few of the qualities of human 
beings. Yet they all share at least one vital characteristic: they are invariably 
imbued with varying kinds of social valence. A building can, for example, have as 
much liking/disliking associated with it as any human. The discussion of "hot 
cognitions" in connection with the primacy of feeling in Chapter Six alerts us to the 
possibility, indeed the likelihood, that people and things share the same capacity to 
elicit an emotional evaluation on the part of the perceiver. 
A successful examination of the phenomenon in regards to person perception only 
would beg the question: what about other social objects and other scales of 
distances? The present thesis proposes that socio-spatial isomorphism is a 
fundamental and ubiquitous human propensity, observable with a variety of objects 
and scales in the everyday environment. 
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Another, no less important, reason for choosing the range of stimuli used here is 
that of subject familiarity. The stimuli are both convenient and accessible for 
subjects. Commonly held knowledge was another important factor. There would be 
little point in asking Scottish subjects, for example, the distances between towns in 
Northern Ireland as in Chapter Nine. It was deemed important to tap into commonly 
held knowledge to reduce randomness in the data. A researcher needs to 
maximize variable strength in order to get results with his crude measurement 
methods. 
CHAPTER 8: Urban Memory 
Urban distance estimation and distortions 
One area of human life that springs to mind when thinking of distortion caused by 
social schemata is our personal network of friends and acquaintances: where they 
live on an urban scale. The environs of St. Andrews provide a good backdrop for 
investigating such personal networks as it is a small coastal town with a medieval 
centre and distinctive geographical centre. 
A study was devised to investigate hypothesis I that foreshortening would occur 
when estimating the distance between ones home and that of a friend. A 
concomitant effect would be that one would overestimate the distance between 
ones home and that of a mere acquaintance or a disliked individual. If, as 
proposed here, individuals carry with them social schemata for the people they 
know and their spatial location then such 'social networks' would provide a rich vein 
of spatial distortion. People with whom we are close are indeed 'close'; people with 
whom we are distant will seem 'distant' in our spatial perceptions and memories for 
that most affectively laden of possessions: the home. 
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Subjects in this study were issued, a fortnight apart, with two different 
questionnaires. In the first they were asked to nominate 8 people from a diverse 
geographical spread in St. Andrews, including their addresses, next to estimate the 
distance between their own home and that of each of their nominees'. 
In the second questionnaire, they were asked general questions about themselves, 
their familiarity with the town, modes of travel etc. They were also asked to 
describe their relationships with each of the nominees on a variety of measures 
Figure 8.1: Map of central St. Andrews 
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including how often they would normally see them and whether they liked them or 
not. 
Asking subjects to indicate the degree of friendship was straightforward enough 
but an immediate problem was how to tackle the issue of asking them to nominate 
people they 'dislike' in a sensitive, confidential and ethical way. Disclosure of 
information about third parties could present problems to many people. The issue 
was tackled in the following way. 
Subjects were assured that: 
9 all information would be on a strictly confidential basis 
" stored details would be anonymous and untraceable, with no identities or 
addresses held on computer file. 
0 all information about third parties was for identification only (the 'matching-up' 
of responses in later parts of the study). 
0 Initials, codes etc. could be used instead of names, if subjects preferred. 
Furthermore, subjects were not directly asked to nominate people they disliked. 
Instead they were asked to indicate how they viewed the regularity of their 
meetings with their nominees, on a scale ranging from "would not try to see more 
often" to "would try to see more often". It was felt that this phraseology was more 
suitable than the word "dislike", the possible use of which seemed unethical. 
With the generous assistance of the University of St. Andrews Registry, contact 
was made by internal mail to over one hundred postgraduates. Failure of return 
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was a major problem and was probably exacerbated by the request for a second, 
follow-up questionnaire. Data from forty volunteers was finally used. All subjects 
had dwelled for at least one year within St. Andrews; the majority were aged 
between 20 to 30 years. Of the total, 26 were male and 14 were female. More 
subjects for the study were obviously desirable form a statistical point of view and 
the ANOVAs and multiple regressions reported below need cautious consideration. 
Two questionnaires (parts "A" and "B") were devised to tap the subjects' cognitive 
map of the area and their perceptions on where the eight people lived within the 
town (see Appendix A). A pilot study among 15 friends/acquaintances showed that 
11, or 73%, were able to nominate eight people- the rest nominating from 5 to 7 
people. Thus eight was chosen as the best maximum number to allow for, enabling 
a). a good spread of locations and 
b). an increased Iiklihood that a range of relationships would come to the study 
from every subject. 
8.2.2.1 art `P 
Subjects were asked to write down, above the eight scales provided, the names 
and exact addresses of eight people they knew who lived in St. Andrews. A 
geographical 'spread' was asked for so that their nominees did not all come from 
the same street or other small area. 
They were asked to indicate by marking a cross on a continuous scale 150 mm 
long, the distance form their own home to each of the nominee's homes without 
recourse to the aid of a map. The scale was marked "0" at one end and "3 miles" at 
the other: the position of subjects' location (on the left or the right end of the scale) 
was reversed for a random selection of half the subject pool. "Crow's flight", rather 
than walking, distances were asked for as it was assumed that subjects would 
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have built up some kind of 'survey' or configurational map of the St. Andrews 
district which they could tap into. A maximum distance of three miles was 
calculated to provide complete coverage of St. Andrews proper and also allow for 
overestimation of test distances, should these occur. 
Why was ratio-scaling not employed as a technique for distance estimation in this 
study? As noted in Chapter 2 on environmental cognition, ratio-scaling not without 
its problems. Perhaps the most serious criticism to be made is that peoples' 
internal representation of the provided 'standard' distance might, and probably 
would, vary. The technique would fail to capture the 'internal validity' of the subject 
and wrongly ascribe over- or underestimation of distance to a given response. 
A possible way out of this problem would be to use multiple standard distances i. e. 
a separate and unique standard distance supplied for each and every distance 
estimation to be made. In reality, this proves a daunting task for the subject: 
practice trials in a pilot experiment (see Chapter 9) indicted that this was not only 
cumbersome but it introduced an unacceptable level of guesswork. 
It was felt here that the concept of three miles was an intuitively easy one for 
subjects to grasp. As a measure of distance the mile is probably one with which 
most if not all subjects would be familiar. It seems reasonable to assume that they 
would share an internal representation which would be matched against reality on 
a daily basis as they commute to their place of study or work. 
8.2 . 2.2 PartB :.:::...:.:: '.. 
This part initially required subjects to provide personal details, crucially where 
exactly they lived in the town. Other information collected included: 
1. age 
2, sex 
3. length of residence in St. Andrews 
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4. methods of transport within the town in a typical week: bicycling, driving 
oneself, being driven, motor biking, public transport. 
Items 3 and 4 were included to provide possible mediating - variables in later 
correlational analysis. It was suspected that length of residence in particular would 
correlate highly and negatively with distance estimation distortion. Postgraduates 
inevitably come from a narrow range of length of residence but given that accuracy 
in urban configurational knowledge can be quickly built up (as mentioned 
previously in Chapter 2) there may be sufficient variance in this variable to warrant 
investigation. In addition to the factor of mere duration of residence in a location, 
active forms of transport might also lead to less distortion in distance estimation 
and so perhaps confound the central hypotheses. 
Having been reminded of the people nominated in Part A, whether by name, initial 
or code, subjects were asked to indicate where on the following three scales, each 
of the eight people would lie (a separate scale being provided for each nominee = 
24 scales). 
. casual acquaintance very close friend 
see seldom see often 
would not, -- 
try to see 
more often 
would 
try to see 
more often 
Each scale was 125 mm long. Continuous scales such as these should provide 
more 'value free' data than if, say, seven point semantic scales were used. It may 
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be true that although a less well educated sample than the one used would divide 
distances into categories such as 'very close', 'not far', 'quite a way', those involved 
here would normally think of space as a continuous variable, measured as a 
distance and convertible to a time ('ten minutes away'): both continuous variables. 
It could be argued that one or two of these scales are redundant since all three tap 
into the same construct- that of general affiliation. However, it should be noted that 
whilst one would expect the three measures to be correlated, different aspects of 
affiliation are being examined. One cannot assume that the more one sees 
acquaintances, the more one likes them: quite the contrary could be true. Asking 
subjects if they would like to see someone more or less often is, as outlined earlier 
,a way of asking them to indicate those they also dislike. 
The measure 'closeness 
of friendship' simply does not tackle this question. It could also reasonably be 
argued that the degree to which an individual wishes to see another is a more 
potent measure of liking and affiliation than the more static and passive indication 
of 'mere' friendship which may disguise the exact feeling of the subject towards an 
individual on that day. 
The names of all postgraduates were kindly provided by the Students' Records 
office of the university following a detailed application. Individuals' names and 
academic departments were helpfully supplied on pre-printed sticky labels. The 
university's internal mail service was the means by which the many potential 
subjects were contacted. With every questionnaire, an addressed envelope was 
supplied to facilitate return by the same route. 
Part B of the questionnaire, along with a reminder list of the (up to) eight people 
nominated in Part A, was administered exactly two weeks after Part A. A delay of 
this length would, it was hoped, divert attention from the connection between the 
distance estimation in Part A and the affective associations with the nominees 
tapped in Part B.: subjects would not be tempted to amend their estimates in the 
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light of their later 'realizations' about their acquaintances (or vice versa) which may 
have happened if the two parts of the questionnaire were temporally contiguous. 
Distance estimation data was converted to distortion scores by measuring the 
actual distances between distance pairs and from these, obtaining percentage 
distortion scores. Inter-home distances were accurately measured from Ordinance 
Survey Maps of the town kindly supplied by North East Fife District Council (scale 
1: 2500, plan Nos. 5017-5117,5016-5116,4915,4817 and 4815). Although the 
maps were those revised in 1983, only one or two sites could not be located. 
Approximations of their exact locations were made on the maps in such a way that 
any consequential errors in measurement would be negligible. 
The following codlings were used in respect of other data from the questionnaires: 
" sex: female = 0 
male = 1 
" age in years: 17-20: 1 
21-24: 2 
25-28: 3 
29+: 4 
" length of residence: 1 year up to 21 
2 years up to 32 
3 years up to 43 
4 years and over 4 
Data regarding modes of transport used in a typical week were coded directly as 
indicated by subjects: 
"0" = used not at all; 
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I" = used around once per week; 
"2" = used several times per week; 
"3" = used every day. 
The three 'friendship' scales provided data by taking measurements in mm (min.: 0; 
maximum: 125) from one end of each scale to the cross made by the subject. For 
the three scales, increasing magnitude of score meant: the closer the friend; the 
more often they saw each other; the more that they would try to see the nominees. 
Three extreme values (> 3 S. D. s) in the distance estimation variable were 
detected and substituted before proceeding. It was possible that there may be an 
association between distance estimation distortion and the actual physical 
distances nominated by subjects. One might suspect, for example, that with the 
scaling technique, the centre-point of the scale may act as a bias, with subjects 
more likely to respond towards the middle range (around 1.5 miles). As a result, the 
shorter distances may be relatively over-estimated and the longer distances 
relatively underestimated. On top of this may be a range effect described by 
Poulton(1975) such that subjects would be relatively more 'accurate' (less % 
distortion, plus or minus) for the longer distances. Distances, nominated by 
subjects, were measured accurately on the O. S. maps and were used to produce 
the scatterplot in Fig. 8.2. 
A correlation coefficient,, based on the data from Figure 8.2, was found to be - 
. 2024, (Pearson r, N=226, p<. 01). There appears to be a 
slight but significant 
tendency for a decrease in distortion as stimulus length increases. On the evidence 
of this confounding variable, further investigations were made. 
The nature of the real, physical distances were examined first: their total range was 
divided into six equi-distant bands (spanning roughly .3 miles each). Band 1 was 
from 0 to 460 metres metric, band 2 from 460 to 922 metres and so on up to band 
6 which ran from 1845 to 2307 metres. Table 8.1 shows basic summary statistics 
for this variable in a breakdown according to estimation distortion. 
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Figure 8.2: A scatterplot for all distance estimation distortions against 
corresponding real (physical) distances. 
It becomes immediately apparent that there is a substantial change in mean 
distortion as the real distance of the estimate being made increases- overall a 
decrease from bands 1 up to 6. Distortion range and variance within each band 
also decreases in the same direction. The number of instances of estimation in the 
longer real distance bands drops dramatically from 73 in band 1 down to only 9 in 
band 6. Although subjects were emphatically asked to nominate people living in a 
wide geographic spread in the town, it seems that most subjects either chose those 
they knew from a small area near their own home, or perhaps know only those in a 
restricted area around their own social ambits. This might explain the narrowing of 
range and lessening of variance as the distance to be estimated increases. 
However the more challenging aspect of this breakdown is the overall drop in 
mean distortion as distance increases. 
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Table 8.1: A breakdown of distance estimation distortion according to real distance. 
[Real distances represented by equi-distant bands from 1 to 6. ] 
An analysis of variance was carried out on the distortion variable as dependent 
variable with the six real distance bands providing six levels of the one factor 
ANOVA. [N. B.: one cell (band 6) falls below ten in number and this may have 
implications for the reliability of the analysis]. From this it appeared that the 
distance bands had significantly different mean distortion rates (F = 3.275, DF = 5, 
p< . 01). Clearly then, real distance is an important variable to consider when 
carrying out analysis of all the other variables in relation to estimation distortion, as 
will be seen later. 
Another prerequisite for effective analysis would be that the people nominated by 
each subject should be distributed throughout the town independently of the 
degree of closeness between subject and nominee. If, as seems likely, distortions 
vary with distance then' if friends live close to the subject, foreshortening effects 
may be disguised. The relationship between degree of friendship and real distance 
was examined but no relationship observed (r= -. 0744, p=. 264,2-tailed). Subjects 
Distance Estimation Distortion 
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appeared not to be nominating their best friends and casual acquaintances from 
close by and far away respectively or vice-versa. 
The overall trend in distance estimation distortion, at least within this urban setting, 
is that subjects overestimate distances, on average, by 66%. The three variables 
which sought to tap the degree of affiliation between subject and nominees were 
correlated in the matrix below. 
Table 8.2: Correlation matrix (Pearson's r) and significance levels for the three 
affiliation variables (closeness of friendship; how frequently the subjects saw their 
nominees; would try/ try not to see more often- a bipolar measure of liking/disliking) 
and estimation distortion. 
One would anticipate that the three affiliation variables would correlate positively 
and significantly together and indeed they do, although the correlation between 
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frequency of seeing and try/try-not-to-see is quite low. As expected, all three 
correlate negatively with distortion though only weakly: try/try-not-to-see seems to 
be the strongest correlate. This suggests that the three are unsuitable for entering 
into a regression model: low correlations among predictor variables are 
recommended as it otherwise becomes difficult to attribute variance in the 
dependent unequivocally to any one predictor variable (Kinnear & Grey, 1994). 
However, judging also from the results of its correlation with the dependent 
variable, distortion, it may be possible to use try/try-not-to-see as a predictor on its 
own. 
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Figure 8.3: Scattergram showing the relationship between the variable try/try not to 
see more and distance estimation distortion 
Although the linear relationship appears to be less than perfect, it is quite 
significant (p=. 017). People whom subjects wish to see more are perceived to be 
Chapter 8 Urban Memory 221 
living closer than those less in demand. In a multiple regression analysis, the 
forward method of variable entry was used. The predictor variables are entered 
one by one with the most highly correlated entered first, until the increase in R2 is 
no longer statistically significant. It was decided to enter three variables into the 
equation: try/try-not-to-see, closeness of friendship and frequency of seeing in case 
partial correlations with the dependent variable (effects of try/try-not-to-see 
partialled out) were obscuring the contribution of the last two variables. 
Nevertheless, construction of the model was halted after entry of the bipolar liking 
variable: 
Dependent Variable.. DISTORTION Distortion in % 
Method: Forward 
CLOSENESS TRYSEE SEEOFTEN? 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 1 
TRYSEE try to see more? 
Multiple R . 17338 R Square 
. 03006 Adjusted R Square . 02509 Standard Error 70.35621 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares 
Regression 1 29914.62010 
Residual 195 965249.31209 
Mean Square 
29914.62010 
4949.99647 
F=6.04336 Signif F= . 0148 
------ _---_ Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
TRYSEE -. 340544 . 138527 -. 173378 -2.458 . 0148 (Constant) 86.929788 9.723042 8.941 <. 01 
--- Variables not in the Equation ------------ 
Variable Beta In Partial Min. Toler T Sig T 
CLOSENES -. 099417 -. 088974 . 776860 -1.244 . 2149 SEEOFTEN? 1.607E-04 . 000158 . 935582 . 002 . 9982 
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It would appear that although the correlation between try/try-not-to-see and 
distortion is weak, it is highly significant. The homes of those whom subjects desire 
to see more are perceived as relatively closer ('less overestimated') than the 
homes of those they would not try to see more. 
Table 8.3: Partial correlations between the potential predictor variables In a linear 
regression model and distance estimation distortion (The Influence of actual physical 
distance has been partialled out. ) 
Table 8.3 reports the results of partial correlations showing an increase in size and 
significance between % distortion and independent variables over the Pearson 
correlations in Table 8.2. These results and others above are highly suggestive of 
a complex role being played by real distance in the relationships between 
predictors and dependent in a possible linear model. 
As observed in the preliminary analysis above, decreasing percentage distortion is 
associated with estimates of longer distances. It seems possible that the size of the 
residual is a function of real distance: there is non-constant variation in the variable 
real distance (containing the actual distances of the subjects' distance estimates) 
in relation to distortion (see Table 8.1 above). 
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Hypothesis testing in linear regression techniques requires homogeneity of 
variance in the residuals, an assumption that has been violated in this instance. 
This heteroscedasticity ("having unequal variances") can be controlled for in the 
regression model by using Weighted Least Squares (WLS). This form of 
regression, as opposed to ordinary least squares, controls the influence of different 
cases in the model. Those observations with larger distortion variance are made to 
have less influence (weight) than others. WLS calculates the residual variance as a 
function of the 'source' variable. In this instance the source of the 
heteroscadasticity- actual distance- was entered as a weighting variable and 
produced the following results: 
Dependent Variable.. DISTORTION Distortion in % 
Method: Forward 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 1 
TRYSEE try to see more? 
Weighted Least Squares - Weighted By.. REALDIST (actual distance) 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. DISTORTION Distortion in % 
CLOSENESS TRYSEE SEEOFTEN? 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. TRYSEE try to see more? 
Multiple R . 21734 R Square . 04724 Adjusted R Square . 04232 Standard Error 1978.95171 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 1 37666874.02455 37666874.02455 
Residual 194 759752477.34271 3916249.88321 
F=9.61810 Signif F= . 0022 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
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TRYSEE -. 421638 . 135955 -. 217338 -3.101 . 0022 (Constant) 81.721403 9.316507 8.772 <. 01 
---- Variables not in the Equation ---- - 
Variable Beta In Partial Min. Toler T Sig T 
CLOSENESS -. 033411 -. 030609 . 799655 -. 425 . 6710 SEEOFTEN? -. 001306 -. 001296 . 937665 -. 018 . 9857 
Once again, the closeness of friendship and the frequency of interaction fail to 
make it into the equation. However the variance in the dependent variable 
accounted for by try/try-not-to-see has increased and its significance increased 
noticeably. 
It seems disappointing that the closeness of friendship declared by subjects 
between themselves and their nominees is related only to percentage distortion by 
small, albeit significant correlations (Pearson and partial). Figure 8.4 illustrates why 
this may be so. The relationship, such as it is, is not overwhelmingly linear. The 
diffuse pattern (undoubtedly leading to large residuals on regression) may help 
explain the poor predictive ability of closeness of friendship. 
- 
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Figure 8.4: Scatterplot of closeness of friendship against distance estimation 
distortion 
300 
Using a ratio scale for this variable may have been part of the problem. Conversion 
to an interval scale was performed: the scale each subject used was divided into 
six equal bands. Six bands were chosen as this number corresponds roughly to the 
intervals implied by a traditional seven point scale. An unequal groups analysis of 
variance produced an F ratio just short of significance (F= 2.224, DF= 5, p=0.053). 
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Figure 8.5: The results of plotting closeness of friendship to a 6-Interval scale and 
plotting it against mean distortion 
Figure 8.5 show a definite decrease in distortion on the 4,5 and 6 categories of 
Closeness of friendship as one would predict. Given that actual distance is an 
important co-variate, the analysis was repeated but his time controlling for actual 
distance. This time an F ratio of 2.38 (p=. 04) was obtained- actual distance , it 
seems, is just nudging the analysis into significance. Post -hoc multiple comparison 
tests (joint Scheffe confidence intervals at 95%) indicated that categories 4 and 5 
were significantly different to the rest (t=2.398, p=. 01733 and t= -2.452, p=. 1499 
respectively). 
The bar chart in Figure 8.4 is highly suggestive of a dichotomous 'break' in the 
variable closeness of friendship. In light of this, the friendship scale was further 
broken down into just two intervals- separated by the midpoint of the scale. Thus 
the first category ('0') could be described as representing those nominees 'more 
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casual' in acquaintance and the second category ('1') as those classed as 'closer 
friends'. 
By converting the closeness of friendship scale to just two intervals, the following 
graph was produced (Figure 8.6): 
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Figure 8.6: A bar chart representing closeness of friendship as two Interval 
categories. [0 (`casual acquaintance) and I (`close friend): 0 (mean =77, SD = 69) 
and 1 (mean = 55, SD = 71)] 
Analysis this time produced an F value of 5.553 (1 DF, p=. 019). Later an F ratio of 
7.702 (p<. 01) was produced in an analysis of co-variance, with actual distance 
once again used as the controlling variable. The 'significance break' appears to 
straddle the centre zone of the original scale. 
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Partial correlations were performed on the other variables with distortion. The 
distortion variable this time was the mean distortion per subject; the controlled 
variable was "Realmean"- the mean of the actual physical distances. These two 
variables themselves correlated negatively as expected but non-significantly 
(Pearson's r=-. 1239, p= . 239). Despite the poor correlation, it was felt that the 
aggregation of distortion scores to produce the overall means may have disguised 
the co-varying aspect of the physical distance variable. Table 8.4 shows the results 
of the analyses. 
Table 8.4: Partial correlations for other variables of Interest with mean distortion 
per subject The influence of mean of actual nominated distance has been removed 
mean 
distortion 
-. 135 . 0623 -. 293 . 0068 . 1071 . 0951 . 
4024 
Per (P= (P= (P= (P= (P= (P= (P= subject 
. 486) . 748) . 123) . 972) . 58) . 624) . 
030) 
From these data it was decided to investigate the following variables further to see 
if they varied systematically within themselves and looking for possible interactions 
between them: sex, age, driving oneself and walking. Figure 8.7 suggests that 
driving oneself and walking are the two variables likely to offer significantly differing 
means. 
Chapter 8 Urban Memory 229 
vo 
80 
80 
40 
z 20 
I- 
0 
I 
00 
z 
w 
-20 
Age Sex Driving Walking 
oneself 
VARIABLES 
Figure 8.7: Distance estimation distortion means over all subjects for the variables 
named. The bars were constructed from the data in Table 8.5 
Using data summarized in table 8.5, various analyses of variance were computed. 
It was found that the co-variable mean of actual nominated distance had little effect 
on the results.; only in the case of the variable sex did it effect an improvement in 
the F-ratio: 
Sex : F= 1.296, df= 1, p=. 263, Real distance mean as co-variate 
Age: F= . 265, df= 2, p=. 769 
Driving oneself: F= 1.583, df= 3, p= . 213 
Walking: F= 2.616, df= 2, p= . 089 
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Table 8.5: Breakdown of overall mean distortion across all subjects for the named levels of 
the independent variables. 
2 (70.7); F (female, 81.3); 0 (82.4); 1 (-10.9); 
means 3 (70.1); M (male, 57.7) 1 (47); 2 (69.6); 
4(54.1) 2 (43); 3(72.2) 
3 (42.7) 
Within the variable walk, it was discovered that level 1 was significantly different 
from levels 2 and 3 (t= -2.17, p=. 037) despite the fact that no overall difference 
was found between all 3 means. It would make sense to regroup the data in this 
variable to examine further the difference in distortion between those who mostly 
walk back and forth to study but the number of valid cases in the level I category 
(N=2) would make any result unreliable and indeed place the above post-hoc 
comparison in a new perspective. In similar analyses, no interactions were found 
between any of the above variables. Other analyses were carried out with regard to 
the relationships between the affiliation scale variables and these others but no 
patterns, let alone significant results, were found. 
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On balance, in accord with the hypotheses 1 and 2, there has been a 
foreshortening of perceived distance as affiliation with the object at that distance 
increases. The overall overestimation of distances means that when discussing 
foreshortening of distance, one needs to refer to the terms 'less overestimation' 
and 'more overestimation' rather than their absolute analogues. Whether or not this 
is an artifact of the scaling method employed here is a moot point but it should be 
noted that the standard deviation overall was 71- rather high considering the above 
mean. 
In retrospect one would have preferred to have used several standard distances to 
help subjects with their estimations. The admonition detailed in 8.2.2.1 above 
regarding the use of ratio-scaling from a purely theoretical. point of view 
notwithstanding, its use would have at least tightened variance around the means 
and even have lead to absolute under/overestimation rather than the relative form 
observed here. 
The variable try/try-not-to-see undoubtedly provided the most interesting result. It 
was perhaps more truly bi-polar than the other two scale variables with the 
statement "would not try to see more often" much more negative in its connotation 
of affiliation than either "casual acquaintance" or "see seldom"- the comparable 
extremes on the other two scales. So it is perhaps not surprising that it appears to 
be a more reliable predictor of distance estimation distortion than `mere' friendship 
or the frequency of meeting. In other words, "actual dislike" (or that which one 
hopes that end of the try/try-not-to-see scale taps into) engenders relative 
overestimation to a much greater extent than probable indifference ('casual 
acquaintance'). 
The variable Closeness of friendship did indicate the foreshortening of perceived 
distance but as earlier indicated, the nature of the response scale for the variable 
of closeness of friendship may have been the reason why the undoubted influence 
of the variable had initially been concealed. What seems to have been happening 
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is that subjects were using the scale as a mere dichotomous device and so analysis by the 
alleged continuous variable was in vain. The consequent reduction in the range of variation 
may have been, in part, responsible for the weak result here. 
Frequency of seeing, one could argue, shows that one does not necessarily need to see 
people often to like them: true, it correlated well with Closeness of friendship but much less 
so with Try/try-not-to-see. So although one tends to regard as friends people one sees 
often, those one sees seldom are (at worst) casual acquaintances rather than 'disliked' 
individuals. Perhaps it is not surprising that this variable proved such a poor predictor of 
estimation distortion. Conversion to interval variables of both 6 and of 2 bands and 
subsequent analyses of variance (not reported) were inconclusive. 
The fact that the subject pool was constituted only by postgraduates may help explain the 
lack of interesting results in the other variables. In such a small town, where most places are 
easily accessible by foot, it perhaps is not surprising to discover little variability in subjects' 
travel habits. For example the length of time a subject has resided in St. Andrews correlated 
very little with estimation distortion. One might suppose that in such a compact urban 
environment with a distinctive medieval street pattern, the cognitive-map schema for the 
town would be built up very quickly on arrival- certainly within the first year. The layout of the 
town is extremely "legible" in the Lynchian sense. Three of the central main streets are 
nearly parallel, running from West to East with radial roads in South West to South East 
directions. 
The more active forms of travel- driving oneself, bicycling etc. are equivocal in their 
correlations with distortion. Most people (85%) reported that walking formed a daily part of 
their travel within a typical week and, again, the compact nature of the environment may 
help to explain this. Those who drive (themselves) a great deal do show a decreasing 
distortion rate: presumably distances within the outer reaches and suburbs of the town are 
represented more 'accurately' in their urban schemata. A lack of variety inherent in the need 
to commute only within a small town has apparently led to an equivalence of travel modes in 
relation to distance estimation distortion. 
Another possible explanation for the lack of decisive results in the case of what one might 
call the biographical variables, is that the distortion term was an overall aggregate distortion 
per subject. In future it may be more profitable to design a measure to indicate e. g. the 
usual type of transport adopted for a given journey . In such a design, one might expect to 
observe a closer relationship between distortion and transport type. 
CHAPTER 9: Inter-Urban 
Distance Estimation 
"So the people of Northern Ireland are locked into membership of 
one of two groups which will probably play a role in determining 
where they live, where they go to school, what games they play, 
and who they marry. " 
(Cairns, 1987, p97) 
Having established that people perceive distances within a town according to the 
affective valence of the target distance, a natural progression was to discover if 
the same socio-spatial foreshortening could take place on a much larger, inter- 
urban scale. The environment of Northern Ireland was able to provide suitable 
stimulus towns for this investigation mainly because: 
1. the society is highly dichotomized along sectarian lines of Protestant/Catholic 
and 
2. most, if not all, of the towns are publicly known to predominate in one of the 
two religions. 
There exists plenty of evidence of commonly held social identities, e. g. even going 
back as far as the 1971 census when over 90% of people answered the (optional) 
question on religious membership (Darby, 1976). Most people in Northern Ireland 
have a clear idea if a town is `in-group' or 'out-group' with regard to their own 
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religion. Given the politico-religious divisions within society there; it is ' difficult to 
imagine a more potent dimension than the perceived religion of towns and cities 
through which to examine socio-spatial isomorphism. 
The proposal is that subjects who live in Northern Ireland will possess schemata 
for the geography of the region which reflects spatially the social and political 
prejudices of their own groups. Specifically one expects that people will 
demonstrate distortions of foreshortening and distancing when making distance 
judgments between towns of known religious composition according to the 
religious group to which they belong. In-group towns (those believed to 
predominate in the subject's own declared religion) should show foreshortening (or 
less overestimation) than out-group towns. 
To help reduce the instance of random error variance in the task, it was decided to 
ask subjects in this study to make distance estimations from the town in which they 
currently resided. Due to prospective arrangements, this town was to be Belfast. 
Judging the distance between two towns on whatever type of scale is anything but 
precise. The decision was made to use a scale with a standard distance as a 
comparator. This was partly because, without some sort of guide, the distortions 
would be random to an unacceptable degree. Also, subjects were asked to provide 
straight-line distances as opposed to e. g. travel distance by road as not all 
subjects would necessarily travel to target towns via the same routes. The reason 
why multiple standard distances were not used was because: 
" in a pilot study in Scotland, using Scottish subjects and Scottish towns as 
stimuli, the degree of difficulty reported by the subjects and the length of time 
taken to complete each trial was prohibitive. 10 of the 13 pilot subjects 
complained about the difficulty of the task 
9 Landmarks such as Iona, Pitlochry and Ullapool were all recognised by the 
subjects but the majority stated that they were not at all sure where they were 
located. 
9 there exist few non-urban landmarks to provide standard distances in Northern 
Ireland. 
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By arrangement with the Department of Psychology, The Queen's University of 
Belfast, three second year laboratory-classes were approached and the help of 
volunteers requested at the end of the respective teaching times. I am especially 
grateful to Dr. Carol McGuiness at the Department for granting access and helping 
in the recruitment process. Data from a total of 62 subjects were finally collected 
but 61 were used for analysis as one subject had failed to complete properly. 
'9: 2: 2: 
9.2.2.1 hoice of towns 
As indicated above, the distance estimations were to be made from Belfast. A total 
of eighteen towns (including one city: Londonderry) were to be chosen as targets 
in the task. They were selected on the basis of their conspicuous religious 
predominance as judged by a panel of family and friends in Northern Ireland from 
a compilation of 32 Northern Irish towns and cities. Although Protestantism can 
hardly be regarded as a single religion, in local terms the expression is generic and 
is interchangeable with the idea of being 'not Roman Catholic'- usually applied to 
the three main independent churches: Church of Ireland, Presbyterian and 
Methodist. 
Six judges were asked to allocate the towns into one of three categories: 
predominantly Protestant, predominantly Catholic and equal proportions of each 
religion/unsure. Of the final 18, nine were judged to be predominantly Catholic and 
nine predominantly Protestant by 100% of the (eight) judges: the results are shown 
in Table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1: The list of 18 towns judged to be predominant In one of two 
denominations. Distances form Belfast are also shown. 
Cookstown 33.3 1 Ballymena 23.3 
Downpatrick 20.4 1 Ballymoney 40.2 
Dungannon 34.3 Coleraine 47.2 
Londonderry 62.6 Craigavon 20.4 
Lurgan 18.9 Enniskillen 71 
Newry 32.8 Lame 18.4 
Omagh 55.6 Limavady 51.6 
Portaferry 21.4 Portadown 24.3 
Strabane 64 1 Tandragee 25.8 
For mostly historical reasons, the territory of Northern Ireland. can be very roughly 
divided into two areas divided by the river Bann- east and west, with mostly 
Protestant towns in the east and Catholic towns in the west. However this 
particular selection of towns avoids that bias. There appears to be no difference in 
mean distance from Belfast for the two groups: Catholic and Protestant towns 
(38.1 and 35.8 miles respectively, t= -. 28, df= 16, p= . 786). Interjudge reliability 
was high with an Alpha value of . 7560 obtained. 
It was not known what the composition of the final subject pool would be in terms 
of the denomination of subjects themselves so the above measures were taken to 
anticipate a reasonable combination of Protestant and Catholic target towns with 
Protestant and Catholic subjects. 
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Figure 9.1: A map of Northern Ireland showing the location of the eighteen towns 
and the Giant's causeway. 
Subjects were asked for their own impressions of denominational predominance. 
For distance estimations, ten random orders of the 18 target towns were generated. 
It would have been preferable to randomly generate the order of target towns for 
each subject but experimenting constraints in the host laboratory setting led instead 
to the use of random orders. However, with each random order being used by just 
six subjects, it was felt that any order effects were effectively controlled . 
9.2.2.2 The standard distance 
Chapter 9 Inter-Urban Distance Estimation 238 
All 19 straight-line distances, including the standard distance, were measured from 
a map of Ireland at a 8cm=20 miles scale. The distance between Belfast and the 
Giant's causeway was chosen as the standard distance. The Giant's Causeway, 
49.7 miles away from Belfast as the crow flies, is a very well-known natural 
landmark on the north coast and is in a popular holiday resort area. Subjects were 
asked to make distance estimations by marking a cross on a response scale. 
In addition to the arguments set out earlier regarding the use of a standard 
distance, it was also considered a 'necessary evil' in order to reduce the cognitive 
load on individuals. This could have introduced a further degree of random error to 
the data. It is fallacious to believe that marking a cross on a line is an easy task 
requiring little effort on the part of the subject. Trials with subjects in Scotland had 
revealed that, at least with conscientious subjects, self reports of difficulty in 
imagining the distances and the length of time need to complete each estimation 
were notable. 
Subjects were also supplied with individual sets of eighteen cards of dimensions 
7.6x12.7 cms with one of the 18 stimulus towns printed on each in black, block 
lettering. 
9: 2: 3: 
-Quesuonnatres': 
The study was administered in the form of a questionnaire. The distance 
estimations were at the beginning. A problem with this (and other) studies was the 
possibility of subjects becoming aware of the central motive behind the distance 
estimation task. This was tackled in two ways: 
" by arranging to have subjects to complete distance estimations before the 
succeeding questions so as to prevent `retro-influence' of responses and 
" by asking subjects questions about all aspects of their travel within Northern 
Ireland to give the impression of desiring information about the generality of 
their geographical knowledge and distract attention away from the questions 
on denominational issues which were also asked. 
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In addition subjects were asked not to turn back and revise responses (in light of 
possible later realizations) but to adhere to the schedule of completion requested 
by the experimenter 
A page of instructions accompanied each questionnaire and this included the 
directive to use only was the crow flies' distances when making distance 
estimations (see Appendix B). 
9.2.3.1 Distance Estimates 
Distance estimations were made over two pages. All estimations were made on a 
150mm scale with the origin city/town marked on the extreme left side. At the top 
of each page was the standard distance - marked on a scale of identical 
dimensions (not shown original size here): 
The direct distance to The Giant's Causeway from Belfast is: 
Belfast 
}I X 
The standard distance marker "X" was positioned according to the full length of 
the scale equaling 80 miles. This allowed for the possibility of substantial over- or 
underestimation of all the target distances. 
9.2.3.2 Travel; familiarity and other variables- 
--- .... ýý=t 
Examining subjects' distance estimations solely in relation to the denominational 
issue would be unlikely to reveal the totality of influences on variation in 
estimation. Following on from the series of 28 distance estimations, the 
questionnaire next examined other possible influences on the subjects perceptions 
of geographical distance. This section contained questions on: 
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1. Frequency of travel 
2. 'Liking' for each of the towns in order 
3. Four possible reasons for preferences expressed in 2 
4. Subjects' own perceptions of the towns' predominant denominations 
For each question, where appropriate, the questionnaire presented one of 10 
random orders of the 18 towns and each order was cycled through subjects in 
each testing session, each order being used no more than three times. Point 4 
was considered necessary as agreement within judges for each town's 
predominant religion was not unanimous. The final page requested various items 
of biographical detail such as duration of residency in Northern Ireland and 
subjects' own professed religion. 
The question on page 3 was designed to assess how often subjects traveled to 
some or all of the 18 towns. Subjects were asked to write down in the spaces 
provided those towns that they had traveled to before indicating how often they 
traveled there. Visiting frequency was assessed with the use of a7 point scale: 1 
(daily) up to 7 (once per year or less). 
The question on page 4 involved use of the stack of cards of printed towns 
mentioned above. Subjects were asked to sort the cards in order- with the criterion 
"the best town in which to live", ceteris paribus. Code numbers (1 to 18) had been 
printed in the top-right hand corner of the 18 cards and subjects were asked to 
write down the number of their most favoured town on the first line and so on down 
to their least favoured town on the last line. 
Next on the questionnaire (p5) was a question to elicit reasons for subjects' 
preferences for towns. Four factors were examined: 
" closeness to family/friends 
" geographical position (the region) 
" religion of its people 
" facilities (shopping, leisure etc. ) 
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Subjects were asked to indicate the importance they placed on these factors for 
each of the 18 towns according to a7 point scale ranging from I (unimportant) to 7 
(very important). 
Although judges had previously categorized the 18 towns according to the towns' 
predominant religion, it was felt appropriate to ask subjects for their own 
impressions on this crucial variable. Subjects were asked to indicate, not only the 
predominant religion of each town (C= predominantly Catholic; P= predominantly 
Protestant, N= equal proportions of each religion; U= unsure/don't know) but also 
the degree of this predominance from 1 (very low %) to 7 (very high %). 
The final page asked for the subject's age, sex, length of time spent living in 
Northern Ireland and Belfast, parental home town and lastly the subject's 
professed religion. The list of choices for response to this last question was not 
only comprehensive but in alphabetical order to avoid possible offense for what 
can be, in Northern Ireland, a somewhat delicate issue. Other denominations were 
included in this multiple choice section in a further bid to distract subjects' attention 
from the importance of religion in the study: 
What religion do you subscribe to? 
(Circle one letter only) 
Catholic C 
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to turn back through the questionnaire to revise their responses at any time. This 
was helped by following a step by step approach to completion: each section of 
the questionnaire was introduced by the experimenter and the succeeding section 
was not begun (finished subjects asked to wait) until all were finished the current 
one. Each testing session lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
After all measurements of the response scales had been made, subjects distance 
estimations were transformed and percentage distortion estimates calculated using 
the mileage information from Table 9.1. The variable "perceived predominance" 
was coded to a dimension of perceived religious predominance from -7 
(predominantly Protestant) through 0 (neutral) up to +7 (predominantly Catholic). 
The variable concerning town preference was coded so that the most favoured 
was assigned 18 points, the second, 17 points and so on down to the least 
favoured town which was assigned just one point. The rest of the data supplied by 
subjects required no transformations. Analyses of variance with the ten random 
orders of target towns as levels showed no differences between groups of overall 
mean distance estimation distortion. 
The design of the study is a mixed one: repeated measures (% estimation 
distortion on towns) as the dependent variable and a between subjects factor 
(religion of subject) as the primary independent variable. The marginal means for 
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the two factors are shown in Table 9.2. It is worth remembering that results for the 
'no-religion' category were complied from just 7 subjects. 
Table 9.2: The means of percentage estimation distortion for the two variables: 
judged religious predominance of town and religion of subjects. 
Judged religious 
predominance of town 
Protestant 7.2 27.2 
Catholic 22.4 11.9 
'no-religion subjects' 24.4 25.1 
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Figure 9.2: An Illustration of the data in Table 9.2 
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Note the interaction between subjects' religion and their estimation of distortion re. 
the two religious types of town. 
Support for hypotheses 1 and 2 would involve an appropriate interaction between 
the two factors. Figure 9.2 illustrates the relationships within Table 9.2 and the 
interaction concerned is in the expected direction. Protestant subjects are 
estimating distances to Protestant towns with less distortion than to Catholic 
towns. Mirroring this finding, Catholic subjects are estimating with less distortion to 
Catholic towns than to Protestant towns. As in the previous study, we are not 
dealing here with absolute underestimation and absolute overestimation but rather 
relative levels of distortion. The results relating to the no-religion category, 
although almost ideal for the purposes of the hypotheses, should be viewed in the 
knowledge of just seven subjects providing this data. 
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Table 9.3: The means of distortion and other summary statistics for the religion of 
subject and the judged religion of town. 
A two factor, repeated measures, mixed design ANOVA was performed on the 
data and produced a significant F ratio for the interaction only of 19.36, DF=2; p< 
. 01. [N. B. : the numbers of no-religion subjects 
falls below 10: conclusions 
regarding this category of subject need to be tempered] A separate ANOVA with 
sex added as an additional between-subject variable showed no significant main 
effects for sex or for interactions with sex. Table 9.3 displays information on % 
distortion means regarding the two main variables of interest: subject religion and 
religion of town. No differences were observed for the main effects: religion of 
subject( F= . 44, DF= 2, p= . 
645) and between religion of town (F= 2.89, DF= 2, p= 
. 096). 
913 
The correlational analyses proved somewhat disappointing. It was expected that 
subjects' liking for a town, as revealed in the card ordering task would play a 
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significant role in influencing estimation distortion. Most items in the inter- 
correlation matrix were small and non-significant. Those of most interest in relation 
to the dependent variable are given in Table 9.4: 
Table 9.4: Pearson's r correlations between Individual Instances of distortion and 
the variables listed. Only those levels of significance below 5% are shown. 
percentage 
estimation -. 0620 -. 1099 . 0307 distortion (p=<. 05) (p<. 01) 
Although two correlations are significant, all three are quite weak. There seems 
some possibility that the more that subjects like a town, the less their distortion in 
distance estimation. However a correlation of . 2984 
(p<. Ol) concerning order of 
liking with frequency of visiting that town indicates the possibility of inter-variable 
influence. Figure 9.3 shows the scatterplot for mean distortion and order of liking: 
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Figure 9.3: A plot of mean distortion for each of the (used) 18 values of Increasing 
preference for town. 
The "perceived predominance" correlation shows that slightly more distortion is 
associated with the Protestant towns. Remember that there are slightly more 
Catholic subjects in the sample (30 vs 24). Figure 9.4 illustrates its relationship 
with the dependent variable: 
Figure 9.5 demonstrates how the dependent variable is associated with frequency 
of visit to any given town. Although the correlation is so low it approaches zero, the 
best fit line would suggests bizarrely that, if anything, distance estimation to a town 
increases the more one visits it. 
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Figure 9.4: A scattergram showing how the perceived religious predominance of a 
town varies with mean distance estimation distortion. 
Table 9.5: Summary statistics for the three named variables. 
perceived predominance of towns -. 72 4.55 14 
frequency of visiting towns . 96 1.26 7 
order of liking towns 9.62 5.19 17 
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Figure 9.5: A scattergram illustrating the relationship between mean distortion and 
frequency of visit. 
Table 9.5 shows a possible reason for the lack of contribution by the three 
variables. All three show remarkably small standard deviations: it may be that lack 
of variance may be responsible. 
One variable which produced dramatic results to the detriment of the hypotheses 
was that of actual physical distance between Belfast and each of the target towns: 
"realdist". A Pearson R of -. 304, (p< . 01, N= 1077) was obtained for a correlation 
between real distance and estimation distortion. Figure 9.6 illustrates the 
Chapter 9 Inter-Urban Distance Estimation 250 
relationship. Note that there are up to 61 distortion values for each discrete real 
distance value: this contributes to the striation effect observed. 
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Figure 9.6: A scatterplot of real distance against distortion. 
It seems clear that distortion decreases as the distance to be estimated increases. 
It may be possible that people have relied more on known mileages as the 
distances to be estimated increase. In any case, this non-constant variation of the 
distortion rate across the values of real distance needs to be controlled for as it 
violates the homogeneity of variance principle intrinsic to analysis of variance. It 
would be possible to enter the variable real distance as a co-variate in an analysis 
of variance. Owing to the mixed nature of the design, this would be difficult to 
envisage without some radical transformation of the data (religion of subject being 
a between variable and real distance varying across distortion-in-towns, the 
dependent variable) One way around this difficulty would be to divide the 
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confounding variable into bands of distortion and treat each band separately. 
Figure 9.7 shows the mean distortions for each of the eighteen inter-town 
distances in the form of a bar chart. 
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Figure 9.7: Bars of mean estimation distortion for the actual distance to the 18 
towns. 0.01miles was added to the actual distance value for Downpatrick as this town 
has an equal distance-from-Belfast value (20.4 miles) as Craigavon- thus allowing a 
full complement of 18 bars for the graph. 
It seems that there are three distinct 'blocks' of distortion bars in Figure 9.6 and so 
three bands of real distance were devised accordingly. These are: 
" Band A: 18.4 to 23.30 miles, 6 towns (3 judged Protestant, 3 judged Catholic) 
" Band B: 24.30 to 40.20 miles, 6 towns (3 judged Protestant, 3 judged Catholic) 
" Band C: 47.20 to 71.00 miles, 6 towns (3 judged Protestant, 3 judged Catholic) 
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Results of analyses can be seen in Table 9.6. Although the interaction observed in 
the primary analysis above was also observed for each of the three bands of real 
distance, the problem of negative correlations between distortion and real distance 
remains. Even within these sub-ranges of the real distance variable, it seems that 
the trend of downward distortion with increasing real distance continues. 
Table 9.6: ANOVA results for the three bands of distance. 
Also shown are the results of Pearson's r correlations between mean distortion and 
actual distance 
It was decided to analyze the distortion data, town by town in a bid to ensure 
homeogeneity of variance within analyses. In this instance, all the observations are 
independent of each other enabling oneway ANOVAs to be performed. Support for 
hypotheses 1 and 2 comes from differences in means in the appropriate direction. 
Table 9.7 shows the results of these analyses. 
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Table 9.7: Percentage distortion means for religion of subject and oneway ANOVA 
results for each town used In the study. 
Scheffe differences are at the 5% level. 
Cookstown 35.7 28.5 27.2 F= . 3097, 
p=. 7349 
Downpatrick 47.1 5.4 60 F= 6.4492, Protestant & 
p= . 003 no-religion 
Dungannon 19.4 14.2 22.2 F=. 1801, 
p=. 8356 
Londonderry 1.9 -1.1 6.7 F=. 5110, 
p=. 6026 
Lurgan 49.4 29.2 28.6 F= 1.3042, 
p=. 2794 
Newry 48.9 31.3 17.2 F= 2.0753, 
p= . 1347 
Omagh 6.1 -6 -8.5 F= 1.8009, 
p= . 1743 
Portaferry 27.9 18.4 85.1 F= 3.4308, Catholic & 
p= . 0393 no-religion 
Strabane 8.8 -11.6 -4.1 F= 3.6881, Protestant & 
p= . 0312 
Catholic 
Ballymena -16.9 28.5 56.6 F= 12.0396, Protestant & 
p< . 01 
Catholic; 
Protestant & 
no-religion 
Ballymoney -10.1 17.9 -10.5 F= 4.3324, Protestant & 
p=. 0179 Catholic 
Coleraine 6.8 16.5 5.2 F= 1.1752, 
p= . 3164 Craigavon 33.8 44.5 43.3 F= . 1722, 
p= . 8422 Enniskillen -2.5 -10.6 -4.4 F=. 3071, 
p= . 7368 Lame 29.1 34.5 61.3 F= . 9863, 
p= . 3791 Limavady -1 .3 7.6 
F= . 1572, 
p= . 8549 
Portadown 1.1 48.5 16.2 F= 6.1513, Protestant & 
p=. 0038 Catholic 
Tandragee 25.4 38.5 45.8 F= . 5372, 
0= . 5874 
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Of all the eighteen towns,, only one (Enniskillen) did not have means in the 
hypothesized direction. Only 6 towns reached significance on the ANOVA 
analyses (3 judged Catholic and 3 judged Protestant). Of these, 3 showed 
differences between one of the religious groups and the no-religion group: there 
were 4 observed significant differences between Protestants and Catholics. Of the 
no-religion groups within each town, 6 have means occurring between those of the 
other two religious groups. Given the number of subjects in the no-religion group 
for every town (maximum of 7), these particular results may not be particularly 
reliable. The results then are far from conclusive but they are highly suggestive 
and they prompted a new line of inquiry. 
This approach involved the construction of a new variable, inspired by the social 
categorization approach of Tajfel, described in Chapter 5. It was noticed during 
data collation that not all subjects agreed with the conclusions of the judges. Some 
subjects 'mis-assigned' towns to a religious category so that the data regarding 
interaction effects were confounded. A Protestant subject might, for example, 
'erroneously' believe that Lurgan is a Protestant town i. e. an 'in-group' town. The 
distortion datum for that case however (possibly showing relative underestimation) 
would be added to the data regarding Catholic towns for that type of subject so 
that evidence supporting hypotheses 1 and 2 (interaction between religion of 
subject and religion of town; in this case relative overestimation) would be 
compromised. 
Overcoming this problem (of which there were nearly 40 examples) was achieved 
by going through the data on a case by case basis and constructing a new variable 
"inorout". The assignment of values (0= out; 1= in; 2= neutral) was based on what 
the subjects themselves believed the predominant religion of each town to be. 
Thus each distortion datum could be assigned to one of three categories: in-group 
data, out-group data or neutral data. Whatever the religion of the subject, one 
would expect that in-group means would demonstrate relative underestimation and 
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out-group means relative overestimation. Marginal means for the new variable and 
the results of new analyses are shown in Table 9.8. 
Table 9.8: Percentage distortion means and oneway ANOVA results (all 
observations Independent) for each of the 18 towns. 
Scheffe differences are at the 5% level. Note that ANOVA Is replaced by at test In the 
case of Ballymena as there were only two categories (in- and out-) for this town. 
Cookstown 33.6 35.4 47.7 F=. 5913, p=. 56 
Downpatrick 42 -4.1 26.4 F= 5.8567, p=. 007 in & out 
Dungannon 33.6 35.4 47.7 F= 1.2833, p=. 2910 
Londonderry 9.3 -7.3 2.5 F= 3.6649, p=. 0335 in & out 
Lurgan 45.3 25 39.2 F= . 7912, p= . 461 
Newry 60 30.9 10.1 F= 4.5364, p=. 0162 in & out 
Omagh 14.8 -15.3 3.8 F= 4.2192, p= . 0231 
in & out 
Portaferry 20.3 1.5 9.7 F= 1.0143, P=. 3766 
Strabane 14.2 -8.8 -46.5 F= 7.4509, p=. 002 in & out; 
out& 
neutral 
Ballymena 28.3 -11.7 t= 3.93, DF= 49, sig. t-test 
p< . 01 Ballymoney 28.7 -11.6 30.8 F= 5.929, p=. 0065 in & out 
Coleraine 23.2 .8 20 F= 5.8038, p= . 0063 
in & out; 
in & neutral 
Craigavon 85.2 7.6 14.2 F+ 6.0455, p= . 0057 in 
& out; 
out & 
neutral 
Enniskillen -2.5 -10.6 -4.4 F= . 3071, p= . 7368 
Lame 41.3 3.2 3.6 F= 6.3263, p= . 0043 in & out 
Limavady 10.7 -14.9 -. 7 F= 2.3901, p=. 1073 
Portadown 59.3 2.9 3.9 F= 7.3172, p=. 0019 in & out 
Tandragee 53 -12.62 34.2 F= 4.5803, p=. 0217 in & out 
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These results are dramatically different to those shown in Table 9.7. Only two 
towns show means in the opposite direction to that hypothesized and neither result 
is significant. Twelve of the towns conform hypotheses 1 and 2 with in-group 
estimation distortions significantly less than those for out-group. Twelve of the 
eighteen towns show neutral means lying between in-group means and out-group 
means. There are three instances of significantly different means for neutral 
estimates and in only one of these (Strabane) is the neutral category not between 
the other two group means. Figure 9.8 illustrates clearly the virtually consistent 
pattern of differences in means for the two categories of particular interest: in- and 
out-group. 
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Figure 9.8: The means of distortion for In-group and out-group categories for each 
of the 18 towns. 
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Figure 9.9: An illustration of the overall differences in means between the three 
categories of the 'inorout' variable. 
The means are 32.9; 1.76 and 13.03 respectively. 
One final analyses was carried out using the data summarized in Figure 9.9. An 
analysis of variance produced an F-ratio of 45.4298, (DF= 2, p< . 01). Post-hoc 
comparison tests among the sample means showed differences between all, out- 
group, in-group and neutral categories (Scheffe, significance level at 5%). Clearly 
distance estimation distortion is less when subjects believe the target town is in- 
group than when the town is perceived to be out-group. 
OUTGROUP INGROUP NEUTRAL 
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There does seem some grounds for supposing that stimuli strongly associated with 
social in- and out-groups tend to be perceived in spatially different ways. The 
ability to detect these different ways by aggregating data across subjects rather 
than looking for distancing/foreshortening within each subject attests to the 
robustness of the observed effect. 
The inability of subjects' religion to exclusively explain variation in distortion of 
estimation to a particular town was easily overcome by conversion of the factor of 
subjects' religion to one of in or out of subjects' religious group, according to the 
stated view of the subjects themselves. Neutral group means are calculated from 
just over 20% of the data used (missing data excluded) but provide a persuasive 
result nonetheless. 
The results underline the wisdom of using, where appropriate, subjects' own 
reports of how they view stimuli rather than rely totally on the opinions of 
independent judges. Especially interesting is the fact that a stronger effect is 
demonstrated when subjects' own religious attributions are the independent 
variable, emphasizing the role played by subjective, motivational influences rather 
than that by cultural norms of distance. 
Turning to the towns which failed to support the hypotheses vis ä vis the 'inorout' 
approach, it was noted that all had average values of perceived predominance 
close to 0 (the equal proportion value). Figure 9.10 reproduces the values of 
perceived predominance for each town and those bars representing towns which 
failed to show differences on the in-group/out-group variable are shown as white. 
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Figure 9.10: The mean values of perceived predominance for each town in 
ascending order from lowest to highest. 
Blank-fill bars represent those towns which individually failed to offer support for 
the hypotheses I and 2 
It would seem that the less polarized a town is on the Protestant/Catholic 
dimension, the less likely it is to elicit distortions in estimations of distance to it. 
"Salience equals distortion". 
CHAPTER 10: Map Making in a 
Sectarian Enclave 
"The "line of cleavage" or what we will call the "Divide", running west 
of the centre is striking, with overwhelmingly Protestant areas to the 
north of the line and Roman Catholic to the south. " 
(Boat, 1969, p32) 
Following on from the previous study, the idea that that group membership in a 
religious context could reveal systematic distortions in the perception of space was 
further investigated using an alternative methodology. Rather than asking 
respondents to produce estimates of difference per se, they were asked instead to 
physically position representations of towns on a large, two dimensional frame. In 
this way it was thought that not only would respondents be able to demonstrate 
how group membership (and schema ownership) would be betrayed by spatial 
distortions from a fixed point but also allow for tell-tale configurations of towns 
relative to their perceived group membership. 
Specifically, it was envisaged that systematic distortions would be revealed by the 
spatial clustering of towns according to the in-group/ out-group rubric. Not only 
would distances between the point of origin (Belfast) and target towns reflect the 
prejudices of respondents but distances between these towns would also reflect 
their sectarian categorization. Distances between same group towns would be 
foreshortened where same group towns are in close proximity and with no 
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dissimilar towns intervening. Similarly the distancing between clusters of dissimilar 
towns would reflect the distancing between the two sectarian groups in the mind of 
the respondent. 
The choice of towns used as stimuli in the previous study seemed ideal for this 
purpose: the geographical spread of the towns from Belfast was balanced between 
the two denominations such that for every town predominantly of one 
denomination, another town of the opposite denomination existed at a roughly 
similar distance from Belfast. There is no marked 'bunching' of same-religion towns 
in any region of Northern Ireland. 
A second objective was to use respondents who had a first hand experience of 
sectarianism in a divided city like Belfast to discover if their perceptions of their 
space differed both qualitatively and quantitatively from their student compatriots. 
The inspiration for the source of these respondents came from a seminal paper in 
human geography, described below. 
It was decided to 'go into the field' and ask people ordinarily resident in Belfast- for 
their impressions of the space in which both denominations live in Northern Ireland. 
The residential part of the city chosen for consideration was prompted by the study 
of Boal (1969). 
In part of a larger study into activity patterns in Belfast, Boal sought to identify, on 
the basis of residents' denomination, a distinctive area of residential division and 
then to examine various activity characteristics and relate these to religious 
segregation. Religious and concomitant political segregation has been a striking 
feature of life in Northern Ireland for centuries, bolstered by violence in the form of 
pogroms and more recently by the so-called "troubles". Residential segregation 
has been well documented in the capital city (e. g. Boal, 1976). 
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The area chosen, where Protestants and Catholics are residentially segregated but 
form propinquitous communities, is along the "divide" mentioned above. It lies 
between two roads: the Springfield and the Shankhill roads and covers an area of 
approximately 40 acres with approximately 5000 residents. The map in Figure 10.1 
shows the area in question. Since the publication of the 1969 paper by Boal, not 
much has changed in the survey area, at least with repect to segregation of the 
two communities. 
The Springfield Road and the Shankhill Road are still well known for their 
predominant religious makeup and the study area itself can be subdivided into two 
smaller but distinct areas. That area bordering the Springfield Rd. was classified by 
Boal as overwhelmingly Catholic and that bordering the Shankhill Road, as 
overwhelmingly Protestant. They were conjoint along one street running through 
the middle of the whole area: Cupar Street. The Catholic area, "Clonard" and the 
Protestant area "Shankhill" were deemed to be predominant in their respective 
religions by Boal to the extent of 98% and 99% respectively. This was determined 
after systematically surveying both areas and eliciting from households such 
information as religion, newspapers read, name given to the area, football team 
supported, schools used, and grocery shops frequented. Inhabitants of both areas 
not only perceived the divide strongly but there was overwhelming consensus on 
where the limit fell i. e. Cupar Street. 
Today the transitional area of Cupar Street has been straddled by a giant wall, the 
so-called "Peace Line". This Berlin Wall type edifice was erected by the authorities 
and prevents assailants from both sides penetrating each others territory to 
perpetrate acts of sectarian violence including murder. It was the virtual certainity 
that respondents from these areas, at the cutting edge of the troubles, would be 
polarized on the religious dimension that led to its adoption for the current study. 
Not only would one hypothesize that respondents would foreshorten distance with 
respect to in-group towns, but also that they would clump in-group towns together 
so that the between in-group town distances would be foreshortened also, and with 
concomitant distancing of out-group towns. 
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Figure 10.1: A map of Belfast showing the position of the surveyed area in relation 
to City Hall in the centre of the city. North projects approximately to the right of the 
page. 
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The popularized view of Northern Ireland is that it contains a highly polarized 
community, with its people separated into two monolithic, static tribes. Such a view, 
of course, makes for ready understanding, especially when the country is viewed 
from the outside when it is easier to simplify the information presented about the 
current conflict. However, it would be wrong to categorize the totality of social 
identity in such a way; identity is can also be a fluid concept with the possibility of 
the "exit" option as Augoustinos and Walker (1995) put it. Anecdotal evidence 
comes from a recent survey which found 17% of the population of Northern Ireland 
regarding themselves as having a third identity: Northern Irish as opposed to British 
or Irish. What doesn't fit, is often overlooked. Nevertheless, treating respondents 
as belonging to one of two groups is conceptually useful and in the area chosen to 
select respondents, probably essential. 
An ordnance survey map and the latest edition of the electoral register at the City 
of Belfast Library allowed for a random sample to be composed. Starting at a 
randomly selected household, one in every ten households was identified for 
testing within each of two areas: Clonard and Shankhill as identified above. 
Unfortunately, no check was kept on the response rate but a rough estimate would 
be 50 to 60%. A total of 29 respondents was recruited- 15 from Shankhill and 14 
from Clonard. It is to be regretted that more respondents were not obtained but the 
circumstances of testing. were difficult: households were approached for co- 
operation in the study not long after the start of an upsurge of violence in the 
Shankhill Road district of the city. Conclusions regarding the significance of the 
results need to, be tempered accordingly. 
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Having used the set of eighteen towns successfully in the previous study, it was 
decided to use them again here in the map creation task. Thus there were 9 towns 
judged to be Catholic and 9 towns judged to be Protestant, with an even spread of 
Catholic and Protestant towns over the territory of Northern Ireland. The same 
standard distance was also used as recognition of the target place (Giant's 
Causeway) was 100%- everyone had heard of it and knew where it lay on the north 
coast. 
In the reproduction task, respondents were given a frame of dimensions 297x297 
mm which allowed a blank, white piece of paper of the same dimensions to be 
fixed on top with several pins. The frame was made of cork-board, allowing for 
insertion and removal of large, map-maker, hexagonal pins (diameter 15mm 
approximately) through the paper and ensuring that once a pin was inserted, it 
stayed in securely until removal. The names of the target towns were ' printed in 
capitals on labels (along with an identifying number) and these then attached to the 
tops of the 18 pins. 
The squares of blank paper were pre-prepared by marking the standard distance 
pair members (Belfast and The Giant's Causeway) in red ink. The direction of polar 
north was also indicated in the top right hand corner. The positions of the standard 
distance pair members were chosen to allow for all possible, reasonable 
overestimations of distances. 130 mm separated the two standard distance pair 
members and each was 54 mm from the edge of the response page. 
Consideration was given to the possibility of changing the orientation of the 
standard distance pair on every response page (and thus for every respondent) in 
order to reduce order effects but this was rejected: every assistance was needed 
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for respondents to minimize random errors and so the consistent orientation of the 
standard distance in relation to the edge of the paper ("north is up") was deemed 
essential. Furthermore, the shape of Northern Ireland and the need for a suitable 
scale from which to collect distortion data played a part in this decision. 
Also used was a pack of cards (118x34mm each) on which were printed the set of 
towns in block capitals together with the same identifying number as used on the 
pin markers (respondents were assured that the numbers in both cases were 
randomly assigned and were for identification purposes only). This pack of cards 
was used with every respondent and had been thoroughly shuffled before use. 
A separate questionnaire was also provided and was filled in by the experimenter 
except for one section as described later. The design of the questionnaire was 
similiar to that used in the previous study (see Appendix B) except for one major 
difference: the first section of distance estimations was excluded. Question 7, 
"what is your parental home town? " was also deleted-The first page requested 
personal information including respondents' age, address and the duration of 
residence in the city. No names were recorded on the questionnaire although the 
experimenter knew the surname of the household. Names were not necessary of 
course but a point was made of highlighting this omission to each respondent to 
reassure them on the question of anonymity. 
Also included on the first page was a question on travel patterns. Respondents 
were first asked if, they had ever visited any of the towns included in the 
experimental task and then to indicate the frequency for each town mentioned by 
ticking one of four boxes: daily; weekly; monthly; once or occasionally (so called 
'functional availability'). 
Page two referred to the use of the printed cards. Respondents were asked to 
arrange the cards in order of preference before answering questions on why they 
chose this order- in exactly the same manner as in the previous study. This was 
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included largely as a safety measure: although town preference and its associated 
variables of explanation proved of limited use before, it -was thought that 
respondents in the previous study may not have shared many of the characteristics 
of this very particular sample. In short, people in this working class sample may 
hold schemata which place more emphasis on this largely evaluational measure. 
To recap: respondents were asked to indicate on a1 to 7 scale (unimportant to 
very important) the importance of closeness to family/friends, geographical 
position, religion of townspeople and quality of facilities in coming to their decisions 
on placing the towns in the order they did. 
The final page was also carried over from the previous study. Having ascertained 
that the perceived religious orientation was crucial to respondents' spatial 
schemata, it was expected to be no less important and if anything, more so, in the 
current study. 
The eighteen towns were printed down one side of the page with 7 point scales 
indicating degree of predominance on the other, with spaces down the middle to 
write down what this predominant religion actually was. A set of ten random orders 
of towns was generated. This set was cycled through the respondent sample such 
that each one was used no more than three times. 
4 
The Clonard area was the first to be entered, starting at a house in Dunmore Street 
as identified from the electoral register. After self-identification, which included 
showing householders an accreditation ID, permission was asked to carry out an 
anonymous survey which included a straightforward locational task. Fortunately, in 
a country where surnames can be used to identify the religion of the holder, the 
author's surname can be ascribed to either 'camp'. However, the author's first 
name is a 'giveaway' and so initials were used! 
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The identify of the eldest person in the household was sought in order to obtain 
permission from them. One in every ten households on the electoral register was 
approached: if the approach was unsuccessful then the nearest household (on 
alternate sides) was sought for help in the research. 
The first task in the procedure was the mapping task. Its precedence was due to 
the need to get 'a clean shot' at their geographical knowledge without 
contamination by the various questions that were to be asked. On entering the 
house, (deemed necessary to complete the task) respondents were invited to 
provide a table or other flat surface on which to work. 
With the blank square page positioned securely on the frame and unmarked 
except for the standard distance pair and direction of polar north, respondants 
were given the marker-pins and asked to locate each pin in the spot where they 
considered the town lay in relation to the two landmarks already included on the 
page. They were informed that there existed no time limit for completion and they 
could rearrange the 'towns' as often as they wished. 
Only when respondents said that they were completely satisfied did the 
experimenter remove the pins, marking with a pen the exact location of each and 
labeling its position with the code number for that town. 
The next task was the card sorting task, when respondents were asked, all things 
being equal, to order the towns in terms of preference for living in. Respondents 
were encouraged to spread out the cards on the table to help them decide relative 
orders more easily and again reminded to take their time. Once they claimed to be 
satisfied, the code-number of each town was written down sequentially on the back 
of their map sheet. The cards were then shuffled for the succeeding respondent. 
Following completion of the sorting task, the questionnaire was presented. Order 
effects were taken into account by always having the question on town religious 
predominance coming last. It was felt that this question asked any earlier would 
unduly influence subsequent questions. Nor could the sensitivities of asking 
questions on religion be taken lightly. 
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The experimenter usually completed the first page as detailed above (full address, 
age, religion, frequency of visits to any of the towns) to save time. When asking the 
respondent's religion, it was done in a casual way ("I assume that since you live 
here, you are ...... 
). No-one objected to this question- their presence in that 
particular street meant that knowledge of their religion was ineluctable. The religion 
of all respondents was in accordance with the two sectarian areas described by 
Boal and now delineated by the Peace Line. 
In order to respect the sensitivities referred to above, the next two questions which 
required consideration of other people's religion, were left for the respondents 
themselves to complete whilst the experimenter pretended to ignore the 
respondent by readying paperwork etc. So the factors involved in ordering the 
towns the way they did and respondent's perceptions of the religious make-up of 
Northern Ireland urban areas rounded off each testing session. 
Refusal rates were quite high as indicated above. This was due to a number of 
reasons. Sometimes no-one of a responsible age was at home or the householder 
was infirm and being looked after by, a non-resident. By far the greatest number of 
refusals came from, nervous individuals who obviously were reluctant to open the 
front door let alone invite a stranger in. In this part of Belfast, merely opening one's 
front door can be a fatal mistake. Even 
. 
when permission was initially granted, 
reassurance was usually needed on several aspects: 
9 the work was to be completely anonymous with no identifying information to be 
held on computer 
" religious and/or political opinions were not being sought (other than those the 
experimenter described as "non-sensitive" and "non-involving") 
" the experimenter was carrying out research for academic purposes only and 
was not a representative of any 'official' body (e. g. Belfast City Council, 
television licensing authority, political parties, Benefits Agency or other 
government office) or church 
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It should be emphasized that once the task was underway, all respondents were 
most helpful and agreeable. However, initial 'reluctance' and other sinister 
concerns meant that only a small sample of respondents was finally achieved. 
After collecting data from only a handful of respondents, it became apparent that 
the methodology was failing in terms of general , 
accuracy of town placement. 
Towns were being placed not only in the wrong county but sometimes not even in 
the counties neighbouring the correct one. Respondents were often locating towns 
in the opposite cardinal direction from Belfast and placing some literally at sea. 
Typical distortion values (% distortion from correct location on the response sheet) 
ran into hundreds of percent. 
The probable reason for the apparent configurational randomness seemed to be 
the travel patterns of the respondents. Virtually all the respondents had visited a 
maximum of three of the towns on the list and even then, visited them no more that 
one per year (or less). People in the surveyed area genuinely seemed to have no 
idea about the geographical configuration of Northern Ireland. Comments from 
respondents included: "I don't know my geography well"; "Strabane is down near 
the border? "; "this area I'm not sure about". 
Indeed the lack of mobility amongst this pool of respondents was startling. The 
variation in the variable regarding frequency of travel was so low as to make it 
virtually a constant. Results are therefore not reported for frequency. This contrasts 
with the previous study which, although it provided frequency of travel data of little 
value in the final analysis, at least yielded greater frequency and variety. Only one 
respondent in the current study had not spent their entire life living in Belfast. 
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People in the previous study were all students whereas those here are wholly 
working class. Class and mobility are closely correlated. 
One area in which the data did seem to provide systematic variation was in the 
distance from Belfast of subjects' town placement and this provided the dependent 
variable for analysis. The vagueness of respondents' configurational knowledge 
was useful, in one respect at least: respondents seemed to be placing towns 
mainly on the basis of distance from Belfast. Their notional knowledge of towns 
would probably have a strong influence on the perceived distances from the city in 
which virtually all had resided from birth. 
As in the previous experiment, support for hypotheses 1 and 2 would come in the 
form of an interaction between the two independent variables: respondents' 
religion and perceived religion of town. Table 10.1 shows that this is indeed the 
case, with Catholics overestimating (relative to Protestants) distances to Protestant 
towns and Protestants overestimating (relative to Catholics) distances to Catholic 
towns. 
Table 10.1: Means of percentage estimation distortion for judged religious 
predominance of town and religion of respondents 
(standard deviations shown in parentheses) 
Judged religious predominance of town 
Protestant 3.3 (68.8) 26.3 (45.6) 
Catholic 18.3 (55.6) 1.7 (47.6) 
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As in the previous study, rather than absolute under- and over-estimation, we are 
dealing here with relative under- and over-estimation. Figure 10.2 illustrates the 
interaction: 
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Figure 10.2: Superimposed line graphs for each town denomination against 
respondent religion 
A repeated-measure (mixed) analysis of variance was used to test for a significant 
interaction. This showed an F ratio of 30.02 (DF= 1, p< . 01). No other significant 
results were obtained, either for respondent religion, respondent gender or religion 
of town, as Table 10.2 shows. 
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Table 10.2: The distortion means and ANOVA results for the main effects- religion 
of respondent, sex of respondent, and the judged religion of town 
Mean F ratio significance 
Respondents: 
level 
1.04 . 322 
Protestant 15.1 
Catholic 10.0 
Respondents: . 23 . 639 
female 12.19 
male 14.67 
Judged religion of . 87 . 363 
towns: 
Protestant 12.05 
Catholic 14.55 
As in the previous study however, a relationship between overall distortion and 
actual distance was detected. It was found that increasing distortion is associated 
with smaller actual distances from Belfast (r= -. 7795, p<. 01) as illustrated by Figure 
10.3. 
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Figure 10.3: A scattergram for the relationship between mean distortion and real 
distance. Distortion values for each town are the means across all respondents 
It seems that the homeogeneity of variance principle for analysis of variance has 
been violated again as there is non-constant variation of the distortion rate across 
the variable for actual distance. From the lessons learnt from the previous study, 
rather than examine the data according to distance 'banding', it was decided to 
immediately examine what was happening at individual town level to see if 
analyses at this level were equivalent to that suggested by the significant ANOVA 
interaction result above. Thus, the data was broken down into separate blocks for 
each town which were analysed separately. The results are given in Table 10.3. 
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Table 10.3: Means for religion of respondent and one-way ANOVA results for each 
town used in the study The predicted direction of means Is based on the judged 
predominance of towns 
Cookstown 25.4 -5.5 yes F= 3.97; p=. 0565 
Downpatrick 55.2 16.9 yes F= 3.26; p= . 0825 
Dungannon 31.7 5.4 yes F= 3.57; p= . 0695 
Londonderry 14.3 -2.7 yes F= 1.51; p= . 2296 
Lurgan 24.5 10.4 yes F= 1.02; p=. 3212 
Newry 35.5 3.1 yes F= 3.95; p=. 0574 
Omagh 10.7 -11.1 yes F= 2.33; p= . 1389 
Portaferry 25.1 20.1 yes F= 0.05; p=. 8212 
Strabane 15.3 -20.9 yes F= 3.49; p=. 0727 
Ballymena 6.8 31 yes F= 0.47; p=. 4997 
Ballymoney -16 3.1 yes F= 1.17; p=. 2880 
Coleraine 17.1 -15.9 no F= 0.01; p=. 9335 
Craigavon 36.7 4.8 no F= 1.24; p=. 2758 
Enniskillen -5.9 -0.8 yes F= 0.07; p=. 7971 
Lame 8.7 42.9 yes F= 1.63; p=. 2125 
Limavady -14.7 -4.9 yes F= 0.43; p=. 5178 
Portadown 1.7 42.6 yes F= 3.35; p=. 0788 
Tandragee -10.3 30 yes F= 2.83; p= . 1058 
Unlike in the previous study, none of the town analyses reached significance. Two 
towns have means in the opposite direction compared with one in the last study. 
The general pattern of results here was not unexpected though the smaller size of 
the F-ratios was. This may be a statistical function of using a smaller sample size 
than before. 
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Another reason might be that the above analyses fail to take into account the 
perceptions of the respondents themselves, relying instead on those of the judges 
when it comes to deciding the direction of means conforming to the hypotheses. 
Respondents make 'mistakes' when describing towns as Protestant instead of 
Catholic and vice versa- such data are then mistreated during subsequent analysis 
as described in 9.3.5. In fact there were proportionally more of these 'mistakes' 
than in the previous study: 49 cases in all- just under 10% of the data. 
Construction of the variable 'inorout' proceeded as in Chapter 9, on a datum by 
datum basis. To summarize: each datum was assigned to one of three categories- 
in-group, out-group or neutral- according to the perceptions of the respondents 
themselves in response to the question on the final page of the questionnaire. 
Subsequent analysis of the data according to the new variable revealed the 
egregiously different results in Table 10.4. 
As Figure 10.4 clearly shows, all the mean distortions are in the predicted direction 
with 12 of the 18 towns showing significant differences. Respondents seem to be 
underestimating to in-group towns and overestimating to out-group towns as 
hypotheses 1 and 2 propose. A surprising result is the observation of absolute (i. e. 
with negative and positive values) rather than relative under- and overestimation in 
respondents' estimates. This is even more evident when one examines the overall 
mean distortions for the three 'inorout' categories in Figure 10.5. There seems no 
obvious reason for the absolute nature of the estimation distortions but it may be 
possible that the (small) sample size may be accentuating the foreshortening/ 
distancing effects for reasons as yet unknown. 
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Table 10.4: In-group and out-group mean distortions and one-way ANOVA results 
(all obs. independent) for each of the 18 towns. Scheff6 differences are at the 5% 
level 
Cookstown 28.2 -9.0 6.0 F= 2.62 p=. 0915 
Downpatrick 90.2 1.7 42.9 F= 11.552; p<. 01 in & out 
Dungannon 51.2 -10.8 19.5 F= 16.318; p<. 01 in & out 
Londonderry 33.6 -16.1 32.9 F= 10.355; p<. 01 in & out 
Lurgan 30.2 0.4 8.9 F= 1.9; p= . 1706 
Newry 46.1 -7.6 78.3 F= 8.827; p= . 0013 in & out 
Omagh 24.8 -15.0 5.6 F= 3.950; p=. 0318 in & out 
Portaferry 27.1 24 14.7 F= 0.079; P=. 9244 
Strabane 25.1 -25.7 -3.8 F= 3.582; p= . 0422 
in & out 
Ballymena 75.8 -29.0 -13.9 F= 5.478; p=. 0106 in & out 
Ballymoney 21.5 -49.1 -16.7 F= 12.315 p< . 01 
in & out 
Coleraine 27.7 -17.6 26.5 F= 4.337 p= . 0237 
in & out 
Craigavon 52.7 -33.0 -1.0 F= 5.148; p=. 0131 in & out 
Enniskillen 16.5 -22.5 -3.0 F= 1.835; p= . 1855 
Lame 63.7 -7.29 -58.4 F= 5.212; p= . 0125 
in & out 
Limavady 10.5 -14.1 -27.1 F= 1.814; p= . 1830 
Portadown 56.3 -30.6 13.5 F= 10.419; p<. 01 in & out 
Tandragee 33.2 -3.4 -1.1 F= 0.970; p= . 3940 
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Figure 10.4: Mean distortions for In-group and out-group estimates only for each of 
the 18 towns 
Given that the variable inorout applies equally validly for all town data, a linear 
regression model was used to explain the variance in the distortion scores. Since it 
has been observed that distortion varies non-uniformly with the actual distance 
being estimated, then it was possible that the relationship between inorout and 
distortion could exhibit a pattern of heteroscedasticity, i. e. where the degree of 
scatter around the best-fit line varies as a function of some other variable (i. e. the 
actual distance). 
Put another way, it might be possible that there is little homogeneity of variance 
(needed for hypothesis testing) in the residuals across different values of the 
predictor variable (inorout in this case). This was investigated by plotting predicted 
scores against residuals: no tell-tale, heteroscedastic, crescent or funnel shaped 
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patterns were observed and the results below are reported for ordinary least 
squares. However 9 outliers were detected outside the range of 3 standard 
deviations and these were removed from the analysis. Recall that inorout was 
coded 0 for out-group and 1 for in-group; neutral was coded 2 although it 
comprised only 13.6% of cases. A Pearson r co-efficient between the variables of 
distortion and inorout was calculated to be -. 3398 (p< . 01). 
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Figure 10.5: Overall means associated the three variable categories- In-group, out- 
group and neutral 
With inorout entered as the predictor variable on % distortion, a multiple R of 
. 377and an R square value of . 14224 was obtained, indicating that 14% of 
the 
variance in distortion is associated with the predictor. Both co-efficients (multiple 
correlation and regression) and the equation indicate high levels of significance: 
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Dependent Variable: DISTORTION % distortion 
Multiple R . 37714 
R Square . 14224 
F= 82.41 Signif F< . 01 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
INOROUT -25.8513 2.84 -. 3771 -9.078 <. 01 
(Constant) 27.1704 2.79 9.749 <. 01 
The standardized regression co-efficient (Beta) suggests that a change of one 
standard deviation in the inorout variable produces a change of nearly 0.4 standard 
deviation units in the dependent variable. There is clearly strong evidence for an 
association between the perceived nature of the target town and the distortion 
incurred in estimating the distance to it. 
Once again, the information gathered on the respondents' individual preferences 
for towns and their explanations for their choices in terms of the four variables 
provided little insight into their possible relationship with the dependent variable. 
The liking for a4 particular town seems unrelated to estimation distortion- a 
correlation between all cases produced a co-efficient of -. 035, illustrated in the 
scatterplot of Figure 10.6. 
However a difference was observed between religions of respondents with regard 
to their preferences for towns. Perhaps not surprisingly, Protestant respondents 
expressed a preference for towns judged to be Protestant whilst Catholics 
preferred Catholic towns as Figure 10.7 shows. 
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Chapter 10 Map- Making in a Sectarian Enclave 282 
no 
V. 5 
U. 0 
W 
U 
Z 
W 
W 9.5 
U- 
w 
a 
U- 
0 9.0 
0: 
U) 
0 
W 8.5 
a 
w 
a 8.0 
Protestant Catholic 
RELIGION OF SUBJECT 
town religion: 
E 
Protaatant 
WCatholic 
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When the data is converted to preferences for in-group, out-group and neutral 
towns, the relationship shown in Figure 10.8 is revealed. 
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Figure 10.8: A barchart for the three categories of group membership- In-group, 
out-group and neutral and their associated mean preference values 
The data suggest that respondents prefer a town of their own religion and the 
regression analysis below supports this, although with only about 2% of the 
variance in the dependent variable accounted for. Since travel to all target towns 
was revealed to be limited, to say the least, respondents may be relying on 
stereotypes to make preference judgements. 
Dependent Variable: 
Multiple R 
R Square 
town preference order 
. 13871 
. 01924 
F=7.906 Signif F= . 0052 
out-group in-group neutral 
TOWN CATEGORY 
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Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
INOROUT 1.038100 . 325 -. 139 3.191 . 0015 
(Constant) 8.809558 . 320 27.505 <. 01 
Correlations of town preference with the four variables of possible explanation for 
the respondents' preferences were decidedly low and non-significant, as Table 
10.5 vividly illustrates. Examination of the relevant scatterplots failed to show any 
indication of possible non-linear relationships. 
Table 10.5: Correlations (Pearson's r) between town preference and four possible 
variables of explanation 
Town . 0005 -. 0324 -. 0278 . 
0255 
preference (p= . 992) (p= . 492) (p= . 555) 
(p= . 591) 
Correlations of the explanatory variables with estimation distortion were also low 
but revealed higher significance levels, as shown in Table 10.6. 
Chapter 10 Map- Making in a Sectarian Enclave 285 
Table 10.6: Correlations (Pearson's r) between the explanatory variables and 
distance estimation distortion 
Estimation 
. 1219 . 0925 . 
1199 
distortion (p= . 011) (p= .. 052) 
(p= . 012) 
. 0896 
(p= '. 062) 
The trend in correlation thus far suggests that perhaps the four explanatory 
variables might better explain variation in the dependent variable, i. e. distance 
estimation distortion, in a regression model. However correlations between the four 
explanatory variables were quite high as Table 10.7 shows. All significance levels 
were less than . 01. As noted in Chapter 8 regarding regression analysis, high inter- 
correlations between potential predictor variables makes it difficult to attribute 
varience in the dependent variable to any one predictor variable and so the 
regression technique is not employed here. 
Table 10.7: Pearson's r correlation matrix for the four explanatory variables 
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The quotation at the top of the chapter might help explain why these particular 
variables are intercorrelated to the extent that they are. A town placed high on the 
order of preference by a respondent might be so placed because e. g. some 
relatives live there. This possible reason in turn points to the importance of the 
religion of the town's inhabitants because, as we have seen, towns on the list are 
viewed by the vast majority of judges and respondents as predominating in one 
religion only. One's relatives, almost certainly in the Northern Ireland context, will 
share membership of one's own religion and the probability of them living in a town 
predominating in this religion is high. Family and friends tend to live closer than 
average so the importance of geographical location comes into play. Shopping and 
leisure facilities, for example, are more likely to be explored in towns where family 
and friends are based. 
In the previous experiment it was noted that the perceived predominance of town 
religion was related to the predictive value of the inorout variable on a town by 
town basis. This study found a similar relationship, as Figure 10.10 shows. The 
towns which individually failed to generate significant differences between in-group 
and out-group estimates had mean values of religious predominance tending 
toward zero. These towns are not contiguous in the graph: other towns that were 
predictive but which also had low mean values of predominance intervene. 
Nevertheless, the result echoes that obtained in the previous study and combines 
with the evidence that all towns had means in the predicted direction. 
Chapter 10 Map- Making in a Sectarian Enclave 287 
6 
M4 
E 
A 
N 
2 
P 
R0 
D 
O 
N 
A 
N 
,4 
E 
-A 
NOME] 
00011111 
I 
123458789 'D 11 12 13 14 15 is 17 19 
INDIVIDUAL TOWNS 
Figure 10.9: The mean values of religious predominance for each of the towns. Those 
towns which failed to show significant differences on the in- or out-group variable 
are shown in white 
Since the experiment showed evidence of absolute under- and overestimation, the 
possibility that absolute values of predominance might vary with distortion was 
examined. Converting distortion scores to absolute values and also converting 
predominance scores to absolute values revealed the following correlation: 
Absolute distortion with absolute predominance, r= . 4212 (p< . 01). Figure 
10.11 
illustrates the relationship: 
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Figure 10.10: Barchart shows how absolute (mean) values of both distortion and 
respondents' perceived predominance are related 
To investigate the relationship between the two variables more fully, a linear 
regression was performed to see if perceived predominance is a good predictor of 
distortion. The following result was obtained, following a check for 
homoscedasticity between the two variables. 
Dependent Variable: Absolute values of estimation distortion 
Multiple R . 42122 
R Square 
. 17743 
F= 109.14356 Signif F< . 01 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
ABSOLUTE Predom. 7.8371 . 750 -. 421222 10.447 <. 01 
(Constant) 18.4060 2.651 6.943 <. 01 
?I 
ABSOLUTE VALUES OF PREDOMINANCE 
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It seems that as the perception of religious predominance increases for either 
Catholic or Protestant towns, then the size of distortion increases also -a finding 
not observed in the previous study. 
One of the aims of the experiment was to study distance perception between the 
target towns in the stimulus set. The occurrence of high levels of locational error in 
the placement task was unfortunate but considering the travel patterns of 
respondents, or rather the lack of them, one should not be surprised. One lesson 
to be learnt is that when carrying out experiments, one should bear in mind 
possible differences between sub-groups. 
Another methodological difficulty in the placement task occurred as respondents 
contemplated where to insert the town pins on the frame. Few respondents 
bothered, despite experimenter reminders and despite the obvious opportunity to 
do so, to re-position pins as they refined the configuration of towns in their own 
minds as the task progressed. It was as though, once they had carefully decided 
on the position of one town, they were reluctant to move it. Thus, somewhat 
paradoxically, the task may have shared the characteristic drawback of a map- 
drawing task in that the problem of 'cumulative adding' error is created as 
respondents add responses serially to the configuration being built up. 
Nevertheless, even with a smaller pool of very different respondents, the results 
were broadly similar to those obtained in Chapter Nine. Respondents may have 
provided configurations with unacceptably high levels of error but at least the 
Belfast-to-town estimates reflected the distortions which respondentive awareness 
of predominant religion engendered. Indeed, although the respondents may not 
have had occasion to travel to any great extent within Northern Ireland, they did 
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appear to have a clear idea, in their own minds at least, of the predominant 
religions of the towns are. 
Why the variable of town preference had no impact on the distance estimates of 
towns is unclear. What is clear is that respondents produce distortions of the 
stimulus distances on the basis of how they perceive the religion of the town and 
this may be the dominant dimension on which respondents from this sectarian 
enclave discriminate between the towns. The variables of closeness of family and 
friends, geographical position and facilities played a negligible role in explaining 
variance in respondents' preference for a town. 
It was hoped that an artefact of the methodology would be the independence of 
percentage estimation distortion with the actual distance being measured. This was 
not the case as Figure 10.2 clearly demonstrated. However, as respondents 
appeared to be operating in a serial manner as they constructed their maps, the 
correlation of estimation distortion with actual distance as in the previous 
experiment should be expected. What we had here was, in effect, a series of 
eighteen ratio-scale judgments being made from Belfast to each of the towns with 
no regard for the inter-town aspect of the task. Perhaps if it was emphasized to 
respondents that they must place only those towns whose location they have a 
clear idea of, then some sort of configurational accuracy might have been 
observed. The reverse side of this coin however is that, with these respondents at 
least, most of the towns would have been excluded from the task. 
An increase in the number of respondents may well have obviated some of the 
problems described above and especially the lack of contiguity between the towns 
which showed no influence from the in-group /out-group variable (see Figure 10.9). 
That foreshortening and distancing did take place despite the relative lack of 
respondents is impressive however. 
It seems likely that the finding of the degree of perceived predominance being 
positively related to distortion, as shown in Figure 10.10, is related to the type of 
respondents used here- undoubtedly they are more highly polarized on issues of 
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sectarianism than e. g. undergraduates. This makes good sense when one 
considers that decisions of where one lives, for those in the Clonard/Shankhill 
areas of the city, can often be survival-dependent and serves to highlight further 
the importance of sectarian schemata in mediating spatial distortion. 
ýý . .ý.. 
Chapter 11: Space Perception 
, 
and the Affective Tone of Social 
Schemata 
Having established a correspondence between the social and the spatial at the 
macro-scale, the purpose of this experiment was to establish whether manipulation 
of commonly held social schemata could influence people in their perceptions of 
distance in smaller scale settings. In most social situations, typical interpersonal 
distances apply, as the gamut of personal space research indicates (Hall, 1963, 
1966; Aiello, 1987). What if perceptions of interpersonal distance were 
systematically biased by the experimenter without the knowledge of the subject? 
Would subjects significantly alter the spacing of individuals in a social setting 
according to their construal of the event taking place? 
The experiment was prompted in part by that of Jaeger (1990) who projected slides 
of photographs that varied in their affective content. Subjects were asked to 
choose one of several tracings of each slide that varied only in the spatial 
separation of the human figures reproduced. A significant schematic effect was 
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observed with figures in positive or 'affiliative' relationships being judged as closer 
(and vice versa), relative to neutral relationships. 
The current experiment provided subjects with photographic examples of social 
situations that were balanced. That is to say, without any other cues, the situations 
would be 'read' as depicting fairly neutral interpersonal relations. This would leave 
these same situations open to manipulation by the experimenter. It would allow the 
experimenter to create a negative or positive image of the relationships depicted 
and to do so in a plausible way. The independent variable of special interest was 
the degree of affiliation that subjects were induced to perceive within the social 
situations presented. How were the neutral social situations to be presented? How 
was the manipulation of the perceived affiliation between individuals in the social 
scene achieved? 
Slides were made of photojournalism photographs culled from newspaper 
supplements, magazines and the like. The main reason for this is that they should 
not depict carefully staged social arrangements. The importance of spatial setting 
is not lost on the advertising business and images created by Madison Avenue 
often use inter-figure space as a direct way of drawing attention to products and 
services. By choosing photographs of social documentary, verite style, the 
attention of subjects would not be directed to the spatial setting as the main focus 
of investigation. Moreover the photographs selected were chosen because of their 
neutral social settings or 'multiple interpretability'; one could interpret several 
possibilities of social relationships presented. In this sense they were like projective 
tests. 
The choice of photojournalism as a source of photographs also blended well with 
the purported aim of the experiment i. e. the use of illustrations in facilitating 
memory. In a further bid to divert attention from the real goal of the experiment, 
subjects were also told that the captions which were published with the original 
photographs formed part of the memory test. 
The use of captions was the method by which perceived social relationships were 
manipulated by the experimenter. By constructing captions that were biased in one 
of two directions, it was hoped that the neutral photographs would be interpreted 
.,... _ý r .ý .ý 
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according to the direction of the caption accompanying it. The captions were 
designed to strongly imply either positive/affiliative or negative/disaffiliative 
relations amongst the human figures depicted in the photographs. 
The nature of "affiliation/disaffiliation" with its connotations of negativity/positivity, 
liking/disliking, friendship/enmity, and so on, was thought to be the most 
parsimonious and likely attribute to be inferred by subjects from the photograph 
and caption couplings. This dimension of affect was used successfully in the 
Jaeger study (1990). It was hypothesized that when a photograph was 
accompanied by an affiliative caption, inter-figure distance would be foreshortened 
relative to an estimate produced for the same photograph but accompanied by a 
disaffiliative caption. The same set of photographs was also used without captions 
as a control condition, though it may be argued that the affiliation/disaffiliation 
dimension is itself self-balancing. 
A total of 80 university students, aged between 19 and 22 years, volunteered as 
subjects. All subjects were students in the School of Psychology, The University of 
St. Andrews and were participants in laboratory classes: they agreed to stay on to 
help after class was completed. Three groups of subjects were used with roughly 
equal numbers of males and females. There were 24 subjects in group 1; 26 in 
group 2 and 30 in group 3. Most were of British nationality and all had no previous 
experience of the experiment. It was thought possible that Ss may have been 
familiar with some of the stimuli used but post-experimental questioning failed to 
show any evidence of this. 
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Photo ra 
A total of 34 colour slides were used as stimuli, seven of which were kindly 
supplied by Jaeger (1990). Each one was produced from published photographs of 
various sizes culled from colour supplements, weekly magazines and the like. Care 
was taken to ensure that the photographs were not prearranged in nature e. g. as in 
an 'advertising spread', but were typical photojournalism, 'candid camera' shots, 
often of the "fly on the wall" variety where the presence of the photographer is not 
observed by the participants in the scene. See Appendix F for examples. 
11 of the photographs were monochrome and 23 were in colour. The slides 
depicted social settings and relationships from simple dyads to several identifiable 
groupings. They were mainly chosen for their neutrality in the relationships 
depicted- a 'blank canvas' on which the effects of captions might be projected. 
Some slides were not quite full-frame 35mm but all figures within them could be 
clearly seen. 
11.2.2.2 ` '>. Dista ce Pairs 
In the experiment, subjects were to be asked to estimate the distance between two 
figures in each slide. One of them, the test figure, was printed on the appropriate 
response scale in the booklet issued to subjects. The second, target figure was 
announced by the experimenter- a tactic chosen to avert the possibility of subjects 
looking ahead in the booklet to anticipate the next distance estimate. 
How were the distance pairs chosen? A range of distances was a major 
requirement of the experiment and pairs were chosen to meet this: 18.1 to 83.5cm 
as seen on screen. Also important was the need for subjects to identify the 
member of each pair easily and without confusion. Figures close together in the 
same dress e. g. two soldiers wearing helmets and fatigues ( "which one does he 
V 
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mean? " ) were avoided for this reason. The final criterion for selection as either a 
source or target figure was placement in the photograph. As the source figure was 
printed on the booklet according to the side of the vertical line it lay (see below), 
the number of source figures was divided equally between the two vertical halves 
of the photograph. This also allowed for distance estimations to be made in both 
horizontal directions. 
ao n: s 
Captions were devised to accompany the slides; a few of those used were from the 
original photographs. Those that were composed were designed to be totally 
plausible; subjects must not have suspected that most of the captions had not 
accompanied the photographs as published. The captions exploited the ambiguity 
of the slides with each one having two captions assigned. Within each caption pair, 
one was judged positive or affiliative in outlook and the other very negative/non- 
affiliative. Ratings of caption were taken from nine independent judges using a five 
point scale which assessed the tone of the caption: ranging from strongly positive 
(affiliative) to neutral to strongly negative (disaffiliative). After several judging 
sessions, the final selection of thirty four caption pairs was made and it included 
only those captions which, 
(a) received an average score of greater than 1.5 numerically and 
(b) received no judgments on the opposing polar dimension (e. g. if a positive 
caption, no ratings of -1 or -2). 
Reliability (alpha) was calculated to be . 9298. 
An example of a caption pair. 
" Affiliative: 
Families in Sicily still work together in the 
fields 
a Disaffiliative: 
Despite this placid scene, mutual animosity 
within the group was rampant 
Chapter 11 Space Perception and the Affective tone of Social Schemata 297 
All captions were presented on separate slides: white block lettering on a blue 
background. Having complementary captions allowed subjects in the experimental 
groups 1 and 2 to be given captions designed to elicit opposing schematic bias for 
any one slide. 
;::::::, >: '.. Scales and Bookie t: ':::::::.: '::: `: °"` `':. . 
To help subjects with the distance estimation task, a five point graphical 
representation of the response bar (scale) was on view: it was placed above the 
screen and equaled the width of the projected image. A pilot study found that other 
arrangements (e. g. different proportional sizes of scale, scale projected) proved 
too difficult for subjects to work with. The purpose of the scale was to provide a 
method of ratio-scaling by which subjects could estimate appropriate inter-figure 
distances. The scale was 127cm in length- sufficiently long to cover the likely 
maximum perceived distance between any two figures in the photographs. 
Each subject was supplied with a response booklet. The first page of this provided 
the necessary instructions. Page 2 had three examples of trials for subjects to 
familiarize themselves with the procedure. Subsequent pages were for 
experimental trials and had photo/caption numbers printed alongside blank fields 
for subjects to write in the captions. The order of caption/photo number was 
randomized. 
Below each field was a scale. Each scale was a proportional reduction of the one 
shown above the screen. At one end of the scale a brief description of the test 
figure was printed for the photograph in question: The chosen end was decided by 
estimating which side of the photo the test figure appeared. If the test figure was to 
the right of the centre vertical, then its description was printed on the right of the 
scale and vice versa. This was done to ease the task of subjects: excessive 
random errors could be produced if the task proved too difficult, as a pilot study 
showed. An example of a scale: 
Caption: 
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Caption: 
man with hat 
The task was to place a cross on each scale which reproduced the distance 
between the test figure and the target one that the experimenter would call out. 
The inter-figure distance was marked by the subject for that particular slide: These 
arrangements served several functions: primarily they served to avoid subject 
anticipation by preventing them form immediately estimating the distance after 
projection when they would find it easier to do so (and hence lead to a reduction in 
subjective distortions). It also avoided placing the target figure always on one end 
of the scale with the danger of producing positional biases in subjects' responses. 
See Appendix C for a reproduction of a typical booklet. 
The presentation order of slides was randomised. Captions were arranged in an 
order related to the order of photographs given. Groups 1 and 2 were the 
experimental groups, each receiving one of the two complementary captions for 
each slide. For Group 1, the caption was randomly chosen from either of the two 
contrasting possibilities for that slide, affiliative or non affiliative and there were 
equal numbers of affiliative and non-affiliative captions used (17 of each). Group 2 
had the complementary caption types used for each photo. 
Group 3 provided the control subjects. These subjects followed the same 
procedure as groups 1 and 2 but were shown no captions at all. Their response 
booklets were similar to those for the experimental groups but had amended 
instructions and contained no blank fields for captions. A different random order of 
picture presentation was used for each of the three groups. 
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To show the slides, a projector was positioned to produce an image of exactly 
127cm in width (full frame). All slides were projected at a distance of approximately 
10.5 metres. It was crucial that the width of the projected image remained the 
same for each group and the zoom lens on the Kodak carousel projector allowed 
accurate sizing of the image. 
To prevent immediate succession to the next pair of slides (photo and caption), 
each pair was placed with a gap between in the projector magazine. Each subject 
sat at a desk with no illumination apart from that afforded by the screen when 
projected with no slide in place. This enabled the subjects to see the response 
booklets satisfactorily when they were to make their response, while remaining in 
relative darkness during each slide presentation. This arrangement helped in 
discouraging subjects from looking ahead in the booklet and so becoming primed 
for the test figure in the next trial- something that they were also asked not to do in 
the printed instructions and verbally by the experimenter at the commencement of 
the experiment. The experimenter timed the duration of each slide presentation 
with a digital timer. 
The three groups, two experimental and one control, were tested in a laboratory on 
three separate occasions. At the top of the booklet's first page was a brief outline 
of the subject material to be used and the area of enquiry. Subjects were told that 
the study was concerned with the effectiveness of illustrations in facilitating 
learning. This was meant to mislead in order to prevent subjects being alerted to 
the variable of central interest i. e. interfigure distance. 
Personal details (e. g. age, gender etc. ) were filled in on the response booklet cover 
page (see Appendix C). A detailed list of instructions then followed, giving subjects 
information on the number of slides to be used, the presentation time, the nature of 
the caption presentations where appropriate etc. 
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For the two experimental groups, the caption chosen to accompany each slide was 
projected first for a period of time long enough for any subject to read at slow 
speed. The duration of each caption varied: the experimenter would read the 
caption silently to himself twice to ensure that all would have had sufficient time to 
read and understand. Immediately following this, the slide of the photograph was 
projected for the appropriate time interval. This had been established from the 
Jaeger (1990) study. The exposure time was not constant across all slides but was 
increased in proportion to the number of figures present: 
Table 11.1: Variation of picture slide exposure times with numbers of figures 
2 4 
3 7 
4-5 8 
6 10 
7+ 14 
`For 9 of the slides, a further 3 seconds exposure time was added as some figures 
were unclear. 
When projection of each slide pair was completed, an empty slot in the slide 
carousel allowed room illumination. During this time, subjects (in the two 
experimental groups) were required to write down in the numbered, empty field in 
the booklet the caption for that slide (i. e. after both caption and slide had been 
shown and removed). The procedure of requesting subjects to write down each 
caption before estimating the required distance was devised in order to 'prime' 
subjects with the affective quality of the caption, as well as to provide an interval 
lest estimation responses became too accurate. 
Only after this had been completed and the experimenter had called out in a loud 
and clear voice what the target figure was in the photo, were subjects then asked 
Chapter 11 Space Perception and the Affective tone of Social Schemata 301 
to make an 'X' on the distance estimation response scale. Subjects in group 3 -the 
non-caption writing group (controls), were simply asked to make their distance 
estimates after a 'fill-in' time of 20 seconds- the average caption writing time for the 
experimental subjects. 
All subjects were reminded that time was limited and they should work quickly 
without being painstakingly accurate. They were told that a maximum time of only 
ten seconds would be given for them to make their response. The rationale for this 
approach was that the effect of schema biasing in subjects' responses would be 
maximised by achieving a balance between the avoidance of random errors and 
the discouragement of striving for absolute accuracy. 
Following completion of the experiment, subjects were asked questions about the 
difficulty of experiments, how interesting or otherwise they found it to be, whether 
or not they had recognised any of the slides and so on. Relevant comments were 
noted. The experiment took about 35- 40 minutes to perform for Groups 1 and 2 
and approximately 15 minutes less than that for Group 3. 
Data were prepared as follows. Measurements of subjects' responses were taken 
from the booklets and converted to percentage deviation scores. This was 
achieved in part by calculating a ratio- the test distance represented on screen 
relative to the scale above the screen. This in turn allowed for conversion back to 
the reduced size scale on the booklets and the establishment of location marks for 
is correct° responses. Deviations from these correct responses were then calculated 
as plus or minus percentage distortions. These percentage distortions provided the 
data for the dependent variable. 
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The caption variables for each photo were coded as 1 if the caption accompanying 
that photo was disaffiliative; 2 if the caption was affiliative and 0 if no caption was 
used i. e. for the control group of subjects. Note that subjects responded to all the 
photographs but not with respect to both caption types within each photo. 
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Figure 11.1: A bar graph of mean distortion fro each of the experimental conditions 
At first sight, it would appear that the hypotheses 1 to 3 receive little support. There 
appears to be slightly more distortion for the affiliative caption type than for the 
disaffiliative caption type (+22.50% versus +20.27%). However the no-caption 
condition shows considerably less distortion (+7.04%). Before examining the data 
Disaffiliative Affiliative No-caption 
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to discover if the means are significantly different, it was considered prudent to 
look for a possible relationship between distortion and actual distance. 
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Figure 11.2: A scattergram illustrating the relationship between distortion and 
actual distance 
As mentioned above, the high variance in subjects' estimates may be indicative of 
an elicitation method leading to random errors. Another possible contributor to this 
high variance could be the actual range of stimuli distances employed, an artifact 
of ratio-scaling. This latter possibility was partially examined by computing a 
Pearson r correlation and constructing a scattergram of the two variables. Clearly, 
as Figure 11.2 shows, distortion decreases as the actual distance to be estimated 
increases. A Pearson correlation was computed to be -. 7256 (p<. 01). 
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With the correlation co-efficient in mind, the variable containing the data for actual 
distance was entered as a co-variate in a repeated measures ANOVA with the 
experimental conditions: affiliative caption, disaffiliative caption and no-caption as 
three levels of a within subject factor. An F-ratio of 11.00 (DF=2; p< . 01) was 
obtained. The critical difference (CD) was calculated from the equation given in 
Kinnear & Gray, (1994): 
CD =q critical if (MS "error / n) 
where q critical is the value obtained from the table of the Studentized 
Range 
Statistic (in Hinkle et al., 1988); MS error is the denominator of the F-ratio and t1 
is 
the number of scores from which the treatment means to be compared has been 
calculated. 
CD was calculated to 6.227 (p < . 01). From the three means above, 
both affiliative 
and disaffiliative means are significantly different from the no-caption mean 
An important finding was that the variation around each mean was quite large 
(S. D. s: 37.56 for affiliative captions; 34.94 for disaffiliative captions and 28.44 for 
no-captions). This high variance in the estimates of stimulus distance suggests that 
the method of elicitation is allowing too much random error to enter in. The 
hypothesized effect would be robustly observed if the methodology was made to 
facilitate more accurate estimations. 
However, it was thought that this aggregated approach to the data may have 
obscured hypothesized effects that were occurring. By examining the photographs 
individually it was hoped that such effects might be uncovered. Individual one way 
ANOVAs were calculated for each photograph's data. These are summarized in 
Table 11.2 
It seems clear that the presence if not the direction of captions is having a major 
effect. Overall and in some of the photographs, the estimates made in the absence 
of captions show significant underestimation. However there is a surprising lack of 
significant differences between the experimental means in each photo. 
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Table 11.2: Means across the three conditions and ANOVA results for each 
photograph with Scheffe significant differences at the 5% level 
1 32.13 58.91 -18.61 7.776 . 0009 0&2 2 43.11 47.22 13.42 2.053 . 1355 
3 120.96 114.03 74.20 2.369 . 1010 4 31.77 45.87 11.8 4.644 . 0125 0&2 5 -8.62 -13.92 -26.45 3.601 . 0320 
0&1 
6 43.55 44.41 25.68 1.272 . 2866 7 37.66 39.38 10.74 2.487 . 0903 
8 61.16 52.14 44.43 0.743 . 4790 9 103.22 89.71 59.00 2.349 . 1028 10 2.58 -12.72 -19.91 4.635 . 0127 
0&1 
11 8.58 12.02 7.00 . 1898 . 8292 12 1.64 -13.9 -10.95 . 2.899 . 0617 13 38.39 27.82 6.60 4.862 . 0104 
0&1 
14 -8.86 3.71 0.44 1.268 . 2876 15 27.59 23.84 20.59 . 1841 . 8323 
16 67.92 39.43 46.94 2.008 . 1414 17 10.58 13.7 3.52 . 6324 . 5344 18 -5.40 -14.48 -9.72 . 5951 . 5541 19 3.82 -5.61 5.7 1.645 . 20003 20 70.32 145.45 65.02 2.664 . 1736 21- 23.74 10.23 12.80 . 7709 . 4664 22 -2.15 -7.84 -1.23 0.640 . 5301 23 -11.18 -9.64 -20.10 1.329 . 2708 24 3.29 3.75 14.62 0.805 . 4509 25 -6.32 12.66 13.34 2.816 . 0662 26 23.30 23.50 29.62 0.272 . 7630 27 32.56 17.55 10.15 2.802 . 0670 28 -6.49 -5.38 -0.08 0.658 . 5209 29 26.40 37.39 -34.65 13.58 . 0000 
0&1 
0&2 
30 -11.66 3.94 -22.11 4.732 . 0116 
0&2 
31 -28.66 -16.76 -22.11 10.78 . 0001 
0&I 
0&2 
32 13.04 16.88 13.07 0.880 . 9159 33 -38.68 -7.23 -57.76 4.729 . 0116 
0&2 
34 -10.24 -11.12 -5.81 . 5610 . 
5731 
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The fact that having photographs shown without captions led to significant 
underestimation of the test distances raised the possibility that the photographs 
themselves were working in unison with the captions to confuse the issue (adding 
`noise' to the data? ); this in spite of the fact that the photographs were chosen in 
the first instance on the basis that they were 'neutral' in content. Another possibility 
was that captions may have been unbalanced, manipulating more than affiliation 
alone. It was decided to look critically at the thirty four photographs used. They 
were examined by eight independent judges and some remarkably consistent 
judgments were made. The judges were asked to rate the overall tone of the 
relationships depicted in each photo according to the following scale (see 
Appendix C for a reproduction of the exact instructions): 
Mutual Neutral Mutual 
liking disliking 
The judges were informed that they should respond according to their immediate 
and spontaneous impression of each photo and that there would be varying 
numbers of different relationships on view. Rather than using categories directly, 
the data consisted of measurements taken from the scale ranging from 0 to plus or 
minus 5.2 cms (the scale was exactly 10.3 cms long). Positive numbers indicated 
that subjects perceived consistent liking in the photo, negative numbers that they 
perceived marked disliking. The size of the integer represented the strength of 
liking/disliking that they perceived. From the series of judgments, a mean value 
was obtained for each photo. The mean values were then categorized into 5 bands 
according to the scheme outlined in Table 11.3. The distribution of photographs 
according to the judgment bands is illustrated in Figure 11.3 
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Table 11.3: The range of mean judgement scores and their corresponding 
judgement bands 
-2.5 to -5 -2 
-1 to -2.49 -1 
±0.99to0 0 
1 to 2.49 1 
2.5 to 5 2 
Note that most of the photographs fall into the neutral (0) category- seventeen in 
all. Next comes the liking category(1) with nine photographs. Great liking (2) comes 
next with five and then disliking and great disliking (-1 and -2) with one and two 
photographs respectively. There seems to be more photographs perceived as 
containing individuals who like each other than not but nevertheless, a distinct 
preponderance of photographs exists in the neutral category with extreme 
liking/disliking firmly marginalized 
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Figure 11.3: Frequency chart for all 34 photographs according to valence 
Judgements 
It is when this categorization is applied to the individual photo analyses that a 
marked association emerges. To begin with, photographs were ascribed to one of 
two 'hypothesis' categories. It has been hypothesized above that captions would 
distort perceived interfigure distance estimates such that the estimates would show 
foreshortening with respect to affiliative captions. 'Yes' was the category assigned 
to those photographs whose caption means were in the direction indicated by the 
hypotheses 1 and 2 and 'No' for those photographs whose caption means were in 
the opposite direction. Photo numbers 6,24,26 and 34 were not included as they 
had virtually no differences in their caption means (less than one percentage point) 
and this resulted in a total absence of photographs in the -1 band. This enabled 
the following cross-tabulation to be made with the remaining 30 photographs: 
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Table 11.4: Crosstabulation for photographs according to judged valence and 
hypothesized direction of means 
Expected frequencies are shown in brackets. The first point to note is the strong 
association of those photographs which conform with the central hypotheses and 
judges' ratings of neutrality in their perceptions of the photographs. A 
preponderance of photographs categorized as neutral seem to be associated with 
caption means that lie in the predicted direction, i. e. less distortion for the affiliative 
caption means (Figure. 11.4). It would also appear that caption means which lie in 
the opposite direction (less distortion for the non-affiliative means) tend to be 
associated with photographs judged as "mild liking". Are these associations 
significant? 
Means in Hypothesized Direction? 
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Figure 11.4: An Illustration of the data displayed In table 11.4. Four photographs 
were not included as they showed virtually no differences In their means 
Although the data in Table 11.4 represents a 'secondary analysis', the scores 
within the crosstabulation suggest a chi-squared distribution. N. B. A traditional 
caution exists with respect to chi-squared distributions: expected frequencies 
should be at least 5. However the caution is probably too severe and some studies 
indicate that this requirement can be relaxed (e. g. Everitt, 1977). In any case, this 
is a preliminary analysis only and will presently be supplemented. 
The chi-squared value, calculated from the data in Table 11.4, is 8.951 with 3 
degrees of freedom. This has an observed significance level of 0.03 (Pearson) and 
a Likelihood Ratio significance of 0.019. Clearly the distribution noted in the above 
cross-tabulation shows that the two variables, the judged tone of relationship in the 
photographs and the direction of the caption means for photographs, are not 
independent of each other. However, it is important to note that the Chi-Square 
no yes 
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test is a test of independence only. What it does not tell one is anything about the 
strength or nature of the association between the two variables. 
Measures of association are required for this extra information. These try to 
quantify any inter-variable relationship noted. However a few caveats should be 
made before applying such measures to the current data. First is that no one 
measure can hope to summarize all types of relationship; one might obtain a low 
value for a given set of data not because the two variables in question are 
unrelated but because they are related in ways to which the measure is not 
sensitive. Furthermore some measures are margin sensitive, meaning that they are 
adversely influenced by the marginal distributions of the rows and columns. In 
other words, they reflect information not only about the association but also about 
the marginals. 
There are two main types of measures of association: those derived from the chi- 
squared statistic and those based on the concept of proportional reduction in error 
known as PRE. The latter type will be computed for the current data; chi-squared 
based measures are hard to interpret (Norusis, 1990). 
A PRE measure constitutes a ratio of a measure of error in predicting the values of 
one variable based on knowledge of that variable alone and the same measure of 
error applied to prediction based on knowledge of another variable. In the case of 
the current data, Goodman and Kruskal's lambda was calculated. This gives a 
probability of error when one variable is used to predict values in the dependent 
variable. Lambda has a range between 0 and 1; 0 means that the independent 
variable cannot predict the dependent variable in any way and 1 that the 
independent variable perfectly specifies the categories of the dependent 
(Goodman & Kruskal, 1954). 
When computed for the cross-tabulation above, lambda was computed to be equal 
to 0.5000 in conformity with hypotheses 1 and 2( 'yes' or 'no': caption means in 
one of two directions) as the dependent variable. In other words, there is a very 
substantial 50% reduction in prediction error when the variable photo judgment is 
used to predict the direction of caption means. In particular, photographs judged as 
neutral predict underestimation in inter-figure distances for affiliative captions when 
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compared with disaffiliative captions. Why this should not occur when the 
photographs used are judged as depicting liking relationships is not immediately 
clear. What does seem clear however is that non-neutral photographs confound 
the results obtained, especially if they depict relationships of mutual liking. 
Given the salience of neutral photographs in the experiment, it seemed prudent to 
treat the dependent variable from these stimuli to separate, non-categorical, 
analyses. There were seventeen photographs in all which were judged to be 
neutral- a figure large enough for analysis of variance as the number of 
observations is a respectable 1360. What would the breakdown of means for this 
important data subset show? Figure 11.6 illustrates this. 
A repeated measures ANOVA, with actual distance as a co-variate, was calculated 
to be 6.99, with a significance level of . 003. The three means illustrated above 
were 28.00,21.25, and 14.55 (S. D. s were 37.94,36.34 and 26.15 respectively). To 
investigate this encouraging result further, the critical difference (CD) for the data 
was calculated (according to the equation in section 11.3.1) and found to be 6.533 
at a 1% level of significance. Thus all the means are in the expected order of 
magnitude and are significantly different to each other in compliance with 
hypotheses 1 "and 2. 
The photographs not included in the analysis (non-neutral) were mostly those rated 
positive in affect and no particular trend was discernible within their data. 
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Figure 11.5: The means of distortion for the three experimental conditions for 17 
neutral photographs 
Clearly then, one can influence the spatial perception of inter-figure distances 
within a photograph by biasing the social configuration of the pertinent schema 
with a suitably valenced caption. However, the final confirmatory evidence was 
only achieved when it was no longer assumed that all the photographs chosen by 
the experimenter were neutral. Ratings by judges showed that the majority (17) of 
the stimulus set were indeed judged to be neutral. However the non-neutral 
remainder was of sufficient number to upset the original straightforward analysis of 
the data. 
, Disdfihat'r s AtflhYive No-caption 
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The relatively high standard deviations observed may be explained by the nature 
of the methodology used. Many subjects in the two experimental conditions 
reported finding the distance estimation part of the experiment rather difficult and 
there seems little doubt that too much random error was entering in consequence. 
If anything the priming of subjects, by requesting them to write down the caption 
before estimating distance, had the opposite effect. If the experiment were to be 
repeated, then it would be sensible to allow subjects more time to study the 
projected photograph. 
The observation that there is less distortion with the no-caption condition supports 
this view. Ideally one would expect this condition to produce an overall mean 
somewhere between those of the other two conditions. The analyses in sections 
11.3.1 and 11.3.4 show that not only did the no-caption condition produce the 
lowest means but also the lowest standard deviations. One might conjecture that 
the presence of captions is inducing a lack of certainty in subjects' responses with 
a concomitant introduction of 'noise' into the data. It is worth noting that subjects in 
the no-caption condition reported little difficulty in the estimation task. 
Another possibility, mentioned above, is that the captions were somehow 
unbalanced, managing to manipulate more than just affiliation/disaffiliation. One 
way around this problem would have to employ the services of judges again, this 
time to rate the captions themselves for emotional content. They would be required 
to rate the extent to which captions evoked the sense of closeness and other 
dimensions. One would then use only those captions that rated strongly on 
affiliation/disaffiliation. " 
That distortion decreased with the distance to be estimated came as little surprise. 
This effect has been noted in related areas of research e. g. in cognitive distance 
methodology as described in Chapter 2, Part 2 and in the experiments of Chapters 
9 and 10 especially. It is one of the problems associated with ratio-scaling 
techniques: estimates of distance will be most accurate when the ratio of the 
provided standard distance to the test distance is close to 1.0 (e. g. Montello, 1991; 
Baird, 1970). 
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In the case of the present experiment, a particular type of ratio-scaling is being 
used. Recall that the scale being used by subjects was roughly the width of the 
projected image. In this case, those inter-figure (test) distances that were the 
greatest came closest to equaling the scale (standard) distance i. e. the ratio came 
closest to one and so these estimates were most accurate. Thus distortion for the 
larger test distances is less than for the smaller test distances and so the 
correlation between distortion and distance is negative and significant. 
One way to tighten-up the data in the current experiment would be to ask subjects 
themselves to rate the affective quality of the captions. This would need to be done 
following completion of the estimation task. Subjects own ratings of the captions 
which influenced their distance estimations would act as good predictors of the 
varying magnitudes and directions of distortion in the dependent variable. It would 
not be unexpected to find a stronger relationship between the strength of affective 
valency of captions and the levels of associated distortion. 
CHAPTER 12: Movable Target, 
Figures 
"But to simplify as much as possible, one can say that all emotions 
share in a basic duality: they are either positive and attractive, or 
they are negative and repulsive. " 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p17) 
A problem with the previous experiment was that some subjects appeared to have 
found the task rather difficult to perform. The results indicated that when subjects 
are faced with a tricky distance estimation task, most of the time their estimates 
are imprecise, leading to a large degree of variance in the results. Captions were 
used successfully to bias subjects' perceptions of inter-figure distances. However, 
for some of the photographs, the presence of captions produced 'noise' in the 
data, contradicting the visual message of the photograph. 
Partly in a bid to reduce these problems, the current experiment provided subjects 
with moveable photocopies of some of the heads (and bodies) of the characters 
nominated by judges- depending on the relationship under investigation- for a 
given photograph. The moveable figure heads were to be positioned within a two 
dimensional frame, wherever subjects thought fit. Given the importance of the 
photographs' ratings in the previous experiment, would the type of relationship by 
itself lead to characteristic distortion? 
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A crucial consideration needed to be taken into account. There exists the 
possibility with all the photographs of frame effects interfering with subjects' 
responses, especially with this methodology where the actual size of the stimulus 
heads acts as a guide to inter-figure distance. A response sheet of a particular 
shape and or size will tend to bias subjects' responses to 'fit-in' with the available 
space To circumvent this problem, the response sheet was a large square-shaped 
piece of paper which -extended far beyond the scaled-down outline of the slide 
frame- in other words, beyond the notional frame outline whose dimensions were 
proportional to the size of the figures in the trial. In this way, it would become 
difficult for the subjects to use the size and edges of the slide mount as a relative 
guide and yet still allow for overestimation. Throughout the experiment, the goal 
was to balance ease of procedure with sufficient ambiguity to reveal the biasing 
effects of various social schemata on subjects' distance perception. 
For this experiment, a transitive equivalence was postulated within each 
relationship. For example, in the case of a group of two people in a photograph, 
the judges who were asked to rate the relationship depicted may have come to the 
conclusion that A, and B display a rather negative relationship. All that the 
experimenter can presume is that the judges believe that A feels towards B in 
much the same way that B feels towards A. In a non-laboratory situation it may be 
argued that this may not necessarily be the case. 
However there is much evidence to suggest that there is a pervasive proclivity 
amongst individuals to perceive social groupings in terms of 'balance' where 
cognitive units, in this case the cognition of sentiment relations, tend toward steady 
states (Heider, 1946,1958; Zajonc & Burnstein, 1965). Heider proposed that "a 
dyad is balanced if the relations between the two entities are all positive or all 
negative....... a triad is balanced when all three of the relations are positive or when 
two of the relations are negative and one positive" (1958, p202). 
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In addition, DeSoto & Kuethe reported in a study of subjective probability in 
interpersonal relations that "positive affective relationships are customary" (1959, 
p292); subjects are apt to believe that two hypothetical persons about whom they 
have no other information most likely feel positive toward each other. Therefore in 
the current experiment it seems that both the judges' and the subjects' tendency to 
'balance' the relationships they see will predominate. Also, when one considers 
the relatively short exposure times that both judges and subjects have had to view 
the photographs, it makes sense to believe that they had insufficient time to 
explore the possibility of imbalance in the relationships. 
Overview: 
1.30 photographs of social interactions were used as stimuli for the 
experiment. 
2. The photographs were rated independently as depicting positive, negative 
or neutral relationships 
3. Subjects took part in a repeated measures design. 
4. After viewing each photograph, subjects answered a question on content 
before: 
5. Recreating the relative positioning of two cut-out figures (one already 
fixed) on blank paper. 
A total of thirty six subjects provided data. Most were volunteers from 2nd year 
psychology laboratory classes in the School of Pychology at the University of St. 
Andrews, though a handful (seven) were persons known to the experimenter. 
Those attending the three laboratory classes kindly volunteered after their formal 
,.. , 
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teaching was completed. Laboratory class subjects' ages ranged from eighteen to 
twenty one years of age; the remainder were mostly in their twenties with two 
subjects over fifty years of age. The non-students were tested at home. Of the 
total, twenty were female and sixteen males. More subjects would have been 
desirable from a statistical point of view and therefore cautious consideration of 
the analyses is needed. 
The photographs selected for the experiment were taken from a variety of national 
newspapers, newspaper supplements and magazines. As in Chapter 11, they 
were primarily chosen on account of their candid depictions of various social 
encounters, these being documentary, un-staged, natural (i. e. not from 
advertisements) scenes. These encounters were deemed to be variously positive, 
negative and neutral with regard to affect. See Appendix G for examples. 
To provide an independent measure of the affective relationships in the 
photographs, found to be so important from the last experiment, eight judges were 
asked to rate the overall tone of relationships that they detected. Thus any 
insignificant relationships were ignored; only the most salient characters and 
relationships in the photograph were identified. They made their responses on a7 
point rating scale (see Appendix D): 
NO. between and 
+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
1IIIII1 
Strongly Neutral Strongly 
Positive Negative 
The dimension of positive-negative was chosen to provide an easily understood, 
global dimension on which judges could indicate the degrees of attraction, 
repulsion and other common social valences perceived between characters in the 
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photographs. It was felt that this most parsimonious of dimensions would tap more 
of the affective valency of the photographs than liking/disliking as used previously 
and as the quotation at the top of the chapter indicates. This global dimension was 
considered important since the experiment relied solely on the affective impact of 
the photographs. So judges were asked: 
"If you 
. 
think the photos show relationships of, for example, hostility, dislike, 
suspicion, mistrust, dis ust, repulsion, wariness, rivalry, enmity or coolness, 
(etc. ), then such relationships should be generally rated as "negative". 
If you believe the relationships to be of, for example, mutual respect, admiration, 
friendship, attraction, affinity, liking, love, closeness, warmth, cooperation, 
kinship or rapport (etc. ), then they should be generally rated as "positive". 
If you believe the relationships to be neither positive nor negative, - then your 
ratings should be "neutral". " 
See Appendix D for a reproduction of the full list of instructions. After the 
judgments of the photographs had been made, interjudge reliability was measured 
by Cronbach's alpha. This was calculated using the scale reliability analysis from 
the professional statistic option for SPSS for Windows. This procedure performs 
item analysis on additive scales to produce various measures of reliability including 
Alpha. The result was Alpha = . 9491. This 
is the value regarding all the 
relationships nominated by judges (90 in total). As not all subjects rated the same 
relationships there was a high percentage of missing data in the analysis. Follow 
up inter-item ('inter judge') correlational analysis revealed high correlations and 
100% significance (at 5% or less; missing data excluded listwise). Thus the high 
alpha value does not overestimate the degree of inter judge agreement. 
For every photo used, one relationship has been selected for testing. The 
particular relationship was chosen because (a) it was rated (and thus nominated) 
by most of the judges (at least half of them) and (b) in terms of the extent of 
judges' inter-agreement- a close match being obtained between the (up to) eight 
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judgments. A scheme was devised whereby relationships were assigned to one of 
the three categories according to ranges of average rating values: 
Positive: 
3 to 1.4 
Neutral: 
1.39 to -1.39 
Negative: 
-1.4 to -3 
+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
From a total of 43 photographs, 30 were finally selected for the experiment: each 
one containing one stimulus relationship easily categorizable according to the 
above scheme. Roughly equal numbers of positive, neutral and negative stimuli 
were arrived at and each photograph was assigned to a category according to 
which of its relationships had been chosen. Table 12.1 shows the nature of rating 
for each of the stimulus relationships and Figure 12.1 shows the average value for 
each category. 
Table 12.1: Table of numbered photographs assigned to one of three categories 
according to how judges rated the stimulus relationship within each photograph. 
The average rating value for each photograph's stimulus relationship is In brackets. 
ý" :-.. 
2 (-0.83) 1 (2) 15 (-1.5) 
3 (0.125) 12 (2.7) 16 (-2.13) 
10 (-0.63) 17 (1.4) 24 (-1.43) 
11 (-1.14) 18 (1.43) 25 (-1.75) 
14 (0) 19 (2.7) 27 (-2.63) 
20 (-0.25) 23 (2.88) 28 (-1.4) 
22 (-0.38) 30 (2.25) 29 (-2.9) 
35 (0.5) 31 
_(1.75) 
32 (-1.6) 
36 (-0.14) 34 (1.5) 33 (-1.88) 
42 (1.75) 41 (-3) 
43 (-1.75) 
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Figure 12.1: Average values for the three categories of photographs derived from 
Table 12.1 
It was felt that subjects might concentrate too much on the placement task with 
resultant reduction in the error variance- that the task would be too easy perhaps. 
Another danger was that subjects would guess the 'hidden agenda' behind the 
experiment i. e. guess that it was a distance estimation task with a particular 
interest in the role of relationship valence. 
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To limit the probability of such limitations; an interference, task was introduced 
which both distracted subjects from the core task and contributed to the illusion 
that other aspects of photograph comprehension were required by the experiment, 
a stated aim on the instructions given. The idea came from a suggestion made by 
Ms. Chloe Gallien, lecturer in French at the University of Abertay, Dundee. The 
actual task, when finally constituted, consisted of a single question which was 
asked by the experimenter immediately after the projection of each slide and 
before the placement task. The questions were designed to be 'authentic' memory- 
test questions which demanded subjects complete attention yet were 
straightforward, if not simple. For example (see Appendix D for the full list): 
31. Were there three or four men in the scene? 
19. Did the young woman have long or short hair? 
24. Did the kneeling player have a sponsored jersey? 
17. How many people were sitting on chairs? 
43. Was the young man in the turban looking to the left or right 
01. How many men were wearing glasses? 
Subjects were able to write down their answers to the questions on a sheet of 
paper with appropriately numbered and ordered blank lines printed. 
Each of the subjects received a booklet that consisted of one page for each trial 
plus one for a practice trial. Each page was 297x297mm and of white paper. This 
size was considered large enough to avoid frame effects but still remain 
manageable by subjects. The shape was chosen in preference to e. g. round, in 
order to discourage subjects' natural bias towards the centre of the stimulus page. 
Chapter 12 Movable Target Figures 324 
The sizes of the photocopy cut-outs in the response booklet were kept to the 
original published size. In this way, not only was a random selection of'sizes of 
stimulus figures produced but also this procedure precluded the possibility of 
introducing a new variable in the experiment: i. e. that of size distortion, which 
would doubtless be related to distance perception. To reduce the likelihood of 
guesswork, it was necessary to specify the size of the stimulus figure: thus the 
width of a head, for example, can be used explicitly or implicitly by the subject in 
judging distances. 
For each of the trials, two figures comprising the chosen relationship were 
selected. One was fixed permanently to the response sheet, the other was placed 
at the top of the sheet, stuck onto a section of re-positional, self-stick paper ("Post- 
it" notes). This construction enabled subjects to repeatedly adjust the position of 
the figure cut-out until completely satisfied and without leaving marks on the 
response sheet. 
In certain photographs, certain characters were `joined together on the photo 
plane, i. e. were overlapping in three dimensions or were touching. In this instance 
whole-figure cut-outs were not used though head and shoulders were. Care was 
taken in these cases that the position of limbs was not suggested (e. g. one photo 
showed Arafat and Rabin shaking hands on the White House lawn) otherwise the 
task might become too easy.. 
The position of the fixed figures on the response page were placed at random but 
with two main provisos. The fixed figures were not placed at right angles to the 
edges of the response page (aligned to a 'grid') but angled randomly (away from 
the sides of the response page) to further minimize potential framing effects (not 
surprisingly, all of the original photographs showed figures at right angles to the 
horizontal edge of the photograph frame). However it was ensured that sufficient 
space was available for subjects to give a response within a reasonable range. 
E. g. if the fixed figure was to the right in the photograph and the test figure to the 
left of it, then in the booklet the fixed figure was not placed towards the left edge of 
the page so that subjects could correctly place the test figure. 
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The position of the printed figure on the response booklet page also allowed for 
the possiblity of excessive overestimation of the inter-figure distances with the aim 
of further minimizing potential frame effects. The choice of which of the two figures 
to use as the fixed figure was randomly varied. All the booklets devised were 
identical in the placements of the fixed figures. 
With regard to frame effects, positions within photos (e. g. figures at opposite 
edges) may be acting as biasing cues, leading to overestimation. Positions, rather 
than the social schemata elicited by the photographic setting, may thus confound 
schematic effects displayed in the data. For example, if the two figures in question 
are at opposite edges of the photo, then subjects might use the rubric "maximum 
distance" when responding. To prevent this, the two figures comprising the stimuli 
for each slide were chosen on the basis that they did not appear at positions in the 
slide which in themselves would act as cues in the task to follow. 
The duration of photograph (slide) exposure was directly related to the complexity 
of each photograph: the more (clearly defined) figures there were, the greater the 
exposure time. The contents of this table has been adapted from that of the 
previous experiment: 
Table 12.2: The exposure times In seconds, for slides, dependent on the number of 
figures to be observed within each 
*for some slides, 2 seconds were added to exposure times as figures were 
unclear. 
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Testing took place over five sessions, three of these during laboratory classes; the 
other subjects were tested at the home of the experimenter but under identical 
conditions (same size of projected image, subjects same distance from the screen 
etc. ). The number of subjects in each session was : 10,10,9,2 and 5. At the 
beginning of each session, subjects were misinformed that the experiment 
concerned the use of illustrations to facilitate learning, in a bid to divert attention 
from the central objective. 
Subjects were then asked to read carefully the instructions that accompanied the 
response booklet. To prevent random error creeping in, special attention was 
drawn to the need for subjects not to guess, either the answer to the questions or, 
more crucially, the position of the moveable figure if one or both of the figures 
were not recognised. Subjects were asked to write "unsure" on the appropriate 
numbered line on the answer sheet if they didn't know the answer to the question 
and "X" in the same place to denote recognition failure. 
The procedure followed for each trial was: 
1. Projection of slide for predetermined interval. 
2. Question delivered orally by the experimenter. 
3. Subjects write down the answers on the answer sheets. 
4. Experimenter waits until all have finished answering before 
5. Asking subjects to turn the page in the booklet and 
6. Requesting them to recreate the relative positions of the two figures shown. 
7. Subjects reminded not to turn the next page (to avoid anticipation). 
The order of stimulus presentation was randomized for each of the sessions with 
the exception of the final two which used the same random order. Therefore for 
each of 4 sessions, the order of trials in the response booklet and the order of 
numbered blank lines in the answer sheets were changed accordingly. There was 
one practice trial at the beginning of each session to familiarize subjects with the 
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procedure. Subjects were asked following the practice trail if there were any 
difficulties but on no occasion were any problems reported. 
For the purpose of data measurement, the center-point of the heads of the two 
human figures in each trial were used to gauge the inter-figure distance. From the 
original photographs, the actual, physical stimuli distances were measured. The 
error value for each subject's trial was then calculated as a percentage of the 
actual distance in centimetres. 
Thus 30 error variables were created having positive and negative values: 10 
related to photographs rated "positive" by judges; 11 related to photos rated 
"negative" and 9 related to those photos rated as "neutral". The means of these 
three groupings were taken for each subject to provide three new variables with 36 
cases (the number of subjects) in each (Table 12.3). 
Table 12.3: Summary statistics for the three variables composed from averaged 
data for each photo type across all subjects 
'POSITIVE' -16.31 7.21 4.91 -28.67 
Distortion 
'NEGATIVE' 26.78 8.51 40.02 8.32 
Distortion 
'NEUTRAL' 6.63 51.35 104.88 -89.10 
Distortion 
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From the above table, a bar chart was constructed to show the difference between 
the three main stimulus types: positive, neutral and negative. 
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Figure 12.2: Barchart of overall mean distortion for each relationship type 
Considerable differences between conditions in the predicted direction can be 
observed. There appears to be considerable relative 'underestimation" of distance 
between figures in a photograph where those figures have been judged to be in a 
positive relationship by the judges. Conversely, where those figures have been 
judged to be in a negative relationship, large relative 'overestimation' is observed. 
At first glance it would seem that neutral relationships excite small relative 
overestimation in inter-figure distance. Inspection of Table 12.3 shows that for the 
photographs concerned, both range and standard deviation for subjects' means is 
very large indeed, certainly much larger than for either of the other two relationship 
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types. This points to the possibility that faced with figures with no particular 
relationship to each other, subjects respond more or less randomly. 
To ensure that the overall degree of error was not associated with the stimulus 
distance, e. g. as the stimulus distance increased, there was not a corresponding 
increase in mean error, a correlation was calculated and scattergram plotted. 
Pearson r=-. 4744; p< . 01. At first sight it would seem that as the stimulus 
distance increases, the distortion declines. The scattergram for the two variables 
showed a different picture however. 
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Figure 12.3: Scatter plot of overall mean distortion for each of the actual stimulus 
distances in centimetres 
The dispersion appears marked with only a few data points contributing to the 
slight negative association as Figure 12.3 shows. 
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However it should be noted that when extreme values are removed, the correlation 
drops to -0.3880 and loses significance (p=0.055). For this reason it was not felt 
necessary to include actual distance in the analyses as a controlling variable. 
In order to discover whether the differences in means observed were indeed 
significant, a one way, repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the data 
used to construct Table 12.3. An F-ratio of 19.66 proved highly significant, (DF=2, 
p< . 01). Were the relationship categories significantly different from each other? 
Multiple pairwise comparisons were carried out following the critical difference 
formula detailed in Chapter 11: 
CD =q critical 
4 (MS error 
/ n) 
CD was calculated to be 12.0174 at a significance level of 1%. The means of the 
relationship categories are significantly different from each other in all pairwise 
comparisons. Such are the size of differences between the three means that even 
the neutral category, with its high variance, is significantly different from the other 
two categories. 
An analysis was also made of the data by gender of subject (analysis by age 
showed no discernable differences and is not reported). Table 12.4 illustrates the 
appropriate marginal means and Figure 12.4 illustrates the findings graphically to 
look for interaction effects. 
Table 12.4: A breakdown of means of the three relationship categories by gender of 
subject Standard deviations are in brackets. 
Category of Relationship 
Female -17.69 (5.88) 27.3 (8.44) 7.25 (58.32) 
Male -14.59 (8.46) 26.13 (8.32) 5.85 (42.94) 
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Figure 12.4: A line graph of the three relationship categories by gender of subject 
The female and male means were found to lie close together close together (4.32 
and 4.89 respectively; SDs. At 8.81 and 5.11). The main effect of gender of 
subject was indicated by a main effect F-ratio of . 00 (p= . 937). Interaction effects 
between relationship category and gender, as illustrated in Figure 12.4, were also 
non-significant (F= . 07; p= . 937). 
Analyses by age proved similarly no-significant. With the subject pool used, there 
was very little variance in age and, conceptually, no reason to divide subjects' data 
into sub-groups (e. g. over and under 20 years of age) for additional analysis. 
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It seems quite clear that type of relationship investigated in, each photo has a 
major effect in the predicted direction on the dependent variable. This works 
however for a summation in the data of all the relationships into three categories. 
What if the actual value of judges' decisions i. e. relationship ratings themselves 
could predict well the mean distortion of each photo? Figure 12.5 illustrates the 
relationship between mean distortion and ratings with a scattergram. 
00 
40 
20 
0 
Z 
O_ 
H 
ý 
"20 
0 
"40 
". 
.4 .3 -2 .10t23 
MEAN RELATIONSHIP JUDGEMENT 
Figure 12.5: A scattergram showing the relationship between mean distortion and 
the average judgement rating for each relationship 
The Pearson correlation co-efficient for the relationship is -. 6574 (p< . 
01). As the 
judgment of the relationship goes from strongly negative to strongly positive, the 
distortion lessens markedly. Table 12.5 shows the result of a regression analysis 
using relationship as a predictor with distortion as the dependent variable (after 
suitable checks for heteroscedasticity). 
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Table 12.5: Summarized result of a linear regression of relationship judgement on 
distortion 
. 657 . 411 20.546 <. O1 -. 657 
With the predictor accounting for over 40% of the variance (adjusted), and a 
change of . 66 standard deviations brought about by a change of one standard 
deviation in the predictor, it seems that the dimension of positive-negative in 
relationship is a very good predictor of subjects' distortion in the perception of 
interfigure distance. 
The dimension of positivity-negativity as the basis for the appraisal of relationships 
seems to be an excellent predictor of how people perceive the spatial arrangement 
of those same relationships. The robustness of the finding is emphasized by the 
lack of any interactions; spatial distortion induced by social bias cuts across both 
age and gender. 
The methodology proved especially effective. There was some correlation between 
distortion and actual distance but this proved negligible when extreme values were 
taken into account. Analyses with actual distance as a controlling variable were 
carried out but have not been reported as the differences to the main effect F- 
ratio, were vanishingly small. This finding is especially welcome in light of the 
profoundly simple method of distance estimation used. 
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As a methodology, repositionable figures on the large, square page does appear 
to provide an effective weapon against psychophysical sources of error such as 
framing and scaling. The result is all the more interesting considering that the 
method used is little more than a disguised form of ratio-scaling. Subjects did not 
have access to an obvious, stated referent, such as a standard distance. This 
latter aid would not have been appropriate in the current experiment in any case. 
For example, the difficulty in estimating the equivalent of, say, one metre is in a 
photograph would be substantial. 
However, what subjects were able to do was to use the width or size of the 
head/body of the origin figure as a form of standard distance, and furthermore, use 
a different standard for each and every photograph. Thus subjects were using 
multiple 'standard distances' in a design which did not apparently result in 
increased cognitive effort as described in the pilot experiment of Chapter 9. 
CHAPTER 13: Multiple Relationship 
Schemata 
The previous experiment was successful in demonstrating that the judged affective 
qualities of a relationship had a direct bearing on the perceived distance between the two 
figures that constituted the relationship. However in our social encounters we invariably 
observe more than just dyadic relationships. Could the same effect be observed not only 
for dyads but triads, quadruplets etc. within the typical group settings in which we engage? 
The following study is an elaboration of the previous one with the specific intent of 
examining how the affective dynamics within groups of people can affect the perception of 
the social distance that others observe between them, on an individual and on a group 
basis. In this study however, subjects were required to reproduce the distances not just 
between 2 figures but between from 3 to 7. 
It is hypothesized that subjects will distance or foreshorten inter-figure distances according 
to the valence of the social relationships they perceive. A major theoretical input for this 
study is provided by Social Identity Theory described more fully in the introductory chapter: 
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'intra-group closeness' and 'inter-group rivalries' are expected to be the dominant socio- 
spatial schemata observed in the subjects' data. 
Suitable photographs were again selected and from these the heads of all the clearly 
identifiable human figures were copied and made moveable within a frame according to 
the methodology already utilized in Chapter 12. Suitable photographs were those deemed 
to depict relationships of a fairly obvious and unsubtle nature and included a rich variety of 
figures from which judges could infer the existence of groups and their attitudes towards 
themselves and others. See Appendix H for examples. 
This time however, the number of figure heads used in each trial ranged form 3 to 7. In a 
reproduction task, the relative positioning of the figures made by subjects were then 
examined in relation to the ratings of the variety of relationships within the photographs 
given by a set of judges. Relationships were rated in a similar way but with some important 
differences. Judges were asked , 
to first identify the grouping(s) and /or 'single' people 
(those without any obvious group membership or affiliation ) within the photograph. Having 
established this they were then asked to rate the relationships within and between groups 
and individuals. The main idea was not only for judges to identify as many groupings as 
possible but to produce from this knowledge as many possible relationships as they could 
perceive. 
gender with ages ranging from 22 to 41 years. None had remembered seeing any of the 
stimuli before. 
A total of ten judges were used to rate the affective qualities of the stimuli: five of each 
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A total of thirty nine subjects were used. Most were tested in group sessions (up to 10 per 
session). Seventeen subjects were students from the School of Psychology at the 
University of St. Andrews and were aged between 18- 20 years. They kindly volunteered 
to participate in the experiment after their laboratory classes were completed. Each 
student was paid a sum of £3 for their help. Of these, twelve were female and five male. 
The ages of the rest ranged from 18 to 40 years and were volunteers approached 
personally from a pool of friends and family contacts. Of these, fourteen were female and 
eight male. When asked after the experiment, none had remembered seeing any of the 
stimuli before. Once again, subject numbers were not as high as one would have wished 
and so the conclusions regarding the forthcoming inferential statistics need to be 
tempered accordingly. 
Each trial contained from between 3 to 7 figures from the stimulus photo and Table 13.1 
shows that the majority of trials (77%) used 3 or 4 cutout figures. This strategy ensured 
that trials were completed within a reasonable period of time. It was noted that subjects 
took nearly five times as long in the placement phase of the experiment for the one trial 
where they had to place 6 cut-out figures (one already fixed in position). 
Table 13.1: Frequencies of cut-outs (figures) used in experiment 
3 13 43.3 
4 10 33.3 
5 6 20 
7 1 3.3 
Total = 30 trials 
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Initially forty one photos were thought to provide suitable stimuli. As in the previous study, 
they were all published photographs- mostly instances of photojournalism. There were no 
'spatially determined' examples that one might find in advertisements. However, eleven of 
the 41 photographs were eventually rejected having been judged unclear or inappropriate. 
The three main reasons for rejection were 
" (a) fuzzy/ out of focus figures; 
" (b) figures located in a manner which would give subjects a foolproof method of 
identifying location e. g. particular overlapping or embracing; 
" (c) photographs which were ambiguous in the portrayal of the various relationships. 
Of the thirty photographs made into full frame slides, eleven were in colour and nineteen 
in monochrome. 
Judges rated relationships on the same 7 point scale as used in the previous study using 
the intuitively simple construct of positive; negative and neutral relationships. These were 
averaged and categorized according to the procedure already used. Thus three final 
valence categories were arrived at, positive, negative and neutral with the following scale 
boundaries (see Appendix E): 
Positive: Neutral: Negative: 
3 to 1.4 1.39 to -1.39 -1.4 to -3 
+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
Reliability of the judgments was found to be high: 
Alpha = . 9859 
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Reliability was calculated in respect of all relationships produced by judges (86 in total). As 
with the previous study, owing to the fact that not all judges nominated and so rated the 
same relationships, there were some missing data in the analysis. Once again, follow up 
inter judge correlational analysis produced sufficiently high correlations (Pearson's r, 
ranging from . 8031 to . 9473; p=<. 00, in every case) 
There were two phases in the process to establish which of the figures in a given photo 
were to be used in the actual experiment. Some of the photographs included larger 
numbers than those reproduced as figureheads. During the first selection, in deciding 
which of the relationships to investigate, it was decided to use only those that were 
nominated by at least 5 of the judges. 
In the second selection phase, these relationships were assessed with respect to the 
degree of perspicuity of the figures in the photos. Those figures not sufficiently distinct 
and without clearly observable facial expressions were excluded, leading to a further 
reduction in the number of relationships to be investigated. Owing to the nature of the 
photographs used, these were usually in the background or else faded in detail. Other 
faces unused were those angled away from the photographer or cropped at the edge of 
the frame. The basic premise was that the central 'focus' of the photograph provided the 
stimulus figures i. e. those involved in what the photographer considered to be the 
illustrative objective of the published photograph. 
The purpose of the study was to discover differences in distance perception between in- 
group versus out-group distances and to see if foreshortening would occur within groups. 
From the data provided by the judges, a breakdown of relationship type was achieved. 
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Table 13.2: The type of relationship nominated by Judges and their valence ratings 
positive 29 7 
negative 0 10 
neutral 38 
Note that when judges nominated relationships that they thought characterized members 
of a group, such relationships were almost invariably deemed to be positive in nature. 
Relationships between two groups or between a group and a single figure show a much 
wider spread of valence. This pattern of relationship type by valence was not unexpected. 
As in the fifth study, one of the heads from each photograph was fixed in position on the 
booklet page. The head to be used in each case was determined randomly because the 
position of the fixed head within the horizontal plane of the photograph could act as a 
bias. In particular, -the range of distances to be estimated around a centrally located figure 
may introduce a range effect with the smaller distances possibly being associated with an 
increased accuracy (e. g. The range effect observed by Poulton, 1975). 
In all other respects, the experiment was carried out in a more or less identical fashion to 
that of Chapter 12, though subjects were given more time to complete each trial as there 
were more of the cut-outs to position. See Appendix E for the instructions printed for 
subjects and the full list of questions asked by the experimenter. As before, subjects were 
asked not to guess and to leave any unrecognized figures in the top right-hand comer of 
the response booklet page. 
To summarize: 
0 30 photographs of social group settings were used as stimuli 
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" The photographs were rated independently as positive, negative or neutral 
" 39 subjects took part in a repeated measures design. 
" After viewing each photograph, subjects answered a question on content before: 
" Recreating the relative positioning of several cut-out figures (one already fixed) on 
blank paper. 
Owing to the increased number of figures used in each trial, there were necessarily more 
inter-figure distances to be recorded. All possible inter-figure measurements (in 
centimetres) were taken from each trial. Thus for a3 figure photograph there were 3 
measurements to be taken (1-ý2; 1->3; 2-ý3); for a four figure trial, 6 measurements; for a 
five figure trial, 10 measurements and for a7 figure trial, 21 measurements. 
So for every subject, 180 measurements were taken from their response booklets: a total 
of 7020 interfigure measurements were made for all 39 subjects. This exhaustive method 
of data collection ensured that all the selected valence judgments could be matched with 
the subjects' relevant interfigure distances. 
Once collected, the raw data was changed into percentage distortion data using actual 
measurements taken form the original photographs. It was this data which provided the 
dependent variable for most of the subsequent analyses. A detailed breakdown of data for 
every stimulus is given in Table 13.3. Within every trial, each cutout figure was given a 
number from 1 to 7 to assist in the collection of inter-figure distances in the data collection 
phase. 
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Table 13.3: This table shows the relationships and their average ratings produced by 
Judges from the thirty photographs 
Two types of relationship were extracted: those within a group and those either between 
groups or between groups and single figures. Beneath each relationship are the relevant 
inter-figure distance(s) in brackets along with mean % distortion for those distances across 
all subjects. Photographs are listed in no particular order. 
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Fi f 
12 "Family" Family & Royal Family Earl Spencer 
Clergy & Spencers & Prince 
+1.6 +1.38 William 
-2.11 +2.33 
(2-3,2-4,2-5, (1-2,1-3,1-4, (4-2,4-3,4-5) (2-3) 
3-4,3-5,4-5) 1-5) 
+21.75% +7.45% +45.64% -45.2% 
5 Team-mates Team-mates 
& referee 
+2 -2.5 
(2-3) 
(1-2,1-3) 
-36.36% +4.6% 
34 Demonstrat- ors 
+2.33 
(1-2,1-3,1-4, 
1-5,2-3,2-4, 
2-5,3-4,3-5, 
4-5) 
-36.18% 
27 police those on police & 
couch those on 
couch 
+1.78 +2.3 -1.9 
(1-3; 1-5; 3-5) (2-4) (1-2; 1-4; 3-2; 
3-4; 5-2; 5-4) 
-5.98% -5.94% +18.61% 
13 bowling team bowling team & opponents 
+2.17 -1 
(3-4) (1-3; 1-4) 
-14.22% -4.27% 
6 father & sons Diana & sons Diana & 
Charles 
+2.29 +3 -2.11 
(2-3,2-4,3-4) (1-2,1-4,2-4) (1-3) 
+80.39% -26.03% -2.11 
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Table 13.3 cont. 
ýM+ +t Yr 
24 the two girls the two girls 
& beggar 
+1.9 woman 
-1.2 
(2-3) (1-2,1-3) 
-23.95% -10.49% 
16 Prince Philip the protestors P. Philip & & co. the protestors 
+2.5 +2.22 -1.9 
(3-4) (1-2) 
(1-3,1-4,2-3, 
+17.95% -9.62% 2-4) 
+27.6% 
32 the 3 men man wearing 
goggles & 
+2.86 `laughing 
man' 
+3 
(1-2,1-3,2-3) (1-3) 
-7.06% -17.17% 
21 school girl & "eating man" 
boys & school 
pupils 
1.5 0 
(1-2,1-4,2-4) (1-3,2-3,3-4) 
-3.16% +1.93% 
7 the five 
people 
+0.89 
(1-2,1-3,1-4, 
1-5,2-3,2-4, 
2-5,3-4,3-5, 
4-5) 
-6.2% 
29 bodyguards bodyguards 
& Bosnian 
leader 
+1.44 +1.6 
(1-3) (1-2,2-3) 
-28.9% -22.65% 
Chapter 13 Multiple Relationship Schemata 345 
Table 13.3 cont. 
SIMr 
YYr 
3 Diana & boy Diana & onlooker & 
onlooker boy 
+2.86 +2.67 +2.33 
(1-3) (2-3) (1-2) 
-2.56% -2.1% -12.55% 
25 party Arthur 
members Scargill & 
+2.43 supporters 
+2.8 
(2-3,2-4,3-4) 
(2-3,3-4) 
-14.34% 
-24.29% 
17 phone box queuers & 
queuers phone box 
user 
+1.56 -1.9 
(1-2,1-3,2-3) (1-4,2-4,3-4) 
-13.91% -1.9% 
22 miners miners & 
Gordon 
+1.89 Brown 
-0.5 
(1-2) (1-3,2-3) 
-9.14% +12.46% 
18 the three 
politicians 
+2.33 
(1-2,1-3,2-3) 
-16.46% 
9 same-team players & 
players opponent 
player 
+1.71 -2.5 (1-3) (1-2,2-3) 
-22.76 -13.63% 
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Table 13.3 cont. 
...... ..... 
14 group of five 
+0.5 
(1-2,1-3,1-4, 
2-3,2-4,3-4) 
-6.98% 
25 party Arthur 
members Scargill & 
+2.43 supporters 
+2.8 
(2-3,2-4,3-4) 
(2-3,3-4) 
-14.34 
-24.29% 
17 phone box queuers & queuers phone box 
user 
+1.56 -1.9 
(1-2,1-3,2-3) (1-4,2-4,3-4) 
-13.91% 
fl -1.9% 
22 miners miners & Gordon 
+1.89 Brown 
-0.5 
(1-2) (1-3,2-3) 
-9.14% +12.46% 
18 the three 
politicians 
+2.33 
(1-2,1-3,2-3) 
-16.46% 
9 same-team players & 
players opponent 
player 
+1.71 -2.5 
(1-3) (1-2,2-3) 
-22.76% -13.63% 
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Table 13.3 cont. 
Yr-Yw 
14 group of five 
+0.5 
(1-2,11-3,11-4, 
2-3,2-4,3-4) 
-6.98% 
25 three dancers 
+2.25 
(1-2,1-3,2-3) 
-15.18% 
4 light-shirted light-shirted 
players players & 
opponent 
+2 player 
-1.67 
(1-3) (1-2,2-3) 
-10.42% -2.1% 
35 demonstrat- male female ors demonstrator demonstrator 
& man in suit & man in suit 
+2.29 -2.56 -2 (1-2) (1-3) (2-3) 
-18.87% +29.29% +66.14% 
8 men at table woman & men at table 
+2.33 
+0.63 
(1-3,1-4,3-4) (1-2,2-3,2-4) 
-12.9% -6.85% 
31 group of girls 
+3 
(1-2,1-3,2-3) 
-20.3% 
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Table 13.3 cont. 
i"w Y 
20 The Spice 
Girls Pop 
Group 
+2.3 
(1-2,1-3,1-4, 
1-5,2-3,2-4, 
2-5,3-4,3-5, 
4-5) 
-9.97% 
15 celebrating golfers 
+3 
all inter-figure 
distances (21 
in total) 
-24.92% 
10 male family 
members 
+3 
(1-2; 1-3; 2-3) 
-19.77% 
3 woman & 
family 
-+1.43 
(1-2,1-3,1-4, - 
2-3,2-4,3-4) 
-16.98% 
19 political Tony Blair & Brown & 
meeting Gordon others 
Brown 
+0.75 -1.29 -1 
(1-2,1-3,1-4, (3-4) (1-4,2-4,3-4) 
2-3,2-4,3-4) 
-14.54% +24.90% +0.27% 
33 group of five celebrating 
+2.89 
(1-2,1-3,1-4, 
1-5,2-3,2-4, 
2-5,3-4,3-5, 
4-5) 
-16.98% 
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Relationships were assigned to one of the three valence categories as detailed in the 
scheme above. Mean percentage distortions were then calculated for each of the three 
categories: positive, negative and neutral . Values for each category are given in Table 
13.4. Figure 13.1 illustrates the comparison graphically. 
Table 13.4: A breakdown of data across all subjects, giving the average distortion, its 
direction (under. or over-estimate: + or) and other summary data for each valence category 
'POSITIVE' -12.67 20.27 80.39 -45.2 125.59 
DISTORTION 
'NEGATIVE' 29.98 35.4 106.41 -13.63 120.04 
DISTORTION 
'NEUTRAL' -0.21 11.44 24.9 -14.54 39.44 
DISTORTION 
This comparison of the three categories resembles that from the previous study. The 
foreshortening and overestimation observed again occurred, in the hypothesized direction. 
The observed S. D. seems to be much less for the neutral category this time. No obvious 
explanation presents itself regarding this, however the main point remains unaffected by 
this anomaly. Subjects are decidedly overestimating inter-figure distances for those 
relationships perceived by judges to be negative and vice versa. 
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Figure 13.1: Comparison between valence judgement categories with respect to their 
associated overall mean distortions 
Are the pronounced differences observed above significant? An analysis of variance for 
repeated measures did produce a significant result (F=4.1 1; DF=2; p=. 034). However this 
cannot be relied upon as there were unequal numbers of cases in the levels of the 
dependent variable and SPSS treated most of the entered data as missing. 
A Chi-Square analysis was calculated with the dependent variable transformed into two 
categories: overestimation and underestimation (expected frequencies are shown in 
brackets): 
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Table 13.5: Chi-squared table shows the observed frequencies for the two categorical 
variables, valence and distortion 
Valence 
Distortion negative neutral positive 
overestimate 8 5 3 
(2.8) (3.1) (10.1) 
underestimate 2 6 13 
(7.2) (7.9) 25.9 
Chi-Square value = 21.948,2 df, significance < . 01 
There appears to be a significantly strong association of overestimation with negatively 
valenced relationships and underestimation with positively valenced ones as the 
descriptive data above predicted. However with two of the cells containing expected 
frequencies less than the requisite five, it was considered prudent to carry out further 
tests, looking particularly at how valence of relationship might be correlated with distortion. 
Could a regression model allow the judges estimations to be used to predict the 
distortion? 
Pearson's r correlations were computed between valence and distortion and to check for 
an unwanted association between actual interfigure distance and distortion. 
Valence x distortion= r= -0.5518, (p< 0.01) 
`Real' distance x distortion= r= -0.184, (p=0.171) 
With a possible confounding factor eliminated, a scatterplot was produced for the 
relationship between the two experimental variables ( Figure 13. ) The relationship does 
appear to be a reasonable candidate for linear regression analysis. 
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Figure 13.2: Plot of distortion by valence. Although It might at first appear not to provide 
the best fit, the best fit line was computed by the statistical package used. SPSS 
Dependent Variable.. DISTORTION overall % distortion 
Multiple R . 55178 R Square . 30446 Adjusted R Square . 29182 Standard Error 22.88128. 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 1 12604.91074 12604.91074 
Residual 55 28795.42428 523.55317 
F= 24.07570 Signif F< . 01 
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Variables in the Equation 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
VALENCE -8.213770 1.673991 -. 551783 -4.907 <. 01 
(Constant) 6.026225 3.504252 1.720 . 0911 
Results show that the predictor accounts for roughly 30% of the variance observed in the 
dependent variable; the F statistic shows the correlation coefficient R to be significant. In 
other words, the valence of an inter-figure relationship is a good predictor of the distortion 
in distance perception between figures perceived to be in that relationship. 
What about hypothesis 4, regarding the influence of group schemata on inter-figure 
distance perception? 
To address this question the data was subdivided into two parts. The first part was 
composed of distortions averaged for the inter-figure distances between figures nominated 
by judges to be members of a group and figures of either another group or a 'single' 
individual but not between group members themselves. The second part consisted of 
distortions averaged for distances only between group members themselves. Thus we 
have two sets of data with which to address the question: "between" data and "within" 
data. 
13... 3.1 Between Data Analyses: <::.: _::: `:::::.... ;::: ::::.. ::.: .... 
Do we perceive the distances between groups and other groups or between groups and 
individuals through the perspective of the social schemata we hold for those situations? 
Several analyses were made to help answer this question beginning with regression 
analysis. 
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Table 13.6: Breakdown of data for distortion by valence for the Between data subset 
'POSITIVE' 
DISTORTION 
'NEGATIVE' 
DISTORTION 
'NEUTRAL' 
DISTORTION 
40 
-18.07 14.85 -2.1 -45.2 43.1 
29.98 -35.4 106.41 -13.63 120.04 
3.18 11.52 24.90 -10.49 35.39 
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Figure 13.3: The association of mean distortion with valence category using the data from 
Table 13.7 
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The graph in Figure 13.3 bears a striking resemblance to that obtained in Fig 13.1. Table 
13.5 indicates that the data for negative distortion is especially similar. A Chi-Square 
analysis showed a strong association of negative valence with overestimation and positive 
valence with underestimation. 
Table 13.7: Chi-square table shows the observed frequencies for the two categorical 
variables, valence and distortion 
Expected frequencies are shown in brackets. 
Valence 
Distortion negative neutral positive 
overestimate 8 5 0 
(5.2) (4.2) (3.6) 
underestimate 2 3 7 
(4.8) (3.8) 3.4 
Chi-Square value = 11.078,2 df, significance < . 01 
Once again, it should be noted that some cells have expected frequencies less than five; 
further analysis was necessary. We next ask if valence is a good predictor of distortion 
type and magnitude? On the basis of Figure 13.4, a linear regression model was 
constructed on this subset of data with the following results: 
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Figure 13.4: A scattergram showing the relationship between distortion and valence for the 
data subset. between. Once again, athough it might at first appear not to provide the best fit, 
the best fit line was computed by the statistical package used. SPSS 
A Pearson's r coefficient was computed before the following regression analysis: distortion 
by valence, r=-. 591, p< . 01. 
Dependent Variable.. DISTORTION overall % distortion 
Multiple R . 59130 R Square . 34964 Adjusted R Square 
. 
32136 
Standard Error 25.66925 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
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Regression 1 
Residual 23 
8147.36866 
15154.93676 
8147.36866 
658.91029 
F= 12.36491 Signif F< . 01 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
VALENCE -9.160664 2.605142 -. 591302 -3.516 <. 01 
(Constant) 5.549170 5.178886 1.071 . 2951 
Accounting for just over 32% of the variance in distortion, the valence of the depicted 
relationships does again seem to be a good predictor of the type of distortion to which 
subjects are prone. Whether positive or negatively valenced, the relationship between two 
groups or between a group and an individual has a significant effect on the size and 
direction of distortion in estimating the distances between them. 
13: 4.3.2 ::. ; *""! Within group analyses'. 
The same analysis procedure was used to investigate the perceived distances within 
groups. The dominant result was an apparent association between positively valenced 
relationships and foreshortening in the perceived interfigure distances. Another striking 
feature of the summary analysis is the absence of negatively valenced results: judges only 
nominated relationships in this category that were perceived as being positive or neutral in 
nature. This absence of negative valences had important implications in the subsequent 
analyses. 
Table 13.8: Breakdown of data for distortion by valence for the Within data subset 
'POSITIVE' -11.01 21.62 80.39 -36.36 116.75 
DISTORTION 
'NEUTRAL' -9.24 4.61 -6.20 -14.54 8.34 
DISTORTION 
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Figure 13.5: Barchart showing the association of mean distortion with valence category 
using the data from Table 13.8 
Is there a negative correlation between valence and distortion as one would expect? 
When a correlation was computed, a negative coefficient was obtained but it was small 
and not significant: -069, p= . 708. Figure 13.6 illustrates why. 
neural positive 
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Figure 13.6: Scattergram showing the relationship between distortion and valence for the 
data subset: Within 
With only a slight negative correlation and quite a dispersion around the best fit line, it 
came as no surprise that further analyses failed to show significant results. A Chi -Square 
analysis produced the following result (expected frequencies are shown in brackets): 
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Table 13.9: Chi-square table showing the observed frequencies for the two categorical 
variables, valence and distortion form the Within group data 
Valence 
Distortion neutral positive 
overestimate 0 3 
(0.3) (2.7) 
underestimate 3 26 
(2.7) 26.3 
Chi-Square value = 0.34245,1 df, significance = . 55842 
Note the preponderance of counts in the positive-underestimate cell. The lack of data for 
the other three categories is undoubtedly one reason for this disappointing result (and for 
the number of cells with expected frequencies less than five). As a matter of interest, it 
was found that when the cell for neutral-overestimate was brought up from zero to just 
three, a Chi Square was achieved of 5.50386 with a significance level at . 01897. 
Clearly 
the data is highly suggestive but results may be clouded by a lack of 'spread' in the data, 
with other category combinations not being, perhaps, sufficiently catered for in the original 
stimulus set. Rather than calculate a Fisher Exact test on the above data (which can cope 
with expected frequencies less than five), an exploratory approach to the data was 
adopted in the first instance. 
It was thought possible that outliers or extreme values might be occluding the results. 
When five of the outliers from Figure 13.6 were removed, a more encouraging picture 
illustrated in Figure 13.7 was obtained. 
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Figure 13.7: Scattergram showing Figure 13.6 with five outliers removed from the data with a 
new best-fit line added 
When a correlational analysis was calculated with this data, a coefficient of -. 4132 with a 
significance level at . 032 was obtained. With this more promising 
data, a multiple 
regression was performed with the following results: 
Dependent Variable.. DISTORTION overall % distortion 
Multiple R . 41319 R Square 
. 17073 Adjusted R Square 
. 13755 Standard Error 7.06988 
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Analysis of Variance 
DF 
Regression 1 
Residual 25 
F=5.14682 
Sum of Squares 
257.25458 
1249.58023 
Signif F= . 0322 
Mean Square 
257.25458 
49.98321 
--------ý-ý--- Variables in the Equation - 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
VALENCE -4.599052 2.027211 -. 413189 -2.269 . 0322 (Constant) -5.245469 4.462847 -1.175 . 2509 
Note that the amount of variance in subjects' distortion that the predictor accounts for is 
noticeably down (to about 14%) when compared with the corresponding result obtained 
from the Between group data (32%). The most parsimonious conclusion would be that 
foreshortening does indeed take place within stimulus groups where relationships are 
judged to be positive. However this result comes with a caveat with regard to the effect of 
negatively valenced relationships within a social group (intra-group rivalries perhaps)- this 
possibility has not been adequately covered by the range of stimuli used in this 
experiment. 
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The results seem very supportive of the hypotheses. The way that subjects perceive the 
positioning of figures within a photograph does appear to be directly influenced by judges' 
assessments of these social schemata that are illustrated. In other words, social schemata 
appear to induce systematic readjustments in the spatial maps constructed when viewing 
people in a group setting. 
An important objective when choosing the stimuli was to arrive at an end result 
uncontaminated by previous experience of the photographs or one that had been primed 
by deliberate positioning of people within the frame by the photographer. In going for `real' 
as opposed to 'lab' stimuli, compromises did inevitably have to be made. Of course it was 
expected (and even hoped) that subjects would bring prior knowledge to their task. They 
may not have seen the particular image of Diana with the Prince of Wales and their sons 
before but they would most likely know of the estrangement within that family unit and 
(unknowingly) bring such knowledge to bear on their perceptions. 
Nevertheless, one or two of the subjects expressed difficulty in identifying several of the 
figures in a photograph after the testing session was finished. It was not unexpected as 
some of the photographs contained images of British politicians unlikely to be recognized 
by some of the subjects and especially by the few foreign students who were included in 
the subject pool. Another problem was that despite careful selection of photographs, those 
that contained certain physical features that may have 'brought' people together did slip 
through: people seated around a table are also "around" each other. 
A curious artefact of the experiment, not noted until the data collection phase, was that 
two figures nominated by judges to have a positive relationship would have little chance of 
undergoing the foreshortening process in the experimental phase if separated on the 
photographic plane by an individual with negative relationships to both. It is interesting to 
note that, in such a case, it appeared that the 'disliked' individual was squeezed out of the 
way, either up or down (i. e. at right angles to the horizontal plane of the other two). 
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The main reason for choosing the types of photographic stimuli used in this experiment 
and in the experiments of Chapters 11 and 12 was to avoid artificially contrived social 
scenarios. It was feared that, for example, advertisements would contain scenes already 
spatially manipulated in an way obvious to the subject. Film posters are an obvious 
example where posture, expression and juxtaposition of characters are carefully chosen to 
encapsulate the content of the film. So photojournalist examples were used as archetypes 
of naturalistic social settings. 
What are the disadvantages of this approach? Naturalistic they may be, but 
photojournalist shots can also be 'contaminated' with possible interpretations of 
contradictory emotional value. An example of this can be seen in the "Skye Bridge 
demonstration" photograph in Appendix H. The female protester in the middle background 
seems to be smiling at the rather unpleasant looking confrontation going on between the 
principal figures in the foreground. Indeed it may be a smile consonant with the situation 
("politician gets his comeuppance"? ). However for a subject viewing the photograph for a 
matter of seconds, the valency might be compromised by apparent emotional 
contradiction. 
Construction of one's stimuli might help in eradicating specious emotional content. One 
could produce stimuli more consistent in their social valency but also balance the stimulus 
set for the number of figures in each photograph, the proportion of background to 
foreground figures, ratio of colour to black & white, standardization of lighting within the 
photographs, etc. 
A concomitant, potential problem with the stimuli used was that they may have referred to 
groups lacking in cohesiveness. 'Proper groups' (as distinct from a `bunch of individuals'), 
would elicit responses more likely to be in line with the hypotheses. Whether the subject 
perceived the individuals present in a photograph as members of a group is a moot point. 
If one was to construct one's own photographic stimuli, then an assessment of the 
perspicuity of the featured groups would be desirable. 
Despite the above reservations, the most striking aspect of the data was its sheer 
robustness. Simple, untransformed percentage data was used as the basis for analyses 
and it was not necessary to record relative foreshortening/distancing within the data: (i. e. 
lesser /greater percentage change expected with lesser /greater separation). Positive and 
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negative distortions in the data allowed use of the absolute terms: underestimation and 
overestimation. 
CHAPTER 14: General Discussion 
The following is a brief synopsis of the main conclusions of the thesis, 
summarizing each experiment in turn. The aim is to critically assess each study 
and determine the degree to which the hypotheses have been supported. 
The environs of St. Andrews was chosen as the basis for its inhabitants to 
estimate the distances between nominated acquaintances living in the town. 
Comparisons were made between estimates concerning 'liked' acquaintances and 
those of 'unliked' according to subjects' own ratings of nominees. It was 
hypothesized that foreshortening would take place for 'liked' acquaintances and 
this was indeed the case. 
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Subjects rated their nominees inter alla on two affiliation variables:, 
" closeness of friendship and 
" would try to see more oftentwould not try to see more often. 
Both of these variables were found to explicate the' degree of relative 
overestimation made by subjects when estimating the distance between their 
homes and those of their nominees. Those nominees categorized as close friends 
showed significantly less distance distortion than those categorized as casual 
acquaintances. The second affiliation variable, essentially a measure of 
liking/disliking, was particularly successful in predicting the degree of distance 
perception distortion" with 'less liked' individuals showing greater relative 
overestimation than 'liked' individuals. 
Both hypotheses 1 and 2 were given good support- the socially valent 'liking' 
variable was responsible for significant distortion in distance estimation in the 
predicted direction. Hypothesis 3 also received support in a regression model 
which showed increased liking for a nominated individual leading to greater 
underestimation of the distance to that individual's home. 
Given the doubt cast on the importance of a configurational spatial schema in 2.6, 
the reader might wonder why the methodology implicitly involved assumptions 
about the use of just that. Subjects were asked to provide "crow's flight" estimates 
which presupposes a survey-like representation. The reader might also remember 
the position taken in Chapter Two that a schema for, e. g. an urban environment, 
need not be configurational in the traditional cognitive-mapping sense; the criterion 
that subjects use for selecting information about the domicile of an acquaintance is 
the functional utility of that information. 
It seems likely that making a visit to the home of an acquaintance requires thought: 
at least some time thinking about the distance between the home and the 
destination. Crossing 'through' streets and buildings mentally in an effort to guess 
the average time need to get there is not an unlikely procedure and whilst the 
newly augmented schema might not be survey-like in the traditional sense, it will at 
least have elements of this configuration because of the functional utility criterion. 
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Taken with the need for a methodology requiring easy accessibility, and the 
predicted robustness of the isomorphism as discussed in Chapter Seven, then the 
choice of 'crow's flight' distance estimation seems not unreasonable. It could be 
argued that "thinking through" streets and buildings is not a universal tactic and 
this may indeed be so, although the results do tend to suggest that the variance so 
introduced into the data is insufficient to disguise the distorting effects of social 
knowledge on the spatial schema. However the inconclusive results obtained from 
the biographical variables in particular (modes of transport used etc. ) point to the 
need for refinement of the data collection technique. Results from other 
experiments reported here suggest that a form of two-dimensional map-making 
may be a more productive way of addressing this issue. 
Subjects at a Northern Ireland university were asked to recreate on a scale, with 
the help of a referent distance, distances between a series of 18 towns in Northern 
Ireland. They were then assessed on a number of measures including order of 
preference (which towns they would prefer to live in), reasons for their orders ( 
closeness to family; facilities etc. ) and lastly but most importantly, the degree to 
which they believed that one or other of the two main denominations predominated 
in each town. It was hypothesized that 'in-group' towns (those towns believed to 
predominate with the subject's own declared religion) would show more 
foreshortening than 'out-group' towns in the distance estimation task. 
The results supported Hypotheses 1 to 3 but only when subjects' own religious 
attributions, rather than those of judges, were used as the independent variable. 
Furthermore, towns perceived to be most polarized on the religious dimension 
showed the greatest overall distortion. 
The main finding relating to the influence of subjects' own religious attributions 
points to the importance of individual schema salience when addressing the raw 
data, at least for these inter-urban estimations. To an extent, the caveat entered 
above with regard to assumptions about survey-like cognitive maps applies here 
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also. It could be argued that subjects would not have previously contemplated the 
distances from Belfast to all the towns and accordingly too much guesswork was 
brought into the task. 
This can be tempered slightly with the knowledge that due to the political situation 
at the time of the data collection, the names of all the towns would have featured 
in the news, some more than others. Knowledge of locations would have varied 
from precise to general so perhaps the criterion of "functional utility" applies here 
also. Personal, socio-economic data was not collected from subjects but it seems 
reasonable to suppose that most of the students who volunteered would be 
reasonably well informed on the geo-political situation of Northern Ireland and 
would repeatedly have had occasion to judge the distance away of the latest bomb 
outrage. 
Of all the experiments in the thesis, perhaps this particular one presents the most 
problems for an explanation of the data in terms of socio-spatial schemata. As 
Figure 9.9, shows, an analysis by simple category seems persuasive. In as much 
as categorization is an essential part of schematic functioning, however, perhaps 
this pattern of results is less surprising. It seems doubtful that the subjects, all but 
three of whom could be classed as "local" (a demographic characteristic of 
Queen's University is that the overwhelming majority of its intake are from Northern 
Ireland), would 'merely' ascribe a category of "in= or "out-group" to the towns they 
were required to consider in the experiment. These towns do come with a heavy 
socio-political valence, whether the specific attribution of a town is consensually 
agreed or not. 
Inhabitants of a particular area of Belfast were asked to perform a 2-D distance 
estimation task on a map of Northern Ireland. The task involved placing pins 
labeled with already chosen towns in their correct position on the map. The area of 
the city was unique in that the so-called "peace-line" divided the neighbourhood 
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and defined two distinct areas where religion defined the category of inhabitant. It 
was hypothesized that the sectarian nature of the area would influence the mental 
schema of N. Ireland with regard to the perceived religion of the stimulus towns. 
Although configurational accuracy of respondents' maps was poor, estimates of 
distance from Belfast to the towns reflected the subjective motivational influence 
of religion. Distances to towns perceived to be 'in-group' with respect to religion 
were underestimated; those to towns perceived to be 'out-group' were 
overestimated. 
The observations regarding the importance of target-town social valence made for 
Chapter 9 above, apply to a large extent here also. Support for hypotheses 1 to 3 
was forthcoming but data for hypothesis 4 (to examine the estimation errors 
between target towns) was too 'noisy' to allow for reliable analysis. With hindsight, 
it seems unsurprising that people in both surveyed areas would have limited 
experience and limited knowledge of the towns used in the map creation task It 
was obvious that they had little configurational accuracy in their cognitive maps of 
Northern Ireland, distances and orientations between the towns being seriously in 
error. Hence attempts to analyze these with regard to Hypothesis 4 had to be 
abandoned. Despite this, the use of 'crow's flight, ' straight-line distances in the 
analysis were appropriate, as in Chapter 9, given the geographic scale on which 
the task took place. 
Straight-line distances are arguably not the most functionally sound basis on which 
to make inter-urban estimates, when undertaking a particular journey. However, 
they are used when comparing a group of destinations, one with another, which is 
essentially what is facilitated by a schema at the first stage of planning. 
It seems reasonable to assume that when such 'calculations' are made, travel 
distance by road (the overwhelmingly predominant form of travel in Northern 
Ireland) does approximate roughly to straight-line distance. Residents almost 
invariably quote them when making inter-city trip estimates in the United States 
where there is an even closer equivalence between miles and driving time. It is 
conceded that, given the subject sample used here, other criteria for estimating 
inter-town distance (typical journey times? ) might prove more theoretically resilient. 
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Examples of photojournalism were used to provide social group stimuli in a 
distance estimation task. Captions accompanying each photograph, presented in 
slide form, had previously been judged as generally positive or negative in valence 
("affiliative" or "disaffiliative") regarding the relationships observed. It was 
hypothesized that the nature of the captions would influence the formation of 
social schemata after observation: Distance estimation between figures in the 
photograph would vary according to which category was signalled by the 
accompanying caption. 
The captions were non-effective in over-ruling the valency shown in the 
photographs but effective if the latter was neutral or ambiguous. It was found that 
the captions were confusing the issue, perhaps by manipulating more than just 
affiliation; the valency of the relationships themselves proved crucial in estimation 
distortion. Specifically, for relationships judged as neutral (people in the 
relationships neither liking nor disliking each other), disaffiliative captions were 
indeed found to elicit relative overestimation of inter-figure distance and, 
conversely, affiliative captions elicited relative underestimation. 
It appears that the oversight regarding the valency of the stimuli themselves was 
largely to blame for the initial lack of support for the hypotheses. Once this 
problem was resolved, the fact that the valency of the photographs could be 
manipulated so directly with captions seems to support a schema based 
explanation of the results. 
The social information in the captions (e. g. "Soviet liberation of the Armenians in 
Azerbajan" / "Soviet Invasion of Azerbajan") allows for initial categorization and 
then schematization as the subject realizes the likely feelings between figures in 
the photograph. It seems probable that (previously held) knowledge structures 
were activated with the material presented. These would subsequently have been 
integrated with relevant selected and interpreted elements from the photo caption 
pairs to produce a new schematic of the social scene. 
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This study required subjects to recreate distances viewed on photo slides by 
actually moving a photocopied cut-out of a human figurehead on a large frame. 
The photographs had already been rated for affect by eight judges. A simple 
question on photograph content was asked during each trial to avert attention form 
the actual objective of the experiment: to see if foreshortening/distancing of figures 
occurred in accordance with how the photographs were rated. 
Results indicated that relationships judged to be positive in nature were 
underestimated and those judged negative were overestimated. Moreover, in a 
regression model, the values of relationship judgments themselves were found to 
be efficient predictors of distance distortion. Hypotheses 1 to 3 are given support. 
Earlier it was pointed out that the individual's own schema salience, vis ä vis the 
valency of the stimuli, is important when assessing the data. Why did this 
experiment rely on judges' evaluations of the social valency of the photographs? 
There are two reasons: extremely high inter-judge reliability and, frankly, the 
demands of the experimental situation. Getting volunteer subjects to rate the 
stimuli themselves after the experiment proper had been concluded would have 
been difficult and may have, in any case, been retro-influenced by their previous 
figure placements. What is important to note is that the valency of the 
photographs, albeit assessed by judges, provided strong support for the major 
hypotheses (1 to 3). 
Perhaps the main difference between this and the previous experiment is that of 
methodology. The technique could be described as a form of 'reproduction' (see 
2.14). The success of the technique is not just results based. It's simplicity made it 
an 'easy' task for subjects to carry out and comments made by them were almost 
entirely positive. From the experimenter's point of view, the actual data 
measurement from the response booklets in this experiment (but more especially 
in the following one) took a considerable period of time. Development of a more 
efficient, perhaps computer-display based arrangement for this type of data 
collection is desirable. 
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The experiment was an elaboration of the previous one and sought to examine 
how multiple relationships, not just dyads, were perceived spatially in relation to 
their affective nature. Figures in the photographs were assigned by judges to 
perceived group membership and rated according to valence ("within group"; 
"between group": positive or negative). Within each trial, there were at least two 
target figures to be positioned, using the same methodology as above. 
Overall results echoed those of the experiment of Chapter Twelve: positively 
valenced relationships were underestimated compared with negatively valenced 
ones. In addition, distances between groups or between groups and 'individuals' 
(non-group members) followed this trend. Inter-figure distances within groups were 
entirely underestimated. No negatively valenced relationships had been observed 
by the judges in the within-group data. Support is given to hypotheses 1 to 3 and 
the results also accord with the expectations of Social Identity Theory, supporting 
hypothesis 4. 
This experiment was the only one on which to fully test hypothesis 4. Although 
efforts were made to include such an analysis in the experiment described in 
Chapter 10, but without success, for the reasons detailed above. The comments 
made above about Chapter 11 largely apply here, and indeed to the experiment 
described in Chapter 12 also. 
It seems plausible to suppose, though admittedly there is no way of knowing this 
from the data alone, that the short interval available for subjects to perceive and 
respond to the stimuli favours a schema approach. An objection might be that 
precisely because there is not much time for analysis, categorization might be a 
'quick and dirty' solution! What such an explanation neglects (and this is the theme 
behind much of the work of this thesis), is that the evaluation, apparently 
necessary for systematic distance estimation errors, is absent in a categorical 
analysis. An interesting idea, to provide some evidence on which to judge the 
issue, would be to conduct a poll after the experiment is finished to gauge 
qualitatively what subjects were actually thinking during the trials. 
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The set of six experiments did use several scales of distance in the various types 
of distance estimation tasks. The last three were all slide based but within the 
slides there was quite a range from several centimetres to several metres. Scales 
of distance not used in the present thesis were inter-city and inter-country (see 
14.2.2 anon). 
Whilst the entire range of scales was not fully investigated the results thus far do 
lead one to infer that socio-spatial isomorphism does occur on inter-country and 
inter-continental distances. To some extent the question about the type of stimuli 
used in the set of six experiments (inanimate vs. animate) discussed in 7.3.3 
overlaps with that of scale (hypothesis 5): i. e. you cannot usually have inter-town 
estimates at intimate distances, except perhaps when such distances are being 
estimated on a map. 
inquiry. These are discussed below, dealing with each experiment in turn. 
Why were variables such as 'transport type' included in the design of this study? It 
was hoped that such variables, although not central to the hypotheses, would help 
explain some of the distance estimation error data. In the event they proved to be 
peripheral but future research might ask subjects for an additional set of distance 
estimations- this time between landmarks within a town. 
The results of the six experiments have suggested various additional avenues of 
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By eliciting the affective valence of such landmarks to subjects at the same time, 
one might be able to build up a picture of how individuals' urban schemata are 
influenced by `positive buildings' as well as `positive people'. So an Epicurean 
subject who looks upon a supermarket on the outskirts with some pleasure might 
relatively underestimate the distance from his or her home by comparison with an 
acquaintance who lives close by the same supermarket. This may nevertheless be 
an acquaintance whom the subject may not like very much. In other words, the 
additional data would reveal localized (and perhaps not so localized) regions of the 
urban schema where compression or expansion of distances would allow the 
valence of people and places to better explain overall distance estimation errors. 
On the question of effective distance estimation methodology, perhaps the ideal 
way around the ratio-scaling dilemma would be to use a plain, two-dimensional 
field, with no scale or standard distance, on which subjects would place markers to 
indicate the distances between their homes and those of their acquaintances. This 
would certainly give a better indication of the internal consistency and validity of 
the individual's schema without the possible confounding error of peoples' different 
concepts of just how long a 'standard' distance is. 
Furthermore, this would add the enticing possibility of relating not only subject- 
acquaintance distance estimations to valence of relationship (as in this study) but 
also relating acquaintance-acquaintance distance estimations to how the subject 
perceives possible relationships within the acquaintance group. This calls to mind 
the sociogrammatic approach. The danger that such an approach (and indeed 
many other methods of eliciting internal representations) might engender is that 
the task could change as well as tap the schema, as noted by Byme (1979). 
Limiting the use of physical landmarks as scale and configurational markers on the 
plane surface would probably also limit this effect. 
For subject-acquaintance investigations only, perhaps the best way to proceed 
would be to ask subjects to provide their own standard distance, whether this be 
that from the subject's home to the acquaintance's home or from the subject's 
home to a landmark. The ensuing ratio-scaling estimations could then be correctly 
transformed into error data using the subject's own standard distance. 
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Results regarding the 'no-religion' subjects need to be treated with considerable 
caution- there were only seven people who indicated this membership category on 
their questionnaires. Such a small number is, of course, not unexpected in 
Northern Ireland where identity, religious and otherwise, has a salience unequaled 
elsewhere and where 'opting out' of group membership is not a viable option. It 
was thought that the two religious groupings, Protestant and Catholic, would 
counterbalance in experimental design terms and the results do not undermine this 
view. In any case, the perspective afforded by the variable in-group/out-group, 
enabled analysis of a set of neutral stimuli more effectively than consideration of 
subjects' religion per se. 
A possible objection is that subjects were required to make only estimations from 
one point- and particularly when that one point, Belfast, lies on the east coast. 
Over- and underestimations in the data could be dissimulated by subjects' 
differentially varying cognitive maps of that part of eastern Northern Ireland. 
Although in this study, the schematic biasing of subjects' schemata for inter-town 
distances were unquestionably, revealed, it may have been partly due to a 
fortuitous selection of target towns. Distance estimations from other towns within 
Northern Ireland, controlling for geographical location and religion, could be used 
to produce composite maps. This would be a multidimensional scaled resolution of 
the geography of the land they co-habit, comparing the two sectarian groups. both 
sectarian groups' own geography of the land they co-habit. Such an approach 
would allow the examination of such variables as proximity to the Northern Ireland/ 
Eire border and the influence of neighbouring out-group towns on the distance 
estimation to in-group towns. 
One could argue that the 'problem' may not be one: unless Catholic towns are 
distributed non-randomly compared to the Protestant ones, the possible objection 
above becomes unconvincing. However, the role of the origin town, common to all 
subjects, may be of some importance. Belfast is predominantly Protestant but it 
should be remembered that the respondents were making estimates from their 
own 'turf', an area homogenous in religious composition, so this issue is more 
complex than at first seems. 
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The lack of contribution made by the additional variables (importance of 
geographical location, facilities etc. in choosing the towns in which to live; 
frequency of visiting, and so on) may have been due in part to the nature of the 
response scales provided. AI to 7 scale may perhaps have provided too much 
scope for response- better perhaps to have asked- "list the towns you travel to 
often. " Rather than ask subjects for the relative importance of a town's 
geographical position#etc., it may have been better to simply ask- "what are the 
factors you see as important in ordering towns in terms of preference? ". 
On the other hand these variables may have been quite otiose in terms of distance 
estimation. Just over 46% of data in the frequency of travel (to a town) variable 
was for the value 0- i. e. once per year or less. This lack of travel to the 18 towns 
overall probably meant that most favoured town', and the importance of proximity 
of family and friends etc. were variables with little influence on the perception of 
inter-town distance. 
Given the politico-religious dimension in spatial schematic effects demonstrated 
here, the scope for further research seems wide. One might profitably look at other 
emotive geographic entities from a Northern Ireland perspective. Would Catholics 
perceive a city like Dublin as being closer than their Protestant counterparts and 
would Protestants perceive London as being closer than Catholics, in line with 
hypotheses 1 to 3? Such an experiment would be best served by asking subjects 
to estimate distances from a long list of all possible distance pairs in order to 
produce a multi-dimensional scaling solution. The spatial pattern of in-group and 
out group towns for the two sectarian subject groups would be rather interesting. 
Other dependent variables, aside from straight-line, inter-urban distance could 
yield interesting results. Different spatial dimensions such as the size or shape of 
an out-group region might be characteristically represented in the subjects' 
schemata for the geographical area in question. One is reminded of the famous 
example in Downs and Stea (1973) of the sketch map of North America as drawn 
by a teenage Richard Nixon, showing an inflated Cuba off the Florida coast, 
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apparently threatening mainland USA. In the present context, the expression so 
favoured by social commentators on Irish issues, i. e. "redraw the political map", 
might have more validity than such a glib piece of journalistic shorthand would 
imply. 
Was the placement task too difficult, i. e. was the information provided by the 
representation standard distance insufficient? It is possible that additional inclusion 
of the outline of Lough Neagh might have proved useful to subjects. The Lough is 
the largest lake in the British Isles with an area of 153 square miles, ' has a 
distinctive, almost rectangular shape and lies in the centre of Northern Ireland. As 
none of the eighteen towns lies along or near its shoreline, its inclusion might have 
led to less configurational error. 
Yet if the concept of religion is important to subjects then why was the variable of 
perceived importance of religion so ineffective? The self-reports on the degree of 
importance subjects place on the religion of a town's inhabitants may not honestly 
reflect how important religion is to them when considering their preference for a 
town. Subjects did, as figures 10.6 and 10.7 illustrate, prefer their own group towns 
after all. People resident in this particular part of Belfast, although willing to 
disclose their own denomination without trepidation, may well have felt wary about 
divulging their opinions on the denomination of others. Residents are probably 
reluctant to admit that they are influenced by religious prejudice though they 
clearly are. 
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A further development of this experiment would require a new selection of 
photographs of recent topical interest, with figures or situations that are easily 
recognizable. Subjects would first study each photograph and then devise their 
own captions. The instruction to subjects might be- "write down the caption that 
you think might have accompanied this published photograph" Only after this 
invention phase would subjects be required to make estimates of inter-figure 
distances. 
The distance estimation phase of the experiment could be designed to take into 
account the fact that the choice of estimation pair would also be that of the 
subject. This would be a necessary progression; if the distances to be estimated 
are specified by the experimenter, they may not be that of the subject. The 
improved method could be achieved by using moveable facsimiles on a two 
dimensional plane (see succeeding chapter methodology). Not only would this 
approach (each subject able to choose their own origins and targets) reflect the 
salience of the figures in the mind of the subject but it would conceivably reduce 
the correlation between actual distance and distortion. 
A further intriguing possibility would be to present photographs and ask the first 
subject to recreate the scene, again with facsimiles of the figures, before taking 
that recreation and presenting it to the next subject as the stimulus. This Bartlettian 
progression of serial schematic bias would be reflected in the correlation between 
subjects distance estimation distortions and their views of the relationships within 
the photograph. One might, for example, be able to trace the subject-by-subject 
foreshortening of distance as a function of the degree of perceived affiliation within 
the photographs. 
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One way of improving the experiment might be to ask subjects themselves to rate 
the photographs for affect, both in terms of type and strength. There was indeed a 
relationship detected between distortion and affective judgment. However an 
analysis with the latter variable determined by subjects, might well provide stronger 
evidence of a causal relationship between affect and distance distortion. To avoid 
the purpose of the experiment from becoming transparent, it would be best if these 
judgments were made in advance of the spatial estimates but in proximity to the 
experiment to avoid attenuation of the perceptions experienced at the time of 
judging 
The affective quality of a relationship schema need not be determined only on the 
dimension of positive-negative, of course. One might investigate the influence of 
more subtle emotions such as envy, suspicion, admiration and so on: precisely 
those mentioned to judges in the instructions detailed above. Selection of stimuli 
would consequently require a great deal of care and rating by judges on a long list 
of possible emotional parameters would necessarily mean, from a time-limit point 
of view, that a separate judging panel rather than the subjects themselves would 
have to perform this function. 
It would not be surprising if the positive/negative dimension used above was 
revealed as a latent variable or factor for a whole range of emotions. This is in line 
with the notion, derived from evolutionary theory, that all emotions have evolved 
from a small number: "Darwinian algorithms of the mind" (quoted in Nesse and 
Williams, 1996). Discourse psychologists might demur from this view ( "[emotions 
are]. a situated contribution to a discourse.. " Harre & Gillet, 1994, p146). Even so, 
this would not preclude the possibility of producing a 'league-table' of affective 
schematic components in a stimulus such as a photograph, each component 
having a characteristic level of associated distortion. Furthermore, an affective 
schematic component may have more explanatory power than a 'mere' emotional 
tag as it takes into account situational and contextual consequences (cp. rivalry- 
between two M. P. s; rivalry- between two toddlers playing). 
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The use of the ten judges has been quite successful in this experiment but what if 
subjects were asked for their judgments on the stimulus relationships after the 
experiment had been completed? This could be accomplished immediately after 
the testing phase or at a later date, depending on subject fatigue and time 
constraints. However the delay between testing and judging would necessarily 
need to be, brief to avoid the inevitable modification and integration changes made 
to the subjects' schemata by the social situations depicted. 
Another possibility for further research in this area would be the use of three 
dimensional models in the recreation phase of the study. The two dimensional 
plane of the response sheet, indeed the stimulus, limited the richness of the 
response that could be generated. Distance within the' depth plane might` enable" 
even further distortions to be made, especially with regard to the distances 
between stimulus figures and the subject. 
A possible reconciliation of this experiment, (and indeed the other five), with a 
social representations approach might involve a cross-cultural study. Mention was 
made in Chapter One of the prevalence of socio-spatial metaphors not only in 
English but in other languages. It may be that the systematic distortion in distance 
perception could be related to culture in a manner parallel to that observed in 
studies of personal space (Aiello, 1987; Hayduk, 1983). The strong possibility 
exists that since a variety of metaphors relating to social and spatial distance exist 
in several languages, then perceived distance distortion might co-vary with culture 
and race. Indeed, there is also the intriguing possibility that social class may be a 
determinant of spatial distortion as it is, though not entirely consistently, with size 
of personal space (Aiello, 1987; Hayduk, 1978). 
Do language differences merely reflect the culture or does culture reflect the 
language? Evidence that language influences thought is shown by some support 
for the Whorfian, linguistic relativity hypothesis. "In many ways, the language 
people speak is a guide to the language in which they think. " (Hunt & Agnoli, 1991, 
p377). Conversely, Hayward & Tarr (1995) examined possible affiliations between 
visual and linguistic representations of space and found that the structure of 
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spatial relations can influence the structure of space as encoded by language. 
This apparent inconsistency in the literature should not detract from the 
supposition that language and perception are closely linked and ought to provide a 
fertile ground for future investigations. 
The six experiments have demonstrated that perception of distance is susceptible 
to bias by social information, over a variety of distance scales and between several 
kinds of social significant objects. Nevertheless, the results raise meaningful 
questions and objections and these will be discussed below. 
The possible objection that distance (or size) measurement in the absence of a 
stimulus is a phenomenon of memory, not of perception, is important. The 
objection could validly be made against several of the experimental studies herein 
when, for example, subjects were asked to estimate the distance to a stimulus not 
within visual range, but which had been viewed seconds earlier. In such an 
instance, it could be argued that a memory based rather than perceptually based 
bias was responsible for the observed distortion. Of course, memorial distortions 
as a function of social knowledge are interesting in their own right and do not 
negate the influence of social schemata. Nevertheless, conceptual imprecision 
when discussing e. g. perceptual bias in distance distortion should be avoided in 
constructing a coherent theory. 
This particular admonition has been made of the "New Look" psychology data: "An 
experience without a stimulus-object is not a perception. " (Allport, 1955, p330). 
However the argument seems to rest on a Gibsonian, "ecological" definition of 
perception current around that era. According to this "bottom-up" definition, data 
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from the visual sense are passively selected by the mind to be assembled as if 
pieces of a jigsaw. The pattern of light entering the optic nerve, the "optic array", 
contains all relevant, invariant and unambiguous information about the positioning 
of the stimulus in space, most notably the "affordances" of the object (meanings or 
potential uses). The mind has little to do except pick-up features of the "ambient 
array of light" reaching it with little or no need of any form of active information 
processing (Gibson, 1950,1966,1979). 
A surprising fact is that Allport recognised so early on that perceptions may not be 
in accordance with the prevalent theories of perception: "Are perceptual 
dimensions, as Pratt says, really stimulus bound? Are there exceptions? " (1955, 
p330). Such suspicions now seem remarkably prescient. 
Other theorists propose a more active, constructive, "top-down" process (Bruner, 
1957; Gregory, 1970,1980; Rock, 1973,1984). This may be characterized as a 
procedure in which the end product is brought about by an interactive process of 
interpreting internal hypotheses, expectation and knowledge: percepts are used to 
make inferences about the object and thus errors are not only possible but likely. 
Neuropsychological data from Zeki (1977,1980) suggest a proactive role for the 
brain in constructing perception of colour according to the "Land" theory of colour 
vision, with its emphasis on the importance of relative luminance of surrounding 
surfaces. The reader will be familiar with such information-processing descriptions 
from the previous definition of a schema! 
Criticisms can be made of both approaches (Eysenck & Keane, 1990). For 
example, in the Gibsonian, 'direct' view, no relevant social information from 
memory being brought to bear on a stimulus (only 'affordances' or potential uses 
of an object being directly perceived) is highly unlikely. If the interactive, 
constructive view of perception holds true and we make errors quite often about 
what we see, then why is our perception typically so accurate? A compromise 
position is proposed by Neisser (1976). 
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Methodological differences between the two approaches point to the relative 
importance of the direct and the 
=inferential 
in perception. Gibson tended to 
experiment with stimuli under ideal visual conditions and those favouring the 
inferential top-down approach tended to favour short exposure times, unclear 
conditions etc. Perhaps bottom-up processes come into play when viewing 
conditions are ideal and top-down when stimuli are unclear or briefly glimpsed; a 
combination of both seem probable in most situations (Eysenck & Keane, 1990)? 
Neisser's attempt to reconcile the two positions is termed the perceptual cycle 
(1976). 
In what is essentially a behaviour 'plan', a complex interaction of top-down and 
bottom-up processing of sensory data takes place. Schemata directs the individual 
to explore appropriate stimuli in the environment. This perceptual exploration then 
leads the individual to move within the environment and sample some of the 
available sensory data. If such data fails to match with data already incorporated in 
the schema, then the schema is modified in such a way as to integrate the new 
information effectively. So top-down theory is represented by the fact that the 
schema mediates some information processing and bottom-up theory by the 
sampling of sensory data which may then go on to modify the schema. 
As has been described earlier, one function of schemata is to make sense of a 
world 'overstuffed' with information. In a given situation, stimulus conditions may 
indeed be ideal, but the context may not be. For example a photograph in a 
newspaper, like many of the stimuli used in the last three experiments, may 
contain clear, visually 'unambiguous' images but will be surrounded with headlines, 
text, yet more photographs, illustrations, adverts etc. etc. The information 
processing load under these conditions is heavy. Schematic processing is not only 
unsurprising in this context, - but may even have become for many of us, a typical 
(learned? ) response, at least to a photographic stimulus. 
As regards other visual print, Stapel & Koomen (1997), as described in Chapter 
One, point to the susceptibility of the Ebbinghaus illusion to distortion by social 
knowledge in their two experiments. In their two experiments, stimuli were still 
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present during the actual testing phase so equivocation about memorial versus 
perceptual effects is obviated perhaps: theorists would surely agree that what they 
observed were biasing effects on the perceptions of their subjects. 
Taking a different tack, one could argue that all perception experiments are 
memory experiments to some degree. As soon as the subject removes his/her 
visual attention from a standard say, then what is studied subsequently is the 
subjects memory for that standard. A classic example is the Müller-Lyer illusion. 
Once the subject's gaze leaves the comparison line and falls on either of the two 
stimulus test lines, the necessary interruption in attention and accompanying 
saccadic motion creates, by definition, a reliance on memory no matter how short 
the time interval concerned. The classic experiments on perceptual constancy 
provide similar examples. What is perceived is elicited by asking the subject to 
reproduce it by adjusting a variable display or to select one that most closely 
resembles it from a number of alternatives. 
j 
It could be argued that social representation theory (and its first cousin, discourse 
analysis) forms the major 'opposition' to social cognitivism within social psychology 
at the present time. The scope and influence of this theory has grown in recent 
years, largely due to the efforts of Serge Moscovici and colleagues (Moscovici, 
1981; 1982; 1984). Moscovici proposes that far too much social psychology 
research, and especially social cognitive research, examines the effects of social 
information at the level of the individual with comparatively little attention to how 
such information functions at a societal level. Harre has observed that for too long, 
much of traditional social psychology has relied on the `artificiality" of the laboratory 
setting and with it, the implication of a mechanistic view of the individual (Harre, 
1979). Social representation, its proponents argue, is the means by which this 
imbalance can be redressed. It is sufficiently diffuse in perspective, drawing 
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equally on sociology, to make possible a truly social social psychology. It may be 
added that at least one researcher proposes that it is no more social than 
mainstream social psychology (Parker, 1987). 
Social representations are thoughts, images, and information that originate in 
society and are maintained and distributed, by it in a form of 'common 
consciousness'. They notionally bear resemblance to the concept of 'collective 
representations' (1898), which Durkheim used as the basis with which to 
differentiate between individual and collective thought. Myths and legends are 
typical examples of collective representations which develop independently of the 
individual and can only be examined effectively at a societal level. Collective 
representations form part of what Moscovici terms the 'common consciousness' in 
which thoughts, ideas and knowledge bases are consensually created and 
societally mediated through linguistic communication and especially via the mass 
media, frequently acquiring a symbolic nature in the process. 
At present it seems that the two approaches, social representations and schemata, 
are distinct, though not wholly irreconcilable (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). The 
emphasis on social context by the former and individual processing by the latter 
seems to point to the complementary deficiencies of each. No attempt will be 
made here at a critique of schemata and social representations, nor indeed a 
syncretism between the two approaches. The degree to which this -occurs is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis but Bonnes & Secchiaroli, (1995) and 
especially Augoustinos & Walker, (1995) go into some detail on the matter. The 
latter authors astutely prefigure their argument with the caveat that integration of 
concepts such as 'schema' and 'social representation' carry the risk of diluting the 
perceived efficacy of both. An attempt will be made here to counter the claim that 
schemata are individualistic and cognitivistic to the extent that they ignore, or at 
least, underplay the role of social action, specifically as demonstrated in the 
present series of experiments. 
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According to Lee (in press), when more and more people share the same schema, 
a conversion of the schema into a social representation takes place. Once 
established as normative in the group, it becomes moulded by the media and then 
acts as a stimulus itself, summoning up and integrating schemata. The process 
feeds off itself: the more that people share the same schema, the greater the 
likelihood of establishment of a social representation, the more schemata are 
created in the minds of others; this helps to bolster the existing representation and 
so on. Thus the role of the purely social is not only accentuated in this process but 
is inextricable. 
This is the limit placed on the role of a social representation by Lee. The two 
concepts seem to impinge on each others 'territory' but to have theoretical 
legitimacy, they should be distinctive. So can the results of the experiments herein 
be better and more precisely described in terms of representations rather than 
schemata? 
It would be difficult to describe, for example, the phenomenon of distance 
foreshortening in social representation- terms. Researchers of that persuasion 
might well argue that the individualistic nature of the experimental method itself 
would hinder such an explanation, assuming that observations of perceived 
distance distortion were not artifactual in the first place! Nevertheless, the question 
"does the phenomenon exist? " seems amenable to investigation only by 
experimental method. One would need to ask people what the supposed 
representation is, so the point of approaching the phenomenon from the social 
representation angle seems somewhat lost. The methodology employed by social 
representationalists may exhibit great ecological and descriptive fitness but the 
reverse side of the coin is that it may also fail to identify a quantifiable, systematic 
variation in the behaviour of people. 
The experiments in this thesis have, in any case, attempted to maximize the fidelity 
of the social content in at least four ways: 
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1. by using 'ecologically sound' stimuli, (e. g. items of photojournalism) not 
artificially created 
2. by getting subjects to provide their own stimuli (e. g. ".... people you know") 
3. by getting subjects to provide indications of their own ratings of stimuli where 
possible (e. g. how well do you like these people?..... which town would you 
prefer to live in? ) 
4. by being accomplished in the subjects own 'space' in the first three 
experiments, away from the laboratory 
Harre has attacked Zajonc's "mere exposure hypothesis" for isolating 'frequency of 
contact' from all other aspects of the social conditions of liking ("social milieu") and 
treating it as an independent variable. In so doing, he argues, frequency loses its 
social nature and hence its value as a factor worthy of investigation "The 
extraction of an element from the structure... would... change the nature of the 
element. It would be no longer what it was in the natural condition. " (Harre, 1979, 
p103). 
Moscovici and colleagues would doubtless agree but the argument wholly depends 
on Harre's definition of the "internally related structure" (e. g. in this case, social 
liking) and the organization in which the element (e. g. frequency) exists. Zajonc 
might counter that detaching frequency of contact from the social milieu in which it 
exists, as Harre suggests, does not necessarily compromise its integrity as the 
effect has been robustly observed in other, non-laboratory, non-experimental 
settings. Harre's theoretical objection is a strong one nevertheless, but in the 
current series of experiments, where the effects of affective valence have been 
strongly observed across a range of scales, stimuli and subject type, its potency 
must surely be weakened. 
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A recurrent theme of the thesis is that all stimuli are basically either positive or 
negative in valence. Nevertheless anecdotal data exists which suggests that 
maybe "subordinate' affective qualities conflate with the positivity/negativity of the 
schema. Such an approach would recognize the Wundtian contribution of the idea 
of complex feeling states to the study of emotion, i. e. tension vs. relaxation and 
excitation vs. depression in addition to positivity vs. negativity. Recall that the 
captions used in Chapter Eleven may have been manipulating more than affiliation 
alone. 
Many people report the experience of seeing an object for the first time and being 
astonished at its size. Those who lust after sports cars and Concorde fanatics are 
continually surprised to find the object of their desires to be much smaller than 
their imagination primed them to expect. In this instance, bigger equals closer as 
before but the objects are bigger in their imaginations because their positive 
valence brings them closer and so, according to the rules of perspective, inflates 
their size. 
Conversely, school children everywhere are familiar with the experience of 
discovering, when they line up to get their "shots" from the nurse, that the syringe 
and needle look a lot bigger and nastier that they had imagined them to be. In this 
case, smaller in their imaginations equates with farther away according to the rules 
of perspective. 
Things may not be that simple however. To return to the Cuba example mentioned 
earlier (14.2.2), it seems plausible that an aggressive and threatening 
neighbouring country may seem bigger (as threat increases so does size, 
therefore it is perceived closer? ). More likely than not then, its towns and cities 
would seem farther away than they are in reality. If the proposal is valid, then a 
'simple' explanation in terms of valence seems insufficient without some reference 
to other complex feeling states. The present thesis sought to establish the 
isomorphism of space and social relationships using examples of fundamental 
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schema action via the positive or negative valence of social stimuli. The 
isomorphism does not preclude involving the potential for complexity in feeling 
evoked by social stimuli. An investigation of such complexity was beyond the 
scope of the present thesis but is surely worth investigating. 
APPENDICES 
Throughout the appendices, every effort has been made to reproduce photographs 
and response scales at the same size as the original materials. However, due to 
the printing requirements of the thesis, some are only approximately to scale. If 
required, the reader should refer to the text for information on their exact sizes. 
Appendix A: Instructions for both testing phases In the experiment " Urban Memory": Chapter 8 
Please Read Carefully 
This first part couldn't be more straightforward and consists of 
Section A only. Please write down the initials and addresses of 
eight people you know in St. Andrews - try to provide the full eight. 
It doesn't matter how well you know them, so long as you know the 
exact address ( eg. 2 Seaview Place ) of each one. Also, please 
include some who are fairly near and some further away so that most 
of the eight are not from the same avenue etc. but are spread out 
throughout the town. 
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I would then ask you to give estimates of the distance between your 
home and each of theirs. All you have to do is to put a cross on the 
line below each address to represent the distance from your home: if 
you are not sure, guess as well as you can. There are three crucial 
things to remember though 
1. It is important that you use direct distances. 
Sie. " as the crow flies" 
2. Do not consult maps of any description. 
(address books can be used if necessary) 
3. Do not give written answers (eq. 111 miles) but place a cross 
where you think appropriate on the line below each address. 
In all parts of the questionnaire, you may erase and rewrite if you 
wish. Note also that there is no time limit for the completion of 
this questionnaire; take as long as you want. 
Please Remember: Do NOT Consult Any Maps! 
Use " As The Crow Flies " Distances 
DISTANCE ESTIMATION i YOUR HOME TO EACH OF THEIRS 
Person's Name Address 
(or initials) 
1. 
n---------------------------------------------------- L 
03 miles 
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2. 
L--------------------------------------------------- L 
03 miles 
3. 
1--------------------------------------------------- N. 
03 miles 
4. 
1--------------------------------------------------- N. 
03 miles 
5. 
n---------------------------------------------------- L 
03 miles 
6. 
L--------------------------------------------------- L 
03 miles 
7. 
L --------------------------------- 
0 
8. 
L--------------------------------------------------- IL 
0 
3 miles 
3 miles 
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Questionnaire for the second testing phase, Part B 
Please Read Carefully 
Welcome to Part B of the survey. This questionnaire consists of two 
sections, B and C. You'll also find supplied a list containing the 
addresses of the people you nominated in Part One (Section A). This 
is to help your recall and enable the questionnaire to be completed 
more easily. 
The questionnaire has been designed to limit the amount of 
disclosure needed about yourself and others. Consequently I don't 
need to know your own identity and you should not write your name 
on any part of this questionnaire. Where information on other people 
is required, you should give initials (or your own code if you like) 
rather than names. I need only be able to distinguish between (and 
not identify) the people that you have listed. 
Section B contains some general questions (1 to 4) regarding you eg. 
how long you have been in St. Andrews, your age and so on. Please 
answer them in the spaces provided. 
Section C features questions on how well you know the people in your 
list (enclosed). You can answer these by simply marking each 
response on the appropriate line (Questions 5 to 7) 
In all parts of the questionnaire, you may erase and rewrite if you 
wish. Note also that there is no time limit for the completion of 
this questionnaire; take as long as you want. 
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Questions 
Please answer the following questions : 1. to 7. 
1. Your name or initials 
Your address 
Your Department 
Age Sex (M/F) 
Faculty 
2. How long have you lived in St. Andrews? years. 
3. What are your usual methods of travel throughout the town in a 
typical week? 
For the given modes of transport below, please indicate the 
frequency of use in an average week. All you have to do is to 
write in the appropriate box : "3" for used everyday; "2" for 
used several times per week; "1" for used around once per 
week and "0" for not used at all. 
Bicycling [I Motor-Biking 
Driving (oneself) [] Being driven by others (] 
Public Transport [j Walking 
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4. Please write here the activities or interests you share in common 
with the people mentioned (and in the same order) as in your 
distance estimation list. 
Name 
1. 
2 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Activities or Interests shared 
8. 
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By marking a cross and labelling, 
John Smith 
eg. d------------------------------- x----------------- 
please use the following diagrams (in questions 5 to 7) to mark 
the position of each of the people as mentioned and numbered in 
Question 4. above.... 
5..... with respect to the closeness of relationship you share. 
Casual 
acquaintance 
very close 
friend 
1. ---------------------------------------------------- 
1 
2. L--------------------------------------------------- L 
3. L--------------------------------------------------- L 
4. a--------------------------------------------------- 
5. --------------------------------------------------- 
U. 
6. L--------------------------------------------------- L 
7. L--------------------------------------------------- 
8. d---------------------------------------------------- L 
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6..... indicating how often you see each one 
see 
often 
1. L------------------------------------------------ L 
2. L------------------------------------------------ L 
3. I------------------------------------------------ L 
4. L------------------------------------------------ L 
5. I------------------------------------------------ L 
6. =------------------------------------------------ L 
7. d------------------------------------------------ L 
8. L------------------------------------------------ I 
see 
seldom 
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7..... showing how you view the regularity of such encounters 
would not would like 
try to see to try to 
more often see more 
often 
1. L----------------------------------------------- I 
2. U. ------------------------------------------------ L 
3. L------------------------------------------------L 
4. n------------------------------------------------ L 
5. a------------------------------------------------- L 
6. L------------------------------------------------ L 
7. d------------------------------------------------ L 
8. L------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 8: Typical questionnaire from the experiment entitled "Inter- Urban Distance Estimation": 
Chpt. 9 
Please remember: Complete each page in turn and do NOT turn back 
to revise previous pages 
Thank you for helping in this study. 
1. 
The first part of this questionnaire requires straight-forward distance estimates to be 
made. Please give estimates of the distance between BELFAST and each of the 18 
towns mentioned. All you have to do is to put a cross on the line beside each town to 
represent the distance from Belfast: if you are not sure, guess as well as you can. 
There are three important things to remember though: 
a. It is important that you use direct (ie. " as the crow flies") distances. 
b. Do not consult maps of any description. 
c. Use the scaled example to give you a reference to work from. 
To help you with some idea of scale, the distance to the Giants Causeway is marked 
on the same-length line and is shown on each page. 
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The direct distance to The Giant's Causeway from Belfast is: 
a----------------------------------%------------------- L 
From Belfast to Strabane 
n------------------------------------------------------L 
From Belfast to Tandragee 
1------------------------------------------------------ L 
From Belfast to Dungannon 
------------------------------------------------------L 
From Belfast to Downpatrick 
1------------------------------------------------------ L 
From Belfast to Portaferry 
L----------------------------------------------------- L 
From Belfast to Portadown 
d----------------------------- 
From Belfast to Ballymena 
L------------------------ 
From Belfast to Larne 
L------------------------- 
------------------ L 
---------------------- 
----------------- U. 
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From Belfast to Enniskillen 
d------------------------------------------------------ d 
From Belfast to Craigavon 
------------------------------------------------------ L 
The direct distance to The Giant's Causeway from Belfast is: 
---------------------------------- ------------------- L 
From Belfast to Coleraine 
------------------------------------------------------ U. 
From Belfast to Omagh 
n------------------------------------------------------- 
From Belfast to Cookstown 
------------------------------------------------------ d 
From Belfast to Ballymoney 
------------------------------------------------------ IL 
From Belfast to L'Derry 
n--------------------- -------------------- 
From Belfast to Lurgan 
d------------------------------------------------------ IL 
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From Belfast to Newry 
------------------------------------------------------ L 
From Belfast to Limavady 
1------------------------------------------------------ L 
2. 
Have you ever travelled to any of the 18 towns? 
Please write down the towns and estimate how often you travel to them by simply 
writing a number for each according to the scale below. 
Please also give all reasons for these visits eg. type of business, shopping, recreation, 
visiting family etc. etc. Those towns that are not mentioned here are assumed to have 
never been visited. 
SCALE 
How Often: Use one of the code numbers below for each town. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Daily More than Once per More than Once per More than Once 
once per week once per month once per per 
week month year year 
or less 
TOWNS HOW OFTEN REASON(S)? 
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3. 
Let us assume for a moment that you wished to live in one of the eighteen towns. Let us also 
assume that you could find a good job, a good house etc. in any of the towns. In an ideal 
situation then, which would be your most favoured town? 
You will see in front of you some cards with the name of a town and a code-number printed 
on each one. Using the cards given, sort the towns into an order of preference from most 
favoured to least favoured town. Give your most immediate, un-sophisticated judgements. 
Only when you are finished and satisfied, write down the code-number for each town 
according to your order. Put the most favoured on the first line, the second most favoured on 
the next line etc. etc. etc.......: 
(If your parental home is one of the towns, please indicate this by circling its number on the 
list) 
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03 cont. 
Having arranged the towns in order of preference, I'd like you now 
to show how important the following four factors were when you 
decided the relative position of each town . 
The importance of each factor can be given by writing in a number 
from 1 to 7 in the box given. Simply use a1 for totally unimportant 
up to a7 for very important- as shown below. Please rate each of 
the towns in turn, working across the page rather than going down 
the list of towns for each factor: 
unimportant (in between) very important 
1234567 
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Closeness to Geographical Religion Facilities 
Family/Friends Position of its (shopping, 
(region) People leisure, etc) 
Larne (j[][] 
Portaferry[ J[j 
Strabane [)(j(j 
Enniskillen[ ] 
Omagh (] 
Craigavon (] 
Lurgan (] 
Portadown [ 
Dungannon [ 
Downpatrick[ ] 
L'Derry [] 
Newry [] 
Tandragee [j 
Limavady [ 
Cookstown [] 
Ballymena (] 
Coleraine [] 
C] 
[l 
[] 
[l 
[] 
[] 
[l 
[] 
[] 
[] 
Il 
[l 
[l 
II 
c] 
(1 
I) 
II 
(I 
cI 
II 
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Ballymoney( J(j(j(I 
4. 
Many of the towns on the list below can be characterised as having 
predominantly Catholic / Protestant inhabitants. 
Please indicate what the predominant religion of each town by 
writing in the space provided.... 
for predominantly Catholic 
P for predominantly Protestant 
N for equal proportions of each religion 
U for unsure/don't know 
In addition, ONLY IF you have answered C or P for a town, please 
indicate the degree of predominance of that religion from very-high 
to very-low by circling a number from 1 to 7 according to the scale 
below: 
i 
Very 
Low % 
TOWNS 
Limavady 
Tandragee 
234567 
Very 
High % 
INANT DEGREE OF 
RELIGION ? PREDOMINANCE 
(C, P, N or U) (if applicable) 
----- 1234567 
----- 1234567 
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Strabane ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dungannon ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Larne ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
L'Derry ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Downpatrick ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lurgan ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ballymena ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Craigavon ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ballymoney ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Portaferry ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cookstown ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Enniskillen ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Omagh ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Portadown ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Newry ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Coleraine ----- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Your Age Sex (M/F) 
How long have you lived in N. Ireland? years (and/or months if 
appropriate) 
How long have you lived in Belfast? years (and/or months 
if appropriate) 
What is your parental-home town? 
What religion do you subscribe to? 
( Circle one letter only) 
Catholic C 
Hindu H 
Muslim M 
Protestant P 
Other 0 
None N 
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Appendix C: Instructions for judges'rating of photographs and captions and subjects' instructions 
for the experiment in Chpt. 11 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Each of the following are actual newspaper and magazine photos showing 
people in various social or group settings. 
Please evaluate the overall tone of the relationships depicted within each 
photo as being mutual liking, mutual disliking or neutral: 
Printed for you are 34 scales on which to make your responses. Make a 
cross at any point on a scale-according to your immediate and spontaneous 
impression of the relationship shown in that photo. 
eg. if you thought photo 1 depicts a scene between people who didn't trust 
or perhaps disliked each other then make a response as follows: 
No. 1 
+2 +1 0 -1 -2 
I------------------ I ----------------- I ------------------- I ----------------- 
Mutual Neutral Mutual 
liking disliking 
The photos you will see have been randomly selected from a pool of many 
different photos and it is important to note that there will not be equal 
numbers of different relationships. 
Appendices 413 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Each of the following are actual newspaper and magazine captions relating to photographs of 
people in social or group settings and describe the relationship(s) in the depicted scene. 
Please evaluate the overall tone of the relationships depicted by each caption as being 
positive or negative: 
Write the caption number in the space provided beside each blank scale. Then draw a circle on 
one of the five bars on the scale-according to your immediate and unsophisticated impression 
of the relationship in that caption- 
eg. if you thought the 8th caption would accompany a photo depicting a scene between people 
who didn't trust or perhaps disliked each other then make a response such as : 
No. +2 +1 0 -1 -2 
I------------------ I ----------------- I ------------------- I ----------------- 
Strongly Neutral Strongly 
Positive Negative 
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The following is an example of an experimental group's booklet design. For brevity, 
the caption response/distance estimation scales are reproduced only for the 
examples page. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please complete the following details. 
AGE: 
Please tick one: 
10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 
J[l[][l[ 
GENDER: (M or F) 
OCCUPATION / STUDY COURSE etc.: 
60-69 
You are about to see a slide show with a difference. The images you will see are examples of 
photos which are being used in a study of the use of illustrations in facilitating learning. The 
images will be presented with their original captions taken from a whole variety of sources 
including tourist brochures, magazines, supplements and newspapers. Colour has been added 
to improve the clarity of some photos. 
ILLUSTRATIONS AND LEARNING 
To the side of the screen you will see a distance scale clearly marked. You will be required to 
make straight-line distance judgements in this study and this scale will make the task more 
easy for you by acting as a reference. 
1. You are going to observe a series of 34 photo-slides and the 34 captions that 
accompany them. Since each caption/photo pair will be viewed for only a few seconds, you 
will need to study each one carefully. 
2. In each of the 34 pairs, the caption for the photo will be presented clearly on screen 
immediately preceding projection of that photo. You should read each caption as it appears. 
3. After both the caption and photo have been viewed there will be a pause for you make 
your responses (a blank field will be shown on screen): 
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4. Using this booklet please write, in the numbered space provided, the actual caption 
just seen. Try to be as accurate as possible but do not take too long. Absolute accuracy (every 
"the", "and" etc. ) is not essential. 
5. Next on the booklet you will see printed a brief description of one of the figures seen 
in the photo. This will be located at one end of a replica of the distance scale (ie. the one 
visible to the side of the screen). Your task will be to estimate the straight-line distance 
between the centre of the head of this figure and the centre of the head of the target person 
which I will then call out. The distance is assumed to be in the horizontal plane only (as if you 
were drawing a straight-line between the heads of the people). 
Make a mark on the distance bar which corresponds to the straight-line distance between the 
two people. 
Eg. 
I ----------------- I --------------- I -------------x--- I ---------------- I man with hat 
woman smoking (target) 
Do not think too long before responding. All I want is your immediate impression of the 
distance involved and not 100% accuracy. Please do not look ahead in the booklet to see the 
next target figure. 
6. The time required to perform each task is limited so work quickly. This is not a 
'reaction-time' experiment but time limits are needed to ensure completion within a reasonable 
period. Please remember to give your own best estimates and not to look to your 
neighbour for help. 
On the first page you will have some examples to try: 
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EXAMPLES: 
A CAPTION: 
the man seated I ----------- 
B 
CAPTION: 
416 
I ----------------- I ---------------- I ------------------ I ----------------- I the woman 
C CAPTION: 
I 
-----------------I ---------------- 
I 
------------------I -----------------I the girl 
reading 
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A selection of ten captions, both positive and negative, used in the experiment. 
The slides were made up from the print size and style shown here: 
(14) A recent immigrant, 
Lee-Sang (pictured on 
arrival at the Batley 
household) confessed to 
feeling a little awkward 
(26) Soviet 
liberation of-the 
Armenians in 
Azerbajan 
(22) The young 
Mr. Jackson was 
always in conflict 
with his producer 
(21) A lengthy doctor's 
queue brings patients 
of all kinds together 
in mutual support 
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(3) Aban's two young 
sons love to help 
their dad run 
the business 
ý, 
(16) The three brothers, 
pictured waiting for 
their limo, work 
together in the same 
'Yakuza' gang in Kyoto. 
(33) Uniquely perhaps, 
members' children are 
encouraged to attend 
and participate in 
the meetings 
(28) With the scholarship 
to be decided soon, 
the rivalry it generated 
Appendices 
in the class caused 
some tension 
(5) Black workers and 
their white boss in 
Birmingham, Alabama: 
scene of some of the 
worst racial confrontations 
of the era 
(32) Members of the 
AWB are ultra loyal to 
their party; it cannot 
be easily assessed 
by outsiders and 
especially journalists 
419 
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Appendix D: Instructions for judges of the photographs, subjects' Instructions and booklet, and 
experimental questions in Chapter 12 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Thank you for agreeing to be a judge for this experiment! You have 
been given a random selection of newspaper and magazine photographs of 
people in social or group settings. As with most examples of photo- 
journalism, there are within these photographs a variety of relationships. 
You may perceive one, or more than one, conspicuous social relationships 
(each involving two or more people) within each photo. 
For example in the first example overleaf, you will perceive two discernible 
groups of people in a toy shop: (1) customers (father and son) looking at a 
particular toy and (2) members of staff wearing red shirts. Thus there are 
three relationships on view: two separate relationships describing the 
disposition within each group and a third describing the attitudes and 
feelings between each group. 
Your simple task is to evaluate the overall tone of these relationships as 
being "positive", "negative" or "neutral". To do this, please draw a circle on 
one of the seven bars on each scale provided, -according to your immediate 
and spontaneous impression of the relationships (remember: in the 
experimental phase, subjects will only see the photos for 4-12 seconds 
each! ): 
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If you think the photos show relationships of, for example, hostility, 
dislike, suspicion, mistrust, disgust, repulsion, wariness, rivalry, 
enmity or coolness, (etc. ), then such relationships should be generally 
rated as "negative". 
If you believe the relationships to be of, for example, mutual respect, 
admiration, .. 
friendship, attraction, affinity, liking, love, 
closeness, warmth, cooperation, kinship or rapport (etc. ), then they 
should be generally rated as "positive". 
If you believe the relationships to be neither positive nor negative, then 
your ratings should be "neutral". 
, ý- -ý 
Please record the photo-identifying number in the space provided beside 
each scale in this booklet. Use a separate scale for each relationship that 
YOU PERCEIVE in a photo, making sure that you label the scale with the 
same photo-number each time. Please ensure when using more than one 
scale for a given photo that you identify, just above the scale, the 2 or more 
individuals being described. 
NO. between and 
3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
--------------- i-------------- i-------------- i-------------- i---------------- i------ 
Strongly Strongly 
Positive Negative 
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Instruction sheet for subjects: 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please complete the following details. 
GENDER: (M or F) 
AGE: 10-19 20-29 30-39 
, 
40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 
(tick one) /[][][][][][][] 
OCCUPATION / STUDY COURSE etc.: 
You are about to see a slide show. The images you will see in each slide are 
examples of photos which are being used in a study of the use of illustrations in 
facilitating learning. These photos originate from a variety of sources including 
tourist brochures, magazines, supplements and newspapers. Colour has been 
added to improve the clarity of some photos. 
ILLUSTRATIONS AND LEARNING 
I. There are 30 photos to be viewed'and since each will be viewed for only a 
few seconds, you will need to study each one carefully. 
2. After each photo has been viewed there will be a pause for you make your 
two responses (a blank field will be shown on screen) : 
3,1st Response: I will ask one simple question regarding the content of the 
photo just viewed. Write your answer on the separate sheet you have been 
given. 
4. In front of you is a large, square booklet. On each response page in the 
booklet you will see reproduced two of the human figures as seen in the photo - 
one will be fixed (at random), the other will be re-positionable and located in the 
top, right hand comer. 
5.2nd Response: Your second task will be to recreate the relative positions 
of these two figures, as seen in the photo, simply by placing the re-positionable 
figure wherever you think best. 
6. Ensure the paper outline is secure when you are satisfied with its final 
position. On completing a trial, please DO NOT anticipate the following one by 
looking ahead in the booklet at the next response page. 
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7. IMPORTANT! DO NOT GUESS! : If you are not sure of the 
answer to the question for a particular photo, then write "UNSURE" on the 
appropriate line on your answer sheet; if you are unable to identify one or both of 
the cut-out figures, please mark an "X" on the same line and then simply wait for 
the next trial. 
8. The time required to perform each task is limited so work quickly. This is not 
a 'reaction-time' experiment but time limits are needed to ensure completion within 
a reasonable period. Please remember to give your own best guesses and not 
to look to your neighbour for help) 
There will be a practice trial to help you become familiarized with the two 
responses required. 
Questions asked by experimenter. 
Example: question Was the girl in the towel holding a cigarette? 
31. Were there three or four men in the scene? 
19. Did the young woman have long or short hair? 
24. Did the kneeling player have a sponsored jersey? 
17. How many people were sitting on chairs? 
43. Was the young man in the turban looking to the left or to the right of the 
screen? 
01. How many men were wearing glasses? 
15. Was the prisoner wearing a shirt or a tee-shirt? 
35. Did the lead runner have a moustache? 
22. How many golf-clubs did you see? 
14. How many backpacks did you see? 
27. Were there four or five soldiers? 
11. Was Hillary Clinton holding a mug in her left or her right hand? 
02. How many people were listening to the woman? 
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41. Was the man on the right wearing spectacles? 
16. Did the man listening have a white shirt on? 
12. Had the woman standing a string of pearls around her neck? 
20. How many yellow coloured buildings did you see? 
23. Were there four or five players shown? 
18. How many boys were actually biting on something? 
28. Were either of the prisoners wearing a tie? 
10. What was written on the back of the shirt? 
36. Was the man drinking with his left or his right hand? 
30. Was the woman behind Michael Jackson wearing spectacles? 
25. Did the guard have his cap on? 
29. Was the ticket inspector making eye-contact with the angry passenger? 
33. What was the colour of the old woman's headscarf? 
32. Was the guy on the left leaning against the wall with his left or right hand? 
03. Was the man holding the telephone in his left or right hand? 
42. How many framed pictures were there on the wall? 
34. Did Tony Blair have his left or right arm raised? 
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Appendix E: Instructions for judges and subjects and the experimental questions used In the 
experiment described in Chapter 13 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Thank you for agreeing to be a judge! You have been given a random selection of 
newspaper and magazine photographs of people in social or group settings. As 
with most examples of photo journalism, there are within these photographs a 
variety of relationships. You may perceive one, or more than one, conspicuous 
social relationship (each involving two or more people) within each photo. 
For example in the first example overleaf, you will perceive two discernible groups 
of people on a football pitch (1) players in red shirts and (2) players in green shirts. 
Thus there are three relationships on view: two separate relationships describing 
feelings within each group and a third describing feelings between each group. 
Your simple task is to identify and judge as many relationships as possible 
between as many people (or groups of people) as possible. 
This is to be done for thirty photographs and there is a special separate response 
sheet provided for each photo. It is important to realize that there is no right or 
wrong judgment: I 
, 
want to understand what it is that you see. Although the 
instructions might seem complicated at first, you will find the actual task quite 
straightforward! 
1. You first need to identify the group(s) and 'single people' if any (i. e. those who 
do not belong to a group). The actual perception of groups and single people 
will be up to you but the photographs have been chosen so that you should 
perceive at least one group in each. Separate pages will be provided on which 
to write this information down. 
2. Next, you need to evaluate the overall tone of the relationships within and 
between them all as being "positive", "negative" or "neutral". To perform this part 
of the task, first write the name of the relationship you have identified in the 
space provided in the main response booklet. Then draw a circle on one of the 
seven bars on the scale below it, judging the overall tone of the relationship 
according to the following guidelines : 
If you think the photos show relationships of, for example, hostility, 
dislike, suspicion, mistrust, disgust, repulsion, wariness, rivalry, 
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enmity or coolness, (etc. ), then such relationships should be generally 
rated as "negative". 
" If you believe the relationships to be of, for example, mutual respect, 
admiration, friendship, attraction, affinity, !! KM, love, closeness, 
warmth, cooperation, kin ship or rapport (etc. ), then they should be 
generally rated as "positive". 
" Ifyou believe the relationships to be neither positive nor negative, then 
your ratings should be "neutral". 
Use one of the scales for each - of the group/people relationships you have identified, using as many scales as you need for each photo. Judge according 
to your immediate and spontaneous impression of the relationships (remember: 
in the experimental phase, subjects will only see the photos for 4-12 seconds 
each! ). 
Examples of rating scales used (only one rating scale shown): 
Photo Number: 
1. How many group(s) do you see? 
Identify. them: 
2. How many 'single' people do you see (if any)? 
Identify them: 
Now please describe the relationship within the group(s); between the 
groups (if more than one group) and between the group(s) and `single' 
people (if any): 
Between and 
+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
strongly neutral strongly 
Positive Negative 
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Questions asked by the experimenter. 
Example:. One of the boys had his hands to his face: the boy on the left, on 
the right or in the centre? 
12. Was Prince William in front or behind Prince Charles? 
5. Was the flag in the left or the right hand of the linesman? 
34. How many people did you see holding the face posters? 
27. How many policemen were in this scene? 
13. Was the batsman wearing a faceguard? 
6. What colour was Diana's jacket? 
24. How many hats or caps did you see in the scene? 
16. The protestor shouting at Prince Philip wore a black woolly cap: true or 
false? 
32. Did the man wearing the helmet have spectacles? 
21. Which hand was William Hague resting on the table, his left or his right? 
7. The woman on the left had no parting in her hair: true or false? 
29. Did either of the bodyguards have a moustache? 
3. On which arm was Diana carrying a handbag- her left or her right? 
25. The rosette on Arthur Scargil's jacket was on his left or his right? 
17. The man in the queue wore a long sleeved shirt- true or false? 
22. The miner with the very dirty face- did he have an electric light or goggles 
on his helmet? 
18. Was the man in the middle wearing glasses? 
9. The player in the red shirt was kicking the ball with his left or his right foot? 
14. Peter O'Toole was wearing a red tie- true or false 
26. Was the headscarf worn by the woman plain or patterned? 
4. The footballer on the right had a sponsor's logo on his shirt- what did it say? 
35. Did the woman protestor behind Michael Forsyth have long, shoulder-length 
hair or short hair? 
8. How many cups did you see in this scene? 
31. The girl in the middle had fair/light coloured hair: True or false? 
20. What was the colour of the dress worn by the woman second from the left? 
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15. The golfer holding the champagne bottle held its neck in his left or his right 
hand? 
10. Did the oldest member of the trio have a breast pocket on his shirt 
30. How many female persons in this photo? 
19. Was Tony Blair looking at Gordon Brown or Peter Mandelson? 
33. What is the colour of the handbag? 
429 
Examples of photographs used in the experiment described in Chapter 11. 
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